ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH VANCE, District Judge

Plaintiffs move the Court to remand this matter to the 34th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Bernard pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendants Ed Dixey, Fred Goodrow, and Pete Maraia oppose the motion. Also before the Court is defendants' Motion to Compel Compliance with Grievance and Arbitration Procedures. For the following reasons, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion to remand and dismisses defendants' motion to compel for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

Between 1947 and 1994, plaintiffs worked at a sugar refinery in Arabi, Louisiana, owned at various times by defendant — employers Amstar Corporation, Amstar Sugar Corporation, Tate Lyle North American Sugars, Inc., and Domino Sugar Company. In February 1999, plaintiffs sued defendants in Louisiana state court under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, seeking damages for the gradual hearing loss that they allegedly sustained when they worked at the sugar refinery. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defendants did not provide them with a safe working environment and exposed them to unreasonably loud noise.

In 2001, plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental and Amending Petition, which named additional plaintiffs. In August 2003, plaintiffs filed a Second Supplemental and Amending Petition, in which they named additional plaintiffs. This petition also added as defendants, Ed Dixey, Fred Goodrow, and Pete Maraia. Dixey was a foreman at the sugar refinery, Goodrow was a mid — to low — level manager, and Maraia was an engineer.

In December 2003, Dixey removed the action to this Court. Dixey grounds jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dixey, Goodrow, and Maraia allege that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, et seq., preempts plaintiffs' state law claims because they arise out of and involve the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Remand

Federal district courts have jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether a claim arises under federal law must be determined by referring to the "well — pleaded complaint." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citing Franchise Tax Ed. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983)); Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). Because a defendant may remove a case to federal court only if the claims could have been brought in federal court, "the question for removal jurisdiction must also be determined by reference to the `well — pleaded complaint.'" Merrel Dow, 478 U.S. at 808 (citation omitted). Under the well — pleaded complaint rule, the federal question must appear on the face of the complaint. See Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1997).

A corollary to the well — pleaded complaint rule is the complete preemption doctrine. This doctrine holds "`that Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.'" Johnson v. Baylor University, 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)). Complete preemption creates federal removal jurisdiction, and it is different from the more common "ordinary preemption," which does not. See id. The Fifth Circuit has distinguished between the two types of preemption:

Ordinarily, the term federal preemption refers to ordinary preemption, which is a federal defense to the plaintiff's suit and may arise either by express statutory term or by a direct conflict between the operation of federal and state law. Being a defense, it does not appear on the face of a well — pleaded complaint, and, thus, does not authorize removal to federal court. By way of contrast, complete preemption is jurisdictional in nature rather than an affirmative defense to a claim under state law. As such, it authorizes removal to federal court even if the complaint is artfully pleaded to include solely state law claims for relief or if the federal issue is initially raised solely as a defense. Id. (quoting Heimann v. Nat'l Elevator Indus. Pension Fund, 187

F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2003)).

Complete preemption is a narrow exception to the well — pleaded complaint rule, and it has been found in two situations only: "`The Supreme Court has clearly sanctioned the rule in the area of federal labor relations and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.'" Id. (citing Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare, Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 784 (5th Cir.), opinion withdrawn and superceded in part on reh'g on other grounds, 207 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000)). Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 completely preempts state law and authorizes removal of actions to federal court. Avco. Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The purpose of Section 301 preemption is to ensure the uniformity of federal law in the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 (1988).

Although the typical Section 301 preemption case is a contract claim in which a party to the collective bargaining agreement asserts that a provision of the agreement has been violated, the Supreme Court has held that Section 301 preemption can apply to state law tort claims as well. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). If the state law claim, whether in tort or in contract, is "substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim . . . or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor contract law." Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted). But not every controversy about employment, or "tangentially involving a provision of a collective — bargaining agreement," is pre-empted by Section 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law. Id. at 211. The Supreme Court has explicitly limited Section 301 preemption to matters in which the application of state law requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413. As noted by the Court, there is nothing in Section 301 that implies that Congress "wished to give the substantive provisions of private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent state regulation." Id. at 211-12. To hold otherwise would "delegate to unions and unionized employers the power to exempt themselves from whatever state labor standards they disfavored." Id. at 212. The Court in Lingle emphasized that it would violate congressional intent under Section 301 to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract. See id. Only "state law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those agreements." Id. at 213. In other words, Section 301 preempts those state law claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with consideration of the terms of — the labor contract. Id. If the claim exists "independently" of rights under a collective — bargaining agreement, the parties may proceed on the state cause of action. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1994) (citations omitted).

