OPINION AND ORDER

BROWN, Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the following motions:

1) Plaintiff Bogart's Request for Judicial Notice and Motion for Oral Hearing (#141) pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201;

2) Plaintiff's Notice of Corrected Request to Take Judicial Notice and Request for Hearing (#142) pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201;

3) Defendant Fabrizio's Request For Judicial Notice (#129);

4) Defendant Workman's Request For Judicial Notice (#111);

5) Defendant Fabrizio's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)(#125);

6) Defendant Workman's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)(#110);

7) Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on his Sixth Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint (#94); and

8) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (#119).

For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice and Motion for Oral Hearing (#141); GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's Notice of Corrected Request to Take Judicial Notice and Request for Hearing (#142); GRANTS Defendant Fabrizio's Request for Judicial Notice (#129); GRANTS Defendant Workman's Request for Judicial Notice (#111); GRANTS Defendant Fabrizio's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (#125); GRANTS Defendant Workman's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (#110); DENIES Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on his Sixth Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint (#94); and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (#119).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action on January 21, 2000. Defendants thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 or for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 on a number of grounds, including res judicata. In the Court's Opinion and Order issued on August 4, 2000, Defendants' previous Motions generally were denied with leave to renew upon provision of a sufficient factual record. At the same time, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute True Names for Fictitiously Named Defendants in which Plaintiff added Defendants Millhouser, Kuipers, and Kaiser as parties to this action.

The California Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), and the Federal Defendants filed a Motion for Joinder in the California Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Such Motions were based on multiple grounds, including res judicata. On December 12, 2000, while those Motions were pending, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute True Names for "Doe 1" and "Doe 2" in which Plaintiff added Defendants Fabrizio and The Honorable David A. Workman as parties to this action. Defendants Fabrizio and Workman, however, did not join in the California Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. In the Court's Opinion and Order issued on March 19, 2001, the Court granted the California Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the Federal Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), 1332(a)(1), and 1346(b).

PLAINTIFF'S REVISED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

The operative pleading in this case is Plaintiff's Revised First Amended Complaint (#55) filed on October 2, 2000. Plaintiff's allegations derive from litigation that arose when the Landgate and the Ojavan real estate transactions, which involve property located in the Malibu hills of California, failed to meet Plaintiff's expectations. Plaintiff alleges Defendants improperly interfered with his rights to the real estate at issue, including his right to develop the property and to sell the property to third parties. Plaintiff contends Defendants' interference occurred in part because of the ethnicity of Plaintiff and his associates. Plaintiff also contends Defendants rejected his development plans for the Landgate property because he refused to pay the bribes demanded by Defendants. Finally, Plaintiff asserts improprieties with the administration of his bankruptcy estate.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings claims for civil rights violations, torts, constitutional violations, interference with contractual and business relationships, unlawful seizure of private land, inverse condemnation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud on the courts. Plaintiff seeks millions of dollars in damages, declaratory relief exonerating his rights, and an injunction to free the real estate at issue from any restrictions and to restrain Defendants from enforcing any prior California judgment.

MOTIONS TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

Fed.R.Evid. 201 specifies when courts may and must take judicial notice of adjudicative facts and provides in pertinent part:

(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.

(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.

A court properly may take judicial notice of orders issued in other court proceedings. See Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n. 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 964 (1995). See also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). A court also may take judicial notice of pleadings filed in other actions. See Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir.) (court took judicial notice of pleadings filed in a related state court action), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 873 (1998). The existence and content of opinions and pleadings are matters capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to official court files that cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2).

Plaintiff filed a Request for Judicial Notice of documents "relating to [the] pending status of Defendants Workman and Fabrizio." Attached to Plaintiff's Request are documents that Plaintiff describes as follows:

(1) Certified Copy of Face Page of Voluntary Petition of Bankruptcy, Case No. 36607-M;

(2) Certified copy of Chapter 7 Discharge;

(3) Motion to Reopen Adversary Proceeding to Determine Dischargeability of Claimed Debt;

(4) 11 U.S.C. § 524;

(5) 11 U.S.C. § 350;

(6) F.R.Bankr.P. 4007; and

(7) F.R.Bankr.P. 5010.

Plaintiff also filed a Notice of Corrected Request to Take Judicial Notice to which he has attached an "Appendix of Foreign Authorities" and copies of case decisions, constitutional provisions, statutes, court rules, and pleadings filed in prior litigation in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon and/or California state court. The Court grants in part Plaintiff's unopposed Request for Judicial Notice and Notice of Corrected Request to take Judicial Notice to the extent Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of the documents he has supplied with his Requests. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence and content of the documents, pleadings, constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules attached to and/or submitted with Plaintiff's Requests.

