MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOBLE, Vice Chancellor.

Plaintiffs Vivian Barry, Robert C. Barry, Joseph W. Nelson, Mary Nelson, and Robert M. Fitzgerald seek a declaratory judgment ruling invalid a conditional use ordinance enacted by Defendant Town of Dewey Beach (the "Town"). The Plaintiffs additionally seek injunctive relief prohibiting the approval of permits pursuant to the challenged ordinance. Also named as defendants in this action are Town Commissioners Patricia Wright, Dale H. Cooke, Ellen Mayhew, and Alice Walsh. Intervenor-Defendant Dewey Beach Suites, LLC ("DBS"), a motel owner expecting to benefit because of the ordinance, was granted leave to intervene under Court of Chancery Rule 24(a)(2).

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. Because the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have standing to pursue their claims, their action must be dismissed.

I. FACTS

On December 28, 2004, the Town Commissioners adopted Ordinance No. 523 (the "Ordinance"), creating a conditional use classification to allow for the conversion of existing hotels and motels to condominiums within the Town's Resort Residential ("RR") and Resort Business ("RB") zoning districts. Hotels and motels are no longer deemed permitted uses in the Town; thus, any hotel or motel is a non-conforming use.

Condominiums are a permitted use under the Town Code. Section 2-202 of the Town Code includes condominiums in its definition of "multi-family dwellings." Sections 14-502.2 and 14-503.2 provide that "multi-family dwellings" are among the "permitted uses" for the RR- and RB-zoning districts, respectively. Multi-family dwellings are required to comply with certain zoning requirements, including those for area, bulk, density, and parking. In order to convert hotels and motels to condominiums under the Town's permitted-use zoning regime ( i.e., to multi-family dwellings), the properties must conform to the restrictions placed on such uses by the Town Code ( i.e., the relevant area, bulk, density, and parking requirements).

The Town Code also sets forth the Town's conditional use authority. Section 14-801 explains the purpose of conditional uses:

The purpose of this Subchapter [authorizing conditional uses] is to provide for certain uses which cannot be well adjusted to their environment in particular locations with full protection offered to surrounding properties by rigid application of the district regulations. These uses are generally of a public or semi-public character and are essential and desirable for the general convenience and welfare, but because of the nature of the use, the importance of relationship [sic] to the Comprehensive Plan, and possible impact, not only on neighboring properties, but on a large section of the Town, require the exercise of planning judgment on location and site plan.

Although the Ordinance sets forth certain minimal requirements for hotels and motels converting under a conditional use permit, it expressly exempts conversions proceeding under the Ordinance from most, if not all, of the restrictions otherwise applicable to multi-family dwellings under the Town Code (including those requirements imposed on new or existing condominiums built as permitted uses). From among the requirements for conversion made less restrictive under the conditional use scheme, the Plaintiffs point to significant changes in applicable density requirements. Their Verified Complaint (the "Complaint") alleges:

The most notable departure . . . from the current requirements of the Code is the recommendation for a minimum square footage of 750 square feet per condominium unit. This square footage allows for a dwelling unit density that is more than four times higher that [sic] the Code allows for permitted use condominium/multi-family dwellings.

The significant effect of the Ordinance is that it purports to authorize the conversion of motels and hotels to condominiums, a conversion that in many — if not all — instances could not be accomplished if hotels and motels were to convert to condominiums as permitted uses instead of conditional uses under the Ordinance, because they would be unable feasibly to comply with the area, bulk, density, and parking requirements otherwise required of multi-family dwellings.

* * *

Before the Town Commissioners approved the Ordinance which facilitated the conversion of hotels and motels to condominiums, the question was referred to the Town's Planning and Zoning Commission. The Planning and Zoning Commission held public hearings on August 18, October 12, and November 10, 2004, at which the initial draft ordinance was reviewed. An opportunity for public comment was provided at the August 18 and October 12 meetings. Plaintiffs' counsel was among those who offered comments at the October 12 meeting. Only the initial draft of the ordinance was available for review at those meetings.

The Planning and Zoning Commission revised the initial draft of the ordinance to incorporate its recommendations. The commission voted, at the conclusion of November 10, 2004 meeting, unanimously in favor of recommending approval of the ordinance, as modified.

Next, the Town Commissioners held a special meeting on December 28, 2004, to consider the proposed ordinance. The public had the opportunity to comment at this meeting. Several comments were made and letters from the public were entered into the record. The Town Commissioners made minor changes to the Planning and Zoning Commission's draft of the Ordinance, and then voted four to one to adopt the amended draft as Ordinance No. 523. Plaintiffs' attorney, who also served as a Commissioner (and now is the Town's Mayor), cast the lone dissenting vote. Following adoption of the Ordinance, notice was published in the Cape Gazette and the Delaware Coast Press on January 14, 2005.

DBS has proceeded with conversion of a motel to condominiums pursuant to the Ordinance.

