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addressing the issue of whether "appellant's right to the free exercise of religion, as secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, was violated when her religious practices were considered in making a custody determination"
Summary of this case from Goffstein v. SieveOpinion
No. 83-1079
Decided June 6, 1984.
Custody — Religious practices may be considered in making custody determination, when — Emotional instability and fanatical misguidedness of custodial parent.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County.
Appellant, Mary H. Birch, and appellee, Robert Birch, were married in 1973 with three children being born of the marriage. The parties separated in 1980 and appellant thereafter instituted an action for alimony in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Domestic Relations Division. Appellee answered and filed a counterclaim for divorce. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the children. The domestic relations court heard extensive testimony and made the following findings of fact:
"3. The evidence is overwhelming that * * * [appellant] is religiously pre-occupied to the point of fanaticism. In September 1978, she was admitted to Timken Mercy-Medical Center with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoia, delusional, religious fanaticism, and detachment from reality. Her beliefs and practices have resulted in her demanding that the children be clothed so that little of their body shows, even in the hottest days of summer. She shows little emotion[,] believing that suffering prepares one for their reward.
"4. The evidence is further overwhelming that * * * [appellant] is totally dominated by her father, Robert Lane. Mr. Lane has been unemployed for most, if not all, of * * * [appellant's] entire life. He is the head of his family and is very involved in the spreading and indoctrinating of his own religious tenants [ sic]. Two brothers and one sister of * * * [appellant] have suffered mental problems, all related to pre-occupation with religion.
"* * * [Appellant] had adopted the doctrines of the ultra-conservative Catholic faith. She has accepted many of the supernatural occurrences at various places to which the Catholic faith attaches no credibility. She professes that the `end times' is imminent and that everyone must prepare. Suffering and constant prayer to the Virgin Mary are required in order to be saved.
"* * *
"6. * * * [Appellee] basically deteriorated as the hearings in this case progressed. His hatred for his father-in-law has engulfed his whole attitude towards his wife. He was and is emotionally unstable. It is obvious he has not been able to cope with his wife's religious conviction and at times her delusions. His reactions have been at times violent, primarily directed at his father-in-law but also at times towards his wife.
"* * * [Appellee] has lived with his sister since the separation and she has taken up the cudgel on his behalf on several occasions. Her emotional stability is at the very best questionable.
"* * *
"* * * There is no question that the children have suffered traumatically during the pendency of this case due to the interactions of their parents and in-laws."
The record also contains testimony that the children often were left unsupervised at which time appellant would explain that God would look after them, were made to rise before dawn on Sundays to attend multiple church services, and occasionally displayed signs of poor hygiene.
The domestic relations court hereupon found both appellant and appellee guilty of gross neglect of duty toward each other and ordered the marital relationship terminated. The court made a property division which is not relevant to the instant appeal. The court further determined that it was not in the best interests of the children to award custody to either parent due to both parents' emotional instability. The court also determined that it was not in the best interests of the children to award custody to a relative. As a result, the domestic relations court ordered that its findings of fact and conclusions of law be certified to the Stark County Juvenile Court for further proceedings with respect to the custody of the children.
The juvenile court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the domestic relations court and found the Birch children to be dependent. Temporary custody was granted to the Stark County Welfare Department with the provision that all the children were to be placed in the same foster home and that visitation by both parents was to be liberal.
R.C. 2151.04(B) defines a "dependent child" as any child "[w]ho lacks proper care or support by reason of the mental or physical condition of his parents, guardian, or custodian."
Appellant appealed the award of custody. The court of appeals affirmed the judgments of the domestic relations and juvenile courts. The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. Patrick L. Menicos, for appellant.
Messrs. Tzangas, Plakas Mannos and Mr. James G. Mannos, for appellee.
The principal question raised in the case sub judice is whether appellant's right to the free exercise of religion, as secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, was violated when her religious practices were considered in making a custody determination concerning her minor children. Appellant maintains that, absent proof of actual harm to the children, she may not be deprived of custody if the custody determination is motivated by appellant's religious practices.
The First Amendment has never been interpreted as an absolute proscription on the governmental regulation of religious practices. In Reynolds v. United States (1878), 98 U.S. 145, 164, it was stated:
"* * * Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."
In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), 310 U.S. 296, 303-304, the court stated:
"Thus the [ First] Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."
In Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), 321 U.S. 158, the court acknowledged that the primary obligation of child-rearing rests with the parents and family. However, the court also recognized at 166-167 that:
"* * * [T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. * * * [T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and * * * this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction."
The court poignantly remarked:
"* * * Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make the choice for themselves." Id. at 170.
See, also, Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Gobitis (1940), 310 U.S. 586 [17 O.O. 417], Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205, and Bob Jones University v. United States (1983), 76 L. Ed. 2d 157.
R.C. 3109.04(A) provides:
"If the [domestic relations] court finds, with respect to any child under eighteen years of age, that custody to neither parent is in the best interest of the child, it may commit the child to a relative of the child or certify a copy of its findings, together with so much of the record and the further information, in narrative form or otherwise, as it deems necessary or as the juvenile court requests, to the juvenile court for further proceedings, and, upon the certification, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction."
R.C. 3109.04(C) sets forth a list of factors which must be considered in determining the best interests of a child. That list includes:
"(3) The child's interaction and interrelationship with his parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
"* * *
"(5) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation."
There is no question that the paramount and overriding concern of the above statute is the best interests of the child, or in this case children, and that it is the court's function to see that the children's best interests are protected. See, e.g., Scholler v. Scholler (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 98, 103-104, and Boyer v. Boyer (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 83, 87 [75 O.O.2d 156]. This obligation of the court to consider the best interests of the children serves to protect them from emotionally unstable and fanatically misguided custodial parents, whether the parents' behavior is religiously motivated or otherwise, while simultaneously safeguarding the parents' fundamental constitutional freedom to raise their children as they deem proper. See Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), 262 U.S. 390, 399, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), 268 U.S. 510, 534-535. In recognition of society's legitimate interest in the welfare of its minor children, the law does not require that a child be actually harmed or that a parent's unsuitability to have custody of her children be disregarded because the parent claims that the bases of her unsuitability are religious practices.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Appellant also argued below that the juvenile court, upon certification from the domestic relations court, may not adopt the latter court's findings of fact and conclusions of law but must hold a new hearing. We can find no support for appellant's argument and note that appellant (or appellee for that matter) is entitled to seek a modification of the custody determination upon the proper showing of changed circumstances. See R.C. 3109.04(B) and 2151.38.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN and J.P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.