Moreover, "just because a CBA provides a remedy or duty related to a situation that is also directly regulated by non — negotiable state law does not mean the employee is limited to a claim based on the CBA." Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, as stated by the Supreme Court in Lingle,

The operation of the antidiscrimination laws does, however, illustrate the relevant point for § 301 preemption analysis that the mere fact that a broad contractual protection against discriminatory — or retaliatory [ — ] discharge may provide a remedy for conduct that coincidentally violates state — law does not make the existence of the contours of the state law — violation dependent upon the terms of the private contract. 486 U.S. at 412-13.

To hold otherwise would provide employers and labor unions the opportunity to place broad terms such as "health and safety" in a CBA in order to skirt liability under state law. This is not the purpose of Section 301 preemption. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212.

The start of any Section 301 preemption analysis is the underlying state law tort and whether the elements of the state law claim require an interpretation of the CBA. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407. The Court must determine whether the state law tort is "sufficiently independent of the collective — bargaining agreement to withstand the pre-emptive force of § 301." Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 (1987). In general, circuit courts have held that if the claim arises under state law and requires no interpretation of the CBA, there is no Section 301 preemption; however, if either one or both criteria are lacking, preemption applies. See, e.g., DeCoe v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994).

Here, the CBA of 1956 provided:

Article XIII — Health and Safety (1) Management shall maintain the Refinery in a manner consistent with proper sanitation, health and safety standards/and each employee, as well as the Union, shall cooperate with Management toward this end.

See Ex. B, Def.'s Mem. Opp. Pl.s' Mot. Remand.

The most recent version of the CBA, in effect from February 2000 to January 2003, provides:

Article XVI — Health and Safety (16.01) Management shall maintain the Refinery in a manner consistent with proper sanitation, health and safety standards; and each employee, as well as the Union, shall cooperate with Management toward this end. (16.02) Management shall maintain and make available a place where any injured or sick employee may be given first aid before being removed to his home or to a hospital. The Superintendent in charge on each shift shall call an ambulance for any such employee whenever necessary. (16.03) The Local may select two (2) employees to act as Safety Committee Members who shall meet monthly with the Safety Coordinator to discuss safety problems and practices. (16.04) The Company shall furnish a service from which employees shall be provided suitable safety shoes to be worn during work hours.

See Ex. D, Def.'s Mem. Opp. Pl.s' Mot. Remand.

Plaintiffs' state law tort claim is based on their allegation that their employer owed them a duty to provide them with a safe working environment free from unreasonable noise. See Pl.s' Compl., at ¶ 6. Under Louisiana law, an employer owes a duty to its employees to exercise reasonable care in providing a safe workplace. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:13. The relevant statute provides, in pertinent part, that

[e]very employer shall furnish employment which shall be reasonably safe for the employees therein. They shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, shall adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such employment and the place of employment safe in accordance with the accepted and approved practice in such or similar industry or places of employment considering the normal hazard of such employment, and shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety and welfare of such employees.

LA. REV. STAT. § 23:13.

To establish a violation of Section 23:13 against an employer, a plaintiff must establish "that her accident and injuries were caused by an unreasonable risk of harm created by the employer's failure to properly fulfill the duties imposed by the . . . statute." Jones v. Trailer, 636 So.2d 1112, 1116 (La.Ct.App. 1994). Here, not one allegation in plaintiffs' complaint relies on or refers to the CBA. Indeed, plaintiffs' complaint specifically alleges that defendants did not comply with state and federal regulations concerning workplace exposure to noise. See Pl.s' Compl., at ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants violated the applicable health and safety provisions of the CBA. To determine whether defendants violated their duty to plaintiffs, a court need look only as far as Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:13. As noted by the Louisiana courts of appeals, to determine whether an employer has violated Section 23:13, the court must examine only whether the employer fulfilled his duties imposed by the statute. See Jones, 636 So.2d at 1116. Contract interpretation is not required here to determine whether the employer is liable in tort. The Court finds that plaintiffs' state law claims against the employers arise independently of and do not require an interpretation of the CBAs.

