ORDER

DAVID BRAMLETTE, District Judge

This cause is before the Court on defendant 3M Company's motion to dismiss (docket entry 20). On December 19, 2003, this Court entered an Order to Show Cause, advising the plaintiffs that their claims against 3M Company could be dismissed for failure to respond to the motion to dismiss, and allowing them ten days to respond. The plaintiffs failed to respond to 3M's motion, and it should therefore be taken as conceded. Furthermore, the Court has this day granted defendants CBS, et al.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings, for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. For the reasons given in the Memorandum Opinion and Order of even date herewith, the Court finds that defendant 3M's motion to dismiss should be granted. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant 3M Company's motion to dismiss (docket entry 20) is GRANTED, and all claims against defendant 3M company are dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The original complaint in this action was filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi, on December 6, 2002. The plaintiffs then filed a series of amended complaints, through and including their Eighth Amended Complaint, filed December 30, 2002. On January 6, 2003, the defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order filed June 30, 2003, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, and dismissed the complaint as against defendants Emmerich and Strittman with prejudice. On October 28, 2003, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to vacate the Opinion and Order.

This case arises out of the television broadcast of "Jackpot Justice," a segment of the CBS "60 Minutes" program which aired on November 24, 2002. The segment focused on multi-million dollar verdicts rendered in rural areas of Mississippi, particularly Jefferson County, and featured interviews with Wyatt Emmerich, a newspaper publisher and columnist from Jackson, Mississippi, and Beau Strittman, a florist from Fayette, Mississippi, the county seat of Jefferson County.

The plaintiffs, who claim to have served as jurors in personal injury cases in Jefferson County, allege that defendant Morley Safer "covered, reported and/or hosted" the "Jackpot Justice" segment, and that defendants Don Hewitt, Deirdre Naphin and Jennifer Breheny produced the segment. (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶ 13). The plaintiffs further allege that the segment "characterized Fayette, Mississippi as 'the land of jackpot justice,'" (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶ 14) and as "'rural and impoverished.'" (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶ 15).

The complaint alleges that defendant Emmerich "described the jurors of Jefferson County who gave $100 or more million dollar jury verdicts with regard to asbestos and 'phen-phen' cases as disenfranchised people and stated that the reason that they gave those verdicts was because they were paying back these yankee corporations or businesses for them being disenfranchised; and also because the said jurors were angry and held resentment." (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶ 16).

The complaint also alleges that defendant Strittman stated "that the said jurors awarded those verdicts because they felt they was [sic] going to get a cut of the money awarded," (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶ 17). Defendants Safer and Strittman are alleged to have "stated that the said jurors received money 'under the table' and 'on the quiet.'" (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶ 18).

The complaint alleges that Strittman's and Emmerich's statements "were libelous, slanderous and defamatory unto the plaintiffs who served as members of those said jurors [sic]." (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 27). The plaintiffs allege that defendants Viacom, CBS, Safer, Hewitt, Naphin and Breheny "were negligent and either knew or should have known that the said statements by [defendants Strittman and Emmerich] were not based on any disclosed truthful facts from a reliable source and that they were libelous, slanderous and defamatory unto the plaintiffs." (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 28). The complaint also alleges a civil conspiracy claim against all defendants for conspiring "to commit defamation, libel and slander upon the plaintiffs." (Eighth Amend. Compl. ¶ 40). The plaintiffs' complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

The defendants' motion is brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), which provides:

After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A court may enter judgment on the pleadings only if the material facts show that the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Greenberg v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 478 F.2d 254, 256 (5^th Cir. 1973).

Rule 12(h) (2) provides that "[a] defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be made . . . by motion for judgment on the pleadings." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (h)(2). However, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which "shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted," Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), a Rule 12(c) motion may be filed only after the pleadings are closed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). When a Rule 12(c) motion is based on the argument that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the standard to be applied is equivalent to that applied to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. St. Paul Ins. Co. Of Bellaire, Tex. v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co., 937 F.2d 274, 279 (5^th Cir. 1991).

