Opinion
C. A. PC-2022-06124
12-18-2024
SEBASTIAN W. ATRYZEK, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Defendant.
For Plaintiff: Sebastian W. Atryzek, pro se For Defendant: Marissa D. Pizana, Esq.
For Plaintiff:
Sebastian W. Atryzek, pro se
For Defendant:
Marissa D. Pizana, Esq.
DECISION
GIBNEY, P. J.
Before this Court for decision is Defendant State of Rhode Island's (the State) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Objection to Plaintiff Sebastian W. Atryzek's (Plaintiff) Petition for Compensation for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 8-2-14 and 12-33-3.
I
Facts and Travel
The facts of the criminal charges underlying this case have been discussed at length in both Atryzek v. State, 197 A.3d 334 (R.I. 2018) (Atryzek I) and Atryzek v. State, 268 A.3d 37 (R.I. 2022) (Atryzek II). The following facts are gleaned from those decisions.
In February 1993, Plaintiff pled guilty to the rape of a child in Massachusetts. Atryzek I, 197 A.3d at 335. After his conviction-for which he received a suspended sentence of fifteen years with a term of supervised probation until June 19, 2000-he relocated to Rhode Island. Id. However, he failed to register as a sex offender in compliance with G.L. 1956 chapter 37.1 of title 11. Id. He was charged with failing to register in 2009, 2010, and 2012. Id. On February 2, 2012, Plaintiff entered a plea of nolo contendere for all of the charges, and he received a sentence of ten months to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) and fifty months suspended. Id. He also received probation. Id. In 2013, he was once again charged with failing to register as a sex offender, pled nolo contendere, and was sentenced to seven years incarceration, with five years to serve. Id.
Plaintiff filed an application for postconviction relief for all his convictions. Id. The Superior Court denied it, holding that he had a lifetime duty to register as a sex offender. Id. He then appealed, via a writ of certiorari, to the Rhode Island Supreme Court arguing, inter alia, that he only had a duty to register for ten years after his supervised probation ended in 2000 for his original conviction in the Massachusetts case. Id. at 336. Our Supreme Court accepted that argument based upon its recent holding in State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018), but it remanded the case for the Superior Court to determine when his sentence expired in the first instance. Id. at 335. On remand, the trial justice determined that Plaintiff's duty to register as a sex offender expired on June 19, 2010, and vacated all four of his failure to register charges. Atryzek II, 268 A.3d at 41.
The State then filed its own petition for writ of certiorari appealing the trial justice's determinations-relevant to this matter is the decision to vacate the convictions for Plaintiff's failure to register in 2009 and 2010. Id. The trial justice reasoned that because Plaintiff pled nolo contendere to those charges in 2012-after the duty to register had expired in June 2010-that those two charges must be vacated. Id. at 42. The State argued that Plaintiff failed to register in 2009 and 2010 while his duty to do so still existed, and, thus, he was properly convicted for those offenses. Id. Our Supreme Court agreed with the State's contention that the proper inquiry was when Plaintiff had committed the offenses-not when he was ultimately convicted for them-and reversed the portion of the trial justice's decision to vacate the 2009 and 2010 convictions. Id.
On October 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint, in which he alleges that the State violated his constitutional rights by imprisoning him. See generally Compl. As a result, he requests that he be awarded $200,000 in damages for the four years he was incarcerated, plus an additional $50,000 at the time of release, and further monetary relief at the statutory pro-rated rate for an additional six months he served. Id. at 5. On October 24, 2024, the State filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. See generally Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and Obj. to Pet. for Compensation (State's Mem.). It argues that the Plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for his conviction per the plain language of G.L. 1956 chapter 33 of title 12 (Wrongful Conviction Statute) because he pled nolo contendere to his charges, and, thus, was never found guilty by a judge or jury. Id. at 16-17. Next, it asserts that the General Assembly did not intend to allow a claimant to succeed on such a claim when the only basis for overturning the conviction was due to a new interpretation of the law governing the offense. Id. at 17-24. It finally argues that for any constitutional claims Plaintiff may be asserting, he cannot be awarded relief because under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the State is not considered a person, and article I, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution is not self-executing. Id. at 7-14. Plaintiff objected to the motion on November 4, 2024, and the State filed its reply brief on November 12, 2024. See Pl.'s Obj.; see also State's Reply Mem.