Fed.R.Evid. 201(e) provides "[a] party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed." Plaintiff is not entitled to be heard in person. See Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842, 849 (9th Cir. 1996) (opportunity to file brief satisfied requirements of Rule 201(e), overruled on other grounds, Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also American Stores Co. v. C.I.R., 170 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir.) (Rule 201(e) does not require hearing, and opportunity to file brief is sufficient), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 875 (1999); Pacific Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, (9th Cir. 2000) (procedural due process requirement of "an opportunity to be heard" is satisfied by an "opportunity to brief the issue fully" and does not mandate a hearing).

Plaintiff was "heard" on his pending Request for Judicial Notice and Notice of Corrected Request to take Judicial Notice when the Court carefully reviewed his requests and the documents attached to his Requests. The Court, therefore, denies that part of Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice and Notice of Corrected Request to take Judicial Notice which seeks oral hearings on his Requests. Defendant Fabrizio filed a Request for Judicial Notice to which he has attached the following documents:

(1) Defendant Workman's judicial Order Directing Clerk of the Superior Court to Execute Deeds Transferring Real Property as filed on June 29, 2000; and (2) a Permanent Injunction issued by the California Superior Court as filed on October 7, 1994.

Defendant Workman has also submitted a Request for Judicial Notice accompanied by the following documents (1) Permanent Injunction issued by the California Superior Court as filed on October 7, 1994; (2) pleadings concerning the California Coastal Commission's Notice of Motion and Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing the Clerk to Execute Deed Pursuant to Judgment as filed in the California Superior Court for Los Angeles County; (3) Order Directing Clerk of the Superior Court to Execute Deeds Transferring Real Property as filed on June 29, 2000; and (4) Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute True Names for "Doe 1" and for "Doe 2" filed in this Court on November 20, 2000. Plaintiff did not oppose the Requests for Judicial Notice of Defendants Fabrizio and Workman.

The Court grants the Requests for Judicial Notice filed by Defendants Fabrizio and Workman. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence and content of the documents and pleadings attached to or submitted with the Requests of Defendants Fabrizio and Workman.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS FABRIZIO AND WORKMAN

In support of their Motions to Dismiss, Defendants Fabrizio and Workman contend the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them and they were not timely served with the Summons and Complaint after this action was filed.

In response, Plaintiff argues this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Fabrizio and Workman because this action is pending between citizens of different states. Plaintiff also addresses at length the substantive merits of his claims even though Defendants Fabrizio and Workman emphasize the substantive merits of Plaintiff's causes of action are not at issue in their pending Motions.

A. Standards for Evaluating Whether the Court has Personal Jurisdiction over Defendants

Plaintiff contends this Court has jurisdiction because this action is between citizens of different states. Plaintiff, however, confuses subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, which are separate and distinct requirements to be decided under different analyses. See Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1083 n. 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. (2001) (the court distinguished between principles governing subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) authorizes a party to assert a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person by motion before filing a pleading in response to an opponent's claims for relief. It is the plaintiff's burden to establish the Court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). When an initial motion to challenge personal jurisdiction is decided on the basis of written materials submitted without an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts in order to defeat the motion. Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)).

In order to establish personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show (1) state law of the forum confers personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate federal constitutional principles of due process. Gray Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). The State of Oregon permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over any party as long as "prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." Or. R. Civ. P. 4L. Oregon's long-arm statute, therefore, confers jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by due process; thus, the jurisdictional inquiry under state law and constitutional due process can be conducted as a single analysis. Gray, 913 F.2d at 760. See also Pacific Atlantic Trading Co., Inc. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1985). Under Oregon law, either specific or general jurisdiction may be asserted over a non-resident defendant. Gray, 913 F.2d at 760.

1. Specific Jurisdiction

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test to evaluate the nature and quality of a defendant's contacts in order to determine the availability of specific jurisdiction:

(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction within the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.

(2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities.

(3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Doe , 248 F.3d at 923 (citation omitted).

In Doe, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on "purposeful availment" as follows "purposeful direction of some act having effect in the forum constitutes sufficient contact to exert jurisdiction" and "a lesser showing of contacts with the forum may be sufficient if considerations of reasonableness so require." Id. (citing Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986)).

2. General Jurisdiction

When a non-resident defendant's activities in the forum state are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic," a court may exercise general jurisdiction over the defendant even if the claim at issue is unrelated to the defendant's activities in the forum. Shedrain Corp. v. Bonvi Sales Corp., 132 F. Supp.2d 1299, 1302 (D.Or. 2001) (citing Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1477 (9th Cir. 1986)). For a defendant to be subject to general or in personam jurisdiction, he must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to assure the maintenance of the suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The Supreme Court has bifurcated this due process determination into two inquiries (1)does "the defendant have the requisite contacts with the forum state to render it subject to the forum's jurisdiction," and (2) is "the assertion of jurisdiction . . . reasonable." Doe, 248 F.3d at 925 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

B. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Fabrizio and Workman

The Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts that would justify authorizing further discovery or conducting an evidentiary hearing concerning personal jurisdiction over either Defendant Fabrizio or Defendant Workman. Furthermore, the Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts that would support denial of the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Fabrizio and Workman.

