Opinion
2:24-cv-03990-RMG-MGB
08-01-2024
Shawn Richards Bey, Plaintiff, v. MUSC Health University Medical Center; Octavia Nicole Washington; and the North Charleston Police Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Shawn Richards Bey (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action challenging the administration of certain medical treatment on his minor daughter (A.R.B.) at the Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”). (Dkt. No. 1.) In bringing this lawsuit, Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 4) and a Motion for an Emergency Injunction (Dkt. No. 5). Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed and Plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff claims that in April 2024, the family pediatrician diagnosed his daughter with mumps after examining a swollen lump under her chin. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1.) When the lump continued to grow, Plaintiff sought a second opinion and took his daughter to Roper St. Francis Hospital, where medical personnel collected bloodwork. (Id. at 2.) Upon receiving the results from the laboratory on May 6, 2024, Roper St. Francis Hospital called A.R.B.'s biological mother, Defendant Octavia Nicole Washington, and told her that A.R.B. needed to go to MUSC's Shawn Jenkins Children's Hospital. (Id.) Once at MUSC, Plaintiff and Defendant Washington learned that A.R.B.'s bloodwork indicated leukemia. (Id.) A doctor apparently informed Defendant Washington, without Plaintiff present, that A.R.B. needed to begin chemotherapy as soon as possible, which would require surgically implanting a stent in her chest within the next two days. (Id.)
Plaintiff suggests that because he and Defendant Washington were no longer in a relationship, they “were not on the best of terms” at the time of the diagnosis, and when he “expressed objection to the proposed procedure,” Defendant Washington “became combative and disagreeable, refusing to listen to what [he] was trying to explain to her about [their] duty of prudence and due care to protect [A.R.B.'s] health and well-being.” (Id. at 1-2.) Instead, Defendant Washington “irresponsibly” agreed to the doctor's recommendations without “ask[ing] for any type of clarification” or “giving time for genuine consideration.” (Id. at 2-3.) Although Plaintiff told the doctor and Defendant Washington that he “did not consent to any chemotherapy procedures being performed”-arguing that “the results of chemotherapy often times cause serious and irreparable damage to one's immune system”-the doctor “claimed that they had the authority to move forward with the procedure against [his] will.” (Id. at 3.) Defendant Washington then “signed a consent form for the medical procedures/surgery/chemotherapy to be performed.” (Id.)
On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff sent an email to the “lead physician . . . giving her due notice to cease and desist any actions to move forward with any medical procedure[,] specifically the chemotherapy that was scheduled.” (Id. at 4.) The notice claimed to invoke Plaintiff's purported “[n]ational, religious, and medical right to not accept and proceed with any medical procedure without full free-willed and informed consent,” asserting that he and Defendant Washington “[did] not have any court order in place at all, so there [was] no legal nor lawful basis that would allow her to make sole decisions for [their] child.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15-16.) To the contrary, the Complaint seems to allege that Plaintiff had “created a trust” with Defendant Washington pursuant to the “national ecclesiastical trust indenture law” of the Moorish American Nation, establishing that he, as the father, was “the decisionmaker and authority” with respect to the “protection and welfare” of A.R.B., who was “held as property” in that trust. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1, 3, 5.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Washington and the medical team “were intent on performing [the] procedure against [his] will” and apparently moved forward with the surgery and chemotherapy despite his “notice to cease and desist.” (Id. at 4.) MUSC's Patient and Family Liaison later sent Plaintiff a letter explaining that,
Under S.C. law, surgeries on minors need only be consented to by one (1) parent. If medically necessary and vital to the minor patient's life and health, then can be undertaken with the documented agreement of 2 physicians that the operation is essential to preserve the minor patient's life and health. [A.R.B.'s] mother consented to the operation.... You do not . . . have sole decision-making authority (unless the Family Court has removed such rights from mom).(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25.)