II
Standard of Review
A motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, provides a trial court with the ability to dispose of a case early in the litigation process "when the material facts are not in dispute . . . and only questions of law remain to be decided." Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 847 (R.I. 1992) (citing 5A Wright &Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1367 at 509-10 (West 1990)). When filed by the defendant, a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is essentially a motion to dismiss, and the Court reviews it as such. See 1 Robert B. Kent, et al., Rhode Island Civil and Appellate Procedure with Commentaries § 12:13 at 138-39 (2020-2021 ed.); see also Chariho Regional School District v. Gist, 91 A.3d 783, 787 (R.I. 2014) (stating "[a] Rule 12(c) motion is tantamount to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the same test is applicable to both ....") (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, although the Court is restricted to a review of the pled facts in a manner most favorable to the nonmoving party, "allegations that are more in the nature of legal conclusions rather than factual assertions are not necessarily assumed to be true." DiLibero v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 108 A.3d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
III
Analysis
A
Petition for Compensation for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration
1. Nolo Contendere Plea
The State first argues that because Plaintiff pled nolo contendere to his charges, the plain language of the Wrongful Conviction Statute bars him from any recovery. See State's Mem. at 1617. Section 12-33-1(b) defines a "wrongful conviction" as "a finding of guilt by a jury or judge, later proven incorrect, that results in incarceration for more than one year." As Plaintiff pled nolo contendere, the State asserts that he was never found guilty by a jury or judge. See State's Mem. at 16-17.
When interpreting a statute, the ultimate aim of the Court is "'to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.'" Epic Enterprises LLC v. Bard Group, LLC, 186 A.3d 587, 589-90 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001)). "'It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.'" Id. at 590 (quoting Alessi v. Brown Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2012)). "'It is an equally fundamental maxim of statutory construction that statutory language should not be viewed in isolation.'" Sosa v. City of Woonsocket, 297 A.3d 120, 124 (R.I 2023) (quoting In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I. 2006)). Thus, the Court must consider "'the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections.'" Id. (quoting In re Brown, 903 A.2d at 149).
As noted by the State, a "wrongful conviction" is defined in the statute as "a finding of guilt by a jury or judge, later proven incorrect, that results in incarceration for more than one year." Section 12-33-1(b). A "finding of guilt" is defined as "[a] legal conclusion that a plea or verdict of guilty is valid." Black's Law Dictionary 772 (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). Therefore, the plain language of the statute supports the notion that a trial justice's acceptance of a defendant's nolo contendere plea is a finding of guilt by a judge. See id.; see also State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 498 (R.I. 1994) ("A plea of nolo contendere is the substantive equivalent of a guilty plea in Rhode Island."). This is contrary to the State's interpretation of the statute, which it cites no authority for support, that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not a finding of guilt by a judge. See State's Mem. 16-17. The Court's interpretation is further buttressed when the statute is read in its entirety.
Section 12-33-4(a) provides four requirements that a claimant must prove to succeed on a petition for compensation for wrongful conviction and incarceration. One such requirement is that he or she "did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence, to cause or bring about claimant's own conviction." Section 12-33-4(a)(3). Directly after this, the statute states "[n]either a confession nor an admission later found to be false or a guilty plea shall constitute committing or suborning perjury, fabricating evidence, or causing or bringing about the conviction under this subsection." Section 12-33-4(a)(4) (emphasis added). Section 12-33-4(a)(4) shows the General Assembly's clear intent to allow people that have pled guilty to the charges they were wrongfully convicted of to be entitled to compensation for such a conviction. If the Court were to accept the State's interpretation, then that provision would be rendered inoperable-a result contrary to how statutes are interpreted in Rhode Island. See Epic Enterprises LLC, 186 A.3d at 589-90 (providing the Court must give effect to the Legislature's intent when interpreting a statute).
Thus, neither a plea of guilty nor nolo contendere is an absolute bar for a claimant seeking to be compensated under the Wrongful Conviction Statute. This Court has previously stated that a claimant who has pled to the charges he or she was wrongfully convicted of has the additional burden of proving his or her legal innocence-such as by either withdrawing the plea or seeking postconviction relief-before compensation may be sought. See Terzian v. Magaziner, No. PM-2021-07092, 2023 WL 1982669, at *8 (R.I. Super. Feb. 7, 2023). That remains true; here, Plaintiff sought to prove his legal innocence by filing an application for postconviction relief, the effect of which will be analyzed below.
2. Factual Innocence and Concurrent Sentences
Although his plea of nolo contendere does not prevent him from seeking relief, Plaintiff must nonetheless prove the statutory requirements to show he is entitled to compensation. See § 12-33-4(a)(1)-(4). A claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to compensation by showing:
"(1) Claimant was convicted of one or more crimes, and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment for more than one year, and has served all or any part of the sentence; and
...
