Opinion
C.A. No. 01A-02-004-JEB
Submitted: July 12, 2001
Decided: September 19, 2001
Appeal From a Decision of the Court of Common Pleas.
Decision Affirmed.
Appearances:
Victor F. Battaglia, Jr., Esq., Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Appellant.
Daniel T. Crossland, Esq., Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Appellee.
OPINION
On December 28, 1998, Plaintiff Clarence Clark filed a complaint in Justice of the Peace Court seeking $2340 in back wages from Defendant Bailey's Construction Company. Trial was set for July 8, 1999, and rescheduled for July 13, 1999, at Defendant's request. Defendant failed to appear at trial, and the magistrate entered a default judgment for Plaintiff on that date.
On September 21, 1999, Defendant filed a motion requesting a "chance for case to be heard." The magistrate interpreted this as a motion to vacate the default judgment and stayed the judgment, pending a hearing. After the hearing was scheduled, Defendant moved for a continuance, which was granted until November 19, 1999. Following the hearing, the magistrate denied Defendant's request to vacate the default.
On December 3, 1999, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas ("CCP"). On October 27, 2000, the trial judge in CCP held a hearing on the motion to reopen the default judgment. He subsequently issued a decision affirming the denial of Defendant's motion, and Defendant appealed to this Court.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying an abuse of discretion standard in what should have been a trial de novo. Plaintiff responds that the hearing below constituted a de novo review and that any error in the trial judge's standard of review did not cause prejudice to Defendant.
An appeal of a decision from the Court of Common Pleas to the Superior Court is on the record and not de novo. In its appellate role, this Court is limited to correcting errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the lower court's factual findings. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Questions of law are reviewed de novo.
Title 10 Del. C. § 132(c); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 72(g).
Shahan v. Landing; Del. Super., 643 A.2d 1357 (1994).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Super., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994).
Wilson v. Sico, Del. Supr., 713 A.2d 923, 924 (1998).
In Justice of the Peace Court, a motion to vacate a default judgment is brought pursuant to J.P. Ct. R. 60 and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Denial of such a motion is an appealable final order, but the appeal may address only the order denying relief and not the default judgment itself. Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9571, a final order in a civil action in JP Court may be appealed to CCP, where "[t]he appeal shall be a trial de novo." In other cases addressing the appropriate procedure on appeal of a magistrate's refusal to vacate a default, this Court has found that the de novo review requires "an evidentiary hearing on all factors pertinent to the motion [for relief from the default.]" And again, "since the magistrate exercised his discretion under J.P. Court Civil Rule 20(b) [the predecessor to current Rule 60], his order denying relief can be set aside on appeal only for abuse of discretion or error of law."
Canton Inn, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., Del. Super., Chandler, J. 1986 WL 2258; Wife B v. Husband B, Del. Supr., 395 A.2d 358 (1978).
Ney v. Polite, Del. Supr., 399 A.2d 527, 529 (1979) (holding that "denial of an application to vacate default judgment possesses all the attributes of finality, and thus, is subject to appeal"); Matt Slap Subaru v. Podolecki, Del. Super., 1989 WL 64147. See also 10 Del. C. § 9571 (providing that an appeal from a final order from JP Court shall be to CCP and shall be a trial de novo).
Kenyon v. Setting, Del. Super., C. A. No. 91C-10-217, Taylor, J. (Feb. 20, 1992) (ORDER).
Canton Inn, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., Del. Super., Chandler, J. 1986 WL 2258.
In the case at bar, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to vacate on October 27, 2000. The judge stated that "[t]his is an appeal on whether the Justice of the Peace abused his discretion." Defense counsel made a proffer as to the substance of Defendant's testimony, which was accepted by Plaintiff's counsel. Based on the proffered testimony, counsel argued that Defendant's conduct constituted excusable neglect because he was on vacation when the continuance notice was issued and because he never received notification of the default judgment. Counsel also argued that Plaintiff would not suffer prejudice from opening the default. Defendant was present and prepared to testify.
Transcript of the Proceedings (10-27-00) at 8.
Id. at 6.
Plaintiff's counsel accepted as true defense counsel's proffer of Defendant's testimony. He argued in response that Defendant's failure to act for 66 days following the entry of the default judgment was simple indifference, not excusable neglect. He asserted that the incomplete record was not a determinative factor and argued that repeated appearances in court were expensive and therefore prejudicial to Plaintiff.
In his written decision, the trial judge reiterated that the only issue before the court was whether the magistrate abused his discretion in denying the motion to vacate the default.
The trial judge carefully reviewed the proffered reasons Defendant's inaction and made independent findings as to Defendant's conduct. He noted in particular that Defendant did not file his motion to vacate until 66 days after entry of judgment and that Defendant' address on court filings was unchanged throughout December, despite his assertion that he had moved in July. The trial judge thoroughly the procedural facts leading up to the magistrate's denial of the motion to vacate and concluded that there was no abuse of discretion. He found defendant's conduct to be far less than diligent and concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to vacate. Pursuant to well-established principles of law, as discussed above, the Court finds no error of law in the decision of the trial judge.
For all these reasons, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby Affirmed.
It Is So ORDERED .