Plaintiff contends that since May 8, 2024, his daughter's “health has rapidly declined from the implementation of [the] chemotherapy treatment,” and the “procedure is stealing life from [her] every day.” (Id. at 5-6.) He also claims that after A.R.B. was released from the hospital, Defendant Washington “had North Charleston policemen come to [his] home and forcibly remove [his daughter] from [his] guardianship without lawful authority,” such that she is now in the exclusive care of Defendant Washington. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Washington “is an imminent threat and danger to [A.R.B.'s] safety,” as she “has no knowledge of chemotherapy and its risk vs. rewards ratio, neither does she know whether or not the diagnosis was accurate” in the first instance. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff contends that by allowing the ongoing chemotherapy treatments without his consent, Defendant Washington “is abusing the trust,” as she agreed to “[obey] the national and religious law protections of the trust,” which include “the ancient tradition of Islamism [that] the body of man and child [be held] sacred and . . . not be cut into unless proven absolutely necessary with the full free-willed consent of the Father.” (Id. at 6-7.) Similarly, Plaintiff claims that MUSC “violated [his] national and religious beneficial right and equitable asset law after [he] gave them due notice of the fact that them moving forward with their procedure without his consent violated [his] national and religious beneficial rights and law.” (Id. at 5.) Based on the above, Plaintiff demands that the “medical procedures and [Defendant Washington's] breach of trust be stopped immediately with a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief to cease the procedures, remove the stint [sic] from [A.R.B.'s] chest immediately and return the trust res [A.R.B.] to [his] custody so that [he] may do what's best for [his] property/child and nurse her back to health without the well-known harmful and many times irreversible and deadly effects of (prolonged) radiation in a little girl's body.” (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff's “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Emergency Injunctive Relief” (Dkt. No. 4) seeks similar relief, asking “to stay Defendants [MUSC] and [Washington] from continuing the harmful radiation treatment being currently forced onto [A.R.B.] . . . and the City of North Charleston Police Department from denying [him] possession of [A.R.B.] as they have recently done under color of authority.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff reiterates that A.R.B. is “held as private property in a private international ecclesiastical trust . . . subject to the ecclesiastical trust indenture law,” which states that “the father [is] the decision maker and authority.” (Id. at 2-3.) Thus, by “[performing] a radiation surgery and therapy procedures on trust res [A.R.B.] against [Plaintiff's] express will intent purpose,” Defendants have engaged in “breach of trust, coercion, trespassing and fraud” and violated Plaintiff's “equitable asset national and religious right.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff's Motion for an Emergency Injunction(Dkt. No. 5) further attempts to enforce these purported rights, demanding “acknowledgement and performance” of his alleged agreement with Defendant Washington based on his status as a “private and true American national of inherited birthright . . . with proprietary rights under the organic American constitution trust indenture via the Treaty of Peace and Friendship ” (Id.)
The full title of Plaintiff's filing is, “Motion for Leave of the Court to Enter the Exclusive Equity Jurisdiction & File Petition for Suit in Chancery & Motion for Emergency Injunction Under Seal.” (Dkt. No. 5.) However, this motion is largely “legalistic gibberish,” Rochester v. McKie, No. 8:11-cv-797-JMC, 2011 WL 2671228, at *1 (D.S.C. July 8, 2011), as the undersigned is not aware of any cognizable legal claims involving “exclusive equity jurisdiction” or “suits in chancery” that would apply here-nor does Plaintiff explain such in his motion.
Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff seems to suggest that this motion (Dkt. No. 5) should be sealed by the Court “to protect [his] proprietary rights.” (Id.) As explained in the order filed contemporaneously herewith, however, Plaintiff did not file a memorandum identifying those supposed proprietary rights or explaining why sealing is necessary to protect the same as required under Local Civil Rule 5.03 (D.S.C.). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff wishes to seal his Motion for an Emergency Injunction (Dkt. No. 5), the undersigned directs his attention to Local Civil Rule 5.03 (D.S.C.).
LEGAL STANDARD
The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Accordingly, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or “baseless” factual contentions may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his or her pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). There are two primary bases for exercising original federal jurisdiction: (1) “federal question” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) “diversity of citizenship” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
In the instant case, the Complaint does not specify which of these two jurisdictional bases Plaintiff intends to invoke for purposes of bringing his claims before this Court. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) To that end, it is difficult for the Court to discern the precise causes of action raised here, as the pleading is largely comprised of various nonsensical, disorganized exhibits filled with pseudo-legal ramblings. See Campbell v. StoneMor Partners, LP, No. 3:17-cv-407, 2018 WL 3451390, at *2, 4 (E.D. Va. July 17, 2018) (explaining that courts need not “scour through [a Pro se plaintiff's] attachments in an attempt to cobble together the facts that could support” the proposed claims or “discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff”), aff'd, 752 Fed.Appx. 166 (4th Cir. 2019); Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a Pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Nonetheless, the undersigned has combed through these attachments in a serious effort to consider the merits of Plaintiff's Pro se claims and finds that the Complaint could liberally be construed as attempting to allege violations of Plaintiff's constitutional right to freedom of religion (see Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5, stating that Defendants' actions were “against his religion of Islamism;” see also Dkt. No. 4 at 1-2, citing to the First Amendment), which would trigger federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (stating that to establish federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff must assert a cause of action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
For example, the Complaint includes a copy of the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the United States of America, and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Morocco,” a “Legal Notice” of “Name Declaration, Correction Proclamation and Publication” asserting Plaintiff's “Moorish Nationality,” an “Amended Order Decree Confirming Declaration as to Correct Name” designating Plaintiff a “free Moor” under the “Free Noble Title Shawn Lamar Richards Bey,” and printouts from the Mayo Clinic's website discussing the side effects of certain medications and chemotherapy treatments. (Dkt. No. 1-1.)
