Summary
holding that "plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act must show that the discrimination she suffered is ongoing" to have standing
Summary of this case from Jones v. Ford Motor Credit CompanyOpinion
01 CV 1853 (HB)
August 31, 2001
ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff brings this claim for discrimination against the City of New York, Jason Turner, Commissioner of the New York Human Resources Administration, Kevin P. Farrell, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Sanitation ("the city defendants"), and the State of New York, Brian J. Wing, Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, and James T. Dillon, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor ("the state defendants") for monetary and equitable relief under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1) and § 8-107(2). The State defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on those claims. As I find that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring her claim for injunctive relief against the state defendants, that claim is dismissed.
Inexplicably, the Assistant Attorney General moved only on behalf of the two individual state defendants. Although the plaintiff in her opposition brief suggested that this omission may be an oversight, counsel for defendants did not address the issue in the defendants' reply. Because the legal analysis contained herein applies with equal force to the State of New York as to the individual defendants, I will sua sponte include the State of the New York as one of the moving defendants.
Plaintiff originally brought claims against the state defendants for violations of Title I of the ADA, however, by a letter dated July 9, 2001, plaintiff informed the Court that she wished to withdraw this claim as she had determined it to be non-meritorious. Plaintiffs request is hereby granted, and this claim is deemed withdrawn.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff receives state and federally funded public assistance to support herself and her daughter through the Family Assistance program. The Family Assistance program is one of the two remaining programs that provides cash and vouchers for public assistance to needy individuals and their families in New York State. To receive assistance, recipients must fulfil work requirements that are assigned by the social service district unless they are deemed to be exempt from this requirement. N.Y. SSL Art. 5 § 331.
The program is administered pursuant to Article 5 of the New York Social Service Law ("SSL") through 58 local social service districts. The plaintiff receives her assistance through the City of New York, which is one of those 58 districts. State law governs the standards for applications, determinations of eligibility and payment. N.Y. SSL §§ 157 et seq., §§ 343 et seq.
On April 19, 1999, the New York City Human Resources Administration ("HRA") assigned the plaintiff to a Work Experience Program ("WEP") in the New York Department of Sanitation to allow her to satisfy her statutory work requirement. Plaintiff reported to the worksite but was told that it was illegal for her to participate in the WEP program since she was attending a methadone maintenance treatment and was turned away despite her protests.
On April 23, 1999, plaintiff requested a fair hearing to challenge HRA's determination that she could not participate in WEP. On October 20, 1999, the New York State Department of Labor held a fair hearing, and the plaintiff attended with counsel. Unfortunately, in May of 1999, plaintiff had resumed the use of illegal drugs, which she claims was due to the fact that she was denied the opportunity to participate in WEP. After the hearing, on December 1, 1999, plaintiff was arrested for petit larceny. Plaintiff appeared in court on December 8, 1999 and was sentenced to probation on the condition that she participate for one year in a court ordered intensive drug treatment program and counseling program.
On February 8, 2000, DOL reversed the HRA's decision to exclude the plaintiff from WEP. The decision read in part:
The record fails to establish that the appellant is exempt from employment requirements. In this regard, it is also noted that at the hearing, the appellant submitted an affidavit from Edwin A. Salsitz, M.D., an attending physician in the Division of Chemical Dependency of the Department of Medicine of Beth Israel Medical Center, which indicated that methadone treatment is in no way an impediment to Appellant's job performance and poses no danger to her coworkers or the public at large simply because she takes methadone; that methadone maintenance is an important part of recovery from the disease of opiate addition, but it does not work by itself; that a person must also have opportunities to rebuild a useful, productive life; that a crucial opportunity for most patients is returning to work or returning to a higher level of performance at work; and that if such opportunities are denied this can be a severe set back for patients and can lead to relapse.
Bristow Decl. Ex. 1 at 3. The opinion concluded that "[t]he Agency is directed to provide the Appellant with the opportunity to participate in the Work Experience Program and to provide her with an appropriate work assignment." Id.
In response to the DOL's decision, on March 16, 2000, the New York City Department of Sanitation issued plaintiff a Notice of WEP Assignment and Reporting that required her to begin work on March 20, 2000. Plaintiff reported for her assignment and performed her WEP assignment from March 21 to March 24. However, plaintiff requested to be released from the assignment due to her enrollment in the court ordered drug treatment program. So, on March 24, the HRA issued a Participant Change of Status Form, which read, "Participant unassigned due to agencys [sic] inability to provide a suitable work site location to accommodate the special needs of the individual participating in a SATP [substance abuse treatment program] on parole and family counseling — conflict of hours." Sanger Decl., Ex. 10.
The parties dispute whether plaintiffs request to be excused from the WEP assignment was premised on a conflict of her hours with her court ordered treatment, as the plaintiff claims and as is suggested by the HRA report, or on her claim that her participation in the drug program rendered her incapable of working, as the state defendants' allege. Resolution of this conflict, however is not necessary for the purposes of this motion.
