Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-00478-RMG
05-05-2023
Adam Armstrong, Plaintiff, v. Argos USA LLC and Robert Charles Kocian, Defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION
RICHARD MARK GERGEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6). (DKT. NO. 4). PLAINTIFF RESPONDED IN OPPOSITION. (DKT. NO. 7). DEFENDANTS REPLIED. (DKT. NO. 8). FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH BELOW, DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff Adam Armstrong is a former employee of Defendant Argos USA LLC (“Argos”). (Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶ 5). When Armstrong was employed by Argos, Defendant Robert Charles Kocian (“Kocian”) was his supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 6). Armstrong brought this action after he was terminated by Kocian. Armstrong brings claims for: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy (against Argos and Kocian), (2) negligent supervision (against Argos), and (3) negligent retention (against Argos). (Id. at ¶ 1).
Armstrong alleges that he was “employed as a Process Engineer” at Argos' cement plant in Harleyville, South Carolina. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11). Armstrong alleges that his position as a “Process Engineer required him to supervise employees” and take responsibility “for the safety of his crew.” (Id. at ¶ 29). Armstrong alleges that Kocian “had the authority to discipline as well as hire and fire employees on behalf of Argos.” (Id. at ¶ 5).
Armstrong alleges that “Kocian received bonuses based on the plant's production, so he had a financial incentive to prioritize production over employees' safety.” (Id. at ¶ 39). Armstrong alleges that Kocian violated “accepted safety principles in the industry by forcing him to work twelve-hour” shifts and by making modifications to plant equipment that were against the manufacturer's recommendations. (Id. at ¶¶ 44-45). As a crew leader himself, Armstrong alleges that he “was unwilling to instruct an employee to take unsafe actions that were likely to cause serious physical injury or death to members of his crew to save time and increase production.” (Id. at ¶ 38).
Armstrong alleges that on September 25, 2021, there was a clog in a cement storage container. (Id. at ¶ 66). Armstrong alleges that he “instructed his crew to work on the clog from the access hatch above the clog” instead of “opening the access hatch directly below the clog because there were several tons of materials that could result in someone being engulfed.” (Id. at ¶¶ 68-69). Armstrong alleges that his crew worked on the blockage for nine hours but was not able to completely clear the blockage. (Id. at ¶ 70). Armstrong alleges that when Kocian came to work Kocian “instructed employees to open the access hatch directly underneath the clog and use a small rivet buster to poke at the blockage” and “cleared the clog in 1.5 hours.” (Id. at ¶¶ 72, 75). Armstrong alleges that Kocian reprimanded him for his method of clearing the clog. (Id. at ¶ 76). Armstrong alleges that he responded by telling Kocian that he “was unwilling to risk an employee's life.” (Id. at ¶ 78). Armstrong alleges that on September 30, 2022, he was terminated by Kocian due to his “reluctance to listen to Kocian's feedback.” (Id. at ¶ 81).
Armstrong alleges that he is a “citizen and resident of Charleston, South Carolina.” (Id. at ¶ 2). Armstrong alleges that Defendant Argos is a Delaware corporation. (Id. at ¶ 3). Armstrong failed to allege the citizenship of Kocian. Defendants clarified that “Kocian is a citizen of South Carolina.” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 12). Defendant Argos is a LLC whose sole member is “Argos North America Corporation.” (Id. at ¶ 9). Argos North America Corporation is “incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Georgia.” (Id.).
On November 22, 2022, Armstrong initiated this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Dorchester County. (Dkt. No. 1-1). On February 3, 2023, Defendants removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), invoking the diversity jurisdiction of this Court. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 5). In their notice of removal, Defendants asked the court to “disregard Defendant Kocian's citizenship for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction under the ‘fraudulent joinder' doctrine.” (Id. at ¶¶ 12-21). Defendants allege that “the only cause of action asserted against Defendant Kocian individually is wrongful termination in violation of public policy,” and there “is no possibility that Plaintiff can establish this cause of action against Defendant Kocian.” (Id. at ¶ 14). Defendants allege that although “Plaintiff does not set forth a monetary demand,” since Armstrong's salary was over $105,000.00 per year, “his potential back pay damages to date alone well exceed $75,000.” (Id. at ¶ 11). Armstrong never contested or responded to Defendants' fraudulent joinder argument.
On February 8, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 4). Plaintiff responded (Dkt. No. 7), and Defendants replied. (Dkt. No. 8). The matter is ripe for the Court's review.
II. Legal Standard
A. Fraudulent Joinder
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Strawn v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008). A defendant removing a case to federal court bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction is proper. Id. The existence of federal jurisdiction is determined at the time the defendant files his notice of removal. See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939).
Under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, “a district court can assume jurisdiction over a case even if . . . there are nondiverse named defendants at the time the case is removed.” Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999). “To show fraudulent joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional facts or that there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court.” Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The party alleging fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden-it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim even after resolving all issues of law and fact in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. at 424.