Although the Complaint vaguely alludes to other federal authorities (see Dkt. No. 1-1, referencing the Nuremberg Code, the Convention on the Prevention of Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), many of these authorities are inapplicable here and/or fail to provide a private right of action. See Rivers v. Goodstein, No. 2:18-cv-2032-RMG-MGB, 2018 WL 4658487, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 2018) (noting that “[t]he mere recitation of inapplicable statutes in connection with patently frivolous claims” does not raise a colorable federal question), adopted, 2018 WL 4656239 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2018); Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020) (finding no basis for federal question jurisdiction where complaint failed to allege sufficient facts in support of conclusory references to purported federal violations), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020); see also Nasi El for Collins v. South Carolina, No. 2:22-cv-506-BHH-MHC, 2022 WL 2835752, at *4 (D.S.C. June 17, 2022) (noting that federal courts have routinely dismissed claims based on treaties, declarations, and/or resolutions regarding Moorish heritage as frivolous), adopted sub nom. El v. South Carolina, 2022 WL 2835373 (D.S.C. July 20, 2022).
Assuming that Plaintiff is in fact alleging violations of his right to religious freedom, the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” U.S. Const. amend. I; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (explaining that the First Amendment has been made applicable to the states by incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The undersigned notes at the outset that “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose . . . [a] child to . . . ill health or death.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). Indeed, “neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation,” and the state's authority “to guard the general interest in youth's well being . . . is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience.” Id. at 166. Thus, parents like Plaintiff typically do not have a constitutional right to withhold medical treatment that is “necessary for or conducive to the child's protection against some clear and present danger.” Id. at 167. The undersigned therefore finds that Defendants' decision to proceed with chemotherapy treatment in response to A.R.B.'s leukemia diagnosis likely falls within this category and overrides any purported violation of Plaintiff's right to exercise his religion.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the Complaint fails to name a defendant amenable to suit in the first instance. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may “vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim for a constitutional violation under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In other words, the conduct must be “fairly attributable” to the state; purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, injurious, fraudulent, or discriminatory, does not provide a basis for action under § 1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-39 (1982). Consequently, Defendant Washington, a private citizen, is not amenable to suit under § 1983. With respect to MUSC and the North Charleston Police Department, courts have routinely held that “inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds” do not qualify as “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. Glenn v. Walters, No. 7:18-cv-275-HMH-KFM, 2018 WL 2122895, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 2118025 (D.S.C. May 8, 2018). Because these Defendants make up facilities, buildings, and/or groups of people, they do not constitute persons for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the physical buildings or the staff and collection of officials they house. See Madison v. Shell, No. 7:22-cv-3549-TMC-JDA, 2022 WL 17156885, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 17128451 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2022) (Police Department); Elder v. Hayden Fam., No. 9:22-cv-1666-TMC-MHC, 2022 WL 18674842, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2022), adopted, 2023 WL 1971974 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2023) (Police Department); Smith v. Nelson, No. 8:22-cv-1467-DCN-JDA, 2023 WL 6643355, at *9 (D.S.C. July 18, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 6358028 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2023) (Hospital/Medical Facility); von Fox v. Med. Univ. of S.C., No. 2:16-cv-179-RMG-MGB, 2016 WL 8732360, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2016), adopted sub nom. Fox v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 2016 WL 693525 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2016), dismissed sub nom. Fox v. South Carolina, 668 Fed.Appx. 442 (4th Cir. 2016) (MUSC). The undersigned notes that while the Complaint names only those three defendants listed in the caption above, other filings indicate that Plaintiff may have intended to include a certain social worker (“Alexis”) as a party to this action. (See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1; Dkt. No. 4.) While this individual could arguably be a state actor for purposes of §1983, her inclusion as a defendant in this case is a moot issue, as Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons stated below regardless.