II. CONTENTIONS

In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs set forth what amounts to a claim that enactment of the Ordinance was an improper exercise of the Town's conditional use authority under its enabling ordinance for conditional use zoning. Specifically, the Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance is not consistent with the purposes for which the Town may employ its conditional use authority and that it establishes as a conditional use a use that is not a "type of use eligible for classification as a conditional use" since that use is already a permitted use. The Plaintiffs' challenge centers around two aspects: (1) the Ordinance allows as a conditional use a use (condominiums) that is a permitted use in the district, and (2) the Ordinance reduces, instead of enhancing, the "conditions" with which hotel and motel owners must comply in order to convert their properties to condominiums. It is without doubt that these facts present, at the very least, an unusual exercise of a municipality's conditional use power. It appears from the Complaint that the Plaintiffs also argue that the Town had a duty to create a record setting forth its reasons for adopting the Ordinance, including the reasons for why the Ordinance satisfied the purposes for adoption of such ordinances enumerated in the Town Code. The Plaintiffs evidently argue that the Town failed to create the necessary record supporting its legislative act.

The Plaintiffs' Opening Brief purports to assert a number of additional grounds for relief that the Plaintiffs "realized as a result of preparation for [their Opening Brief]. . . ." It appears that the Plaintiffs seek to present three principal, additional claims. First, the Plaintiffs claim that the Ordinance "violates the delegation requirements of" 22 Del.C. § 302, which provides, inter alia, that a municipality's zoning regulations "shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each [zoning] district but the regulations in 1 district may differ from those in other districts." It has been said that this category of claim amounts to a type of statutory equal protection challenge. Second, the Plaintiffs assert that the Ordinance improperly conflicts with the Town's Comprehensive Plan. Third, they argue that the Planning and Zoning Commission failed to have present a final draft of the Ordinance at its second meeting and thereby violated the requirement that it hold public hearings with an opportunity for public comment with respect to the proposal. This claim is separately addressed in some detail, below. Defendants, the Town and Commissioners, resist the Plaintiffs' claims on their merits. DBS contends that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Standard for Summary Judgment

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. "Under Court of Chancery Rule 56, summary judgment may be granted only when there are no issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no material question of fact exists." A party opposing summary judgment, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but . . ., by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Court of Chancery Rule 56] must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If [she] does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against [her]." In the context of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, no issue of fact material to resolution of these motions is in dispute.

B. Standing — A Threshold Question

The Court must first address whether the Plaintiffs have standing to maintain this litigation. DBS has argued that the Plaintiffs lack standing to proceed with any of their claims. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the standing needed to pursue this action.

1. Requirements for standing

"Unlike the federal courts, where standing may be subject to stated constitutional limits, state courts apply the concept of standing as a matter of self-restraint to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are `mere intermeddlers.'" "The term `standing' refers to the right of a party to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to enforce a claim or to redress a grievance." This Court must answer the "threshold question" of standing affirmatively in order to "ensure that the litigation before the tribunal is a `case or controversy' that is appropriate for the exercise of the court's judicial powers." Standing deals "only with the question of who is entitled to mount a legal challenge and not . . . the merits of the subject matter in controversy."

The Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that they have standing. At the summary judgment stage, a party attempting to meet this burden may not rest on "mere allegations," but must "`set forth' by affidavit or other evidence `specific facts' which must be taken as true for purposes of the summary judgment motion."

From among the requirements imposed in Delaware for demonstrating standing, a party must, in the absence of a statutory grant of standing, show that its "interest in the controversy [is] distinguishable from the interest shared by other members of a class or the public in general." In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the United States Supreme Court stated, in language applicable here, that "[w]hether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance." In Akins, the Supreme Court explained that this type of analysis ( i.e., whether a grievance is too widely shared to merit standing):

invariably appears in cases where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature- for example, harm to the "common concern for obedience to law." The abstract nature of the harm- for example, injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed-deprives the case of the concrete specificity that characterized those controversies which were "the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster," and which today prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion.

Put simply, identification by a party merely of a "common concern for obedience to law" constitutes the quintessential example of an interest that is insufficient to warrant standing.

2. The Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate standing

In this instance, the Plaintiffs have offered no cognizable evidence in support of standing beyond the allegations of the Complaint. They have alleged that the approval of a conditional use permit under the Ordinance:

will greatly compromise the faith that citizens of Dewey Beach have in the effectiveness and fairness of the existing Town Zoning Code. If the applicant for conversion is allowed to violate so greatly the density limits of the Code, other property owners will demand the same treatment. Much of the property in the Town could be developed at higher density than currently allowed by the Code at great profit to individual property owners but to the ultimate detriment of the quality of life in the Town. The uniform enforcement of the Zoning Code requirements is the way that each property owner can rationalize and accept constraints on his/her desire to achieve maximum financial gain. A greater good can be achieved, but only if everyone complies with the law. Few citizens will be willing to make sacrifices for the common good when a few are favored by the legislative process and are allowed to reap windfall profits at the expense of the community. Once faith in the Code is lost, it will be extremely difficult to sustain the support and confidence of the number of citizens needed to ensure attainment of the goals of the zoning code.

As stated above, this is the Plaintiffs' only "evidence" that may plausibly be considered by the Court in resolving this issue.

