ORDER

GREGORY L. FROST, District Judge

This matter is currently before the Court for consideration of an August 24, 2005 Motion for Issuance of an Order of Possession and Preliminary Injunctive Relief filed by Plaintiff, Amerisourcebergen Corporation. (Doc. # 2.) For the reasons that follow, the Court finds the motion well taken.

I. Background

The following recitation of facts is set forth for the limited purpose of addressing the motion sub judice. The parties should note that "findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a district court in granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at a trial on the merits." United States v. Edward Rose Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)).

Plaintiff, Amerisourcebergen Corporation, is a medical and pharmaceutical products supplier that entered into Credit and Purchase Agreements with Defendants Hood Medical Services, Incorporated d/b/a Hoof Pharmaceutical a/k/a Hood Pharmacy and Hood Dialysis Services, LLC. Defendant George S. Hood executed these agreements (Doc. # 8, Ex. 1, 2) and served as a personal guaranty for the agreements, acting as a surety. Each agreement contains a security agreement provision that, in the event of default, entitles Plaintiff to take possession of collateral and to recover attorneys fees and collection costs from Defendants.

Defendants are admittedly in default. Following unsuccessful attempts at resolving the outstanding debts, Plaintiff initiated the instant action on August 24, 2005. (Doc. # 1.) On that same date Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Issuance of an Order of Possession and Preliminary Injunctive Relief. (Doc. # 2.) The Court therefore conducted an informal conference with the parties pursuant to S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 65.1(a) and then scheduled the motion for an in-court hearing. (Doc. # 5.)

On September 13, 2005, the matter came on for a hearing. The parties had previously filed comprehensive stipulations (Doc. # 8), and, relying on the stipulations, Plaintiff presented no additional evidence at the hearing. Defendants presented the testimony of Defendant Hood. Following closing arguments, the Court issued an oral decision granting Plaintiff's motion. This Order memorializes that decision.

II. Analysis

A. Standard Involved

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the consequent inquiry involved in addressing a motion for a preliminary injunction:

In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a district court must consider and balance four factors: (1) whether the plaintiff has established a substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits; (2) whether there is a threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by granting injunctive relief.

B. Discussion

The Sixth Circuit has explained that "[r]eplevin is an action where the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully taken or wrongfully detained such goods or chattels." Heidtman Steel Products, Inc. v. Compuware Corp., No. 3:97CV7389, 2000 WL 621144, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2000) (citing Anderson v. Boneman, 199 Mich. 532, 535, 165 N.W. 830 (1917)). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have wrongfully withheld collateral to which Plaintiff is entitled. The parties' stipulations, the plain language of the underlying agreements involved, and the testimony received at the hearing support Plaintiff's right both to take possession of the collateral and to enjoin Defendants from interfering with that right.

The first factor this Court must weigh in determining whether preliminary injunctive relief is warranted is whether Plaintiff has established a substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits. Having considered the written submissions in this case, the testimony, and the representations of the parties, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Defendants have, in fact, stipulated as to the amounts owed, their failure to pay these amounts, Plaintiff's right to the collateral related to these amounts, and Plaintiff's entitlement to attorneys fees and costs. (Doc. # 8, at 1-4 ¶¶ 1-17.)

Plaintiff has also demonstrated a risk irreparable harm. The evidence presented via stipulation and at the hearing indicates that collateral has been and is continuing to be depleted. Defendants have stipulated that unless an injunction were to issue, they would continue to deplete the collateral. (Doc. # 8, at 4 ¶ 17.) Given the apparent financial condition of Defendants, this would render Plaintiff's ability to collect on the debts improbable if not impossible. Further, Defendant Hood's prior false representations regarding payment of the debts at issue undercut his professed intent to pay now and his assurance that payment will occur.

The third factor that the Court must consider is whether issuance of the requested injunction will cause substantial harm. In considering this factor, the Court must (1) balance the harm Plaintiff would suffer if the request for a preliminary injunction were denied against the harm Defendants would suffer if an injunction were to issue, and (2) assess the impact the preliminary injunction might have on relevant third parties. See Corporate Exp. Office Prods. v. Warren, Nos. 01-2521 DBRE 01-2667 DBRE, 2002 WL 1901902, at *27 (W.D. Tenn. 2002). The Court has already discussed the claimed harm that Plaintiff would suffer in the absence of an injunction. Therefore, the Court now turns to the harm that Defendants and other parties might suffer as a result of an injunction.

