Summary
In Durant, our Supreme Court agreed with defendants when it held that the term "necessary costs" as used in § 29 refers to those costs that were essential or indispensable to the maintenance of the mandated program.
Summary of this case from Durant v. Department of EducationOpinion
No. 95214.
February 2, 1993.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals are reversed, the claim for specific performance is reinstated, and the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens is vacated. MCR 7.302(F)(1). There was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs exercised the option to purchase the property in question. Assuming, as the Court of Appeals did, that they did so, a contract for the sale of the land was formed. The lower courts concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate on the issue whether the defendant sellers breached that contract. In those circumstances it was improper to conclude that the remedy of specific performance would be unavailable. The case is remanded to the Chippewa Circuit Court for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not retained. Reported below: 196 Mich. App. 455.