This offering by the Plaintiffs is nothing more than a bald statement of interest of the sort which earlier opinions have unremittingly chastised as insufficient. In the absence of any additional showing, standing cannot be premised on a merely abstract desire to ensure municipal obedience to the law. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have set forth almost precisely the type of generalized grievance that constitutes the classic example of a harm that will not, by itself, confer standing — i.e., a "common concern for obedience to the law." Furthermore, they have failed to identify any "concrete and particularized injury." Because the Plaintiffs have not met the threshold requirement of demonstrating standing, their claims must be dismissed.

C. Plaintiffs' Challenge to the Public Hearing Process Before the Planning and Zoning Commission

One of the Plaintiffs' challenges to the Ordinance may be deserving of additional consideration because, in part, of the importance of public participation in the workings of local government as recognized in the Town Code. The Plaintiffs contend that the Town's Planning and Zoning Commission failed to satisfy the public hearing requirements set forth by the Town Code. Section 14-1301(c)(1) provides: "The Zoning Commission shall hold a public hearing on any proposed amendment, supplement, or change before submitting its report to the Town Commissioners and for this purpose may request the submission of all pertinent data and information by any person concerned." The Planning and Zoning Commission held three public meetings on the Ordinance, and the public was allowed an opportunity to comment at the first two meetings. The Plaintiffs, however, challenge whether the Planning and Zoning Commission complied with the public hearing requirements because no copy of the final draft of the ordinance ultimately recommended to the Town Commission was made available during the Planning and Zoning Commission's first two meetings. A preliminary draft of the ordinance was available for consideration at those meetings; however, the draft ultimately approved by the Planning and Zoning Commission at its November 10 meeting significantly differed from the preliminary draft. In their briefs, the "Plaintiffs argue that a third public meeting [( i.e., another opportunity for public comment)] was required on November 10 because up to that point in time no proposal had in fact been prepared or discussed."

In order to address this claim in more detail, the Court must return to the issue of standing. In Citizens Coalition, Inc. v. County Council of Sussex County (Citizens Coalition I), the plaintiff-organization asserted, among other claims, a due process challenge regarding the public's opportunity to participate in a hearing on a zoning matter before the County Council. The Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's "procedural" claims on standing grounds, finding that it had made, inter alia, specific allegations of harm to an interest the statute was designed to protect. Even though this proceeding is at the summary judgment stage, the Plaintiffs rely solely on the allegations contained in their verified complaint. Yet, as explained above, a mere interest implicating a "common concern for obedience to the law" is insufficient to merit standing.

The Complaint also alleges, however, that the Plaintiffs are "property owners and voters in the Town of Dewey Beach who wish to have the Town and the Commissioners/defendants adhere to the requirements of the law when changing, amending or supplementing the provisions of the Town Zoning Code." Although the additional, mere facts of owning property and of being voters in the Town are insufficient to satisfy standing with respect to the Plaintiffs' other claims ( i.e., their substantive claims), it is at least arguable that, under Citizens Coalition I, these facts may merit standing for the Plaintiffs' claim regarding the sufficiency of the public hearing ( i.e., their procedural claim). This potential arises because the opportunity for comment by the Town's citizens is presumably the interest the ordinance requiring a public hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission is intended to protect.

In Citizens Coalition I, however, a non-abstract injury to an interest the statute at issue in that case was designed to protect was specifically identified and set forth, inter alia, by the plaintiff. In this instance, the Complaint fails to allege that the Plaintiffs (or even the public) were denied an opportunity to comment or that the opportunity afforded them was not meaningful. Instead, the Complaint merely sets forth alleged violations of ordinance and statute and then, in substance, asserts that this litigation is premised on — and intended to vindicate — what amounts to a "common concern for obedience to the law." No other evidence is offered in support of standing. Although it would likely not require significantly more, the Court views the Plaintiffs' mere statement that they are property owners and voters in the Town as insufficient to merit standing, by itself, in this instance.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Plaintiffs do have standing to maintain this claim, the Court concludes that it is without merit for the following reasons. First, review of the record makes clear that the public had sufficient opportunity to comment on the issue of conversion and on potential changes to be made to the preliminary draft. Indeed, at the beginning of the Planning and Zoning Commission's first meeting on August 18, an alternate draft of the ordinance was presented on behalf of another entity with an interest in converting hotels and motels to condominiums. This draft and the reduction in restrictions thought by some to be necessary to make conversions feasible were debated at both the August 18 and the October 12 meetings. Of course, it is possible that subsequent amendments may be of such a broad character as to deprive the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment. In this instance, the revisions to the preliminary draft may have been significant; however, given the substantial opportunity afforded the public for comment before the Planning and Zoning Commission and, more importantly, the subsequent opportunity to comment on the final draft granted the public at the Town Commissioners' December 28 meeting, this argument is ultimately without merit. The Planning and Zoning Commission's recommendation was, of course, not binding on the Town Commissioners, who were charged with the final decision of whether to adopt or reject the Ordinance. The Court, therefore, does not view the denial of a third opportunity for public comment before the Planning and Zoning Commission as actionable.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS SO ORDERED.