The crux of defendants' Section 301 preemption argument, however, centers on the claims against the executive officers. Defendants argue that the executive officers assumed their duties to plaintiffs through the CBAs, and that no executive officer liability arises independently under Louisiana law. Defendants cite to the relevant provisions of the CBAs that provide that "Management" will — maintain the refinery consistent with proper health and safety standards. (See Ex. D, Def.'s Opp. Mot. Remand, at 30). Based on this language, defendants argue that preemption is proper because plaintiffs' suit against the managers is grounded on obligations arising out of the terms and conditions of the CBAs. The Court finds defendants' arguments unavailing.

Before the 1976 amendment to the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act, Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:1032 provided that workers' compensation benefits "were the exclusive remedy of an employee, his personal representatives, dependents or relations, against an employer for injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment." Nails v. American Optical Corp., 740 So.2d 1262, 1265 (La. 1999). Because the law conferred immunity on the employer only, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an injured worker could "seek recovery in tort from negligent executive officers and their liability insurers." id. (citing Cantner v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La. 1973)).

However, in 1976, the Louisiana legislature passed Act No. 147, which amended Revised Statute § 23:1032 and extended tort immunity to the executive officers of an employer. See id. (citing Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La. 1981)). In Bazley, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly held that the revision to section 23:1032 granted immunity to executive officers. Bazley, 397 So.2d at 479. In Walls, the Supreme Court found that the revision to section 23:1032 operated prospectively only, immunizing executive officers in tort after October 1, 1976. 740 So.2d at 1270. Therefore, for negligent acts that arose before October 1, 1976, plaintiffs can sue executive officers in tort for their negligent acts, and the executive officers can have a duty to provide a safe workplace to their employees. See, e.g., Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1072-73 (La. 1992) (upholding finding that executive officers had a duty to provide employees with a safe workplace from 1945-1976).

The complicating factor here is that plaintiffs' claims straddle the 1976 grant of immunity to executive officers. This is not an obstacle to plaintiff's post — 1976 claims against the executive officers, however, because the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that plaintiffs' noise claims do not fall under the exclusive — remedy provisions of Louisiana Workers' Compensation Laws, as their injuries do not arise from an "accident." Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 2003-778 (La.Ct.App. May 1, 2003) (unreported decision), stay and writ denied, 843 So.2d 382 (La. 2003). Because plaintiffs' claims do not fall within the exclusive remedy provisions, plaintiffs may sue their employer and its executive officers in tort. The executive officers thus possess no tort immunity for gradual hearing loss.

Therefore, contrary to defendants' assertions, Louisiana case law and the revised statute provide grounds for imposing liability on executive officers for failure to maintain a safe workplace for the period encompassed within plaintiffs' claims here. It remains to determine whether the claims against the executive officers arise independently of or require an interpretation of the health and safety provisions of the CBAs.

Under Section 23:13, an executive officer may be liable to an injured employee if " (1) the employer owed a duty to the — plaintiff, the breach of which caused plaintiff's damages; (2) the duty was delegated by the employer to the executive officer; and (3) the executive officer breached this duty through his own personal fault." Winterrowd v. Travelers Indem. Co., 452 So.2d 269, 275 (La.Ct.App. 1984). Clearly, a determination of whether the executive officers are liable to plaintiffs does not require an interpretation of the health and safety provisions of the CBAs. The existence of the employer's duty, whether there is a breach of that duty, and causation will be determined by Louisiana case law and the elements of Section 23:13. Whether the employer delegated this duty to the executive officers is a question of fact to be determined by a Louisiana court. Resort to the CBAs does not answer this question. Under Louisiana law, the issue of delegation is a fact — intensive inquiry designed to identify the precise individuals within the company on whom the duty actually devolved. See id. at 275-77.

