ROGERS

Charles L. Howard, with whom, on the brief, was Sheila A. Huddleston, Hartford, for the defendant (appellant). Steven D. Ecker, with whom was M. Caitlin S. Anderson, for the plaintiff (appellee).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, EVELEIGH and McDONALD, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

This appeal requires us to consider the scope of governmental immunity that is afforded to a political subdivision of the state that has been sued for allegedly negligent conduct that is alleged to be connected to the proprietary function of operating a water supply company. After the plaintiff, Maribeth Blonski, was injured when she rode her bicycle into a pipe gate on property maintained by the defendant, the Metropolitan District Commission, she brought this action claiming that the defendant had negligently maintained the gate in an unsafe and dangerous condition. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly. The questions that we must answer in this appeal are: (1) whether the defendant was immune from liability pursuant to General Statutes § 52–557n (a)(2)(B) because the maintenance of the gate to control the recreational use of the property was a governmental function requiring the exercise of discretion or, instead, the defendant was liable under § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) because its conduct was connected to its proprietary function of operating a water supply company; and (2) if the defendant was not entitled to immunity under § 52–557n (a)(2)(B), whether it is entitled to immunity pursuant to the Recreational Land Use Act (act), General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 52–557f et seq. We conclude that the defendant was liable pursuant to § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) because the maintenance of the gate was inextricably linked to a proprietary function, and that it is not entitled to immunity pursuant to the act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant is a specially chartered municipal corporation whose duties include supplying water to residents of certain towns (district). To this end, the defendant maintains several water reservoirs and water treatment facilities, including a property in West Hartford consisting of 3000 acres of land and five reservoirs. The defendant allows the public to use the property for recreational activities, including walking, running and biking on the numerous trails that run through the property.

In 1976, after experiencing recurring problems on the West Hartford property, including vandalism, theft, litter, water contamination, the sale and use of drugs and alcohol, and frequent motor vehicle accidents, the defendant's board voted to close the roads on the property to public motor vehicles. The defendant installed two gates blocking access to the property's road system from the public parking lot. Each gate consisted of a three inch diameter pipe that was attached at one end to a hinge on a vertical post at the side of the road. When closed, the other end of the pipe could be locked to a vertical post on the other side of the road. The pipes, which were painted yellow, were suspended approximately three and one-half feet from the ground.

The defendant's policy was to keep the gates closed, but workers doing maintenance work on the reservoirs occasionally left them open. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the defendant made a decision to keep the gates closed at all times to protect the water supply from any attempt to contaminate it. On September 28, 2001, the defendant's manager of water treatment sent an e-mail to various personnel directing them to keep the gates closed and locked until further notice.

One of the gates was located at an entrance to Red Road, a paved road that ran through the West Hartford property in a three mile loop. There were markings on Red Road establishing a lane for bicyclists and indicating the direction in which the bicyclists were supposed to travel. On May 16, 2002, the plaintiff went to the reservoir property to videotape a segment on mountain biking for a cable television program that she hosted. After taping the segment, she and a friend went for a bicycle ride. As they headed back to the parking lot at the end of their ride, the plaintiff entered onto Red Road. She was riding with her head down at approximately twenty to thirty miles per hour, in the direction of the closed gate and against the designated direction for bicycle traffic. The plaintiff testified that the pipe gate suddenly appeared in front of her “out of nowhere,” and she attempted to slide underneath it. She was unable to do so and struck her head on the pipe, thereby incurring severe injuries to her cervical spine, including a burst fracture of the last cervical vertebrae, as well as other injuries. As a result of her injuries, the plaintiff was required to undergo numerous surgeries and extensive physical rehabilitation. She suffers from chronic pain, difficulty breathing, a permanent disability in her neck and other ailments.

The plaintiff brought this action alleging that the defendant had negligently maintained Red Road and the gate in a dangerous and defective condition. Specifically, she alleged that the defendant had: “closed [the] pipe gate across [Red Road] in a manner that was unsafe”; “failed to erect barriers that would close the path to vehicular traffic but allow bikes to pass safely through”; and “failed to properly warn of the closure of the [Red Road] pipe gate by signage on the path and markings on the roadway.” The defendant asserted as a special defense that the plaintiff's claims were barred by § 52–557n (a)(2)(B) and General Statutes § 52–557g. After the plaintiff presented her case at trial, the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict claiming that she had failed to prove that the defendant's actions were connected to its proprietary function and that the defendant therefore could not be held liable under § 52–557n (a)(2)(B). In the alternative, the defendant claimed that, if it was acting in its proprietary function, it was entitled to immunity under § 52–557g. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. Thereafter, the jury found in interrogatories that the defendant had been negligent and that its negligence had an “inherently close connection” to its proprietary function of supplying water to residents of the district. It also found that the plaintiff was 30 percent comparatively negligent. The jury awarded economic damages of $150,000 and noneconomic damages of $2.75 million. The defendant then filed a motion to set aside the verdict, again claiming that there was insufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of whether the defendant's conduct was connected to its proprietary function and, in the alternative, that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that the defendant was immune pursuant to § 52–557g or to submit that question to the jury. The trial court denied the motion and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied its motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict because no reasonable juror could have found that the alleged negligence had an “ ‘inherently close connection’ ” to the defendant's proprietary function of supplying water. See Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38, 56, 881 A.2d 194 (2005) (to establish that political subdivision of state is liable under § 52–557n [a][1][B], plaintiff must prove “an inextricable link or inherently close connection between the plaintiff's specific allegations of negligence and the defendants' operation of a water utility” [emphasis in original] ). The defendant further claims that, if this court rejects its claim that, as a matter of law, its negligent conduct was not connected to its proprietary function for purposes of § 52–557n (a)(1)(B), it is entitled to immunity under the act. We address these claims in turn.

At the outset, we set forth the applicable standard of review. “The standards for appellate review of a directed verdict are well settled. Directed verdicts are not favored.... A trial court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not reasonably and legally have reached any other conclusion.... In reviewing the trial court's decision to direct a verdict in favor of a defendant we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.... Although it is the jury's right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven ... it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation.... A directed verdict is justified if ... the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the court to set aside a verdict rendered for the other party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 497–98, 853 A.2d 460 (2004).

We next turn to the principles governing the availability of a governmental immunity defense for political subdivisions of the state who engage in proprietary activities. This court held in Considine v. Waterbury, 279 Conn. 830, 844, 905 A.2d 70 (2006), that “§ 52–557n (a)(1)(B) codifies the common-law rule that municipalities are liable for their negligent acts committed in their proprietary capacity....” “It is well established that a proprietary function is an act done in the management of [a political subdivision's] property or rights for its own corporate benefit or profit and that of its inhabitants.... The ... operation of a water utility for corporate profit is a proprietary function.” (Citationsomitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, supra, 275 Conn. at 53, 881 A.2d 194.

In Martel, the plaintiff was injured while mountain biking on a property that the defendants owned and/ or operated, but did not use in connection with its water supply operation. Id., at 41–42, 881 A.2d 194. This court held that the defendants were entitled to immunity from the plaintiff's claim alleging negligent maintenance of the biking trail because that conduct was unconnected to the defendants' proprietary function. Id., at 53, 881 A.2d 194. In Elliott v. Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 389, 715 A.2d 27 (1998), the plaintiff's decedent was killed by a hunter while jogging on a watershed property owned and operated by the defendant city. This court held that the defendant was immune from a claim that it had been negligent in opening watershed lands to hunting because that conduct was unconnected to the defendant's proprietary function. Id., at 413, 715 A.2d 27. In both Martel and Elliott, however, this court recognized that a governmental entity may be held liable for its allegedly tortious conduct when that conduct is “inextricably linked to a proprietary function.” Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, supra, 275 Conn. at 53, 881 A.2d 194;id., at 56, 881 A.2d 194 (governmental entity may be held liable when there is “ inextricable link or inherently close connection between the plaintiff's specific allegations of negligence and the defendants' operation of a water utility” [emphasis in original] ); Elliott v. Waterbury, supra, at 413, 715 A.2d 27 (noting that, in previous cases, governmental entities were held liable when “allegedly tortious conduct ... was inextricably linked to the operation of the water utility for corporate gain”); see also Considine v. Waterbury, supra, 279 Conn. at 852, 905 A.2d 70 (when defendant city leased clubhouse and restaurant to third party for its own corporate profit, defendant was not entitled to immunity for negligence claim by restaurant customer who was injured when he fell through window panel because maintenance of panel was connected to proprietary function); Carta v. Norwalk, 108 Conn. 697, 699, 701–702, 145 A. 158 (1929) (when defendant city rented beach property to third party for its own corporate profit, defendant was not entitled to immunity for claim arising from death of person who was fatally injured when he dove into water and struck his head on submerged concrete pier); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 588, 115 A. 11 (1921) (defendant city operating water utility was not entitled to immunity for claim by plaintiff who sought recovery for injuries suffered when she was shot by security guard defendant had hired to protect reservoir, which had been closed to public, from saboteurs); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 366–67, 59 A. 487 (1904) (defendant city was not entitled to immunity for claim that it had negligently conducted work on reservoir, resulting in death of workman).

In the present case, the jury's finding that the defendant's conduct in installing and maintaining the closed pipe gate that injured the plaintiff was inextricably linked to the defendant's proprietary water supply operation was supported by the evidence that the purpose of the gate was to protect the water supply. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant may be held liable for its tortious conduct pursuant to § 52–557n (a)(1)(B).

In support of its claim to the contrary, the defendant points out that the provision of free recreational opportunities by a governmental entity historically has been considered a governmental function, not a proprietary function. See Hannon v. Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 16, 136 A. 876 (1927); Epstein v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 283, 284, 132 A. 467 (1926). The defendant contends in its brief that, under Martel and Elliott, as a matter of law, “allegations of negligence relating to the free recreational use of municipal water company property [do] not have an inherently close relationship to the business of water supply,” and, therefore, public water utilities cannot be held liable for any negligence relating to recreational use of the property. (Emphasis in original.) The defendant also points out that “the plaintiff's claims do not relate to the fact that the road was closed to motor vehicle traffic, or even to the purpose for the closure; they relate to the manner in which the closure was accomplished. [Specifically] [t]he plaintiff alleges that the gate was improperly designed for use on a bicycle path, and that the [defendant] failed to warn cyclists going the wrong way of the gate's existence and closure.” (Emphasis in original.) The defendant contends that it is entitled to immunity because, although it installed and maintained the gate to protect the water supply, the plaintiff's allegations of negligence “[relate] exclusively to the [defendant's] negligence in providing a safe environment for recreational use and, more specifically, for cyclists,” not its negligence in protecting the water supply operation itself.

Although the defendant's reasoning is not entirely clear to us, it appears to be arguing that a governmental entity cannot be held liable for its allegedly negligent conduct when the conduct was inextricably linked to a governmental function, such as providing free recreational opportunities, even if the conduct also had a proprietary purpose. We disagree. As we have indicated, this court held in Considine v. Waterbury, supra, 279 Conn. at 844, 905 A.2d 70, that § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) was “an attempt to codify municipal common-law liability for acts performed in a proprietary capacity.” We also recognized in Considine that, when a municipality is acting in its proprietary function, the general rule is that it “is liable to the same extent as in the case of private corporations or individuals....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 843, 905 A.2d 70, quoting 18 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 2003) § 53.23, p. 383. The court in Martel and Elliott recognized a narrow exception to this rule in cases where the governmental entity was engaged in both a governmental function and a proprietary function and the plaintiff failed to establish any inherent connection between the allegedly tortious conduct and the proprietary function. Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, supra, 275 Conn. at 56, 881 A.2d 194 (when defendants did not maintain property as part of water supply operation and opened property to public for hunting and fishing without charging fee, court failed “to discern ... how the defendants' allegedly negligent supervision and maintenance of the trail on which the plaintiff was injured was inextricably linked to the [MetropolitanDistrict Commission's (commission) allegedly proprietary] purpose in acquiring the property” to develop future water supply); id., at 55 n. 13, 881 A.2d 194 (even assuming that commission was engaged in proprietary function of preserving water supply, “plaintiff failed to produce any evidence demonstrating the existence of an inextricable link between the commission's allegedly negligent supervision and maintenance of the trail on which the plaintiff was injured and the commission's proprietary maintenance of the property for purposes of preserving water purity”); Elliott v. Waterbury, supra, 245 Conn. at 413, 715 A.2d 27 (“defendants' allegedly tortious conduct—opening the watershed land to hunting, and the manner in which it regulated that activity—is unconnected to its operation of a water utility”).

We decline the defendant's invitation to expand this exception to include situations in which the allegedly tortious conduct was also linked to a proprietary function. When a governmental entity engages in conduct for its own corporate benefit in a manner that poses an unreasonable risk of harm to others, we can perceive of no reason why it should not be held responsible for all of the consequences of that conduct, just as a private person would be. Indeed, as the plaintiff points out, failing to do so would lead to anomalies. For example, the defendant does not appear to dispute that, if, instead of a recreational user, a person who was involved with its proprietary water supply operation had been injured as the result of its negligent maintenance of the gate, the defendant would be liable to that person. Thus, the defendant implicitly contends that its liability for proprietary activities performed in a negligent manner depends on the nature of the injured person's activity. We are aware of no authority, however, for that proposition. Rather, § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) focuses on the nature of the defendant's activity. See General Statutes § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) (political subdivision of state is liable for damages caused by “negligence in the performance of functions from which the political subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit ” [emphasis added] ).

In response to the plaintiff's argument that our focus should be on the nature of the defendant's activity, not the plaintiff's conduct, the defendant contends that the plaintiff's “allegations of negligence relate solely to the use of the property for bicycling” because she claimed that the gate was improperly designed for bicycle traffic.It contends that “[t]he [proprietary] reason for closing the gate, under these circumstances, is incidental” and, therefore, is not inextricably linked to the allegedly tortious conduct. (Emphasis in original.) Presumably, however, the defendant would have made this same argument if the plaintiff had been injured by a water pipe that was entirely unconnected to the use of the property for recreational purposes. Thus, the defendant is effectively claiming that no allegation of tortious conduct made by a person using the property for recreational purposes could be inextricably linked to the defendant's proprietary function. We are not persuaded. If the legislature had wanted to carve out claims by recreational users of public lands from the scope of § 52–557n (a)(1)(B), it knew how to do so. See General Statutes § 52–557n (b) (enumerating specific exceptions to liability imposed by § 52–557n [a] ); General Statutes § 52–557g (exceptions to liability of owner of land available to public for recreation); General Statutes § 25–43c (e) (exceptions to immunity for liability in cases of wilful or wanton conduct by water companies that issued permits and charged fees for issuance for such permits to reimburse them for cost of fishing and other recreational activities in public water supply storages and reservoirs). Accordingly, we reject the defendant's claim that § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) does not constitute a waiver of immunity to the plaintiff's claim, and we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict on this ground.

We turn next to the defendant's alternate claim that, if its installation and maintenance of the gate was a proprietary function for purposes of § 52–557n (a)(1)(B), it must be entitled to immunity pursuant to the act. Section 52–557g (a) provides in relevant part that “an owner of land who makes all or any part of the land available to the public without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service for recreational purposes owes no duty of care to keep the land, or the part thereof so made available, safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering for recreational purposes.”

The defendant acknowledges that, in Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 680, 680 A.2d 242 (1996), a majority of this court held that “municipalities [and, by extension,other political subdivisions of the state] are not ‘owners' within the act,” but the act grants immunity exclusively to private landowners. The defendant contends,however, that, notwithstanding this court's decision in Conway,§ 52–557gdoes provide immunity to governmental entities that are engaged in proprietary activities because they are the equivalent of private entities under those circumstances. In support of this claim, it cites numerous cases and authorities for the general proposition that, when a municipality is acting pursuant to its proprietary function, it is effectively functioning as a private entity and, therefore, is liable for negligence claims in the same manner, and only to the same extent, that a private person would be. Accordingly, the defendant argues, because private entities are immune under the act from negligence claims arising from the free recreational use of their land by members of the public, it also is entitled to immunity from such claims.

We agree that § 52–557n (a)(1)(B) incorporates the general common-law principle that political subdivisionsof the state acting in their proprietary capacity are liable only to the extent that private persons would be under similar circumstances. See Considine v. Waterbury, supra, 279 Conn. at 844, 905 A.2d 70 ( § 52–557n [a][1][B] “was an attempt to codify municipal common-law liability for acts performed in a proprietary capacity”); id., at 843, 905 A.2d 70 (recognizing that, under common law, municipality acting in proprietary capacity is liable to same extent as private persons would be under same circumstances). Thus, we recognize, for example, that where a private person could not be held liable for a negligence claim under the common law becausethe injured person was trespassing, a governmental entity acting in a proprietary capacity also could not be held liable under § 52–557n (a)(1)(B). See Fiel v. Racine, 203 Wis. 149, 151, 233 N.W. 611 (1930); see also Caman v. Stamford, 746 F.Supp. 248, 249 (D.Conn.1990) (“[e]nactment of § 52–557n did not create any new liability for municipalities which did not exist in the common law”). We reject, however, the defendant's attempt to graft this general principle onto the specific provisions of § 52–557g. Neither the defendant nor any of the authorities that it cites has explained why the general common-law principle that political subdivisions of the state acting in their proprietary capacity are liable to the same extent that private persons would be under similar circumstances should trump a specific statute in which the legislature granted immunity exclusively to private persons because it concluded that there were good reasons to treat governmental entities and private persons differently in that specific context.

