Opinion
C. A. 22-3025-JD-PJG
05-30-2023
Kevin M. Bowlin, Plaintiff, v. Lieber CI, Warden; SCDC, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Kevin M. Bowlin, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 48.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Bowlin of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 50.) Bowlin filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 53.) Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken as true for purposes of resolving the defendants' motion to dismiss. Bowlin is an inmate in the Lieber Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). Bowlin filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaining that the conditions of confinement in Lieber violate his Eighth Amendment rights. Bowlin alleges the drinking water and food at Lieber is “unhealthy” and “contaminated.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5, 8, 14.) Bowlin also alleges he is exposed to “undercooked food.” (Id. at 14.) Bowlin alleges the food and water issues cause constant stomach pain and bleeding in his digestive system. (Id. at 6.) Bowlin further alleges that Lieber has no air conditioning, poor ventilation, and bugs and rats “are a problem” and have bitten him. (Id. at 5, 14.) Finally, Bowlin claims that Lieber's recreational area has razor wire that is positioned too low. Bowlin claims the razor wire cut his finger badly in May 2022 and still poses a threat to him. Bowlin seeks compensation for his injuries and to have these conditions remedied.
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
1. Claims for Damages
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim for damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The defendants argue that Bowlin's claims for damages should be dismissed because the named defendants are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. Bowlin names only SCDC itself, a state agency, and the Warden of Lieber, a state official, as defendants. However, state agencies and state officials in their official capacity cannot be sued for damages under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-68, 71 (1989) (holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983, and finding Congress did not intend to override the State's sovereign immunity by enacting the statute); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 482-83 (4th Cir. 2005). Because Bowlin has not named a defendant that is a “person” amenable to a suit for damages under § 1983, Bowlin's claims for damages must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Arguably, Bowlin named only the Lieber Correctional Institution itself. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2.) However, the prison itself is an inanimate object that is also not amenable to suit. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983 a “person” includes individuals and “bodies politic and corporate”); see, e.g., Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the Lexington County Detention Center, “as a building and not a person, is amenable to suit under § 1983”).
Also, the court does not construe any individual capacity claims against the defendants. Bowlin's Complaint expressly seeks relief against the defendants only in their official capacities and Bowlin did not sue the warden under the warden's actual name.
2. Claims for Injunctive Relief
Consequently, Bowlin's claims can only proceed against the named defendants pursuant to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), if he states a plausible claim upon which injunctive relief can be granted. “[A] federal court [is permitted] to issue prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, on the rationale that such a suit is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.” McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010). But, the defendants argue that Bowlin's allegations in the Complaint fail to plausibly show a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “[T]he Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement and ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.' ” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (internal alterations omitted). To proceed with his claim under the Eighth Amendment, Bowlin must demonstrate: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “These requirements spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be called ‘punishment,' and absent severity, such punishment cannot be called ‘cruel and unusual.' ” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991)). “What must be established with regard to each component ‘varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.' ” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)).
To show that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to an inmate's conditions of confinement, the inmate must show that he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation-a serious or significant physical or emotional injury or a substantial risk of such serious injury, and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent-that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health of safety. Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016). A sufficiently serious deprivation is one that “poses a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions, or ‘a substantial risk of serious harm resulting from exposure to the challenged conditions.” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal alterations omitted).
Here, the defendants argue that the conditions Bowlin complains about in the Complaint are not sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, they argue that Bowlin merely claims that the air conditioning is “not up to his level of enjoyment” rather than complaining that the climate is inhumane. (Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 48 at 5-6.) The defendants also argue that Bowlin does not claim he is being denied food, water, shelter, or medical care, but rather that he is merely critiquing the quality of those conditions. (Id.)
The defendants do not address the subjective prong of the Farmer test.
The court notes that while the defendants' argument on this point is conclusory-it lacks citation to supporting legal authorities and application of the law to the facts-some of Bowlin's claims are too conclusory themselves to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, Bowlin's claims about a lack of air conditioning and pest infestations, without more, fail to plausibly support a claim that those conditions violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating a pest infestation only rises to a level of constitutional concern if it is “prolonged” and “significant”); Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (providing that a mere lack of air conditioning, without a showing that the lack of air conditioning poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the inmate's health, does not state a claim for deliberate indifference); accord Blackmon v. Garza, 484 Fed.Appx. 866, 869 (5th Cir. 2012). Bowlin provides no allegations to explain how the lack of air conditioning poses a serious risk to his health and safety. Nor does Bowlin's allegation about having bug bites, without more, show that the presence of bugs or rodents at Lieber poses a serious threat to his health and safety. Therefore, Bowlin's claims based on pest infestation and lack of air conditioning fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
However, the court concludes that Bowlin's claim that contaminated and unhealthy water and food are causing him severe digestive illness raises a plausible violation of the Eighth Amendment at this stage of the proceedings. It is well settled that prisoners have a right to “nutritionally adequate food, prepared and served under conditions that do not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it.” Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). Similarly, Bowlin's claim that the recreation yard's razor wire poses a risk of severely cutting him, especially in light of Bowlin having “almost lost [a] finger” after being cut by the wire previously, plausibly alleges that the wire poses a severe risk to his health and safety. Prisoners have a right to be protected from hazardous conditions of the prison itself that expose them to a substantial risk of harm. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). Consequently, Bowlin plausibly alleges that the contaminated and unhealthy water and food and the razor wire in the recreation yard at Lieber pose a substantial risk to his health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Whether those allegations can be proven is a question for subsequent proceedings.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that Bowlin's claims for damages and claims based on inadequate air conditioning and pest control be dismissed. If this recommendation is adopted, Bowlin's remaining claims will be for injunctive relief as to the contaminated and unhealthy water and food and the razor wire in the recreation yard at Lieber.