Under this standard, a court must look only at the pleadings, accept the well-pleaded allegations contained in them as true, and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jones v. Geninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5^th Cir. 1999); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5^th Cir. 1990). The court may also take into account any judicially noticed facts. Herbert Abstract v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5^th Cir. 1990). Ordinarily, if matters outside the pleadings are also presented to the court for consideration, a Rule 12(c) motion must be treated as one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1064 (5^th Cir. 1987). However, there is an exception to the general rule that a court is precluded from considering material outside the complaint on a Rule 12(c) motion. If a document is referred to in the complaint, is "central" to the dispute, and no party questions its authenticity, then it may be considered by the court. International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. ATT Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2^nd Cir. 1995); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9^th Cir. 1994); Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7^th Cir. 1993). See also Salts v. Moore, 107 F.Supp.2d 731, 735 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (on Rule 12(c) motion, court may consider documents incorporated by reference in the pleadings). In this case, the videotape and written transcript of the "Jackpot Justice" broadcast are clearly referred to in the complaint, are central to the dispute, and their authenticity is not questioned.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), must be considered in light of Rule 8, which addresses the general rules of pleading. Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Rule 8(e) requires that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct," and dispenses with technical forms of pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e).

The Court is also mindful of the fact that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas A M University Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5^th Cir. 1997). A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5^th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, an early disposition of a case on its merits is sometimes appropriate at the pleading stage.

In Velle Transcendental Research Association, Inc. V. Esquire, Inc., 354 N.E.2d 622 (Ill.App. 1976), the court noted that Rule 8 "is a rule of pleading which does not assert a principle of substantive law and . . . was not intended to dispense with the substantive requirement of proving facts showing that the article published was of and concerning the plaintiffs." Id. at 626. A complaint must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of the plaintiff's claim, or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. 5 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1358 at 601-02, n. 76 (1969). In Boswell v. Honorable Governor of Texas, 138 F.Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Tex. 2000), the court stated:

The Court may dismiss a claim when it is clear that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5^th Cir. 1990). "In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere allegations." Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 881 (5^th Cir. 1989). While a complaint need not outline all the elements of a claim, the complaint must be comprehensible and specific enough to draw the inference that the elements exist. Walker v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5^th Cir. 1990); Ledesma v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 818 F.Supp. 983, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1993). Furthermore, "'[c]onclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted as true' by a motion to dismiss." Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5^th Cir. 1992) (quoting Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Company, 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5^th Cir. 1974)). The ultimate question in considering a motion to dismiss is whether the complaint states a valid cause of action when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lowery v. Texas A M University Sys., 117 F.2d 242, 247 (5^th Cir. 1997).

The issue presently before the Court is whether the plaintiffs' complaint states any claim against the movant defendants upon which relief can be granted. To establish a claim of defamation, the plaintiffs must prove the following:

(1) a false and defamatory statement was made concerning the plaintiff; (2) there was an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) the publisher was negligent in publishing the defamatory statement; (4) the plaintiff suffered damages resulting from publication of the defamatory statement.

Thus, the failure to plead the "of and concerning" element of a defamation suit may be raised at the pleading stage and made the subject of a motion to dismiss. In Mitchell, the plaintiff argued that a decision on the viability of her defamation claim at the pleading stage was premature. The court found that "the nature of a libel action lends itself to judicial scrutiny in the early stages of a defamation lawsuit." 703 F.Supp. at 1258 n. 10. The court also noted that "'[d]ismissal of defamation suits for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action or to state a claim upon which relief may be granted occurs with relative frequency.'" Id. (quoting R. Slack, Libel, Slander and Related Problems 533-34 (1980)). One reason for this is that "'in a libel suit the central event — the communication about which suit has been brought — is usually before the judge at the pleading stage.'" Id. (quoting R. Slack, 533-34). "'Thus courts routinely consider on motions to dismiss issues such as . . . whether [the statement at bar] is "of and concerning" the plaintiff. . . .'" Id. (Quoting R. Slack, 533-34). See also Church of Scientology International v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 173 (2^nd Cir. 2001) (plaintiff's burden to show statement was of and concerning him should ordinarily be resolved at the pleading stage); Cardone v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 884 F.Supp. 838, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("In order to state a libel claim, plaintiffs must allege facts showing that the alleged defamatory statement was published 'of or concerning' them. . . . Whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable connection between the plaintiff and the alleged libel is a question for the court."); Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Tran, 287 F.Supp.2d 167, 174 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Although the 'of and concerning' requirement is generally regarded as an issue of fact for the jury to decide, the court may grant a motion to dismiss a defamation claim where the challenged statements 'are incapable of supporting a jury's finding that the allegedly libelous statements refer to plaintiff.'") (quoting Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 469 F.Supp. 1048, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).