B. Motion to Dismiss
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”). To be legally sufficient a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(A)(2). A RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED UNLESS IT APPEARS CERTAIN THAT THE PLAINTIFF CAN PROVE NO SET OF FACTS THAT WOULD SUPPORT HIS CLAIM AND WOULD ENTITLE HIM TO RELIEF. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999); Mylan Labs., Inc., 7 F.3d at 1134.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is obligated to “assume the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint and the existence of any fact that can be proved, consistent with the complaint's allegations.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). While the Court must accept the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, it “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Id.
III. Discussion
A. Kocian was Fraudulently Joined.
In South Carolina, an “at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason, with or without cause,” except “where there is a retaliatory termination . . . in violation of a clear mandate of public policy.” Barron v. Labor Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 614 (2011). Nevertheless, South Carolina courts will not permit a public policy cause of action where an employee has an existing statutory remedy. See, e.g., Barron, 713 S.E.2d at 637 (“The public policy exception does not . . . extend to situations where the employee has an existing statutory remedy for wrongful termination.”). An existing statutory remedy includes administrative remedies. See, e.g., Martin v. Boeing Co, No. 2:16-cv-02797-DCN, 2016 WL 7239914, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2016) (finding that plaintiff “had an existing federal statutory remedy for wrongful termination through the federal OSHA statute” because he could have filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.”).
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”), which enforces the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1977) (“Mine Act”), has jurisdiction over Argos' cement plant in Harleyville, South Carolina. In 1979, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, United States Department of Labor, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) entered into an “agreement to delineate certain areas of authority.” (Dkt. No. 4-2). In this interagency agreement, “the following jurisdictional determination[] [was] made: MSHA jurisdiction includes. . . cement plants.” (Id.) Therefore, MSHA has jurisdiction over the Argos cement plant.
The Mine Act “protects a miner's right to refuse work under conditions that he reasonably and in good faith believes to be hazardous.” Gilbert v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 866 F.2d 1433, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Mine Act prohibits any person from discharging “any miner. . . [who] alleged danger or safety or health violation in a coal or other mine.” 30 U.S.C. § 815(c). The aggrieved miner may “file a complaint with the Secretary. . .[who] will cause such investigation be made . . . within 15 days.” Id. The Secretary has the authority to initiate “the immediate reinstatement of the miner pending final order on the complaint.” Id. The Mine Act also provides for relief “including, but not limited to . . . reinstatement....with back pay and interest” and attorney's fees. Id. Finally, the Mine Act provides for opportunities to appeal, including judicial review. Id.
The Court finds that Armstrong had an existing federal statutory remedy under The Mine Act § 815(c). Consequently, there is no possibility that Armstrong could prove that Kocian could be liable for wrongful termination in violation of public policy under South Carolina law. Accordingly, the Court finds that Kocian was fraudulently joined and that the Court has jurisdiction to consider Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 4).
B. Armstrong's Wrongful Termination Claim against Argos is Dismissed.
For the same reason the Court found that Kocian was fraudulently joined, the Court grants Argos' motion to dismiss Armstrong's wrongful termination claim in violation of public policy. As stated above, since Armstrong had an existing federal statutory remedy under The Mine Act § 815(c), he cannot bring a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy under South Carolina law. The Court grants Argos' motion to dismiss Armstrong's wrongful termination claim in violation of public policy.
C. Armstrong's Negligent Supervision and Retention Claims are Dismissed.
“To prove his negligence claim, [Armstrong] must show: (1) [Argos] owed him a duty to do or not to do any of the things alleged; (2) [Argos] breached this duty; (3) [Armstrong] was injured, and (4) [Argos'] breach of duty proximately caused this injury.” Gause v. Doe, 317 S.C. 39, 42 (1994). “An essential element in a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Without a duty, there is no actionable negligence.” Bishop v. S.C. Dept. of Mental Health, 331 S.C. 79, 81 (1998).
In South Carolina, employers do not owe any duty of care when terminating an at-will employee. Gause, 317 S.C. at 42. (affirming dismissal of negligence claim because employee failed “to meet the first element of a negligence claim because his complaint does not allege he was anything other than an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all, irrespective of any inadequate investigations, false assumptions, or failures to reevaluate on the part of the employer.”).
The claims against Argos for negligent retention and supervision are barred by South Carolina's at-will employment doctrine. Armstrong's “complaint does not allege he was anything other than an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all.” Gause, 317 S.C. at 42. Therefore, Armstrong cannot establish the first element the negligence claim: that “[Argos] owed him a duty to do or not to do any of the things alleged.” Id. Even after viewing the complaint in a light most favorable to Armstrong, his claim does not have “facial plausibility” because he does not plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Court grants Argos' motion to dismiss Armstrong's negligent retention and supervision claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Kocian was fraudulent joined and that the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) to consider Argos' motion to dismiss. Argos' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 4).
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.