1. Jurisdictional Facts Concerning Defendant Fabrizio

Defendant Fabrizio submitted a Declaration in support of his Motion to Dismiss in which he declared he is a Court Manager in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. In his Declaration, Fabrizio attests to the following He has resided in the state of California "for the past 38 years"; he has no office, employees, agents, telephone, property, or venture capital within the state of Oregon; he is not authorized to transact business from within the state of Oregon in any business entity and "has not done so"; he has not purchased, sold, or leased property within Oregon; and he has not purchased, sold, or leased property outside of Oregon for use in Oregon.

Moreover, Fabrizio testified in his Declaration that he has not engaged in any advertising or solicitation of business within Oregon. Apart from this action, he has not used the state or federal courts in Oregon as a litigant, he has no relatives or close personal friends in Oregon, and he has not appointed a local agent for service of process within Oregon. Fabrizio also stated in his Declaration that he has never been present in the state of Oregon and has "no other contacts with the state of Oregon." Defendant Fabrizio also averred in his Declaration that he has "had no contact of any kind with plaintiff Bogart other than to sign documents as ordered by the judicial officer in the Los Angeles court case as designee of the clerk of the Court."

Plaintiff has not submitted an affidavit or any other evidence to refute the statements in Defendant Fabrizio's Declaration. The undisputed evidence in the record, as well as the judicially-noticed documents, show the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Fabrizio occurred entirely in California. Fabrizio signed "some 28 Grant Deeds" transferring interests in real property located in California pursuant to an order of the court. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Fabrizio's actions in California had the effect of "converting Oregon-held securities, valued [at] $1-2 million"; however, Plaintiff merely has established that Fabrizio acted in his capacity as a clerk of the California state court.

2. Jurisdictional Facts Concerning Defendant Workman

Defendant Workman submitted a Declaration in support of his Motion to Dismiss in which he declared he is a Judge of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. In his Declaration, Workman attests to the following He has resided in the state of California "for the past 70 years"; he has no office, employees, agents, telephone, property, or venture capital within the state of Oregon; he is not authorized to transact business from within the state of Oregon in any business entity and he has never "done so"; he has not purchased, sold, or leased property within Oregon; and he has not purchased, sold, or leased property outside of Oregon for use in Oregon.

Moreover, Workman testified in his Declaration that he has not engaged in any advertising or solicitation of business within Oregon. Apart from this action, he has not used the state or federal courts in Oregon as a litigant, he has no relatives or friends within Oregon, and he has not appointed a local agent for service of process within Oregon. Workman also stated in his Declaration that he has not been personally present in the state of Oregon since 1995 when he visited Portland, Oregon, for two days to attend the wedding of a friend's daughter. Workman also attested the only other times he was physically present in Oregon were in 1950 and again in 1951 when he drove through the state on his way to and from summer employment in Seattle, Washington. He further declared he has "no other contacts with the state of Oregon." Defendant Workman also attested in his Declaration that he has had "no contact with plaintiff Bogart other than in connection with judicial proceedings."

Plaintiff has not submitted an affidavit or any other evidence to refute the statements in Defendant Workman's Declaration. The undisputed evidence in the record, as well as the judicially-noticed documents, show the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Workman occurred entirely in California. Plaintiff complains about judicial rulings and conduct by Judge Workman in California during 1993-94 and 2000. Judge Workman handled matters and made rulings in judicial proceedings properly before him that involved Plaintiff and/or corporations in which Plaintiff held an interest. Plaintiff alleges Judge Workman's most recent, relevant rulings and conduct in California had the effect of "converting Oregon-held securities, valued [at] $1-2 million"; however, Plaintiff merely has established that Judge Workman was acting in his capacity as a judge of the California state court.

3. The Court Does Not Have Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Fabrizio and Workman

With respect to specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff has not satisfied any element of the applicable three-part analysis concerning either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman. No evidence has been submitted to establish either Defendant intentionally engaged in the purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of Oregon law. For example, there is no evidence that either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman intentionally engaged in conduct in California calculated to cause injury to Plaintiff in Oregon or that either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman intentionally directed their activities to Oregon. See Myers, 238 F.3d at 1073 (citations omitted). The requirement of purposeful availment ensures "a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party." Doe, 248 F.3d at 924 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted).

