OPINION

BARAJAS, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a workers' compensation case wherein the jury found that Appellant failed to give requisite notice of his claim to the Industrial Accident Board within one year of the date of the accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal turns primarily on the actions and/or inactions of Appellant's trial counsel in failing to present evidence of timely notice to the Industrial Accident Board ("IAB") within one year of the date of Appellant's unfortunate accident. The record in the instant case shows that Appellant, through counsel, failed to properly provide information requested in response to interrogatories, failed to supplement those deficient interrogatories in that he failed to provide necessary addresses and/or telephone numbers of witnesses, failed to specify any expert witness's opinion as to extent and duration of incapacity, and failed to properly supplement the interrogatories. The record further shows that Appellee specially denied, pursuant to TEX.R.CIV.P. 93, that notice of injury and claim for compensation were timely filed with the IAB. Although clearly and openly put on notice that the issue of timeliness in the filing of the requisite notice of injury would be contested, Appellant, through counsel, put on his case-in-chief and rested without presenting any evidence concerning the filing of his claim for compensation. The details of the above deficiencies are discussed below.

A. Appellant's Discovery Error

Appellee filed suit on November 19, 1991, appealing an Industrial Accident Board ("IAB") award in favor of Appellant arising out of an alleged injury sustained by Appellant on March 27, 1990. After the parties announced ready for trial, Appellee moved to exclude Appellant from calling any witnesses at trial because, in response to Appellee's interrogatories, Appellant failed to properly provide information requested and failed to supplement the deficient interrogatories. Appellee's interrogatories, and Appellant's deficient responses thereto, are provided as follows:

Interrogatory No. 15:

If you intend to call expert witnesses at the trial:

(a) Give the names and addresses of all expert witnesses you intend to call and the subject matter to which the expert witnesses are expected to testify. Please specify the expert witness' opinion as to extent and duration of incapacity, if any. [Emphasis added]

(b) Attach a copy of all reports received from such expert witnesses.

Answer:

(a) Drs. Eduardo Hazarian, K. Zolfoghary, T.P. Rajashekhar, Lyn Neil, Toni Ghiselli, R.R. Jaurenek

(b) Medical records are attached.

Interrogatory No. 18:

Please state the name, address and telephone number of any person who has or may have potential knowledge of the relevant facts of this lawsuit. [Emphasis added].

Answer: Magdaleno Vasquez, Benjamin Ochoa, Jose A. Apresa

Because Appellant failed to provide addresses and/or telephone numbers of the witnesses, failed to specify any expert witness's opinion as to extent and duration of incapacity, and failed to properly supplement, the trial court excluded Appellant from calling any witnesses at trial, save for Appellant himself.

B. Appellant's Trial Error

After the parties were realigned, Appellant's counterclaim alleged a timely filed claim for compensation with the IAB, or alternatively, good cause for late filing. On July 8, 1994, ten days prior to trial, Appellee filed an amended answer in which Appellee specifically denied, pursuant to TEX.R.CIV.P. 93, that Appellant's notice of injury and claim for compensation were timely filed with the IAB.

At trial, Appellant made a second, this time fatal, mistake. Appellant put on his case-in-chief and rested without presenting any evidence concerning the filing of his claim for compensation. Thereafter, during Appellee's case-in-chief, the trial court and the parties, outside the presence of the jury, discussed the matter. Appellee apprised the trial court that it was Appellant's burden to prove timely filing because Appellee had specifically denied that Appellant had timely filed his claim for compensation. In response, Appellant asserted that the copy of the claim he had attached to his answers to interrogatories showed the date of filing. To counter Appellant's assertions, Appellee's counsel, outside the presence of the jury, was sworn in and testified that the documentation received "included a Notice of Injury and Claim for Compensation apparently signed by Mr. Apresa, but it did not contain a date of signing, nor any indication as to when it was received by the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission."

The trial court, in determining whether to allow Appellant to reopen his case and still outside the presence of the jury, allowed William Elias, the attorney who had handled Appellant's claim before the IAB, to testify. Mr. Elias testified that he had submitted a claim for compensation to the IAB on May 7, 1991, and that he had forwarded a copy of that claim for compensation to Appellee. Appellant then requested the court to reopen the evidence to allow either Appellant or Mr. Elias to testify concerning the notice of injury. The trial judge, clearly troubled by the import of his decision, denied Appellant's request:

MR. ANDERSON: Judge, I'm going to object to the reopening of the evidence. There has been no showing of diligence to produce the evidence during his case in chief.

THE COURT: I'm going to sustain it. I have to, Mr. Kalman. I hate to do it. I don't like it. I cannot stand it. I looked for every way to get around it. I can't do it. And, you know, I'm going to do that.

MR. KALMAN: Well, Your Honor, for the record, the only time this issue was raised is when Mr. Anderson —

THE COURT: It was raised by a verified pleading that you had before this trial started.

Thereafter, Appellee rested its case, and the case was given to the jury.

Despite Appellant's deficiencies in complying with discovery requests and the trial court's ruling to disallow all witnesses but Appellant, Appellant received favorable jury findings on total and permanent disability and wage rate. However, due to Appellant's failure to put forth evidence concerning the filing of his claim for compensation, the jury found that Appellant failed to give requisite notice of his claim to the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission within one year of the date of the injury. As a result, judgment was signed and entered in favor of Appellee.

II. DISCUSSION

In his sole point of error, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in not permitting Appellant's attorney to testify and to place before the jury evidence on the issue of notice to the IAB. Appellant contends that the trial court's refusal to allow said testimony and evidence effectively denied him the right to a fair trial.

