KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge

OPINION & ORDER

Lloyd R. Ambinder, Esq.
Leonor H. Coyle, Esq.
Virginia & Ambinder LLP
New York, NY
Counsel for Plaintiff Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
Leeds Brown Law P.C.
Carle Place, NY
Counsel for Plaintiff Michael A. Jakowsky, Esq.
Jackson Lewis LLP
White Plains, NY
Counsel for Defendants KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

On April 15, 2015, Plaintiff Robert Boyle ("Plaintiff") brought a putative collective action against Robert M. Spano Plumbing & Heating, Inc., along with Robert M. Spano individually and any other entities affiliated with or controlled by Robert M. Spano Plumbing & Heating, Inc., pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., New York Labor Law Article 19 § 663, the provisions of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, part 142, and New York Labor Law Article 6 § 190, et seq. (See Compl. ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 1).) The Parties jointly moved for approval of their proposed settlement. For the reasons that follow, their Motion is granted.

I. Background

According to Plaintiff, Defendants, who employed Plaintiff as an apprentice junior plumber from approximately October 2012 through January 2015, regularly required their employees to work more than 40 hours per week without providing legally mandated overtime and otherwise engaged in a policy and practice of underpaying their employees' wages, including by failing to pay spread-of-hours compensation. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3-5, 10, 18.)

On December 9, 2015, the Parties submitted to the Court a proposed settlement agreement, which they requested that the Court approve. (See Dkt. Nos. 23-25.) The Court denied the Parties' submission without prejudice on January 12, 2016, because the release provision was too broad, the Parties did not provide the Court sufficient information to determine Defendants' potential exposure in the matter, and the extent to which Plaintiff's counsel would be entitled to fees from the settlement agreement and Plaintiff was ambiguous. (See Dkt. No. 26.) On January 19, 2016, the Parties submitted a memorandum of law in further support of their earlier, already denied Motion, (see Dkt. No. 27), in response to which the Court advised the Parties that they were free to submit a revised settlement proposal that comports with the Court's earlier Order, (see Dkt. No. 28). On February 22, 2016, the Parties submitted a revised settlement agreement. (See Dkt. Nos. 29-30.) The Court held a conference on April 12, 2016, after which the Parties submitted a revised settlement agreement in light of a lingering error which the Court pointed out to the Parties during the conference. For the reasons to follow, the settlement agreement is approved.

II. Discussion

As noted in the Court's prior Order, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A), a plaintiff's ability to dismiss an action without a court order is made "[s]ubject to . . . any applicable federal statute." "Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The Second Circuit has recently confirmed that the FLSA is an "applicable federal statute," such that "Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims with prejudice require the approval of the district court or the [Department of Labor] to take effect." Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 824 (2016). Consequently, "the [P]arties must satisfy the Court that their agreement is 'fair and reasonable.'" Penafiel v. Rincon Ecuatoriano, Inc., No. 15-CV-112, 2015 WL 7736551, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2015); see also Velasquez v. SAFI-G, Inc., No. 15-CV-3068, 2015 WL 5915843, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2015) (same).

When assessing a proposed settlement for fairness, there is generally "a strong presumption in favor of finding a settlement fair, as the Court is generally not in as good a position as the parties to determine the reasonableness of an FLSA settlement." Lliguichuzhca v. Cinema 60, LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Matheis v. NYPS, LLC, No. 13-CV-6682, 2016 WL 519089, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016) (same); Souza v. 65 St. Marks Bistro, No. 15-CV-327, 2015 WL 7271747, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2015) (same); Martinez v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 10-CV-7688, 2013 WL 4427917, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) (same).

As a number of courts have recognized, although a court should consider the totality of the circumstances, the most significant factors include:

(1) the plaintiff's range of possible recovery; (2) the extent to which the settlement will enable the parties to avoid anticipated burdens and expenses in establishing their respective claims and defenses; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the parties; (4) whether the settlement agreement is the product of arm's-length bargaining between experienced counsel; and (5) the possibility of fraud or collusion.

(1) the presence of other employees situated similarly to the claimant; (2) a likelihood that the claimant's circumstance will recur; (3) a history of FLSA non-compliance by the same employer or others in the same industry or geographic region; and (4) the desirability of a mature record and a pointed determination of the governing factual or legal issue to further the development of the law either in general or in an industry or in a workplace.

In it is last Order, the Court concluded that the proposed settlement was unsatisfactory because (1) the Parties' proposed general release was too broad, (see Order 4-5 (Dkt. No. 26)), (2) the Court did not have enough information to determine Defendants' potential exposure to Plaintiff in the action, (see id. at 5-6), and (3) the wording of the proposed settlement apparently left open the possibility that Plaintiff could be called upon by his attorneys to pay additional legal fees, (see id. at 6-12). The Court will begin by considering whether the Parties have satisfactorily addressed each of these issues.

With respect to the first, the Parties have adequately reworked the release provision, although an apparent drafting error remains. Before addressing that error, the Court notes the manner in which the Parties have revised the release: Previously, the Parties' "General Release" was a full, separate independent exhibit to the Parties' "Negotiated Settlement Agreement" and contained exceptionally broad language. (See Dkt. No. 24.) In contrast, this time, the Parties' revised Negotiated Settlement Agreement does not have a separate "General Release" exhibit, (see Letter from Leonor Coyle, Esq., to Court (Feb. 22, 2016) Attach. 1 ("Revised Settlement Proposal") (Dkt. No. 30)), but, rather, contains language in ¶ 1(d) of the revised Negotiated Settlement Agreement, a portion of which reads:

Plaintiff hereby completely releases all statutory, contract, tort and all other claims against Releasees and releases and forever discharges Releasees to the fullest extent permitted by law from all actions, causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants, contracts, bonuses, controversies, agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages, judgments, extents, executions, obligations, grievances, claims, charges, complaints, claims for attorneys' fees and/or costs, and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, known or unknown, which Plaintiff, Plaintiff's heirs, executors, administrators, successors and/or assigns may now have or hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever against Releases [sic] based upon any conduct occurring from the beginning of the world up to and including the day of the date of this Agreement for conduct set forth in the Lawsuit including, claims arising under or pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and New York Labor Law, and its governing regulations.

