The trial court erred in overruling general demurrers to plaintiff's petition.

SUBMITTED JANUARY 5, 1967 — DECIDED APRIL 27, 1967.

Albert Vermont brought this action on a homeowner's insurance policy to recover for the loss by theft of a large diamond owned by plaintiff. The petition alleged that plaintiff delivered the diamond to a jeweler in 1952 for sale under a brokerage agreement. The diamond later was transferred to another jeweler for the same purpose, and remained in the latter's possession until 1964. In May 1964, it was discovered that the diamond was missing from the latter jeweler's stock and could not be located. The policy in question, which was in force when the loss occurred, covered "unscheduled personal property usual or incidental to the occupancy of the premises, owned, worn or used by an insured . . . while elsewhere than on the premises, anywhere in the world," but this coverage expressly excluded "articles carried or held as samples or for sale." One of the perils insured against was "theft, meaning any act of stealing or attempt thereat, or mysterious disappearance." The defendant insurer enumerates as error the trial court's judgment overruling defendant's general demurrers to the petition.

BELL, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff contends that the phrase "articles carried or held as samples or for sale" means "property owned or used by the insured of a commercial nature in the conduct of his trade, occupation, or business." We reject this construction.

While it is the general rule that ambiguities in an insurance contract must be construed most favorably to the insured, this rule has no application when the contract is unambiguous. Hulsey v. Interstate Life c. Ins. Co., 207 Ga. 167, 169 ( 60 S.E.2d 353). Where the terms of an insurance policy are plain and unambiguous, the courts have no right to enlarge the contract or to make it more beneficial by construction, but must carry out the intention of the parties as expressed by the literal terms of the policy taken in their usual and ordinary meaning. Golden v. National Life c. Ins. Co., 189 Ga. 79, 87 ( 5 S.E.2d 198, 125 ALR 838); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kellar, 213 Ga. 453, 458 ( 99 S.E.2d 823); Fokes v. Interstate Life c. Ins. Co., 59 Ga. App. 680, 681 ( 2 S.E.2d 170); Robinson v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 72 Ga. App. 19, 21 ( 32 S.E.2d 855); Southern Indem. Co. v. Young, 102 Ga. App. 914 (1) ( 117 S.E.2d 882).

An exclusionary clause similar to the one in this case was enforced literally in Gross v. Globe Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 142 Misc. 918 (256 NYC 570). See Orren v. Iowa Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 230 N.C. 618 ( 54 S.E.2d 927); Ann. 80 ALR2d 1289. Our research discloses no authority to the contrary, and plaintiff cites none.

If plaintiff was coincidentally trying to sell the diamond while utilizing it for its usual purpose of adornment, it would be an issue of fact whether the article was held for sale or primarily for another purpose. But where plaintiff was trying to sell the article and maintained no other purpose for it, it came within the exclusionary provision of the policy as a matter of law, irrespective of whether it was in any way related to plaintiff's usual occupation or business.

The trial court erred in overruling general demurrers to the petition.

Judgment reversed. Jordan and Pannell, JJ., concur.