The question of whether evidence should be admitted or excluded during trial is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. Fandey v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1994, writ denied); Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex.App. — Austin 1992, writ denied). Thus, we review the complained of evidentiary rulings in this case under the abuse of discretion standard. Fandey, 880 S.W.2d at 168; Ethicon, Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 831. The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in our opinion, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court's actions. Fandey, 880 S.W.2d at 168. Rather, it is a question of whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). In other words, we must determine whether the court's rulings were arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242. The mere fact that a trial court may decide a matter within its discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242. Nor does a mere error of judgment amount to an abuse of discretion. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1989).

The issue before us is governed by TEX.R.CIV.P. 270, which provides as follows:

When it clearly appears to be necessary to the due administration of justice, the court may permit additional evidence to be offered at any time; provided that in a jury case no evidence on a controversial matter shall be received after the verdict of the jury.

After having rested his case, the right of a party to reopen it and introduce additional evidence is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134, 189 S.W.2d 471, 476 (1945); Turner v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Word of Faith World Outreach v. Oechsner, 669 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1984, no writ). The trial judge should liberally exercise his discretion to permit both sides to fully develop their case. Lifestyle Mobile Homes v. Ricks, 653 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Zodiac Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 566 S.W.2d 341, 346-47 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1978, no writ). The trial court's decision should only be overturned for clear abuse. Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Thomas, 650 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "A trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen a case after evidence is closed, particularly where the party seeking to reopen has not shown diligence in attempting to produce the evidence in a timely fashion." McNamara v. Fulks, 855 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1993, no writ); see Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Mfg. Co., 598 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smart v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex.R.R., 560 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (asserting that "there must be a showing of diligence upon the part of the moving party" in requesting court to allow a party to reopen his case after resting).

In offering the testimony of Appellant's attorney on the issue of notice to the IAB, Appellant has failed to show due diligence. Ten days before trial, Appellee specifically denied, in a pleading verified by affidavit, that Appellant had timely filed his claim for compensation. As a result of Appellee's verified denial, this matter was put in issue and Appellant had the burden of pleading and proving that he timely presented his claim to the IAB and that if there was a delay in the filing, good cause existed for it. Robicheaux v. Aetna Casualty Sur. Co., 562 S.W.2d 568, 569-70 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ); see Lee v. Houston Fire Casualty Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 294, 295-96 (Tex. 1975); TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(13) ("In case of such denial the things so denied shall not be presumed to be true, and if essential to the case of the party alleging them, must be proved."). Despite the fact that Appellant was put on notice before trial that he would be required to prove timely filing, Appellant failed to put on any evidence of this necessary element of his claim. Only after resting his case and being informed by Appellee that the notice of injury and claim for compensation did not contain a date of signing or indication as to when it was received by the IAB did Appellant attempt to proffer the necessary evidence. Based on the above facts, we cannot say the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles in refusing to reopen the evidence. As such, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Appellant cites U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ramos, 863 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1993, writ denied) and other cases for his assertion that notice or knowledge of the injury to the employer waives any requirement that the claimant timely file a claim of compensation with the IAB. However, these cases deal with a different notice requirement within the scheme of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).

The former Texas Workmen's Compensation Law, Article 8307, s 4a set forth two deadlines. First, in order to make a claim for workers' compensation, an employee must give notice of injury to the association or subscriber within thirty days after the happening of an injury or the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease. See Mosley v. Employers Casualty Co., 873 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1993, writ denied). Second, the Texas Workers' Compensation Act required that an employee file his claim for compensation within one year of the date of injury, or show good cause for failing to do so. See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967) (repealed by Act of 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 16.01(10), 1989 Tex.Gen.Laws 114) (current version at TEX.LAB.CODE § 409.001-.004 (Supp. 1995)); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Reyna, 897 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tex. 1995).

Appellant's reliance on the Ramos line of precedent is misplaced. These cases hold that the thirty-day notice requirement is not mandated when an employer actually knows of an employee's injury. See, e.g, DeAnda v. Home Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex. 1980); Ramos, 863 S.W.2d at 538; Belknap v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 587, 588 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1977, no writ); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 573 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Ener, 126 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1939, no writ). These cases do not hold, nor are we aware of a Texas decision which holds, that a claimant need not file a claim for compensation with the IAB within one year of the injury if the employer has knowledge of the injury. Were this the law, the one-year notice requirement of Article 8307, § 4a would have largely been rendered moot.

Finally, without citing any authority, Appellant contends that the trial court should have allowed Mr. Elias to testify as a rebuttal witness. Although not specified in his brief, Appellant apparently alleges that because Appellee's attorney testified to the court, outside the presence of the jury, on the issue of notice, Mr. Elias, who also testified outside the presence of the jury, should have been placed before the jury as rebuttal to the testimony of Appellee's attorney.

Appellant misinterprets the meaning of rebuttal evidence. "Rebuttal evidence is evidence given to disprove facts given in evidence by an adverse party." Valley Indus., Inc. v. Cook, 767 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988, writ denied)[emphasis added]; see Greenstein, Logan Co. v. Burgess Mktg., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 179 (Tex.App. — Waco 1987, writ denied) (noting that rebuttal testimony is limited "to those issues which were placed in conflict by the adverse party's evidence during the case-in-chief"). In the instant case, because Appellee's attorney and Mr. Elias testified to the court outside the presence of the jury, there was no testimony before the jury to rebut. As such, the trial court correctly found that Mr. Elias could not be called as a rebuttal witness. Accordingly, because we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court, Appellant's Point of Error No. One is overruled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.