This Court previously held that there was no nexus between the plaintiffs and the allegedly defamatory statements of defendants Emmerich and Strittman; thus, the "of and concerning" element of the plaintiffs' defamation claims against those defendants was lacking. Berry v. Safer, 293 F.Supp.2d 694, 703-04 (S.D. Miss. 2003). The task now before the Court is to determine whether there is any nexus between the plaintiffs and the allegedly defamatory nature of the broadcast as a whole. Allegedly defamatory statements of interviewees like Emmerich and Strittman must be set in the context of their respective utterances. Allegedly defamatory communications of television media defendants, on the other hand, are considered in the context of the entire broadcasted news report. See Mann v. City of Tupelo, 1995 WL 1945433, *12 (N.D. Miss. April 13, 1995) (citing Lawrence v. Evans, 573 So.2d 695, 698 (Miss. 1990)). See also McGrath v. Fluech, 71 N.E.2d 553, 554-55 (Ill.App. 1947) ("In determining whether the article in question clearly includes all of the group referred to, we must consider the article in its entirety and not merely that portion of the article . . . relied upon to be libelous per se."); Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wash.App. 1986) ("in determining whether a publication is defamatory, it must be read as a whole and not in part or parts detached from the main body").

In addition, the identification of the plaintiffs must be certain and apparent from the words and images themselves. The plaintiffs cannot by implication identify themselves as the target of an alleged defamation if the allegedly defamatory statement does not point to them. It is not necessary that the plaintiffs be mentioned by name; however, it must appear on the face of the complaint that a third person viewing the broadcast would reasonably have understood that the allegedly defamatory content was of and concerning the plaintiffs and that it referred to them. Coffey v. MacKay, 277 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ill.App. 1972). Mere conclusory allegations that others understood the allegedly defamatory statements to refer to the plaintiffs are not sufficient to raise a question of fact on the face of the pleadings. Id.

Defendant CBS's "Jackpot Justice" segment of "60 Minutes," reported and narrated by defendant Safer, begins:

It's been nicknamed "Jackpot Justice." It's about where lawyers like to go when they sue big corporations for personal injury. It's not to the big cities where the corporations are headquartered, but to places like, for example, rural and impoverished Jefferson County, Mississippi.

Why Mississippi? Well, plaintiffs' lawyers have found that juries in rural, impoverished places can be mighty sympathetic when one of their own goes up against a big, rich multinational corporation.

Fayette, Mississippi. The Land of Jackpot Justice. Poverty may be the ruling condition, but there are those who have found a means of escape.

("Jackpot Justice" Transcript, p. 2).

After this introduction, the report focuses on Emmerich, who opines that "[t]here are more lawsuits filed [in Jefferson County] than there are inhabitants of Jefferson County. Something like a third of all the pharmaceutical cases for some drugs have been tried there." (Trans., p. 3). Among these cases, Safer recounts, are:

Cases like the $150 million that was awarded to 5 plaintiffs whom a jury found were injured by a diet drug. In neighboring counties, the $100 million that was awarded to 10 people who took a heartburn pill.

It's not just drugs. One hundred fifty million to six plaintiffs who argued that they might someday become seriously ill because of asbestos exposure.

Even though many awards are reduced on appeal, many more are settled for undisclosed amounts, because companies now fear these Mississippi juries.

(Trans., p. 3).

The report returns to Emmerich, as Safer asks, "Just what's behind these generous awards?" Emmerich replies:

Look at the jurors. These are disenfranchised people. These are people who have been left out of the system, who feel like, hey, stick it to the Yankee company. Stick it to the insurance companies. Stick it to the pharmaceutical companies.

The African-Americans feel like it's payback for disenfranchisement, and the red-necks, shall we say, it's, like, hey, get back — it's revenge for the Civil War.

So there's a lot of resentment, a lot of class anger, a lot of racial anger. It's very easy to weave this racial conflict and this class conflict into a big money pot for the attorneys.

(Trans., p. 4).

Safer then explains that "[s]ince word of the verdicts started to spread in the mid-90's, the number of lawsuits filed in Jefferson County has exploded. As they say, it pays to advertise." (Trans., p. 5). A portion of an advertisement is then played, in which a female speaker says, "I took Fen-Phen. I thought everything would be fine. I had no idea I could be hurt by it. Now I'm part of the $12 billion settlement." (Trans., p. 5). Safer then comments, "What makes places like Jefferson County so lovable to lawyers, of course, is the renowned generosity of its jurors. So lawyers go venue-shopping, as they call it, scouring the boondocks for a friendly jurisdiction." (Trans., pp. 5-6).

The broadcast next focuses on Bankston Pharmacy in Fayette. "It hardly looks like Fort Knox," says Safer, "[b]ut a prescription filled by the Bankston Pharmacy in Fayette, Mississippi, can and has put many a Mississippian on the Yellow Brick Road to millions and millions of dollars." (Trans., p. 6). Hilda Bankston, the pharmacy's former owner, asserts on camera that she was forced to sell her business in the wake of "hundreds" of lawsuits. (Trans., p. 7). There follows an interview with Daphne Van Devander, a pharmacist from neighboring Claiborne County, who opines that customers will drive 100 miles to her pharmacy "to get a prescription filled for a drug that is in a current litigation, and they only want two capsules . . . to be able to say they had it filled in my county." At this point, Strittman is introduced:

Safer:

Everyone in Fayette knows this man, a local florist, now a multimillionaire. But he doesn't want his name known nationally. He took the obesity drug Redux, and started complaining of chest pains, and was found to have a major blockage in his heart, which he says was caused by the drug.

After seeing an ad in a local newspaper seeking plaintiffs, he joined a suit against the manufacturer. He won't say how much he received in a settlement, but he admits he hit paydirt.

A 50-cent diet pill made a lot of people multimillionaires.

Safer:

A 50-cent diet pill?

Strittman:

Made a millionaire. Come a long way. You know, in the area that I'm from, a lot of people dream to be rich. With the diet pill company, it has helped them to become whatever they wanted to be.

His payday may not be over. He's a plaintiff in yet another suit, this time against the makers of the diet drug Meridia.

Do you think you're going to do as well with the Meridia suit?

I think I'll do better, because not as many people took Meridia as they did Redux. So therefore, we should get awarded more money.

(Trans., pp. 9-10).

Next, the broadcast introduces attorneys Shane Langston and Dennis Sweet, followed by excerpts from Safer's interview with them:

Safer:

Shane Langston, the former head of the Mississippi Trial Lawyers Association, and his partner, Dennis Sweet, have so far won hundreds of millions of dollars for clients in various suits — minus of course a hefty percentage for the lawyers.

You never hear about the cases that get dismissed before they even get to a jury. You never even hear about the cases where the jury comes back and returns a zero verdict for the plaintiff. They just don't make the headlines.

But the fact is you wouldn't have this great influx of lawyers here if this place didn't seem like paydirt.

Langston:

One of the reasons we've seen the influx is because of the national media. You've got white Corporate America coming in and saying, we can't get a fair trial in these rural black counties. Well, if they say that, what do you think is going to happen? They're going to file lawsuits in the rural black counties.

Sweet won an award of $150 million for his five clients whom the jury found had suffered serious health problems because of a diet drug.

Look at the facts of what I proved in that case. We put a lot of time in proving them. I think it slights us to say — and I think it slights me to say, as a black attorney — that they just gave us the money because we sent down there and asked.

Let me tell you what people are saying. They're saying that, among many white Mississippians, this is payback time for losing the Civil War. Among many black Mississippians, it's payback time for all those years and centuries of disenfranchisement.

That's just plain old basic racism.

Langston:

I believe that Jefferson County jurors are fair. I believe they'll listen to the evidence and render fair judgment.

(Trans., pp. 10-13).

The broadcast then cuts to the Strittman interview, following an introductory remark by Safer:

Shafer:

But our Fayette florist says that jurors often feel that those big, fat, rich companies should pay up.

That they should award it to us. Yes, sir. The jury awarded these people this money, because they felt as if they were going to get a cut off of it.

The jurors benefit? Is that what you're saying?

Strittman:

They benefit after court and everything is over with. Yes, sir.

Uh-huh. On the quiet?

Strittman:

Mm-hmm. Under the table. Yeah.

Safer:

In his case, the company settled before it reached a jury. But stories abound about jury complicity in some Mississippi cases.

No juror we contacted would talk to us. The situation's gotten so bad that for the first time in its 90-year history, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned companies about the risk of doing business in Mississippi. Privately, lawyers say there'd be even bigger awards and more of them if all the cases went to trial. But many companies now feel it's better to just settle than to roll the dice in the Mississippi courts.

(Trans., pp. 13-14). Safer then introduces another portion of the Emmerich interview:

Safer:

Publisher Wyatt Emmerich says that not only are juries hurting business in this state, they're also inadvertently setting national drug policy.

It doesn't matter if the FDA says a drug is safe. The FDA looks at the benefit and looks at the potential deaths, and says, you know, the benefit is more than the harm.

Yet you go to Jefferson County, where half the jurors don't have high school degrees, and all you do is trot out the 50 deaths. Then you say, can you believe that these people died? Time to send a message that they can't kill Mississippians.

Next thing you know, some pharmaceutical company owes $500 million in punitive damages. If a pharmaceutical company can get sued for a billion dollars down in Jefferson County, they're not going to produce the drug, because the risk is too high.

Then there's the question of insurance.

Emmerich:

It's disastrous. What's happening now is that doctors and the local hospitals are starting to get hammered.

(Trans., p. 14-15).

Next, the broadcast focuses on two physicians from Natchez, in neighboring Adams County, who describe the exodus of medical doctors from the area. Safer explains that as a result of the proliferation of lawsuits, malpractice insurers have escalated their premiums or ceased doing business in Mississippi altogether. (Trans., pp. 15-16). The report concludes with comments from various interviewees on tort reform. (Trans., pp. 16-18).

As noted previously, the requirement that allegedly defamatory statements be "clearly directed toward" and "of and concerning" the plaintiffs is strictly enforced by the Mississippi courts.See, e.g., McCullough v. Cook, 679 So.2d 627, 631 (Miss. 1996) (even if subject statements were false, plaintiff must still establish that words employed were "clearly directed toward the plaintiff"); Blake v. Gannett Company, Inc., 529 So.2d 595, 603 (Miss. 1988) (if statements "are not clearly directed toward (concerning) the plaintiff, this Court does not reach the question of whether those statements are defamatory").

In this case, nowhere in the "Jackpot Justice" broadcast are any of the plaintiffs referred to by name. It is generally recognized, however, that a plaintiff "need not be mentioned by name so long as he is pointed to by description or other circumstance tending to identify him as an object of the [defamatory] language." Klauder v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 66 Pa. D.C.2d 271, 274 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1973), and cases cited therein; see also 54 ALR 4^th 746, Annotation: Libel and Slander: Sufficiency of Identification of Allegedly Defamed Party. In Montgomery Ward Co. v. Skinner, 25 So.2d 572 (Miss. 1946), the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that "it is incumbent upon a plaintiff seeking compensation for a libel or slander to show that the statement complained of was made with reference to him, but as stated in 33 Am.Jur. 243, § 263, 'He may discharge this burden by proof of relevant circumstances'. . . ." Id. at 580. And in Conroy v. Breland, 189 So. 814 (Miss. 1939), it was recognized that extrinsic facts may make it clear that a statement refers to a particular individual. Id. at 815, citing Restatement of Torts, § 564, and comments thereunder.

The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts provides that "[a] defamatory communication is made concerning the person to whom its recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to refer." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 564. Comment b further states:

It is not necessary that the plaintiff be designated by name; it is enough that there is such a description of or reference to him that those who hear or read reasonably understand the plaintiff to be the person intended. Extrinsic facts may make it clear that a statement refers to a particular individual although the language used appears to defame nobody. . . . It is not necessary that everyone recognize the other as the person intended; it is enough that any recipient of the communication reasonably so understands it. However, the fact that only one person believes that the plaintiff was referred to is an important factor in determining the reasonableness of his belief. If the applicability of the defamatory matter to the plaintiff depends upon extrinsic circumstances, it must appear that some person who saw or read it was familiar with the circumstances and reasonably believed that it referred to the plaintiff.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 564, comment b.

A review of the entire videotape and transcript reveals no specific reference to the plaintiffs, by name or otherwise. The plaintiffs argue, however, that the media defendants "targeted persons in Fayette, Jefferson County, Mississippi, who were summoned for Jury duty, who heard the case and made a final determination." (Plaintiffs' Memorandum Brief, ¶ 3). "[W]ithout saying it, the Broadcast implied that these Jurors were tainted or that they made a decision based on something other than the evidence heard and presented, implying that they were coerced, motivated, encouraged to make the decision reached by them, not based on the Law but based on 'undue influence' and/or 'personal gain' as was aired in their Broadcast." (Id.). Since the plaintiffs are residents of Jefferson County, the Court assumes they served on state court juries in Jefferson County.

In Skinner, the Mississippi Supreme Court, citing the Restatement of Torts, noted the possibility of liability in a defamation action where the reference is not to an individual but to a small group, as distinguished from a general class, where the class is so small "as to indicate that the plaintiff is the person intended or at least to cast such grave suspicion upon him as to be defamatory of him." Skinner, 25 So.2d at 580, citing Restatement of Torts, § 564, and comments thereunder. The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts provides:

One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or class of persons is subject to liability to an individual member of it, but only if,

(a) the group or class is so small that the matter can reasonably understood to refer to the member, or

(b) the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to the member.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 564A. The comments note that "[a]s a general rule no action lies for the publication of defamatory words concerning a large group or class of persons." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 564A, comment a. On the other hand,

[w]hen the group or class defamed is sufficiently small, the words may reasonably be understood to have personal reference and application to any member of it, so that he is defamed as an individual. In this case he can recover for defamation. Thus the statement that "That jury was bribed" may reasonably be understood to mean that each of the twelve jurymen has accepted a bribe. It is not possible to set definite limits as to the size of the group or class, but the cases in which recovery has been allowed usually have involved numbers of 25 or fewer.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 564A, comment b.

Individual jurors have been held to have a cause of action for defamation based on a reference to the jury on which they served. In Carter v. King, 94 S.E. 4 (N.C. 1917), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that jurors could bring a defamation action for "words, oral or written, tending to impeach the integrity and conduct of jurors in the discharge of their duty." Id. at 6, citing 25 Cyc. Law Proc., Libel Slander 352 (1907). The defendant in Carter had referred specifically to the jury on which the plaintiff served, which had been unable to agree on a verdict and was split eleven to one. The defendant had written in a letter that the jurors' inability to reach a verdict "was due entirely to whisky and the appeal made to their prejudice," and he had "stated publicly that there was 1 man on the jury that was not bribed." Id. at 5. The court found that this statement naturally implied that the other eleven jurors were bribed, and that the plaintiff was one of the eleven. Id. The plaintiff could maintain his action although there was no reference to him individually. "It was as harmful to libel and slander the plaintiff collectively as one of the 11 jurors as it would have been to have libeled him individually." Id. at 6. See also cases collected at 52 ALR 4^th 618, Annotation: Defamation of Class or Group as Actionable by Individual Member, § 20 (Jurors).

"Jackpot Justice" refers to "juries in rural, impoverished places," jurors in Mississippi, and jurors in Jefferson County. According to the broadcast, jurors in Jefferson County are renowned for their "generosity." (Trans., p. 5). Immediately preceding Strittman's statements that an unidentified jury received money "under the table" are Langston's comments on the fairness of Jefferson County jurors. (Trans., p. 12-13). This is arguably enough to create a fact question regarding whether the broadcast as a whole could reasonably be understood as connecting Strittman's statements to Jefferson County jurors. However, a viewer of the program could not reasonably conclude that the statements referred to a particular identifiable jury in Jefferson County. Granted, Strittman's allegation of criminal activity is directed to "the jury" as opposed to juries in general, but nowhere in the broadcast is "the jury" identified. Nothing in the broadcast imputes criminal activity to any plaintiff. See Eskew v. Plantation Foods, Inc., 905 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Tex.App. 1995) (stating rule that "a member of a group has no cause of action for a defamatory statement directed to some or less than all of the group when there is nothing to single out the plaintiff").

