ORDER

JOHN BATES, District Judge

Plaintiff Eugenie Barton has brought this action against defendant Joseph Venneri alleging that defendant defamed her when he sent an e-mail to her supervisor at work, in which he accused plaintiff of possibly committing a felony. See Compl. ¶¶ 26-46. According to plaintiff, defendant sent that e-mail, and initiated other communications with her, because he was upset over plaintiff's failure to sell a parcel of land. Id. ¶ 1. In the course of that dispute, plaintiff alleges that defendant has engaged in an ever-escalating harassment of her, which culminated with defendant sending the e-mail to plaintiff's supervisor at the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). Id. ¶ 22. On the basis of that single e-mail, plaintiff seeks in the three counts of her Complaint damages from defendant for defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.Id. ¶¶ 36-46.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendant from communicating with her or the FCC, except through counsel. Plaintiff has also filed a supplemental motion noting that defendant, in a second e-mail to her supervisor, has threatened to have plaintiff charged with a "felony." See Pl. Supp. Mot. at 1-2. Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court preventing defendant from contacting plaintiff, her colleagues, or her supervisors for any reason related to the property dispute. For the following reasons, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that she will suffer irreparable harm absent the relief requested; (3) that other interested parties will not be harmed if the requested relief is granted; and (4) that the public interest supports granting the requested relief.Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Katz v. Georgetown Univ., 246 F.3d 685, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 1505-06 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d at 843. In determining whether to grant urgent relief, a court must "balance the strengths of the requesting party's arguments in each of the four required areas." CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995). "If the arguments for one factor are particularly strong, an injunction may issue even if the arguments in other areas are rather weak."Id. It is particularly important for plaintiff to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; where a plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, "it would take a very strong showing with respect to the other preliminary injunction factors to turn the tide in plaintiff['s] favor." Davenport v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 166 F.3d 356, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1999);Nat'l Head Start Ass'n v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246 (D.D.C. 2004) (factors "must be balanced against each other, but it is especially important for the movant to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits").

Because preliminary injunctions are extraordinary forms of judicial relief, courts should grant them sparingly. Sociedad Adonima Vina Santa Rita v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2001); see Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court has stated that "`[i]t frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.'" Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); accord Cobell, 391 F.3d at 258.

ANALYSIS

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff argues that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims because defendant's e-mail to plaintiff's supervisor satisfies the elements of each claim in the three counts of her Complaint. See Pl. Mot. at 9-12. Although plaintiff may have a strong case on the specific damages claims in her Complaint, it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff is likely to obtain the injunctive relief she seeks. It is plaintiff's likelihood of succeeding in obtaining permanent injunctive relief relating to an alleged pattern of harassment and abuse that is the touchstone for the availability of the preliminary injunctive relief plaintiff seeks, not her likelihood of succeeding in obtaining damages for a single defamatory e-mail.

The Complaint asks in passing that defendant be enjoined from contacting her, her colleagues or supervisors on any matter relating to the disputed property. See Compl. (prayer for relief). However, plaintiff has not shown how she is likely to be entitled to that relief on the merits, as opposed to the money damages that form the heart of her action. Merely because defendant's one e-mail may be found defamatory or to constitute an invasion of privacy does not automatically entitle plaintiff to the broad injunctive relief she seeks in her motion. The Court does not see how plaintiff would be entitled to that injunction merely because defendant sent an allegedly defamatory e-mail. Such injunctive relief barring future communications or publication does not routinely flow from a defamation liability finding.

II. Irreparable Harm

The second prong of the preliminary injunction inquiry is a showing of irreparable injury to the movant in the absence of the requested relief. See Sociedad Anonima, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14. The alleged harm must be concrete and immediate to warrant extraordinary injunctive relief, and vague or speculative injury will not suffice. See Wisconsin Gas Co. v. Fed. Regulatory Comm'n, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("the injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical"). In short, the threatened injury must be of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm, because injunctions are not intended "to prevent injuries neither extant nor presently threatened, but only merely `feared.'" Comm. in Solidarity v. Sessions, 929 F.2d 742, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

Here, plaintiff argues that defendant's continuing harassment "threatens the very existence of her professional life . . . and personal, emotional well-being. . . ." Pl. Mot. at 12. Plaintiff also contends that defendant's threatened communications are "actual" and intended to threaten plaintiff's professional career. Id. However, plaintiff has not submitted any competent evidence into the record (i.e., affidavits, exhibits) that would permit the Court to assess whether she, in fact, faces irreparable harm to her professional life if an injunction is not issued. Not only is there no competent evidence submitted with her motion, but plaintiff's Complaint contains only broad conclusory statements as to alleged harms suffered by plaintiff. See Compl. ¶ 24 ("[d]efendant's conduct, . . . unless enjoined . . . will continue to cause Ms. Barton irreparable injury . . ."); ¶ 45 ("[d]efendant's conduct has in fact caused Ms. Barton to suffer severe emotional distress in the form of humiliation and fear"). In a motion for preliminary injunction, the movant bears the burden of establishing irreparable harm, see Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d at 844, and here plaintiff has fallen well short of that mark. Plaintiff's evidence (or lack thereof) does not establish that she will suffer the necessary actual and imminent concrete harm to justify this extraordinary remedy.

Accordingly, it is this 11th day of May, 2005, hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is DENIED.