The CBAs' generic reference to "management," which the 1956, 1967, and 2003 CBAs use coextensively with "the company," says nothing about which individuals ultimately bore the duty in this case. See, e.g., Ex. D, Def.s' Mem. Opp. Remand, at 1 ("On this 5th day of February 2000 at New Orleans, Louisiana, the Domino Chalmette Refinery of Tate Lyle North American Sugars, Inc. (hereinafter called the `Company' or `Management'. . . .")). Indeed, the CBA is not even clear whether the duty imposed on — "management" under the health and safety provisions actually refers to the management personnel or to the company. Further, Louisiana state courts have typically determined whether an employer delegated a duty to a specific executive officer without the need of a CBA. See, e.g., Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 (holding that in the typical case state courts can resolve a discrimination or retaliatory discharge claim without interpreting the `just cause' language of a CBA). Moreover, Louisiana law allows the executive officers to further delegate duties and to escape liability. There is no limit on the levels of delegation that may occur under Section 23:13. If the executive officers show that they delegated the duty to a lower level officer, they may escape any liability that Section 23:13 would otherwise impose on them. See, e.g., Jones, 636 So.2d at 1123 ("If the defendant's general responsibility has been delegated with due care to some responsible subordinate or subordinates, he is not himself personally at fault and liable for the negligent performance of this responsibility unless he personally knows or personally should know of its nonperformance [or] malperformance and has nevertheless failed to cure the risk of harm."). Reference to the CBA will not aid this analysis.

To satisfy the final element of their state law claim, plaintiffs will have to establish that an executive officer breached the delegated duty through his own personal fault. That generic "management" is listed as the responsible party in the CBA offers no assistance in determining whether an executive officer personally breached a delegated duty owed to plaintiffs. The Court therefore finds that the contours of the state law violation do not depend on an interpretation of the CBA. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 412-13.

Moreover, the duty imposed in the CBAs and the duty under Section 23:13 are not co-extensive. The CBAs refer only to proper sanitation and health and safety standards. Section 23:13 creates a broader duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:13.

Defendants' reliance on cases such as Hechler and United Steel Workers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990), is misplaced. In Hechler, plaintiff brought suit against her union, alleging that it breached its duty of care when it did not provide her with a safe workplace. 481 U.S. at 853. The Supreme Court held that Section 301 preempted plaintiff's suit against the union because it required the interpretation of the CBA. See id. at 862. In its analysis, the Court expressly noted that under common law, it is "the employer, not a labor union, that owes employees a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing a safe workplace." Id. at 860 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court noted that under Florida law, no similar duty arose for a third party, such as a labor union. See id. In Hechler, the union's duty arose only through the CBA. See id. The Supreme Court expressly stated that it did not answer the question of whether Section 301 would preempt plaintiff's claim had she sued her employer, upon whom Florida law imposed a duty to provide a safe workplace. See id. at 862 n. 5. Here, however, plaintiffs sue their employers and its executive officers, who may have a legal duty independent of any CBA.

In Rawson, the plaintiffs, survivors of miners killed in a mine disaster, sued the miner's union in negligence for failing to properly inspect the mine before the accident. 495 U.S. at 365. The Supreme Court held that Section 301 preempted the plaintiffs' claims because the duty assumed by the union arose under the CBA and therefore required an interpretation of the contract. See id. at 371-72. The difference there, however, was that the union's obligation to the deceased miners arose out of its agreement in the CBA to inspect the mines. See id. at 371. Although the union could have been held liable under Idaho state law for negligent performance of its inspection, this "duty of inspection" arose only because the union had agreed to inspect the mine in the CBA. See id. The Supreme Court held that " [i] f the Union failed to perform a duty in connection with the inspection, it was a duty arising out of the collective — bargaining agreement. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Here, however, individual defendants can have a statutorily — imposed duty to provide a safe workplace under Louisiana law, and their alleged negligent conduct does not arise because of something that they agreed to do only in the CBA.

