RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CHRISTINE E. KELLER, JUDGE.

The defendant, Timothy McNamara, has moved for summary judgment in this legal malpractice action, claiming that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to his special defense that the three-year statute of limitations (General Statutes § 52-577) expired before the plaintiff, Rudolf Bee, his former client, commenced this action on March 4, 2001.

After reviewing the parties' memoranda of law and other documents submitted, the court finds there are genuine issues of material fact that render summary judgment inappropriate on the claim that the statute of limitations expired. Summary judgment, like a directed verdict, may be rendered when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion. United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 380, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).

First, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not a formal or de facto termination of the attorney-client relationship occurred before March 4, 2001. In DeLeo v. Nusbaum, 263 Conn. 588, 597, 821 A.2d 744 (20003), our Supreme Court adopted the continuing representation doctrine, concluding that in legal malpractice cases, "the statute of limitations is tolled during that period for which the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant continued to represent him with regard to the same underlying matter; and (2) either that the plaintiff did not know of the alleged malpractice or that the attorney could still mitigate the harm allegedly caused by that malpractice during the continued representation period." With regard to the first prong, the formal termination of the attorney-client relationship occurs when the attorney is discharged by the client, the matter for which the attorney was hired comes to a conclusion, or a court granted the attorney's motion to withdraw from the representation. A de facto termination occurs if the client takes a step that unequivocally indicates that he has ceased relying on his attorney's professional judgment in protecting his legal interests, such as hiring a second attorney to consider a possible malpractice claim or filing a grievance against the attorney. Id., 597-98.

The court finds there remains a genuine factual dispute as to whether or not thelaintiff's actions and/or letters accomplished a de facto termination of his relationship with the defendant before March 4, 2001. The question is whether the plaintiff, before that date, intentionally adopted a clearly adversarial relationship toward the defendant which he never attempted to reestablish.

With respect to both parts of the second prong of the continuous representation doctrine, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff knew of the alleged malpractice or whether the attorney could still mitigate the harm allegedly caused by that malpractice during the continued representation period, and the duration of that period, as noted above, is another disputed, material fact. Although the plaintiff was clearly unhappy with the performance of the defendant as his counsel, whether he specifically was aware of the malpractice alleged in his complaint before the termination of the attorney-client relationship is not conclusively established from the documentation provided. The resolution of the question whether the defendant could mitigate the harm allegedly caused by the malpractice also raises a number of factual issues, such as the various steps the defendant could have taken and the likelihood of success that cannot be conclusively determined on the basis of the information provided by either party. Such an inquiry will undoubtedly require a review of the facts and the law relevant to the underlying divorce action by an expert.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is denied.