"(ii) Claimant's judgment of conviction was ... vacated for reasons other than the ineffective assistance of counsel and the accusatory instrument was dismissed; and
"(2) Claimant did not commit any of the crimes charged in the accusatory instrument; and
"(3) Claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence, to cause or bring about claimant's own conviction." Section 12-33-4(a) (emphasis added).
This Court has broken down the statutory requirements, explaining that Plaintiff's burden is to prove:
"1) conviction; 2) sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year; 3) actual imprisonment; 4) reversal or vacatur of the conviction for reasons other than ineffective assistance of counsel; 5) dismissal of the accusatory instrument; 6) that the claimant did not commit any of the crimes charged in the accusatory instrument; and 7) that the claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence, to cause or bring about his own conviction." Terzian, 2023 WL 1982669, at *4.
The Court has further explained that those requirements indicate that a claimant has a duty "to affirmatively prove both 'legal innocence' (pursuant to § 12-33-4(a)(1)) and 'factual innocence' (pursuant to § 12-33-4(a)(2)) by a preponderance of the evidence at trial." Id.
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was 1) convicted of the 2012 and 2013 charges; 2) that he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment exceeding one year; 3) he actually served at least part of those terms; 4) the convictions were vacated for reasons other than the ineffective assistance of counsel; and 5) the accusatory instruments were dismissed. See Atryzek II, 268 A.3d at 39. Thus, Plaintiff has successfully alleged that he will be able to prove his legal innocence. See Terzian, 2023 WL 1982669, at *4.
Plaintiff fails, however, to allege that he is factually innocent of the charges; rather, he relies solely on the fact that his convictions were vacated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See generally Compl. Essentially, there is no dispute that Plaintiff failed to register as a sex offender in either 2012 or 2013. See id. "Our Compensation Statute is not designed to recompense 'all procedural winners,' but only those 'innocent persons' who have suffered the 'miscarriage of justice' of wrongful conviction and imprisonment." Terzian, 2023 WL 1982669, at *7 (internal quotation omitted). "Section 12-33-4(a)(2) will serve to 'separate those who were wrongfully imprisoned from those who have merely avoided criminal liability.'" In re: Bozzo, No. PM-2022-3883, 2023 WL 3990272, at *4 (R.I. Super. June 8, 2023) (quoting Walden v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962, 967 (Ohio 1989)). Plaintiff's conviction was overturned on a procedural technicality, due to the General Assembly amending the relevant statute controlling how long a sex offender must register as such. See Atryzek 1, 197 A.3d at 337-38. Section 12-33-4(a)(2) does not include an exception for when a statute has been reinterpreted. It requires that the claimant show that he or she did not commit any of the acts as described in the information, and this Court will not graft an exception to it here. See Epic Enterprises LLC, 186 A.3d at 590 (providing the Court must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning when it is written unambiguously); see also Bundy v. State, 36 N.E.3d 158, 165 (Ohio 2015) (refusing to add an exception for a criminal statute being found unconstitutional to the requirement that a claimant prove actual innocence under a comparable wrongful conviction statute).
Therefore, although Plaintiff has shown his legal innocence, he has not alleged his factual innocence for his failure to register as a sex offender as the law was interpreted at the time. The ultimate vacatur of his convictions is insufficient to show that he is factually innocent by the plain language of the Wrongful Conviction Statute, and, thus, he is entitled to no relief for the time he spent incarcerated.
Additionally, for his convictions for failing to register as a sex offender in 2009, 2010, and 2012, a review of our Supreme Court's relevant decision on his application for post-conviction relief reveals that Plaintiff only had his 2012 conviction vacated; thus, his 2009 and 2010 convictions remain valid and his incarceration for them was lawful. See Atryzek II, 268 A.3d at 43. Therefore, he is also not entitled to any compensation for the time he served in connection with those convictions because a claimant is not entitled to compensation when he or she "was concurrently serving a sentence for a conviction of another crime for which [he or she] was lawfully incarcerated." Section 12-33-4(d).
B
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and State Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff makes allegations that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated because he was imprisoned. See generally Compl. However, the only relief he seeks is that allowed by the Wrongful Conviction Statute. See id. The plain language of the statute only allows a claimant to recover when he or she can prove the elements located in § 12-33-4(a). It does not allow a claimant to recover based upon constitutional violations. See § 12-33-4(a). The Court is thus unable to grant Plaintiff the relief he seeks for those allegations.
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Counsel shall submit the appropriate order for entry.