However, the Court also feels obligated to note that, while the Parties removed references to the General Release in what now is ¶ 1(c) of the revised settlement proposal (¶ 1(d) in its predecessor), the wording still prohibits Plaintiff from initiating any legal proceeding against Defendants without limiting the provision's reach to such claims as may be released. (Compare Revised Settlement Proposal, at unnumbered 3-4 with Aff'n in Supp. Attach. 2, at unnumbered 3-4 (Dkt. No. 24).) In light of the change made in the current ¶ 1(d), the Court doubted that the Parties intended ¶ 1(c) to remain so broad, as a narrower release would do Plaintiff little good if he could not file any legal action whatsoever against Defendants. When asked about the issue at the status conference held on April 12, 2016, the Parties confirmed that ¶ 1(c) was, in fact, intended to be limited by the change made to ¶ 1(d).

With that said, the Court is now convinced that the settlement is fair in light of Defendants' potential exposure in this case. At the time of its last Order, the Court remained unsatisfied because the Parties did not explain the basis for their apparent conclusion that Defendants' maximum exposure at trial fell somewhere in the neighborhood of $29,000, noting that, to the extent such assertion was explained by the damages spreadsheet contained in Plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 disclosure, that analysis did not contemplate attorneys' fees in any way, despite the Parties' representation that "Plaintiff sought to recover approximately $29,000.00 inclusive of . . . attorneys' fees." (See Order 5-6 & n.3; see also Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Mot. for Approval of FLSA Settlement and Att'ys' Fees and Costs ("Suppl. Mem.") 2 (Dkt. No. 27).)

The Parties subsequently confirmed that Plaintiff's spreadsheet was, in fact, the basis for this assertion. After reviewing that spreadsheet, the Court agrees that, if Plaintiff's claim is limited to the pursuit of wrongfully withheld overtime, a figure of approximately $29,000—comprising the wrongfully withheld overtime payments and liquidated damages in the same amount—would mark the upper limit of his possible recovery. Likewise, Plaintiff's potential recovery through settlement of $16,500—that is, $22,500, less attorneys' fees of $6,000—is comfortably north of half of the amount that Plaintiff by his own estimate could have recovered at trial. (See Suppl. Mem. 2 ("Plaintiff sought to recover approximately $29,000.00 inclusive of liquidated damages and attorneys' fees.").) Such a robust recovery—particularly when augmented by settlement's inherent time, cost, and risk savings—is "fair and reasonable," Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335, and courts have approved more modest FLSA settlements, see, e.g., Villalva-Estrada, 2016 WL 1275663, at *3 ("[T]he proposed settlement would allow [the plaintiff] to receive 47% of his maximum possible recovery, i.e., 100% of his unpaid wages and 22% of the possible statutory and liquidated damages. In light of the previously discussed litigation risks, this rate of recovery is reasonable under the circumstances."); Beckert v. Ronirubinov, No. 15-CV-1951, 2015 WL 8773460, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2015) (approving FLSA settlement of $29,557.97 out of a maximum possible recovery of $114,700).

Finally, the Parties have satisfactorily addressed the Court's concerns about the amount of attorneys' fees for which Plaintiff will be responsible. As noted in the last Order, the Court was concerned that ¶ 5 of the Negotiated Settlement Agreement—which, then as now, read, "The Parties shall bear their own attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements and there shall be no application to any Court by any Court [sic] by any Party or by any attorney representing any Party for attorneys' fees, costs and/or disbursements, except as provided herein"—opened the door to Plaintiff being made to "bear [his] own attorneys' fees" to the extent not provided for by the settlement agreement. (See Order 8-9.) This wording still strikes the Court as odd; however, the Parties have unambiguously represented that the settlement "contemplates the total payment to Plaintiff's Counsel in the amount of $6,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs," and that "[n]o further payments shall be sought from Plaintiff." (Suppl. Mem. 5.) With such assurances from the Parties, the Court concludes that the attorneys' fees provision is acceptable.

With these prior concerns out of the way, the Court sees no other reason why the settlement should not be approved. The Wolinsky factors collectively weigh in favor of settlement, see Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335-36, and allowing the Parties to settle would afford them certainty, finality, and resolution of their dispute without the attendant risks and delay inherent in litigation generally, see, e.g., Zamora, 2016 WL 1366653, at *1 (approving FLSA settlement where it would "allow the parties to avoid the costs associated with continued litigation" and "would provide certainty whereas continued litigation would carry significant risks"). Indeed, the mitigation of litigation risks may weigh particularly heavily in this case, where the Parties have agreed that "Defendants' produced payroll documents . . . on their face support the argument that Plaintiff either worked [fewer] overtime hours than those alleged in the [C]omplaint or was compensated for all hours worked," and where "Plaintiff understands that in order to succeed at trial he must prove that he worked a greater number of hours than those reflected in Defendants' payroll records." (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Approval of FLSA Settlement and Att'ys' Fees and Costs 3-4 (Dkt. No. 25).) Therefore, the Court is satisfied that the proposed settlement represents a reasonable compromise of Plaintiff's claims, and, accordingly, it is approved.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Parties' settlement is approved. SO ORDERED. Dated: White Plains, New York

April 27, 2016

/s/_________

KENNETH M. KARAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE