J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we confront a number of issues relating to pretrial procedure, including the important question whether civil litigants may refuse to respond to interrogatories on the ground of constitutional privilege. The case began when the Black Panther Party (the Party), Huey P. Newton, and other individuals sued the United States and various government officials, alleging that they had unlawfully conspired to destroy the Party. After presiding over several years of bitterly fought discovery battles, the District Court granted a government motion to dismiss the Party's action. It reasoned that dismissal was appropriate because the Party had: (1) unjustifiably claimed a First Amendment privilege and refused to answer several interrogatories that would have required it to reveal the names of Party members whose names were not known to the public; (2) failed to clarify answers to interrogatories that the District Court believed to be inconsistent or evasive; and (3) disobeyed a discovery order requiring individual Party officers to respond to interrogatories originally served on the Party itself. The District Court also dismissed Huey Newton, ruling that he had improperly asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he refused to answer several interrogatories. Finally, it dismissed all other plaintiffs.

The Party, Newton, and the other plaintiffs now challenge these dismissals. They also appeal the District Court's decision to award to appellees the costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing the motion to dismiss, the decision to grant summary judgment in favor of government officials who held office after 1973, and the decision to deny a motion for an extension of time in which to file for class action certification. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the dismissals, the decision to award attorney fees and costs, and the decision to grant summary judgment. We affirm the denial of the motion for an extension of time in which to file for class certification. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with our decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint

Plaintiffs-appellants are the Party, Newton, the Party's founder, and various other Party members and supporters. In December 1976 they filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and two classes: all individuals who had been or continued to be members of the Party, and all individuals who had provided political or financial. assistance to the Party. The Party and Newton also sought money damages. Defendants-appellees are the United States and various government officials, including past and present Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Attorneys General, Secretaries of the Treasury, Postmasters General, and Commissioners of the Internal Revenue Service. Present officials were sued in their official and individual capacities. Past government officials were sued only in their individual capacities.

In their complaint appellants alleged that since 1968 the appellees and other unknown government employees had engaged in a continuing conspiracy to destroy the Black Panther Party, in violation of the Constitution and various statutes. They stated that they first learned of the existence of this conspiracy in 1976, when the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities published a report entitled Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S.Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Books II and III (Senate Report). According to appellants, this report reveals that the FBI formed a special counterintelligence program called COINTELPRO primarily to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalists." Appellants suggested that through this program the FBI orchestrated efforts to undermine the Party.

Appellants conceded that they lacked specific details about the nature and scope of the conspiracy against the Party; they stated that they hoped to obtain further information through use of discovery. Relying in part on information provided in the Senate Report, however, they were able to allege a number of specific activities. They complained of unlawful mail openings, warrantless wiretaps and break-ins, and burglaries. Appellants contended that the government, with the assistance of local law enforcement agencies, harassed and even assassinated Party officers, members, and supporters. They further suggested that appellees had incited dissension within the Party through use of anonymous letters, paid informants, and agents provocateurs. They alleged that appellees also instigated violent confrontations between the Black Panthers and other black organizations. Finally, they claimed that appellees deterred contributions to the Party, crippled the Party newspaper, The Black Panther, discouraged press coverage of Party activities, and sabotaged the Party's public service programs.

At the conclusion of their complaint appellants asked the District Court to enter a declaratory judgment finding that appellees had violated their constitutional and statutory rights. They also requested that appellees be enjoined from taking any further action to undermine the Party or harm its members and supporters. The Party and Newton each asked for $50 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive damages.

B. Proceedings Below

Discovery battles and other pretrial disputes consumed almost three years. On May 26, 1977 the District Court denied appellees' motions to dismiss and directed the action to proceed to discovery. It also denied appellants' motion for an extension of time in which to move for class action certification, invoking Local Rule 1-13(b), Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Local Rule 1-13(b) provides that motions for class action certification must be made within 90 days of the filing of the complaint. Appellants filed a request for production of documents during the same month. They withdrew this request shortly thereafter in favor of a second request. Later, after appellees complained about the breadth of the second request and moved for a protective order, appellants filed a superseding third request. At the same time the parties agreed that discovery would take place in "waves." During the initial wave they planned to limit their discovery to requests for documents and interrogatories; they would have an opportunity to take depositions during subsequent waves.

In July 1977, before initiating any discovery, the government officials who had held office after 1973 moved for summary judgment on the ground that they could not have been involved in any of the acts alleged. They filed affidavits setting forth the dates on which they assumed office and disclaiming any knowledge of or participation in a conspiracy against appellants. Appellants responded with an affidavit of counsel under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that they needed further discovery before they could respond to appellees' motion for summary judgment. They also noted that the affidavits of three of the post-1973 officials, former Postmaster General Benjamin Bailar, former Attorney General Edward Levi, and former Internal Revenue Service Commissioner William Williams, raised new issues of material fact, since they seemed to concede involvement in investigations of the Black Panther Party. Finally, appellants noted that their complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy, and that at least one overt act had occurred after 1973. The District Court decided to grant this motion in July 1978, observing that the officials' affidavits supported their claims of noninvolvement, and that appellants had failed to file an evidentiary submission of their own, even though they had been given "ample opportunity" to take discovery since filing their affidavit of counsel.

Appellees served 244 interrogatories on the Party on January 31, 1978. Three months later they served 82 interrogatories on Huey Newton. On June 12, 1978 appellees moved to dismiss the Party and Newton under Rule 37(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because their responses to the interrogatories were late. Appellants responded by stating that answers would be filed by July 24. Answers were actually provided on July 27, 1978. The Party's answers, which were prepared by one of its officers, Joan Kelley, were more than 100 pages in length. It refused to answer several interrogatories that would have required it to reveal the names of Party members whose identities were not known to the public, claiming that the information was privileged under the First Amendment. It also objected to a number of interrogatories on the ground that they were unduly burdensome. When the information requested in an interrogatory could be obtained from the Party's newspaper, The Black Panther, the responses simply referred appellees to that publication. Newton's answers were 22 pages in length. He asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with respect to 32 of the interrogatories, claiming that they would have required him to disclose information concerning events that were the subject of pending criminal prosecutions or criminal and civil investigations.

On September 21, 1978 appellants filed a motion under Rule 37(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to compel production of documents by appellees. Appellants began by noting that the materials they had received were highly disorganized. They stated that the documents were provided in random order in unlabeled boxes, that the CIA did not even keep pages of single documents together, and that only the IRS provided an index. Appellants went on to claim that appellees had failed to produce a number of requested documents without stating any objections to production. They suggested that appellees were deliberately concealing the existence of relevant material. Appellants also argued that even where appellees had stated objections to production of certain documents, their objections were improper.

The next day appellees renewed their earlier motion under Rule 37(d) to impose the sanction of dismissal. They asserted that neither the Party nor Newton could refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground of constitutional privilege. They objected to the Party's claim that several of the interrogatories were overly burdensome. They also suggested that Joan Kelley, who prepared the Party's responses, was not a proper representative since she had only been a Party officer since 1971 and thus did not have firsthand knowledge of many of the events referred to in the complaint. Finally, they contended that many of the Party's responses were incomplete, evasive, or inconsistent. Appellants objected to the filing of this motion as a motion for sanctions, contending that it should have been filed as a motion to compel.

In November 1978 the District Court stated that it would consider appellees' motion to dismiss first, because that motion was "potentially dispositive" of the case. Consideration of appellants' motion to compel discovery was indefinitely postponed. Shortly thereafter the court heard argument on the question whether appellees were entitled to file a motion for sanctions, or whether they were first required to file a motion to compel discovery. It agreed with appellants, and ruled that the motion to dismiss should have been filed as a motion to compel discovery under Rule 37(a). Appellees complied with this ruling in late December 1978. In their new motion to compel they raised the same objections that they had raised in their earlier motion to dismiss.

The Party responded to appellees' motion to compel with two lengthy memoranda, large portions of which endeavored to explain the apparent inconsistencies in the Party's original responses. The Party also voluntarily supplemented many of the responses to which appellees objected. Joan Kelley provided an affidavit in which she detailed the extent of her search and her qualifications to act as the Party's representative. Huey Newton filed a 35-page memorandum and an affidavit describing his own efforts to respond. Like the Party, he also voluntarily supplemented several of his responses.

On August 6, 1979 the District Court issued an order and an accompanying memorandum in which it granted appellees' motion to compel further responses by the Party and Newton. It ruled that the Party must answer the interrogatories with respect to which it had claimed a First Amendment privilege, reasoning that "[p]laintiff cannot assert this privilege and at the same time proceed with this lawsuit, withholding information vital to the defense of the parties sued." The court also held that the Party must supplement responses to 44 interrogatories that appellees had alleged to be inconsistent or evasive. The District Court further ruled that each of the Party's officers should provide supplemental responses to 107 interrogatories. It conceded that Joan Kelley, the Party, and its attorneys had made "a good faith effort to provide full and complete answers," but reasoned that such an order was nonetheless appropriate because of "1) the scarcity of records, 2) the time lapse between the alleged occurrences and the present and 3) the scattering and possible unavailability of many witnesses." Finally, the court ruled that where the Party did not provide specific information, but simply referred to The Black Panther, it should provide supplemental responses based upon a full and complete review of that publication.

As for Newton, the court held that he must answer the 32 interrogatories with respect to which he had claimed a Fifth Amendment privilege. The court stated:

[D]efendants contend that the withheld information is vital to their defense, many times to the point of telling them what exactly they are accused of doing. Therefore, if plaintiff Newton is to proceed with this lawsuit * * * he must answer * * *. This Court is not compelling plaintiff Newton to waive any privileges he may have, but is merely leaving the choice to Mr. Newton, as a plaintiff, whether he wishes to continue to press claims relating to these interrogatories.

Joint Appendix (JA) 856. The court also ordered Newton to supplement his answers to five other interrogatories.

The Party responded to the court's August 6, 1979 order by filing over 200 pages of supplemental answers. In these new responses it provided additional information based on a complete search of back issues of its newspaper. Some of the new responses helped clarify the alleged inconsistencies. The Party continued to claim a First Amendment privilege with respect to portions of three interrogatories, however. In addition, it refused to obey that portion of the order requiring each of the Party's officers to respond to 107 interrogatories. The Party insisted that under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it was entitled to appoint its own representative, and that the court did not have the power to order all Party officers to respond. The Party did supplement its answers to the 107 interrogatories, however. The supplemental responses were prepared by a new representative, JoNina Abron, who, in conjunction with Joan Kelley, reviewed the interrogatories to determine whether additional information might be available. Past and present members were contacted. Abron also called a meeting of the Party's Central Committee, which is its governing body; at this meeting each of the 107 interrogatories was again reviewed.

Huey Newton complied with that portion of the August 6 order which required him to supplement his responses to five interrogatories. He maintained his claim of Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to 30 interrogatories, however.

Several weeks after the supplemental responses were filed appellees moved to dismiss the Party and Newton under Rule 37(b). Appellees also sought their costs and attorney fees under Rule 37(b). In an order dated January 25, 1980 the District Court granted these motions. The Court found that the Party had failed to comply with its August 6 order. Although "plaintiffs cannot choose to be litigants and at the same time exempt themselves from the rule of law that binds all federal litigants," the Party had continued to assert a First Amendment privilege. Moreover, the Party's attempt to clarify the 44 inconsistent and evasive interrogatories was inadequate.

In some instances not only do [the supplemental answers] fail to clarify previous answers, they create further confusion. In other instances they either completely ignore the inconsistencies the Party was directed to address or they introduce new information inconsistent with that already given in this case and with information given under oath by * * * Huey Newton. * * *

JA 1132. Finally, the court stated that the Party had ignored that portion of the order which required its officers to respond to a list of interrogatories.

The court also found that Newton had failed to comply with the August 6 order by continuing to claim a Fifth Amendment privilege. The court then stated that imposition of the sanction of dismissal was appropriate because the Party and Newton had displayed "conscious disregard" for its order. It also stated that the Party and Newton should pay the reasonable expenses incurred by appellees in bringing their motion to dismiss. Under Rule 37(b) the party failing to obey a discovery order must pay expenses unless the court finds that the failure to obey was "substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust."

Although appellees' motion to dismiss referred only to Newton and the Party, the court's January 25 order and the supporting memorandum referred simply to "plaintiffs." Appellants therefore filed a motion for clarification, in which they asked whether the order was intended to dismiss the entire case against all plaintiffs, including those individuals not covered by appellees' motion, or whether the order was restricted to Newton and the Party. On February 13, 1980 the District Court resolved this ambiguity by entering an amended order in which it stated that all named plaintiffs were dismissed.

II. STANDARDS GOVERNING IMPOSITION OF THE SANCTION OF DISMISSAL

We will begin by describing, in general terms, the legal standards that govern imposition of the sanction of dismissal under Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule provides that if a party fails to obey an order to provide discovery under Rule 37(a), the court "may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just * * *." A number of possible sanctions are set forth, including orders that certain facts be taken as established or evidence excluded; orders that claims or defenses be unopposed or pleadings struck; orders that reasonable expenses caused by the recalcitrant party be paid; and orders that the party be held in contempt. The most extreme sanction listed in Rule 37(b) is dismissal.

In Internat'l Union, UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense Education Foundation, Inc. (National Right to Work), 590 F.2d 1139, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we stated: "The validity of the sanctions imposed under [Rule 37(b)] depends, in the first instance, on the validity of the discovery orders on which they were based." See also Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975). That is, sanctions can be imposed for failure to obey an order compelling discovery under Rule 37(a) only if that order was justified. Thus, in this case, the validity of the District Court's order imposing the sanction of dismissal depends on the validity of the August 6 order compelling further responses.

Even when the underlying discovery order is valid, the District Courts should exercise their discretion to impose the extreme sanction of dismissal in rare circumstances. Ordinarily that sanction is appropriate only when a party has displayed callous disregard for its discovery obligations, or when it has exhibited extreme bad faith. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). The extent to which the other party's preparation for trial has been prejudiced is a relevant consideration. If less drastic sanctions will be equally effective, they should be employed; dismissal should be used as a last resort. See Marshall v. Segona, 621 F.2d 763, 768 (5th Cir. 1980). It is instructive to consider the facts of Morton v. Harris, 628 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1980), a case cited by defendants, in which a District Court decision imposing the sanction of dismissal was approved. Morton refused to provide his income tax returns even after the court ordered him to do so. He implied first that he had the documents, then asserted that he had lost them, and finally produced copies of a few of the documents that had been in his possession throughout. The District Court displayed a remarkable degree of patience; before the final dismissal, it dismissed Morton once without prejudice, and then reinstated him so that he would have another opportunity to pursue his claims.

The Supreme Court has indicated that the extreme sanction of dismissal may be used, not just to penalize litigants who have acted in bad faith, but also to deter parties to other lawsuits from disregarding their discovery obligations. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, supra, 427 U.S. at 643, 96 S.Ct. at 2781. In the absence of a valid underlying discovery order, however, or where the litigant on whom the sanction will be imposed has not displayed unusual intransigence, dismissal is not proper. The deterrence goal, by itself, will not support such a harsh result.

III. DISMISSAL OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Having outlined the standards governing imposition of the sanction of dismissal, we can proceed to consider the reasons supplied by the District Court for its actions in this case. As we have already explained, the District Court based its decision to dismiss the Party on three grounds: (1) the Party's failure to obey that portion of the August 6 order which required all officers to respond individually to a list of 107 interrogatories served on the Party; (2) the Party's failure to clarify answers the court believed to be inconsistent or evasive; and (3) the Party's failure to obey that portion of the August 6 order which required it to disclose the identities of Party members whose names were not known to the public.

As we explain below, we conclude that the three reasons supplied by the District Court do not support the decision to dismiss the Party. (1) That portion of the August 6 order which required each of the Party's officers to respond to 107 interrogatories was not valid. Thus under National Right to Work, supra, the Party's failure to obey this requirement does not justify imposition of sanctions. (2) That portion of the August 6 order which required the Party to explain allegedly inconsistent or evasive answers probably was valid. We find, however, that the Party's supplemental responses adequately explained any apparent inconsistencies or evasiveness. The District Court's decision to impose the sanction of dismissal cannot be justified on this ground. (3) We cannot determine on the basis of the record as it now stands whether that portion of the August 6 order which required the Party to divulge the identities of members not known to the public was valid. If it was not, then the Party's failure to comply could not justify imposition of sanctions.

We set forth the legal principles that the District Court should have applied in determining whether the claim of privilege was proper, and remand so that it may reconsider this question. On remand, if the District Court concludes that the claim of privilege should have been upheld, then the Party should be reinstated and given another opportunity to pursue its claims. If the court concludes that the claim of privilege was properly denied, it may enter a new order compelling the Party to respond. If the Party then refuses to comply, the court may consider imposing sanctions.

A. Requiring Each Party Officer to Respond to Interrogatories

In its August 6 order the District Court stated that each Party officer should respond under oath to a list of 107 interrogatories originally served on the Party. In our view, the District Court erred when it ruled that each of the officers must respond. It lacked the power to make such an order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an organization is entitled to designate the officer or agent who will prepare responses to interrogatories. The organization has broad discretion in making this choice. See 8 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2171 at 530, § 2172 at 539 (1970); Holland v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 28 F.R.D. 595 (D.D.C. 1961) (party serving interrogatories may not select officer or agent of adverse party). When the responses prepared by the designee are inadequate, or when the designee improperly objects to the interrogatories, the District Court may grant a motion to compel further responses under Rule 37(a). If this order is not obeyed, the court may grant a motion for sanctions under Rule 37(b), which, as we have seen, empowers it to "make such orders in regard to the failure as are just * * *." In situations where the organization completely fails to respond to interrogatories, a motion to compel discovery under Rule 37(a) is not necessary. Instead, the party that served the interrogatories may immediately move for sanctions under Rule 37(d). This rule also gives the court discretion to "make such orders in regard to the failure as are just * * *."

The District Court's August 6 order requiring each of the Party's officers to respond was not consistent with the scheme set forth in the Rules. The original responses to the 107 interrogatories were prepared by Joan Kelley. In many of her answers she stated that only limited information could be provided because records were not available. In other answers Kelley referred to the Senate Report describing the FBI's counterintelligence activities. And in several others, where the government had asked questions designed to obtain admissions from the Party that it had engaged in unlawful activities, she simply stated that it possessed no information. The District Court was apparently concerned that this lack of information would hinder preparation of the defendants' case; it stated that an order requiring all officers to respond was appropriate because records were unavailable and witnesses were scattered, and because many of the events complained of had occurred several years in the past.

Nothing in the Rules, however, gave the District Court discretion to order all officers to respond simply because it believed that the original responses prepared by the Party's designee did not contain sufficient information. Rule 37(a) states that when a designee's original responses are inadequate, the court may enter an order requiring supplemental responses. It does not give the court power to override an organization's choice of representative under Rule 33(a). It may be true that Kelley's original search for information could have been more vigorous; the fact that JoNina Abron was able to uncover additional information when she prepared the supplemental responses to the 107 interrogatories supports this conclusion. Under the circumstances, however, the District Court should have simply entered an order requiring the Party and its representative to conduct a more complete search for information. Then, if it concluded that the representative's response to this order was inadequate, it might have had power under Rule 37(b) to require all Party officers to respond to the 107 interrogatories; that rule, unlike Rule 37(a), does give the courts broad discretion to fashion appropriate orders.

Appellees suggest that the District Court's order was authorized by Rule 37(d), which, as we stated above, confers power to make such orders as are just when a party completely fails to respond to interrogatories. They argue, in effect, that Kelley's original answers to the 107 interrogatories were so inadequate as to constitute a total failure to respond. But Rule 37(d) has not been interpreted to apply when a party has actually served answers, unless the responses provided are so incomplete as to be grossly inadequate, or unless there is evidence of evasiveness. See 8 C. Wright A. Miller, supra, § 2291. We do not feel that the original responses could be characterized as grossly inadequate. After all, they totalled more than 100 pages. Indeed, the District Court expressly found that the Party had conducted a "good faith search" for information.

Because we do not believe the District Court properly ordered the Party's officers to respond to the 107 interrogatories, the Party's failure to obey this order cannot support imposition of the sanction of dismissal. But even if the underlying discovery order was valid, we would not be able to find that the failure to obey supports dismissal. The Party did not refuse to provide any more information. Its new representative, JoNina Abron, submitted a comprehensive set of supplemental responses totalling more than 50 pages. Moreover, appellants' refusal to comply with the court's order was based on a colorable legal claim. The Party's behavior could not be said to constitute the sort of inexcusable intransigence that would justify imposing the extreme sanction of dismissal. Cf. Morton v. Harris, supra. It is also relevant to note that appellees are not prejudiced by the Party's failure to comply with the terms of the August 6 order. See Marshall v. Segona, supra. Again, JoNina Abron's supplemental responses are quite detailed. Moreover, appellees would have had an opportunity to depose Party officers during later stages of discovery. Indeed, because the Party refused to comply, a potentially confusing situation was avoided. The purpose of serving interrogatories on the Party was to obtain admissions. But if each of the officers had responded, it would have been unclear whether they were speaking for themselves or their organization.

B. Inconsistent and Evasive Responses

Another reason supplied by the District Court to justify dismissal is its finding that the Party failed adequately to clarify 44 responses to interrogatories that the court considered to be inconsistent or evasive. We are unable to conclude that the portion of the August 6 order requiring clarification or additional information was invalid. We find, however, that the District Court erred when it ruled that the supplemental responses did not provide sufficient clarification. In our view, the explanation provided by the Party was adequate. Dismissal could not be justified on the ground that the Party failed to comply with this portion of the August 6 order.

As the Party points out in its brief, the interrogatories to which further responses were directed on the ground that the original answers were inconsistent or evasive can actually be divided into five categories. First, there were interrogatories with respect to which the Party had claimed a First Amendment privilege. Second, there were interrogatories that the Party objected to on grounds of burdensomeness. Third, there were interrogatories to which the Party responded by referring appellees to its newspaper. Fourth, there were interrogatories which sought further information concerning allegations in the Party's complaint, and to which the Party responded that it would be relying on discovery received from appellees. Finally, there were interrogatories the responses to which appellees disputed as a matter of fact because they believed them to be inconsistent with other evidence. Thus the court's description of each of the 44 responses as "inconsistent or evasive" may be somewhat broad.

The Party's responses to the interrogatories that fall within the first four categories clearly do not support dismissal at this stage. As we have already seen, the responses involving a claim of First Amendment privilege were not only included in the list of 44 inconsistent and evasive answers, but were also made the subject of a separate portion of the August 6 order; we show infra that it is unclear on the basis of the record as it now stands whether the claim of privilege was properly denied. Dismissal cannot be justified on the ground that the Party has refused to disclose its membership list until after the District Court has reconsidered the privilege question. As for the interrogatories that the Party objected to on grounds of burdensomeness, we note that supplemental responses were provided after the District Court entered its August 6 order. Review of these new responses convinces us that the Party has fulfilled its obligations. With respect to those interrogatories that the Party answered by referring to its newspaper, we point out that in its August 6 order the court explicitly ruled that the Party must prepare supplemental responses after conducting a full search of the publication. The Party did conduct this search. In the opinion accompanying its order dismissing appellants the court noted that the Party had supplemented its responses on the basis of information drawn from The Black Panther. As for the interrogatories which asked for further information regarding the Party's claims, and which the Party responded to by stating that it hoped to rely on further discovery from appellees, we have seen no evidence suggesting that the Party made these claims as part of a conscious effort to conceal relevant information. A decision to dismiss could not be justified on this ground.

The category of interrogatories to which appellees objected on the ground that the original responses were inconsistent with other evidence requires only slightly more attention. Having examined the Party's responses to each of the interrogatories that fall within this category, we cannot conclude that the portion of the District Court's August 6 order requiring clarification constituted an abuse of discretion; although many of the contradictions pointed to by appellees involve relatively insignificant issues, we believe that such an order was warranted. We do conclude, however, that the Party adequately explained the apparent inconsistencies in its supplemental responses and in the memoranda supporting its opposition to appellees' motions. The District Court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous. Appellees may continue to dispute the accuracy of the Party's responses. But dissatisfaction with an opposing party's responses to discovery requests is not unusual in complex cases. These disputes may be resolved at trial. Certainly, the Party has not displayed the sort of conscious disregard for its discovery obligations that would justify imposition of the sanction of dismissal.

We will not discuss each of the disputed answers here. Instead, we will simply describe several responses that seemed to present particularly troublesome contradictions. One example concerns allegedly inconsistent statements made regarding the size and composition of the Party's governing body, the Central Committee. In one of its original responses to appellees' interrogatories the Party stated that "the Party is and always has been governed by a fifteen-member body known as the Central Committee." The Party also listed the names of 22 past and present Committee members whose identities were known to the public. The government challenged the accuracy of these statements. It pointed to responses to interrogatories made by Huey Newton in which Newton confirmed that the Central Committee was a 15-member body but named only eight past and present members whose identities were publicly known. It also noted that in an unrelated criminal trial Newton testified that when he left the United States in 1974 the Central Committee consisted of himself and Elaine Brown, and that when he returned to this country in 1977 Elaine Brown left the Party and the Committee dissolved. Finally, the government notes that in an unrelated civil case Elaine Brown responded to interrogatories by identifying a total of 10 Committee members. Brown did not explain whether she intended to identify all members of the Committee or only the past and present members whose names were publicly known.

The Party's explanation is complex, but fully coherent. In one set of supplemental responses it clarified its first answer by stating that

the Central Committee has always consisted of approximately fifteen members. This number has fluctuated slightly. At times, there have been more than fifteen people on the Central Committee, and at other times there have been fewer than fifteen people. At present, for example, there are twelve members of the Central Committee.

As for the testimony of Newton in the unrelated criminal trial, the Party explained that when he said the Central Committee consisted only of him and Elaine Brown in 1974, and that it subsequently dissolved, he intended to refer to a central core within the Committee. According to the Party, this core consisted of the Committee members with whom Newton, as Party leader, was most likely to confer before making major decisions. This explanation is plausible: the Party suggested that such a central core existed in its original responses. The Party also stated that when Elaine Brown identified 10 Committee members she probably intended to identify only those past and present members whose names were already known to the public. It further explained that the Party identified 22 past and present members, whereas Newton and Brown identified only eight and 10 respectively, because it realized that, over time, more names had become public.

Another dispute involves an effort by appellees to obtain evidence establishing that the Party was committed to violence. In its interrogatory the government asked the Party to provide a list of its rules and by-laws. The Party provided a list, but appellees claimed that the response was evasive because it failed to include two items known as the "8 Points of Attention" and the "3 Main Rules of Discipline," which had been included in Party publications. According to the government, these two items contained rules suggesting that the Party was a violent organization. The Party explained that the "8 Points of Attention" and the "3 Main Rules of Discipline" were provided merely as examples of the rules of another revolutionary organization. It conceded that a Party press release implied that the rules applied to Party members. It claimed, however, that the press release was based on an article in The Black Panther, and that this article supported the Party's position. We think this explanation is adequate.

A third example also involves an effort to obtain an admission that the Party was a violent organization. Appellees asked whether Party members were required or encouraged to carry firearms. The Party responded by stating, "Within the limits of the law and the Constitution, the right to bear arms and defend one's home and property was not discouraged." Appellees argued that this answer was evasive. The Party supplemented its response by stating that, although Party members were not required to carry or train with firearms, "the atmosphere of harassment by law enforcement officers was such that members were encouraged to carry firearms." It also noted that under Party rules members were forbidden to carry weapons while intoxicated, or to use weapons unnecessarily. We find that this answer is sufficiently responsive.

A final example involves two interrogatories in which appellees asked whether Party members were encouraged to give the Party a portion of the proceeds whenever goods were "taken without an exchange of consideration." The Party denied this allegation. Appellees argued that this answer was inconsistent with information contained in a House Committee on Internal Security Report, Gun-Barrel Politics: The Black Panther Party 1966-1971, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1971), as well as with the "8 Points of Attention" and the "3 Main Rules of Discipline." The Party responded by pointing out that the House Committee Report discounted the reliability of the source on which the allegation was based; it also noted that other statements by the Party and the "8 Points" and the "3 Main Rules" themselves supported the Party's denial. Again, we believe the response, as supplemented, is adequate.

C. Claim of First Amendment Privilege: A Balancing Test

We have already held that the Party justifiably refused to obey the portion of the August 6 order requiring each of its officers to respond to 107 interrogatories, and that it adequately complied with the portion of the order requiring it to clarify 44 of its original responses. Thus the only reason supplied by the District Court to support dismissal that remains for our consideration is its finding that the Party unjustifiably claimed a First Amendment privilege.

In the three interrogatories with respect to which the Party continues to claim a First Amendment privilege appellees requested the names of all Party officers, the names of the leaders of local Party affiliates, and any documents reflecting the belief that appellees had conspired to destroy the Party. The Party responded in part, providing the names of 59 Party officers and 68 publicly known local leaders. It also provided the requested documents. Although it deleted from these materials all names of members not publicly known, it listed the names of 600 members whose identities were public.

The Party claims that the identities of its leaders and members who are not known to the public are privileged under the First Amendment; it suggests that if the names of these individuals are released, they will be harassed and their rights of expression and association will be infringed. The Party goes on to contend that because of this privilege the August 6 discovery order requiring it to disclose the names could not be justified. Thus its failure to obey provides no support for the decision to dismiss. The Party is clearly correct when it states that District Courts may not order disclosure of privileged information. Rule 26 expressly provides that parties may not obtain discovery of matters that are privileged. It is far more difficult to determine whether, under the circumstances presented by this case, the Party has made a valid claim of privilege.

Membership lists of groups engaged in political expression clearly deserve some First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court recognized this need in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), which held that Alabama could not force the NAACP to reveal its membership list. The Court stated, "It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective * * * restraint on freedom of association * * *." Id. at 462, 78 S.Ct. at 1171. Privacy is particularly important where the group's cause is unpopular; once the participants lose their anonymity, intimidation and suppression may follow. And privacy is important where the government itself is being criticized, for in this circumstance it has a special incentive to suppress opposition. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1416, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978).

Appellees suggest that even if the Party's membership list would ordinarily be entitled to some First Amendment protection, it automatically waived whatever constitutional rights it possessed when it filed this lawsuit. The logic behind this automatic waiver rule may, at first glance, seem appealing. After all, plaintiffs are "voluntary" litigants; they have created the situation that threatens their constitutional rights. This reasoning has led at least one court to adopt a waiver rule. See Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Incorporated, 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But in our view, the appeal of this logic is superficial only. Ordinarily, plaintiffs file suits because they believe the courts provide the best, if not the only, means to protect their rights. To say they must waive those rights when they come into court would make any judicial protection meaningless. Here, for example, the Party is suing the government in part because it believes the government has infringed its First Amendment rights of expression and association. An automatic waiver rule would frustrate this purpose. Indeed, requiring plaintiffs to choose between waiver of their constitutional rights and dismissal raises serious due process questions; if plaintiffs have a right to a day in court, that right is seriously infringed.

In our view, a balancing inquiry should be conducted to determine whether a claim of privilege should be upheld. Before granting a motion to compel discovery and forcing a plaintiff to choose between disclosure and sanctions, the plaintiff's First Amendment claim should be measured against the defendant's need for the information sought. If the former outweighs the latter, then the claim of privilege should be upheld. In this way the interests of both parties can be protected. Use of balancing tests to determine whether compelled disclosure is necessary is well established in the First Amendment context. In NAACP v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S. at 463, 78 S.Ct. at 1172, the Supreme Court stated that disclosure of membership lists by the defendant NAACP and the accompanying abridgement of its freedom of association would be appropriate only if the state could demonstrate a compelling interest in disclosure. A balancing test was also used by this court in National Right to Work, supra, where we held that the defendant, the National Right to Work Legal Defense and Educational Fund, could be forced to disclose its contributors only after a detailed inquiry into the other party's need for the information. Balancing tests are also used to determine whether reporters must disclose their confidential sources to civil litigants. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 2654, 41 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). To be sure, these cases do not involve attempts by plaintiffs to claim a First Amendment privilege. But nothing in the language of the opinions suggests that the proper approach varies depending on whether the plaintiff or the defendant is seeking constitutional protection.

In fact, a balancing approach has been adopted in cases very similar to this one, where the plaintiff has asserted a First Amendment privilege and refused to make discovery. In Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976), the plaintiff, an association formed to advance the educational and social status of Mexican-Americans, challenged the constitutionality of a state educational code provision that would have required it to disclose its membership. The association refused to answer three interrogatories from the school board that asked for the names of its members. The District Court, which adopted an automatic waiver theory, ordered disclosure and then dismissed when the association refused to comply with the order. The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating:

To require them to forfeit that which they seek to protect in order that they might receive federal assurance that they were indeed entitled to it initially would be an abdication by the federal court of not only its federal stature, but its judicial robes as well.

The language of N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra, is much too strong to permit this result. * * * [W]e cannot agree with the trial court's distinction of that case on the basis that the N.A.A.C.P. was the defendant there. * * *

Id. at 192. The court then balanced the plaintiff's interest in protecting the names of the association's members against the state's need for the information and ruled against disclosure. Similarly, in Hastings v. North East Independent School District, 615 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit reversed a District Court order dismissing a plaintiff teachers organization when it refused to release the names of its members who were not publicly known. The court stated that on remand the District Court should weigh the defendant's need for the names of the members against the plaintiff's constitutional interests before ordering disclosure or imposing additional sanctions.

Balancing one party's First Amendment interests against another party's need for disclosure to determine whether a claim of privilege should be upheld or whether discovery should be ordered requires a detailed and painstaking analysis. The need for First Amendment protection should be carefully scrutinized. See NAACP v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S. at 460-462, 78 S.Ct. at 1170-1171; National Right to Work, supra, 590 F.2d at 1152. The argument in favor of upholding the claim of privilege will ordinarily grow stronger as the danger to rights of expression and association increases. We emphasize, however, that the litigant seeking protection need not prove to a certainty that its First Amendment rights will be chilled by disclosure. It need only show that there is some probability that disclosure will lead to reprisal or harassment.

The interest in disclosure should also be carefully examined. Several factors are relevant in conducting this examination. First, courts must consider the relevance of the information sought. The interest in disclosure will be relatively weak unless the information goes to "the heart of the matter," that is, unless it is crucial to the party's case. See Zerilli v. Smith, supra, 656 F.2d at 713; National Right to Work, supra, 590 F.2d at 1153; Carey v. Hume, supra, 492 F.2d at 636. Mere speculation that information might be useful will not suffice; litigants seeking to compel discovery must describe the information they hope to obtain and its importance to their case with a reasonable degree of specificity. See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972). Second, courts must determine whether the litigants seeking disclosure have pursued alternative sources. Even when the information sought is crucial to a litigant's case, disclosure should be compelled only after the litigant has shown that he has exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information. National Right to Work, supra, 590 F.2d at 1153. Because of the preferred position of First Amendment rights, "compelled disclosure * * * [is] normally the end, and not the beginning, of the inquiry." Zerilli v. Smith, supra, 656 F.2d at 713 ( quoting Carey v. Hume, supra, 492 F.2d at 638). Infringement of First Amendment interests must be kept to a minimum.

On the basis of our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the District Court properly applied these principles in deciding that the claim of privilege should be denied and that disclosure should be ordered. In its August 6 order it stated: "Plaintiff cannot assert this privilege and at the same time proceed with this lawsuit, withholding information vital to the defense of the parties sued." Later, in its order dismissing the Party, it stated: "These may well be the individuals able to provide defendants with the information necessary for their defense — even to the point of telling them what exactly they are accused of doing."

These statements might be interpreted as suggesting that the District Court intended to apply a balancing approach. Clearly, however, they do not reflect the careful analysis that is necessary before an order compelling disclosure should be made. The court never specifically addressed the question whether the Party's fears of harassment and interference with First Amendment rights were substantial. As for the other side of the balance, the court simply accepted appellees' claims that the undisclosed names were crucial, even though appellees had never stated precisely what information they hoped the unnamed individuals would provide. The court also failed to consider the possibility that alternative sources might be able to provide the information sought. In particular, it failed to recognize that appellees might be able to obtain the information they needed from the individuals that the Party had already named. If appellees really were uncertain about what they were accused of doing, for example, it seems likely that they could have obtained helpful information from the Party members whose identities had been disclosed.

We remand so that the District Court may reconsider its decision to order disclosure in light of the principles we have outlined above. If appellees cannot show that their need for the undisclosed identities is substantial, and the court concludes that the claim of privilege should have been upheld, the Party should be reinstated. If, on the other hand, the court decides that the claim of privilege was properly denied, then it may enter a new order requiring the Party to respond. If the Party fails to comply with this order, sanctions may be appropriate. We point out, however, that sanctions should be carefully tailored to preserve to the greatest extent possible the First Amendment values at stake. Again, dismissal should be used only as a last resort.

IV. DISMISSAL OF HUEY NEWTON:

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE

Huey Newton claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer a number of interrogatories that would have required him to disclose information relating to matters that were the subject of pending criminal prosecutions or pending criminal and civil investigations. In its August 6 order the District Court ruled that Newton must either answer the interrogatories with respect to which he had asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege or face dismissal. When Newton continued to rely on the privilege, he was dismissed. We cannot determine on the basis of the record as it now stands whether the District Court's August 6 decision denying Newton's claim of privilege and compelling disclosure was valid. We remand so that the District Court may reconsider its decision to order disclosure in light of the legal principles we set forth below.

Just as appellees argued that an automatic waiver rule should be applied in the First Amendment context, so also they contend that such a rule should be applied in the Fifth Amendment context. Again, we disagree. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), the Supreme Court recognized that penalizing assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege effectively destroys the privilege. Thus it held that the judiciary may not impose sanctions that make assertion of the privilege "costly." See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). Requiring a plaintiff to choose between proceeding with his lawsuit and claiming the privilege clearly imposes a substantial cost. This cost cannot be justified on the sole ground that the plaintiff chose to initiate the suit and thus can be characterized as a voluntary litigant. Again, an individual "voluntarily" becomes a plaintiff only because he believes the courts provide the best means of protecting his rights. Indeed, as we noted in the First Amendment context, an automatic waiver rule raises serious due process questions; the plaintiff is in effect deprived of his day in court. Our conclusion that a per se waiver rule cannot be justified is supported by decisions in other circuits. See Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979) (proper exercise of Fifth Amendment rights by plaintiff in discovery stage of civil case can never justify automatic dismissal); Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1976) (there are "constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause").

In our view, a balancing approach is clearly preferable, since it gives far greater protection to plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights. Under this approach the claim of privilege should be upheld unless the defendant can show that his need for the information in question is substantial. Even in circumstances where the defendant has demonstrated a strong interest in disclosure, an order requiring the plaintiff to choose between his Fifth Amendment rights and dismissal will not be proper, except where other, less drastic, remedies are not available.

Use of a balancing test is not unprecedented in the Fifth Amendment context. In fact, in Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, supra, the Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted a balancing analysis to determine whether a plaintiff could invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to answer interrogatories. In that case the plaintiff brought a libel action after the defendant had broadcast a radio program in which it was alleged that the plaintiff had abused federal loan programs in which it was alleged that the plaintiff had abused federal loan programs. The plaintiff invoked the Fifth Amendment at a deposition in response to questions about the loans. The lower court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff's assertion of the privilege could not justify automatic dismissal. It stated that "a civil plaintiff has no absolute right to both his silence and his lawsuit. Neither, however, does the civil defendant have an absolute right to have the action dismissed anytime a plaintiff invokes his constitutional privilege." 608 F.2d at 1088. It went on to hold that by measuring the relative weights of the competing interests the courts could afford better protection to both parties. The court emphasized that in conducting this balance dismissal should be the last rather than the first step.

When plaintiff's silence is constitutionally guaranteed, dismissal is appropriate only where other, less burdensome, remedies would be an ineffective means of preventing unfairness to defendant.

Id. The Fifth Circuit then applied the balancing test to the facts before it. It recognized that the information sought by the defendants went to the heart of their case. But it decided that the balance tipped toward the plaintiff, and that all discovery should be stayed for three years until the statute of limitations on the potential criminal prosecutions had run.

On the basis of our review of the record, we cannot determine whether the District Court properly applied these legal principles when it entered an order requiring Newton to choose between disclosure and dismissal. In reviewing Newton's claim of privilege the court made statements virtually identical to those it made in dismissing the Party. It observed that appellees had contended that the information withheld by Newton "is vital to their defense, many times to the point of telling them what exactly they are accused of doing." This language might be interpreted as showing that the court intended to apply a balancing test. Even if this interpretation is correct, however, it is clear that the court did not undertake the careful analysis that is necessary before a claim of privilege can be denied.

First, the court never considered whether there was a serious threat to Newton's Fifth Amendment rights. The record as it now stands strongly suggests that Newton properly invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. Although appellees make several arguments in an attempt to show that Newton's invocation of the Fifth Amendment should not be respected, these arguments lack merit. Appellees contend, first, that Newton's claims involve no more than "imaginary hazards of incrimination." But Newton declined to answer the interrogatories in question precisely because they would have required him to disclose information about incidents that are the subject of pending criminal prosecutions or pending criminal and civil investigations. Newton concedes that the civil investigation has now been completed. However, that investigation did not terminate until after appellees had filed their motion for sanctions and Newton had filed his original and supplemental responses. Second, appellees suggest that Newton refused to answer several interrogatories that would have required him to identify participants in events that are the subject of criminal prosecutions in part because he wished to protect those individuals; they argue that this is not a proper claim of privilege. But as appellants correctly point out, identification of potential witnesses is within the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Finally, appellees claim that Newton has already waived his privilege because he testified about many of these issues in an unrelated criminal trial. However, a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is effective only in the proceedings at which the accused testifies. See, e.g., United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958); Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437, 444-445 (5th Cir. 1952); see generally C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 132 at 281 (1972).

On the other side of the balance, appellees have not made the detailed showing of need that would justify an order forcing a party to choose between disclosure and dismissal. Appellees have contended that the information is crucial "to the point of telling them what exactly they are accused of doing." But the record does not now provide much support for this contention. In fact, as appellants emphasize, the Fifth Amendment claims seem to relate only to a small portion of the lawsuit; the interrogatories Newton refused to answer pertained primarily to allegations contained in three subparagraphs of the complaint. It may be true that if appellees are never able to obtain the withheld information they will be prejudiced. This does not necessarily mean, however, that at this stage of the litigation an order forcing immediate disclosure is appropriate. Far less drastic remedies would seem to be available. The court apparently never considered the possibility of delaying Newton's obligation to respond until the criminal prosecutions and investigations are terminated or until the relevant statutes of limitations have expired. Newton has repeatedly stated that he would be willing to answer the interrogatories once the danger of prosecution has passed. In the meantime, appellees could proceed with discovery on other issues. It is instructive to compare the facts of Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, supra, in which the Fifth Circuit stayed the plaintiff's obligation to respond for three years, even though the information sought by the defendants went to the heart of their case.

We remand so that the District Court may reconsider its decision to deny the claim of Fifth Amendment privilege and to force Newton to choose between disclosure and dismissal in light of the balancing test we have just described. In conducting this balancing inquiry the court should consider whether an order delaying Newton's obligation to respond until the danger of criminal prosecution has passed would unduly prejudice appellees. If it finds that such an order would be appropriate, then Newton should be reinstated and given another opportunity to pursue his claims. Even if the court finds that appellees need the information in question immediately, complete dismissal should be a last resort; the court might consider, for example, dismissing only that portion of Newton's suit that relates to the withheld information.

V. DISMISSAL OF OTHER INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS AND AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

Appellants also challenge two District Court orders closely related to the decisions to dismiss the Party and Newton: (1) the order dismissing all other plaintiffs, and (2) the order requiring the Party and Newton to pay the expenses incurred by appellees in bringing their motion for sanctions.

A. Dismissal of Other Individual Plaintiffs

In their motion for sanctions appellees did not seek dismissal of any of the plaintiffs other than the Party and Newton. In its order granting the motion the District Court referred only to "plaintiffs." Thus, as we explained above, plaintiffs filed a motion for clarification, asking whether the court intended to dismiss only the Party and Newton, or whether it also intended to dismiss the other individual plaintiffs. The court responded by filing an amended order and final judgment in which it stated that "defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby granted" and that "all named plaintiffs to this action are hereby dismissed * * *." We reverse the dismissal of the other plaintiffs.

The District Court failed to set forth any findings of fact or law supporting its determination that the other plaintiffs should be dismissed. However, appellees have offered two theories that they believe support this determination. First, they suggest that the claims of the other plaintiffs were contingent upon the claims of the Party and Newton. Thus, when the Party and Newton were dismissed, dismissal of the remaining plaintiffs was appropriate. But the other plaintiffs' claims are not contingent upon the claims of the Party and Newton. The complaint alleges that the defendants engaged in a continuing conspiracy against the Party, its members, and its supporters. There is no reason why the other plaintiffs, as Party members and supporters, could not continue to litigate this claim, even though the Party and Newton are out of the case.

The second theory offered by appellees is that, although the District Court used the word "dismissal," it actually intended to grant a motion for summary judgment against all the other plaintiffs that appellees had filed roughly one year earlier. In this motion appellees claimed that summary judgment was appropriate because the other plaintiffs, unlike the Party and Newton, had only requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellees argued that there was no evidence showing any continuing harm, and that therefore equitable relief was unwarranted. Appellants responded to this motion by stating that their complaint did allege the possibility of continuing harm, and by filing an affidavit of counsel pursuant to Rule 56(f) in which they asked that consideration of the motion be deferred until they had an opportunity to take further discovery. Under Rule 56(f) the District Court may either deny a motion for summary judgment or postpone its decision when it concludes that additional discovery is necessary. We do not agree with appellees that the District Court's amended order can be interpreted as granting their motion for summary judgment. The District Court nowhere refers to Rule 56 or to the motion. We will not affirm the District Court's dismissal on this basis.

Because appellees' efforts to salvage the amended order are unavailing, the other plaintiffs should be reinstated. They should be given an opportunity to pursue their claims even if the court determines on remand that the Party and Newton were properly dismissed. If we have misinterpreted the order, that is, if the court did in fact intend to grant the motion for summary judgment, it may simply enter a new order explicitly stating that the motion is granted. We would point out, however, that summary judgment may be premature. There appears to be considerable merit to appellants' argument that a continuance is appropriate under Rule 56(f); at this stage of the litigation appellants have not had sufficient opportunity to uncover evidence supporting their claim of continuing harm. We note, for example, that the District Court never ruled on appellants' motion to compel production of documents by appellees.

B. Award of Attorney Fees and Costs

In addition to dismissing all appellants, the District Court, acting pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered the Party and Newton to pay the reasonable expenses incurred by appellees in bringing their motion to dismiss under Rule 37(b), including costs and attorney fees. We reverse. Appellants need not pay appellees' expenses.

Rule 37(b) states that the court shall require a party failing to obey a discovery order made under Rule 37(a) to pay the reasonable expenses caused by the failure, "unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." In this opinion we have already ruled that the Party complied with that portion of the August 6 discovery order which required it to clarify apparently inconsistent or evasive responses. Thus there was no "failure to obey" that would trigger the expenses provision of Rule 37(b). We have also ruled that the portion of the order requiring all Party officers to respond to a list of 107 interrogatories was not valid. Thus, although the Party did fail to obey this ruling, the failure was clearly "substantially justified." In addition, we have held that the District Court should reconsider those portions of the August 6 discovery order which require the Party and Newton to choose between assertion of a constitutional privilege and dismissal. At this stage we cannot find that their refusal to release the withheld information was not substantially justified. Under the circumstances, any possible basis for an award of expenses under Rule 37(b) has evaporated.

VI. OTHER ISSUES

Appellants raise several other issues not directly related to the decision to dismiss and award costs. In particular, they challenge the District Court's decisions to: (1) grant partial summary judgment in favor of all individual defendants who held office after 1973; (2) deny appellants' motion for an extension of time in which to file for class certification; and (3) postpone consideration of appellants' motion to compel discovery until after consideration of appellees' motion to compel. Appellees contend that we may not reach these issues since the notice of appeal filed by appellants pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure only referred to the orders granting dismissal and awarding expenses. Rule 3 provides that notice of appeal "shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from * * *." Rule 3(c), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. We are not persuaded by this argument.

The Supreme Court has rejected a strict construction of Rule 3. In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 229-230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), it held that an appeal should not be dismissed simply because the appellant failed to list all orders appealed from in its Rule 3 notice. In addition, this court has held that "when an appealable final judgment is entered, appeal brings up the entire record for review, including interlocutory orders." Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835, 90 S.Ct. 93, 24 L.Ed.2d 85 (1969). If appellees would be prejudiced by a decision to consider issues not specifically included in the notice of appeal, our conclusion might be different. See Gunther v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 255 F.2d 710, 717 (4th Cir. 1958) ("appeal should not be dismissed for mistakes which do not mislead or prejudice the appellee"). They have not made such a showing, however. We note that the Joint Appendix includes all of the orders which appellants wish to challenge.

A. Summary Judgment in Favor of Individual Defendants Who Held Office After 1973

In July 1977 each of the individual appellees who took office after January 1974 moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were not in office at the times of the acts alleged. They filed affidavits setting forth the dates on which they assumed office and disclaiming any knowledge of or participation in a conspiracy against the appellants. Appellants responded with an affidavit of counsel under Rule 56(f), stating that they needed further discovery before they could respond to appellees' motion for summary judgment. They also claimed that the affidavits of three of the appellees, Postmaster General Benjamin Bailar, Attorney General Levi, and Internal Revenue Service Commissioner William Williams, raised new issues of material fact, since they seemed to concede involvement in investigations of Party activities. Finally, appellants noted that their complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy, and described several overt acts occurring after January 1974. In July 1978 the District Court granted the motion. It stated that the post-1973 appellees' affidavits evidenced a lack of involvement in the acts alleged, and that the affidavits were substantiated by the recency of the terms of office. Moreover, appellants had failed to respond with evidentiary submissions of their own. The court recognized that appellants had filed an affidavit of counsel pursuant to Rule 56(f), but found that since that affidavit was submitted "plaintiffs have had ample opportunity to take * * * discovery and have taken discovery * * *."

We reverse on the ground that appellants had not yet been given sufficient time to take discovery. When the motion was granted, discovery was still in the first "wave." In fact, appellants had received appellees' first response to their request for documents only three months earlier. The materials they received were highly disorganized. Moreover, only three days before the order granting summary judgment was entered, appellants received an entirely new batch of documents. Because appellants believed appellees' response was inadequate, they later decided to file a motion to compel discovery. Under the circumstances, the District Court should have denied or at least postponed its decision on the motion for summary judgment. A central purpose of Rule 56(f) is to insure that diligent parties are given a reasonable opportunity to complete discovery and prepare their cases. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). Sufficient time for discovery is particularly important where crucial facts are in the control of the opposing party. Washington v. Cameron, 411 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Costlow v. United States, 552 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1977). Here, appellants have repeatedly stated their intent to rely on materials provided by the government through discovery to prove their claims of conspiracy.

Although we conclude that appellants should be given an opportunity to take further discovery, we are not convinced, on the basis of the record as it now stands, that they will be able to uncover any evidence implicating the post-1973 appellees. Almost all of the activities described in the complaint were alleged to have occurred before 1974. In fact, the FBI's operations under COINTELPRO were disbanded in 1971. The complaint does refer to two recent events: it alleges that the FBI continues to take the license plate numbers of all persons who visit Elaine Brown, and it states that in 1976 the government allocated funds "to pay off informants and provacateurs [ sic]." But these actions are not necessarily unlawful. It is also true that former Attorney General Edward Levi, former Postmaster General Benjamin Bailar, and former Acting IRS Commissioner William Williams concede that they participated in investigations of the Party. There is no indication that their conduct was illegal, however. Under the circumstances, the District Court might consider establishing an expedited discovery schedule with respect to the claims against the post-1973 government officials. By expediting discovery the court could ensure that these individuals will avoid any unnecessary involvement in further litigation.

B. Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File for Class Certification

On March 11, 1977 appellants filed a motion for an extension of time in which to move for class certification. Appellees opposed that motion on the ground that under Local Rule 1-13(b) of the Rules of the District Court for the District of Columbia motions for class action certification must be filed within 90 days of the time the complaint is filed. Here, the complaint was filed on December 1, 1977. Thus the time for moving to certify a class had expired 11 days prior. According to appellees, since the time for moving to certify a class had expired, motions for extensions of time in which to file for certification were also precluded. The District Court agreed, and refused to grant an extension. We affirm.

Appellants failed to offer any compelling reasons why the local rule should not be followed. In their motion appellants argued, first, that "[r]esearch into the facts which will determine the extent of the alleged class is extremely time-consuming and is still underway." But ongoing research need not have precluded a timely motion for class certification. At least as a preliminary matter, the definition of the proposed class that was provided in the complaint would have been sufficient for purposes of a motion for class action certification. Second, appellants argue that a motion was not yet appropriate because the complaint had not yet been served on appellees, and because the government had received an extension of time in which to respond to the complaint. But this excuse is unavailing. It is instructive to compare Coffin v. Sec'y of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 400 F.Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1975) (three-judge court), where class action certification was denied for failure to comply with Local Rule 1-13(b). In that case the court rejected a claim that plaintiff should not be held to the 90-day limit because defendants had filed motions to dismiss, to dissolve the three-judge court, and to transfer the case, and the class action certification issue could not be resolved until those motions were decided. We also point out that strict enforcement of Local Rule 1-13(b) implements the policy of Rule 23(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that the status of class actions should be determined quickly. Moreover, this was not a situation where appellants had failed to "beat the clock" by a few hours.

C. Decision to Delay Consideration of Appellants' Motion to Compel Production of Documents by Appellees

Appellants claim that the District Court abused its discretion when it decided to postpone consideration of their motion to compel production of documents by appellees. As a result of this postponement, appellants argue, the District Court decided the motions to compel further responses to interrogatories and to dismiss without considering appellees' misbehavior. Appellants suggest that, particularly where the court was deciding whether dismissal of their case was appropriate, the conduct of appellees was relevant. Appellees respond by arguing that the District Court has broad discretion to manage the timing of discovery. Because we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings, we need not resolve this dispute. We believe, however, that there is some merit in appellants' position. When a court is deciding whether to impose sanctions on one party, the behavior of the other party deserves some consideration. On remand, if the District Court is confronted with new motions for sanctions by appellees, it should examine their conduct before making its decision.

VII. CONCLUSION

We reverse the District Court's order dismissing the Black Panther Party and Huey Newton. The case is remanded so that the court may reconsider its decision to deny their claims of constitutional privilege in light of the legal principles outlined in this opinion. If the court decides that the claims of privilege should have been upheld, both the Party and Newton should be reinstated. We also reverse the dismissal of the other named plaintiffs. Regardless of the court's decision regarding the Party and Newton, these individuals should be reinstated and given another opportunity to pursue their claims. We reverse the decision to award expenses to appellees: because we conclude that the dismissals were inappropriate, the basis for that award has evaporated. And we reverse the District Court's decision to award summary judgment in favor of the individual appellees who held office after 1973, since we do not find that appellants have had sufficient opportunity to take discovery. We affirm the District Court's decision to deny appellants' motion for an extension of time in which to file for class action certification. The individual appellants may not press claims on behalf of the classes described in their complaint.

Although we believe this action should go forward, we admonish all parties to do their utmost to ensure that this suit proceeds expeditiously. We hope that, particularly when the parties seek further discovery, there will be more cooperation and less acrimony. No reason appears why this case, given a good faith effort by all parties, cannot proceed to a responsible conclusion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.