The evidence shows any effect in Oregon of conduct by either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman in California was at most fortuitous or attenuated. Moreover, the available evidence establishes that any resulting injury in Oregon occurred because of Plaintiff's unilateral decision to relocate to that state. The decision by Plaintiff to move to or reside in Oregon, however, does not constitute purposeful availment in Oregon by either Defendant Fabrizio or Defendant Workman. Thus, Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong of the test for specific personal jurisdiction.

The Ninth Circuit follows a "but for" test of causation for determining the second prong of the test. Myers, 238 F.3d at 1075 (citing Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Plaintiff must show he would not have suffered an injury "but for" the non-resident defendant's forum-related conduct. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show he would not have suffered injury "but for" conduct or activities by either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman in the state of Oregon.

As noted, the third prong of the Ninth Circuit test for specific jurisdiction requires a finding that the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is reasonable. When the court concludes a defendant "purposefully established minimum contacts with a forum state, and that the claims at issue arise from those contacts, the court must determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of 'fair play and substantial justice.'" Doe, 248 F.3d at 925 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 326). When a plaintiff has not satisfied his burden regarding the first two prongs of the test for specific jurisdiction, however, "the Court need not reach the third prong of the specific jurisdiction test." Doe, 248 F.3d at 925. Here, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish either purposeful availment or a "but for" relationship between Plaintiff's alleged injuries and the conduct of Defendant Fabrizio or Workman in Oregon. The Court, therefore, need not address the third prong of the specific jurisdiction test.

Even if the Court were to evaluate the reasonableness prong, however, the evidence shows the exercise of specific jurisdiction over either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman would be unreasonable. The reasonableness determination requires consideration of the following seven factors:

(1) the extent of purposeful interjection;

(2) the burden on the defendant to defend the suit in the chosen forum;

(3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state;

(4) the forum state's interest in the dispute;

(5) the most efficient forum for judicial resolution of the dispute;

(6) the importance of the chosen forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and

(7) the existence of an alternative forum.

Gray, 913 F.2d at 761 (citation omitted).

With respect to the above seven factors, the Court concludes (1) There has been an insufficient showing by Plaintiff that either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman purposefully interjected themselves into the state of Oregon; (2) to require either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman to defend this federal court action in Oregon would impose a considerable hardship and undue burden upon them; (3) Plaintiff's action seeks to relitigate matters previously addressed and/or decided by trial and appellate courts of the state of California, Plaintiff requests this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a California trial judge and a California court manager for their official conduct in judicial proceedings in California involving disputed interests in land located in California, and, therefore, a potentially significant conflict exists between this Court and the sovereignty of California; (4) Oregon's interest in this dispute that arises from events that were litigated in California and occurred when Plaintiff was a California resident is not strong even though Plaintiff is now apparently an Oregon resident; (5) the most efficient forum for judicial resolution of the dispute is California because the relevant witnesses and evidence are primarily located in California; (6) the importance of this forum to Plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief is insufficient because this action involves Plaintiff's interest in land located in California and relates to his conduct and the conduct of Defendants Fabrizio and Workman while in California; and (7) Plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing that the state and federal courts in California are not available to him as alternative forums. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to satisfy any single prong of the three-part test to establish this Court's specific personal jurisdiction over either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman.

4. The Court Lacks General Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Fabrizio and Workman

The Court concluded above that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman have engaged in "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" activities in the state of Oregon. See Hirsch, 800 F.2d at 1477. Indeed, Plaintiff conceded the Declarations submitted by Defendants Fabrizio and Workman show that neither of them have a "regular connection" with the state of Oregon. The Court also found Plaintiff did not show sufficient jurisdictional facts to establish that this Court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Fabrizio or Workman would be reasonable. See Doe, 248 F.3d at 925. Accordingly, this Court holds it does not have general personal jurisdiction over either Defendant Fabrizio or Workman.

Based on the foregoing, the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Fabrizio and Workman are GRANTED. All of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Fabrizio and Workman are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment as to his Sixth Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint. The Court, however, previously concluded Plaintiff's Sixth Claim was barred by operation of the res judicata doctrine and dismissed Plaintiff's Sixth Claim in the Court's Opinion and Order issued on March 19, 2001. Furthermore, the Court has now granted the Motions to Dismiss of Defendants Fabrizio and Workman for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on his Sixth Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint is DENIED as moot.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

As noted, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to his Sixth Claim is moot because the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's Sixth Claim in the Opinion and Order issued on March 19, 2001. The Court, therefore, has not considered Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice and Motion for Oral Hearing (#141); GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's Notice of Corrected Request to Take Judicial Notice and Request for Hearing (#142); GRANTS Defendant Fabrizio's Request for Judicial Notice (#129); GRANTS Defendant Workman's Request for Judicial Notice (#111); GRANTS Defendant Fabrizio's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (#125); GRANTS Defendant Workman's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (#110); DENIES Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on his Sixth Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint (#94); and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (#119).

IT IS SO ORDERED.