Subsequently, HRA issued a Notification of Work Requirement and Right to Contest, which advised the plaintiff that she was required to participate in WEP but also concluded that she had "work limitations," although it did not specify the nature of these limitations. On August 3, 2000, plaintiff requested yet another fair hearing, this time challenging the HRA's determination that she was required to participate in WEP. The DOL issued an opinion on March 16, 2001, that, contrary to the plaintiffs hopes, found that the plaintiff did not qualify for an exemption and even questioned the HRA determination that the plaintiff was "work-limited." The report read:
The record does not reflect whether HRA's decision was influenced by the earlier DOL determination or whether it was reached independently.
Confusingly, the report states that plaintiffs "had advised the Agency that [she] suffered from substance abuse and related medical problems, which prevented [her] from engaging in work activities as a condition of receiving Public Assistance benefits." See Bristow Decl. Ex. 2 at 2. This appears to conflict with the HRA's Participant's Change of Status Form, dated March 24, 1999, which suggested that plaintiff has reported that she had a conflict of hours. However, resolution of this disparity is not necessary for the purposes of this decision.
The Appellant advised the Agency that [she] suffers from substance abuse and related medical problems, which prevents such individuals from engaging in work activities in order to receive Public Assistance. Base in [sic] the Appellant's claim, the Agency found that the Appellant was not totally disabled and was therefore required to engage in work activities on a limited basis in order to receive Public Assistance. The Agency failed to present evidence at the hearing to support its determination that the Appellant is work-limited. Therefore the Agency's determination cannot be deemed proper.
The DOL directed the Agency to "immediately reevaluate the Appellant's work-exempt status. [and]. . . provide the Appellant with written notification of its determination [and] to exempt the Appellant from work activities until such time as the Agency determines that the Appellant is not work-exempt." See Bristow Decl. Ex. 2 at 5.
After filing a complaint with the EEOC on her claims under Title I of the ADA on September 9, 1999, plaintiff brought the instant action. In her complaint, she claims that the city defendants violated Title I of the ADA and the New York City Human Rights Law and that the city defendants and the state defendants violated Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. All of plaintiffs claims are premised on the same basic facts, that she was denied a WEP assignment due to her participation in a methadone treatment program. She seeks only injunctive relief from the state defendants, and both injunctive and monetary relief from the city defendants.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
As a consequence of the record submitted and relied upon, I treat this motion as one for summary judgment and apply the requisite standard. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no disputed issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995). On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). But, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
II. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Against the State
Although neither party addressed the issue of standing, I find that it is dispositive here, and therefore I address it § sua sponte. In her complaint, plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief from the state defendants. Specifically, plaintiff requests an order "to abolish all policies and practices that discriminate against recipients of public assistance who are receiving drug treatment, and in particular, methadone treatment."
"It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy." See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). To satisfy this requirement in an action for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must first allege that she has suffered an injury in fact and second that the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable ruling from the Court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Under this test, "'past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.., if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). Thus, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act must show that the discrimination she suffered is "ongoing." See Stan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 111 F. Supp.2d 119, 125 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that plaintiff did not have standing when "there [were] no allegations of ongoing discrimination" as "the complaint allege[d] only discrete instances of discrimination in the past"); Naiman v. New York Univ., No. 95 Civ. 6469, 1997 WL 249970, at 4 (May 13, 1997) ("[I]n order for Naiman to have standing to seek injunctive relief against NYU, he must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a "real or immediate threat that [he] will be wronged again.").
Here, plaintiff concedes that the DOL ordered the HRA to provide her with a WEP assignment. She also admits that the HRA provided her with an assignment but that, at her own request, she was excused from it and then proceeded to seek an exemption from the very assignment that she had fought to receive. Regardless of the reason for the flip-flop in plaintiffs views, it is clear that neither the HRA or the DOL is currently discriminating against her, quite the contrary as they have informed her that she must participate in WEP regardless of her drug treatment status. Moreover, plaintiff has put forth no other allegations, nor could she given the undisputed facts, that future discrimination is imminent due to her participation in a drug treatment program. Consequently, plaintiff is not subject to ongoing discrimination, has alleged no case or controversy, and has no standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief. As the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief only from the state defendants, her claims against these defendants must be dismissed.
II. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Against the City
The same rational is applicable to the city defendants as with the state and no injunction may issue. However, plaintiffs claims for money damages remain, and thus I cannot dismiss the claims against the city. I advise the plaintiff, however, that from the facts before me, it appears that she has a uphill battle to sustain her claim against the city, particularly with respect to her argument that she suffered damages as a result of HRA's determination that she was barred from the WEP program.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, plaintiffs claims against the State of New York, and James T. Dillon must be dismissed.