Nevertheless, the Court need not decide this issue at this time, as the true basis for Plaintiff's claim renders this action frivolous and outside of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. To satisfy § 1331, the court “must look beyond the verbiage of a complaint to the substance of the plaintiff's grievance....” See Burgess v. Charlottesville Savings and Loan Assoc., 477 F.2d 40, 43 (4th Cir. 1973) (explaining that the complaint must “contain allegations affirmatively and distinctly establishing federal grounds not in mere form, but in substance and not in mere assertion, but in essence and effect”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While the Complaint, on its face, alleges that Defendants' conduct violated, and continues to violate, Plaintiff's religion of “Islamism,” the purported religious violations on which this claim rests are actually terms of the “trust” created by Plaintiff and Defendant Washington pursuant to the “national ecclesiastical trust indenture law” of the Moorish Nation. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5.) As noted above, Plaintiff contends that the “religious law protections of the trust” secure his right to serve as the sole decisionmaker and custodian with respect to A.R.B., who is held as his “property” in the trust, and that Defendants' actions violate these alleged tenets. (Id. at 5, 7; see also Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15, suggesting that Plaintiff holds the “highest equitable interest” in A.R.B.) These references to Plaintiff's religion, however, are largely superficial, as they more accurately speak to the parental and custodial rights purportedly established under the trust agreement executed between Plaintiff and Defendant Washington. Such allegations do not establish an actionable federal question for several reasons.
First, the nature of the trust is frivolous and does not provide a sound basis on which this Court may act because it is clearly rooted in the so-called “sovereign citizen” movement. Generally, sovereign citizens are “proponents of the view that an individual has special status in the United States as a function of association with a ‘Moorish' group.” Hampton-Bey v. Concord Police Dep't, No. 1:19-cv-9, 2019 WL 3751028, at *3 (M.D. N.C. May 2, 2019); see also U.S. v. $7,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 583 F.Supp.2d 725, 732 (M.D. N.C. 2008) (stating that individuals identifying as Moorish Americans are “the most recent incarnation of a notorious organization of scofflaws . . . who attempt to benefit from the protections of federal and state law while simultaneously proclaiming their independence from and total lack of responsibility under those same laws”). However, “allegations of a special status” on the basis of “Moorish ancestry” have “been thoroughly discredited and noted as patently frivolous” by federal courts. Bey v. Fekete, No. 8:23-cv-4782-HMH-KFM, 2024 WL 1623554, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2024) (internal citations omitted); see also Hampton v. City of Durham, No. 1:10-cv-706, 2010 WL 3785538, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Sept. 22, 2010) (“Any claims or arguments . . . which are based on [ ] membership in the Moorish American Nation are frivolous.”).
“The law is clear that Moorish Americans, like all citizens of the United States, are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which they reside.” See Jones-El v. South Carolina, No. 5:13-cv-1851-JMC, 2014 WL 958302, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2014) (collecting cases); see also El-Bey v. North Carolina, No. 5:11-cv-423-FL, 2012 WL 368374, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 9, 2012) (“[A]ny claim based on the contention that Plaintiffs are not subject to the laws of [the state] because of their alleged Moorish nationality and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1787 is frivolous.”), adopted, 2012 WL 368369 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 3, 2012). Accordingly, Plaintiff's supposed status as a Moorish American National and his related rights under the “ecclesiastical trust indenture law” of his trust do not establish a cognizable constitutional right to circumvent South Carolina lawand unilaterally dictate his daughter's medical care and/or custody.
As alluded to in the letter from MUSC's Patient and Family Liaison (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25), the South Carolina Childrens Code provides,
Health services of any kind may be rendered to minors of any age without the consent of a parent or legal guardian when, in the judgment of a person authorized by law to render a particular health service, such services are deemed necessary unless such involves an operation which shall be performed only if such is essential to the health or life of such child in the opinion of the performing physician and a consultant physician if one is available.S.C. Code § 63-5-350; see also Banks v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 314 S.C. 376, 380 (1994).
Second, as suggested above, the Moorish tenets described in the trust do not reflect true constitutional rights as contemplated under the First Amendment, but rather, sound more in state domestic law. After stripping away the sovereign citizen legalese from Plaintiff's various exhibits, his Complaint essentially boils down to a dispute regarding Plaintiff's rights over his daughter's medical care and custody; in short, he is challenging Defendants' purported interference with his parental rights. Indeed, Plaintiff seems to suggest that the terms of the trust somehow enable this Court to order the removal of the stent from A.R.B.'s chest and the end of her chemotherapy treatment, and to impose some sort of custodial injunction that restores A.R.B. to the care of her father. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 7.) However, this Court simply does not have the authority to provide this relief, as such matters are more appropriately reserved for the state courts.