The allegedly defamatory statements were therefore not "clearly directed toward" nor "of and concerning" any particular jury. Thus, they lack the specificity required to impose liability. "[V]ague, general references to a comparatively large group do not constitute actionable defamation." 52 ALR 4^th 618, § 23, citing Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, Div. Of CBS, Inc., 665 F.2d 110 (6^th Cir. 1981).

"In balancing the societal interest in free speech and press against the individual interest in reputation, courts have chosen not to limit the former except to prevent injury from defamatory statements reasonably susceptible of a definite application to a particular individual." Scelfo v. Rutgers University, 282 A.2d 445 (N.J.Super. 1971), citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).

Where the group is small there is a great likelihood that others will understand that the defendant intended to attribute certain qualities, beliefs, or acts to each member. Moreover, others are more likely to believe the statement to be based on information concerning each particular individual rather than that it is a generalization drawn from the observation of a few. As the group becomes larger, it is less likely that the statement will be understood as referring to each member of the group and its character as a generalization becomes clearer.

The plaintiff in Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Company, 93 So.2d 171 (Miss. 1957), was Executive Secretary of the United Dry Association, a prohibition group. He brought two claims for defamation against the defendant based on two separate newspaper editorials. The first mentioned the plaintiff by name. The second referred only to the "Drys," which the Mississippi Supreme Court found referred "to no particular person, but to . . . those who advocated no change in the prohibition laws, which included a majority of the qualified voters participating in the liquor referendum." Id. at 174. Because the plaintiff was not sufficiently identified in the second editorial, that claim was not actionable. Id.

As the district court observed in Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F.Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992):

If a class is sufficiently broad, no one member really suffers personal injury. For example, the slur "all lawyers are shysters" may be offensive to those lawyers who are not, but no attorney could reasonably complain that he personally has sustained damage to his character and reputation by operation of such a vacuous generality.

(Id. at 935) (citing Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 893, 898-99) (other citations omitted).

As a matter of law, an alleged defamation against all jurors in Jefferson County can have no personal application to any individual juror. The only way a Jefferson County juror can maintain suit is if "the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to" that juror. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 564A.

As noted previously, Mississippi law recognizes the right of a plaintiff to introduce evidence of relevant circumstances and extrinsic facts to show that he was in fact the person defamed.Montgomery Ward Co. v. Skinner, 25 So.2d at 580; Conroy v. Breland, 189 So. at 815. However, the plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of any such evidence.

"The real test in weighing identification is whether some nexus exists between plaintiff and the allegedly defamatory language."Klauder, 66 Pa. D.C.2d at 275. In the instant case, no connection can be shown between the plaintiffs and the allegedly defamatory statements other than the fact that the plaintiffs served as jurors in Jefferson County. The statements lack the requisite specificity of reference to any of the eight named plaintiffs or the juries on which they served. Therefore, the Court concludes as a matter of law that a viewer of the program could not have reasonably believed these statements were intended to refer to the plaintiffs.

Because the plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish that the allegedly defamatory statements were "of and concerning" or "clearly directed toward" the plaintiffs, the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings shall be granted, and all claims against the movants shall be dismissed. Under some circumstances, plaintiffs are allowed an opportunity to amend their complaint to cure deficiencies in the allegations of the elements of a claim. In this case, however, the plaintiffs would be unable to amend their complaint to state a cause of action which would satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement. See Thomas v. Jacksonville Television, Inc., 699 So.2d 800, 806 (Fl.App. 1997); Gen. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Parkerson, 369 F.2d 821, 825 (5^th Cir. 1966) (repleading serves no purpose when recovery is barred as a matter of law). Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants CBS Broadcasting, Inc., Media General Operations, Inc. d/b/a WJTV, Don Hewitt, Morley Safer, Deirdre Naphin and Jennifer Breheny's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) (docket entry 18) is GRANTED, and all claims against said defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.