Summary
concluding that, upon death of life tenant, life tenant's lessee became tenant at sufferance because his lease and right to possession terminated
Summary of this case from Rapillo v. CitiMortgage, Inc.Opinion
March 21, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff leased premises from Harold Goodman which he subsequently subleased to two subtenants. After Harold Goodman's death in 1989, the plaintiff discovered that Harold Goodman had only possessed a life estate in the premises. The defendants, as the remaindermen, served notices to quit pursuant to Real Property Law § 228 on the plaintiff and the subtenants. The subtenants, fearing eviction, began paying rent directly to the defendants.
The plaintiff then commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful eviction. The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendants' motion. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that because the defendants failed to bring a summary proceeding against him, his interest in the property was never extinguished, and he was therefore wrongfully kept out of the premises.
We find no merit to the plaintiff's contentions. Upon the death of Harold Goodman, the life tenant, the plaintiff's lease and his right to possession of the premises terminated (see, Matter of O'Donnell, 240 N.Y. 99; Williams v. Alt, 226 N.Y. 283). The plaintiff then became a tenant at sufferance, which tenancy was terminated by the notice to quit (see, Real Property Law § 228; Tunick v. Federal Food Stores, 117 Misc. 329; Haberman v. Wager, 73 Misc.2d 732; 74 N.Y. Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 819). By paying rent directly to the defendants, the subtenants attorned to the landlord, which in effect ousted the plaintiff and reinstated possession under the defendants (see, Matter of O'Donnell, supra; Ripple's of Clearview v. Le Harve Assocs., 88 A.D.2d 120). Because the plaintiff was no longer in physical possession of the property and did not have a right to possession of the property, neither a summary proceeding nor an action in ejectment was necessary (see, Katz v. Grifa, 156 Misc.2d 203; Yoon Ku Kim v. 1299 Nu-Brite Cleaners, 145 Misc.2d 586).
Moreover, we find that the defendants' supplemental record was properly filed, as it contained papers which were before the Supreme Court on the motion for summary judgment and were considered by the Supreme Court in its decision and order granting summary judgment to the defendants (see, CPLR 5526; 2001 Real Estate; Space Catalyst v. Campeau Corp., 148 A.D.2d 315).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. Sullivan, J.P., Miller, O'Brien and Krausman, JJ., concur.