We recognize that not all of the reasons for excluding governmental entities from the act that we cited in Conway are equally compelling when applied to property that is owned and operated by a governmental entity in its proprietary capacity. For example, this court stated in Conway that, because municipalities are already engaged in the governmental function “of providing parks, pools, ball fields, etcetera, the legislature had less incentive to dangle the carrot of immunity to encourage municipalities” to open their lands to the public. Conway v. Wilton, supra, 238 Conn. at 671–72, 680 A.2d 242. When a governmental entity is running a proprietary operation such as a water supply company, however, it is not required to open the property to the public for recreational purposes, and providing immunity would provide an incentive for it to do so. Nevertheless, nothing in Conway suggests that the question of whether the legislature intended to afford immunity to a governmental landowner depends on whether the governmental entity was acting in a governmental or a proprietary capacity. Rather, this court stated categorically that the legislature had provided that “municipalities [and, by extension, other political subdivisions of the state] are not ‘owners' within the act.” Id., at 680, 680 A.2d 242. The defendant has not asked this court to overrule Conway, and we have no authority to create a judicial exception to the legislature's exclusion of political subdivisions of the state from the act in cases in which the governmental entity is acting in its proprietary capacity. See Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 554, 569, 937 A.2d 13 (2007) (this court cannot substitute its views for those of legislature or read into statute provision that legislature could have enacted but did not).

Moreover, the legislature expressed no disagreement with this court's conclusion in Conway for fifteen years. See State v. Canady, 297 Conn. 322, 333, 998 A.2d 1135 (2010) (“we ... presume that the legislature is aware of [this court's] interpretation of a statute, and that its subsequent nonaction may be understood as a validation of that interpretation” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Indeed, it was not until after the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case that the legislature saw fit to amend § 52–557f to apply to political subdivisions of the state. See Public Acts 2011, No. 11–211 (P.A. 11–211); Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 19, 2011 Sess., pp. 6137–38, remarks of Robert Moore on behalf of Metropolitan District Commission (present case “brought a renewed focus to the liability of all public entities ... for injuries to individuals who use their land” that was “not limited to” efforts that led to drafting of legislation that was enacted as P.A. 11–211). During the committee hearings on the proposed legislation, Attorney Steven D. Ecker, who represents the plaintiff in this case, testified that, in his opinion, the legislation was unnecessary because municipalities are already immune to many claims of negligence arising from the recreational use of their lands pursuant to § 52–557n. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, supra, pp. at 6188–89. He explained that the defendant had been found liable to the plaintiff in the present case because that statute does not provide for immunity when a municipality is acting in its proprietary capacity. Id., p. at 6192. Ecker also stated that the defendant in the present case had attempted to plead immunity under § 52–557n. Id., p. at 6195. In response, Representative Arthur J. O'Neill pointed out that “for a long time the recreational use statute hasn't applied to entities such as” the defendant. Id. It is clear, therefore, that the legislature in 2011 did not believe that the act provided immunity to a political subdivision of the state that is engaged in a proprietary function and that opens its lands to a recreational user who is injured as the result of the entity's proprietary activities. Indeed, that was the very gap in the statute that the legislature was attempting to fill by enacting P.A. 11–211. See Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 368, 819 A.2d 822 (2003) (“[w]e presume that, in enacting a statute, the legislature intended a change in existing law” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Moreover, as we have indicated, there is nothing in the legislative history of the original act that would lead to the conclusion that the legislature originally had a different understanding. See Conway v. Wilton, supra, 238 Conn. at 666–71, 680 A.2d 242(legislative history of act indicates that legislature intended to provide protection only to private landowners).

We conclude, therefore, that, although, under § 52–557n (a)(1)(B), the liability of a governmental entity acting in its proprietary capacity generally is no greater than that of a private person under similar circumstances, because § 52–557g granted immunity from negligence claims involving the free recreational use of land exclusively to private persons, not to political subdivisions of the state, the more general principle does not apply. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the defendant was not entitledto immunity from the plaintiff's claim pursuant to § 52–557g, and that it properly denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict on this ground.

The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion PALMER, EVELEIGH and McDONALD, Js., concurred.

NORCOTT, J., concurring.

I concur in the result.