Indeed, the domestic relations exception generally precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over child custody matters. See Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting “the long established precedent that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and generally abstain from hearing child custody matters”); see also Ross v. Rakes, No. 3:18-cv-537, 2018 WL 6175462, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 30, 2018) (explaining that child custody matters “are generally not heard in federal court” because state courts “have the experience to deal with this specific area of the law”) (internal citations omitted), adopted, 2018 WL 6173885 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 26, 2018); In re Mitchell, No. 11-08880-8-ATS, 2013 WL 5798941, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. Oct. 25, 2013) (referencing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989) (“Domestic relations matters are preeminently matters of state law, and where possible, it is preferable that domestic matters be handled in state court.”)).
Because the loss of parental rights is “intricately connected to the issue of child custody,” such claims are typically subject to the domestic relations exception. Ross, 2018 WL 6175462, at *9. Such is the case here, as Plaintiff's Complaint-at its core-attempts to alter and restore Plaintiff's parental rights so that he may control the custody and medical care of his daughter. See Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining that federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases that “seek a declaration of present or future [custodial] rights”); Ross, 2018 WL 6175462, at *6 (dismissing claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the domestic relations exception where the “true nature of the complaint” was an attempt to challenge custody). The Court simply cannot decide such matters. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a true federal question for purposes of this action, and the Court therefore lacks such jurisdiction under § 1331.
To be sure, the Court would effectively have to order the necessary state officials to take certain actions pertaining to A.R.B.'s care and custody, which it cannot do. A federal district court has “no jurisdiction over state employees and cannot compel a South Carolina state agency to take a particular action. LeVan v. Warden, Lee Corr. Inst. No. 4:22-cv-3990-MGL-TER, 2023 WL 6164303, at *1 (D.S.C. June 26, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 6162303 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-7061, 2024 WL 889234 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024); see also Dais v. Huggins, No. 8:08-cv-3629-JFA-BH, 2008 WL 5062329, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 20, 2008) (referencing Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2nd Cir. 1988) (explaining that it is well-established that “federal courts have no general power to compel action by state officials”).
Without a federal cause of action, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction over any potential state law claims unless there is complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000 as required under § 1332.Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978); see also Cent. W.Va. Energy Co., Inc. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that diversity jurisdiction “requires complete diversity among parties, meaning that the citizenship of every plaintiff must be different from the citizenship of every defendant”). Because Plaintiff and Defendant Washington appear to be citizens of South Carolina (see Dkt. No. 1 at 2), complete diversity does not exist here. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is also attempting to raise certain state law claims here, he cannot invoke diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter entirely.
Although the Complaint does not expressly raise any specific state law causes of action, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff's various filings allude to breach of trust, negligence, trespass, fraud, and other South Carolina common law claims. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3, 6.)
Courts have routinely held that a plaintiff's purported status as a Moorish American does not render him diverse for purposes of jurisdiction under § 1332 absent evidence that he is a citizen of another recognized nation or resides in a different state. See Nasi El for Collins, 2022 WL 2835752, at *8 (collecting cases). Plaintiff's Complaint confirms that he resides in South Carolina for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.)
It is for these same reasons that the undersigned also finds Plaintiff's motions for emergency injunctive relief (Dkt. Nos. 4, 5) subject to summary dismissal. Immediate injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); see also Collins v. Bernedette, No. 2:22-cv-1391-RMG, 2022 WL 16951738, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2022) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Rather, a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction should issue only when the movant has established all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; see also Henderson for Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Bluefield Hosp. Co., LLC, 902 F.3d 432, 439 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “ Winter made clear that each of these four factors must be satisfied to obtain preliminary injunctive relief”).
Beyond alleging “imminent danger” to A.R.B.'s health (Dkt. No. 4 at 3), Plaintiff does not substantively address the individual Winter factors in his motions for injunctive relief; nevertheless, the undersigned finds that the first factor is dispositive here, as Plaintiff cannot succeed on the merits where the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims. Once again, Plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief ask this Court to interfere with his daughter's chemotherapy treatment as directed by licensed medical professionals and effectively order the necessary state officials to take certain actions pertaining to A.R.B.'s care and custody based on the terms of a Moorish National trust. The undersigned reiterates again that this Court cannot provide such relief. Consequently, Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of his claims here, and his motions for emergency injunctive relief (Dkt. Nos. 4, 5) are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned is of the opinion that Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies identified above by amending his Complaint. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993). The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without further leave to amend. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022). The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 4) and Motion for an Emergency Injunction (Dkt. No. 5) also be DENIED .
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Charleston, South Carolina
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).