Mercure, J.

Plaintiff commenced this action, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud and negligence, to recover for damages sustained in connection with defendant's manufacture, sale and delivery to plaintiff of a transformer. Service was effected upon defendant, a Massachusetts corporation, in Massachusetts. Defendant's answer asserted, inter alia, the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the defense upon the ground that defendant subjected itself to New York jurisdiction by entering into a contract to supply goods in this State (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]). Supreme Court denied the motion; plaintiff appeals.

We reverse. It is undisputed that defendant manufactured, sold and shipped the transformer and additional replacement equipment to plaintiff in New York. Under CPLR 302 (a) (1), Supreme Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who "transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state" (emphasis supplied). The emphasized language was added in 1979 (L 1979, ch 252, § 1) in order to abrogate the "mere shipment" rule established by prior case law (West Mountain Corp. v Seasons of Leisure Intl., 82 A.D.2d 931) and was proposed to extend New York's long-arm jurisdiction to its constitutional limits (1979 Report of N Y Law Rev Commn, 1979 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 1450-1453; see, Island Wholesale Wood Supplies v Blanchard Indus., 101 A.D.2d 878, 879). Under the current law, New York courts may exercise jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who contracts outside this State to supply goods or services in New York so long as the cause of action arose out of that contract (see, Lupton Assocs. v Northeast Plastics, 105 A.D.2d 3, 6).

Plaintiff's purchase contract and defendant's sales order and bill of lading all provide for shipment to New York and defendant collected New York sales tax in connection with the transaction, establishing its knowledge that the equipment was destined for New York. By shipping the goods to New York, defendant not only created a jurisdictional predicate under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Drake Am. Corp. v Speakman Co., 144 A.D.2d 529, 530-531; Tonns v Spiegel's, 90 A.D.2d 548, 549-550; see also, Davidson Pipe Supply Co. v G.W. Sales, 685 F. Supp. 332; cf., Paradise Prods. Corp. v Allmark Equip. Co., 138 A.D.2d 470, 471; Cooperstein v Pan-Oceanic Mar., 124 A.D.2d 632, 633, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 611; Augsbury Corp. v Petrokey Corp., 97 A.D.2d 173, 176-177), it also established the constitutionally required "minimum contacts" (International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316) and satisfied due process requirements by purposely availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York, invoking the benefits and protections of its laws (Hanson v Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253; see, McGee v International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-223; American Natl. Bank Trust v Alba, 111 A.D.2d 294, 297-298). Defendant's conduct and connection with New York was such that it should have reasonably anticipated being "haled into court" here (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297; see, Burger King Corp. v Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-475; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N Y Civ Prac ¶ 302.11a).

Finally, recognizing that the jurisdictional significance of delivery terms has been an area of great conflict (see, Island Wholesale Wood Supplies v Blanchard Indus., 101 A.D.2d 878, 879, supra), we reject the assertion that shipment of the equipment F.O.B. defendant's place of business acted to divest New York of jurisdiction. The technical transfer of risk of loss in Massachusetts (see, UCC 2-319 ) notwithstanding, the fact remains that defendant contracted to supply, and did in fact ship, goods into New York, thereby placing the case squarely within CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Cavalier Label Co. v Polytam, Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 872; Cleopatra Kohlique, Inc. v New High Glass, 652 F. Supp. 1254, 1257-1258). Defendant has not come forward with anything which indicates to us that the Legislature intended to give any jurisdictional import to such delivery terms, and the 1979 amendment to CPLR 302 (a) (1), requiring only that defendant contract to supply goods in the State, whether actually shipped or not, would indicate to the contrary (see, Cavalier Label Co. v Polytam, Ltd., supra; Drake Am. Corp. v Speakman Co., supra, at 531).

Order reversed, on the law, with costs, motion granted and first affirmative defense contained in the answer dismissed. Kane, J.P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.