Opinion
20-P-1019
07-28-2022
BODHISATTVA SKANDHA v. LUCY SOTO ABBE & others. [1]
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Bodhisattva Skandha, filed a pro se civil rights complaint based on the Massachusetts Parole Board's denial of parole. A Superior Court judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. We affirm.
Background.
Skandha is serving a life sentence for second-degree murder and has many times been denied parole by the Massachusetts Parole Board, most recently on November 1, 2013. On October 15, 2016, Skandha filed a "civil rights complaint with a jury demand" in the Superior Court, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and the motion judge dismissed Skandha's complaint with prejudice.
Although we do not have the board's decision, there is no dispute that Skandha was denied parole. Skandha's failure to include this relevant portion of the record violated Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as amended, 481 Mass. 1637 (2019); since we decide this appeal based on Skandha's failure to state a claim, this failure does not affect the outcome.
Neither of Skandha's direct constitutional claims is permitted under governing law. The United States Supreme Court has not recognized a direct cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977), and there is similarly no direct cause of action under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. See Martino v. Hogan, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 710, 720 (1994). We limit our review to the other causes of action Skandha advances in his complaint.
Discussion.
"We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Edwards v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 254, 260 (2017), and case cited. "In assuming the facts as alleged, however, '[w]e do not regard as "true" legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations'" (citation omitted) . Id. "To survive a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged must 'plausibly suggest[] (not merely be consistent with) an entitlement to relief'" (quotation omitted) . Id., quoting Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008) .
In his complaint, Skandha alleges that (1) he was "coerced" into attending his public parole hearing on October 1, 2013; (2) the defendants conspired together to prevent Skandha from obtaining parole; and (3) the defendants conspired to retaliate against him based on his prior parole history. Specifically, Skandha claims that the defendants were indifferent about his medical needs and that, by appearing before the parole board, he was "forced to relive the tragedy of the crimes" to which he pleaded guilty. Skandha asserts that this was "psychological torture, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration Of Rights." Skandha also alleges that the defendants denied him parole "in retaliation for exercising his right of confrontation." Lastly, Skandha claims that he is "entitled to know specifically what is required of [him] in order to be granted" parole, and why each board member decided to deny him parole.
Skandha's complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636 (factual allegations must plausibly suggest that plaintiff is entitled to relief). While "reliance on inferences or conclusory statements may not necessarily render a pleading defective, the pleader may be well advised to avoid undue reliance on inferences which can only invite a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted." Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 701-702 (1975), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). Bare allegations of intent, motive, and conspiracy, without more, cannot rise to the level required to sustain a claim. See Okoli v. Okoli, 81 Mass.App.Ct. 381, 392 (2012) (order granting wife's motion to dismiss husband's claim of conspiracy to defraud affirmed where husband's conclusory allegations fell short of stating claim).
Skandha cannot find the support he seeks in Wilborn v. Walsh, 584 F.Supp.2d 384, 384 (D. Mass. 2008). In Wilborn, the court found sufficient a State inmate's factual allegations that the board denied him parole because of his (homosexual) sexual orientation where, using examples, he alleged that the board granted other, similarly situated, heterosexual prisoners parole. 584 F.Supp.2d at 393-395. Here, by contrast, Skandha has provided no factual support for his allegations. Therefore, his complaint was properly dismissed.
Skandha also did not allege facts sufficient to warrant declaratory relief, and, even had he done so, declaratory relief is not an appropriate remedy where an individual is challenging an administrative decision in his case. See Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass.App.Ct. 126, 135-136 (2013) ("declaratory relief is not 'an appropriate remedy where the validity of an adjudication by the board in an individual case is being challenged'" [citation omitted]).
None of Skandha's remaining arguments, all of which we have considered, warrant discussion. See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
Because we affirm the dismissal for failure to state a claim, we need not address Skandha's arguments that the motion to dismiss should have been treated as one for summary judgment and that he was inappropriately denied discovery.
We affirm the judge's order dismissing Skandha's complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.