Defendants argue that should the Court grant an injunction, they risk losing their business operations. The Court recognizes this potential harm to Defendants, but qualifies the weight to be afforded Defendants' asserted risk by the fact that such harm would be essentially self-inflicted. Self-inflicted harm that could result from issuance of preliminary injunctive relief should not excuse their actions so as to preclude an injunction. Cf. Pappan Enter. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 806 (3d. Cir. 1998) (holding in trademark infringement case that "a party's self-inflicted harm by choosing to stop its own performance under the contract and thus effectively terminating the agreement is outweighed by the immeasurable damage done to the franchiser of the mark"); Midwest Guar. Bank v. Guaranty Bank, 270 F. Supp. 2d 900, 924 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that a party "cannot place itself in harms way, and then later claim that an injunction should not issue because of costs which it must incur in order to remedy its own misconduct").

Defendants also cannot shield themselves from an injunction by pointing to the harm to their employees that possible cessation of their operations would produce. Although the Court is sympathetic to the harm that an injunction will potentially inflict on Defendants — and even more sympathetic to the harm that will fall upon Defendants' employees — these harms would result from Defendants' actions and are outweighed by the harm to Plaintiff.

To their credit, both parties agree that patient care is of paramount importance. This factor weighs against entry of injunctive relief here, although evidence presented at the hearing as to the existence of numerous other local medical services and dialysis service providers that could potentially service Defendants' patients partially mitigates this concern.

Also of considerable weight in the instant preliminary injunction analysis is the fourth factor involved in the inquiry: whether issuance of the injunction would serve the public interest. Defendants have plainly conceded by stipulation each element of this case. It is beyond question that there is a strong public interest in the enforcement of valid contracts and the collection of valid debts. Granting injunctive relief would serve the public interest in both capacities.

Having balanced the foregoing factors, the Court concludes that a preliminary injunction is warranted in this case.

C. Security Bond

Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff is entitled to possession and preliminary injunctive relief, the extant question thus becomes what, if any, security bond the Court should require. It is within "the inherent equitable power [of the Court] to condition an injunction on certain undertakings, including the posting of a security bond by the party seeking the injunction," Division No. 1, Detroit, Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Consol. Rail Corp., 844 F.2d 1218, 1225 (6th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Rule 65(c) reinforces this power, providing that "[n]o . . . preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined." Although this language would appear to mandate a bond, the Sixth Circuit has explained that whether to require a bond is within the discretion of the Court. See Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995).

Having considered the equitable circumstances of this case, the Court in its discretion concludes that in light of Defendants' stipulations and lack of apparent defenses, the Court finds that the posting of a bond would not be appropriate here.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for possession and for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. # 2.) Absent a contrary order from this Court, the injunction shall remain in effect until further Order of this Court.

The Court ORDERS:

(1) Plaintiff is entitled to an Order of Possession allowing the United States Marshal and/or the Franklin County Sheriff to seize all of the personal property of Hood Medical Services, Inc. (and its pharmacy operations) and Hood Dialysis Services, LLC, wherever located, and now owned or hereafter acquired, including: accounts (including health-care insurance receivables), chattel paper, inventory, equipment, instruments, investment property, documents, deposit accounts, any commercial tort claim described on the credit application, letter of credit rights, general intangibles, supporting obligations and proceeds and products of all the foregoing, and to give exclusive access to this collateral to Plaintiff or its designated agents;

(2) Before the foregoing order will issue, Plaintiff shall submit to the Court via letter, which will then be placed on the docket, a specific list of all collateral sought, with the timing of this submission at Plaintiff's election;

(3) Plaintiff shall concurrently copy Defendants' counsel with a copy of said letter;

(4) Defendants shall have three business days following receipt of said letter to dispute or otherwise contest any portion of Plaintiff's list;

(5) The Court will subsequently issue an Order based on its approval of Plaintiff's list;

(6) Defendants shall immediately — as of September 13, 2005 — notify all account debtors to pay the accounts to Plaintiff;

(7) Defendants shall immediately provide Plaintiff with a list of names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all account debtors, and this list shall include each amount owed;

(8) Defendants shall cooperate and not interfere with Plaintiff's attempt to collect the accounts from the account debtors;

(9) Defendants shall immediately turn over to Plaintiff all sums received from any account debtors;

(10) No bond is required in conjunction with the grant of the preliminary injunction;

(11) Plaintiff shall file a motion with supporting evidence for attorneys fees and costs of collection within thirty days of the date of this Order; and

(12) Defendants can still provide service to patients, but all monies received as a result of that service must be paid to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.