At oral argument, defendants relied heavily on the argument that both the CBA and state law impose a duty on the executive officers, and therefore the Court may not "split" the duties by separating them into two distinct obligations. This argument is without merit. Merely because Louisiana law and the CBA may each impose a duty does not mean that Section 301 preemption applies. The test for Section 301 preemption is whether the state law duty is "inextricably intertwined" with a necessary interpretation of the CBA, not whether state law and the CBA impose a similar, or even the same, duty on the employer or the executive officer. As noted by the Supreme Court in Caterpillar, "Caterpillar's basic error is its failure to recognize that a plaintiff covered by a collective — bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state — law contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective bargaining agreement." 482 U.S. at 396-97. This reasoning applies equally to a claim asserted in tort. Plaintiffs may assert their state law rights as long as those — rights require no interpretation of the CBA. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 412-13; Humble, 305 F.3d at 1009 ("[J]ust because a CBA provides a remedy or duty related to a situation that is also directly regulated by non — negotiable state law does not mean the employee is limited to a claim based on the CBA.").

The Court finds that plaintiffs' claims against the executive officers arise independently of and require no interpretation of the CBAs. Section 301 of the LMRA does not preempt plaintiffs' claims, and removal was therefore improper.

B. Motion to Compel Compliance with Grievance and Arbitration Procedures

Because the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction here, the Court does not reach defendants' motion to compel compliance with grievance and arbitration procedures.

C. Sanctions

Plaintiffs also seek sanctions and costs under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) against defendants for improper removal and falsely asserting a basis for federal jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the Court denies plaintiffs' motions.

The Court may impose appropriate sanctions, including attorney's fees and costs, on an attorney who files a pleading in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 2001). Rule 11 provides that when an attorney submits a pleading to the court, he certifies to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief that (1) the pleading is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as harassment, unnecessary delay, or increased costs of litigation; (2) the pleading is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for modification of existing law; and (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support, or if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b); Childs v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 29 F.3d 1018, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994); American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 968 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1992). An attorney must make a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law of a case at the time when he affixes his signature on any papers submitted to the Court. Mercury Air, 237 F.3d at 548.

A party who seeks Rule 11 sanctions must notify the offending party 21 days before presenting the motion to the court so that the offending party can withdraw the claim or correct its defects. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(a). This provision is mandatory, and there is no evidence in either the record or the memoranda that plaintiffs complied with this procedural prerequisite. See Elliot v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the Court will not award sanctions under rule 11.

Nevertheless, the Court may also award costs and attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Fifth Circuit has held that "a court's discretion to award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) is triggered only if the court first finds that the defendant's decision to remove was legally improper." Avitts v. Amoco. Prod. Co., 111 F.3d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Miranti v. Lee, 3 F.3d 925, 929 (5th Cir. 1993)). Even if the Court finds that a defendant improperly removed a matter from state court, the Court has wide discretion with regard to whether to award costs and attorney's fees and may take into account, among other things, the complexity and uncertainty of the removal issue. See Miranti, 3 F.3d at 928 (and cases cited therein).

Although the Court remands this matter, the Court does not find any improper purpose underlying defendant's notice of removal. Although the Court has found removal legally improper, "the Court is convinced that [defendant's] filing . . . is the product of . . . misguided legal research, rather than a failure to attempt a reasonable inquiry into the law or an intent to harass." Cross v. Cross, No. Civ. A. 98-1144, 1998 WL 690978, at *4 (E.D. La. 1998). The answer to whether Section 301 preempts plaintiffs' state law claims is not as pellucid as plaintiffs suggest. Defendants had arguable support for their argument that federal jurisdiction existed, namely in cases such as Hechlar — and Rawson. The Court finds that sanctions are inappropriate if the position a lawyer adopts is reasonable from the point of view "both of existing law and to its possible extension, modification or reversal." In re Ulmer, 19 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court therefore declines to award costs and attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion to remand and remands this matter to the 34th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Bernard. The Court further dismisses defendants' motion to compel compliance with grievance and arbitration procedures for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court further denies plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and costs.