THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FRANCESCA AMATO

Plaintiff, pro se

ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Francesca Amato (“Plaintiff” or “Amato”), proceeding pro se, filed an action against Ulster County Family Court Judge Anthony McGinty (“Defendant” or “Judge McGinty”). (Dkt. No. 1.) This case is related to Orr v. McGinty, 1:17-cv-1280 (GLS/TWD). (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee, but instead seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 16.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiff's fourth IFP application (Dkt. No. 16) and recommends dismissal of the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 6) in its entirety. 1

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action and moved to proceed IFP on July 30, 2021. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) However, the initial pleading was not signed and Plaintiff was directed to submit a signed copy of the complaint. (Dkt. No. 5.) On August 13, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a signed copy of the complaint, but also attached five exhibits that were not submitted with the original pleading. (Dkt. No. 6.) As such, the signed pleading was docketed as the amended complaint.

Thereafter, by Orders filed October 28, 2021, November 17, 2021, and December 17, 2021, this Court denied Plaintiff's motions to proceed IFP. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 11, 14.) In the December 17, 2021, Order, Plaintiff was afforded one final opportunity to submit a fully completed IFP application or pay the entire filing fee by January 6, 2022. (Dkt. No. 14.) Despite the foregoing directive, Plaintiff's fourth IFP application was not filed until January 10, 2022. (Dkt. No. 16.)

II. IFP APPLICATION

Plaintiff declares in her fourth IFP application that she is unable to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 16.) After reviewing the submission, the Court finds Plaintiff meets the requirement for economic need and thus her IFP application is granted.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

A. Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that - . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 2

To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, “does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

A pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a less strict standard than attorney drafted pleadings. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (“Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.”). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her pleadings “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this “does not exempt 3 [Plaintiff] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).

B. Summary of the Amended Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant in both his “judicial” and “individual” capacity. (Dkt. No. 6 at 1.) The amended complaint is written on a form complaint brought pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id. at 1-4. Plaintiff also lists her minor child, C.A.B., as a plaintiff. Id. at 1, 5 (“Plaintiffs Francesca Amato & C.A.B. (hereafter, the ‘Plaintiffs')-hereby makes these allegations against Defendant herein as follows[.]”).

Her disabilities are listed as “ptsd” and “LAS”, which she defines as “Legal Abuse Syndrome caused by defendant's actions and inactions.” Id. at 2. She complains of the following conduct: denial of participation in public service or program, failure to make alterations to accommodate disability, retaliation, and others “in federal suit.” Id. at 3. However, the section of the form complaint titled “Facts” is blank. See id. As to the “Prayer for Relief”, Plaintiff states “see attached lawsuit.” Id. at 4.

The “attached lawsuit” consists of 24 typewritten, single spaced pages, id. at 5-29, along with an additional 56 pages of exhibits. (Dkt. Nos. 6-1 through 6-5.) The “attached lawsuit” references the related action, Orr v. McGinty, 1:17-cv-1280 (GLS/TWD), and Plaintiff states she is “requesting the right to re plead [and] I am also filing a new verified complaint due to ongoing abuse by the defendant.” Id. at 5. 4

Plaintiff's amended complaint also references 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 5-6. Plaintiff claims the “policies, practices, procedures and standards established and/or maintained by Defendant violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 5. She also claims that “[u]nder color of authority, Anthony McGinty deprived me of my rights to my child, due process, and ADA rights were completely violated.” Id. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, along with injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 5-6. She further states:

I demand my son's immediate return to his home with me at once and that a permanent restraining order is placed on this highly abusive Judge Anthony McGinty and also in his individual capacity as I feel he is a threat and danger to my family within his political power and lack of professionalism and boundaries. I'm also concerned with his mental state and feel he is unfit and I have overwhelming information and belief that he is an addict.

According to Plaintiff, “this is also a civil rights action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964” because Defendant authorized “unconstitutional, gender-biased contested Judgment of Custody polices, practices, procedures and standards.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends Judge McGinty's “policies, practices, procedures and standards are gender biased, unconstitutional, have disparate impact on women and violate women's NYS entitled equal economic, property ownership and custody rights in contested Judgement of Custody Orders when domestic violence (“DV”) exists.” Id. at 7. Judge McGinty “has a history of court orders that change custody to abusive fathers and remove them from safe, loving caretakers with an extreme general bias against mothers.” Id. at 11. Defendant also ignores the ACP address confidentially program of New York State. Id. 5

Generally, Plaintiff alleges that from “February 2019 to Ongoing” Defendant “enforced polices, practices, procedures, and standards that prevented Plaintiff from proving the Custody Orders issued by trial were based on the wrong legal standards, erroneous facts, a biased unconstitutional trial. And prevented me from being able to have my witnesses and my own testimony.” Id. at 7. Defendant also “denied Plaintiff child access to his Service dogs and home status quo and private bedroom and consistent life needed to heal from past abuse.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges Judge McGinty denied her “all ADA accommodations requested over and over orally and in writing and further abuse[d] his power by forcing plaintiff to draft own motions and train all parties in the ADA in order to protect my rights that continually are denied.” Id.

She further claims Judge McGinty is “intentionally practicing and inflicting highly unlawful Discriminatory abuse upon [Plaintiff] due to [her] years of reputable advocacy and exposure of him.” Id. at 6. He has also retaliated against her because of her “two time best-selling book, Punished 4 Protecting: The Injustice of Family Court.” Id.

Plaintiff explains that “anytime I enter the Family Court it will be the three of themagainst me leaving an extremely unfair disadvantage, further harm and suffering and full control. 6 I am constantly bullied and they cooperate together to continue to retaliate against me by using my child as their pawn. McGinty's actions have caused my son and I irreparable injury and each second this continues threatens to harm us indefinitely.” Id. at 11.

Plaintiff claims “having pre diagnosed ptsd and LAS received zero ADA Accommodations requested and missed a court appearance on March 8, 2020.” Id. at 12. According to Plaintiff, she missed the court appearance “due to stress and denial of rights combined with fear of [the] court causing further harm to my son and family and fear of further McGinty retaliation causing ptsd to be triggered.” Id. She has “no recollection of being handed a slip” and did not put the March 8, 2020, court date on her calendar. Id. Plaintiff claims Defendant:

refused to give me enough time to get proper expensive counsel needed to fight such a traumatic 3^rd trial. I was thrown into trial and discriminated further bc I “did such a good job, I couldn't possibly have ptsd” this only proves that I didn't willfully miss a court date two days before our Country was on COVID quarantine but that with ptsd memory issues occur during high stress moments. McGinty used it as a legal loophole to strip me of all custody giving my son to his estranged father who barely had visits of 8 hours a month and abandoned the child in California after he was released from jail. McGinty was clearly Aware of all of this as he testified to it during the 2020 trial.

Plaintiff also claims Judge McGinty “intentionally ignores all emergency motions and puts them out months and months at a time; and takes hearsay from the father without any evidence or fact finding violating and taking/ away more rights.” Id. at 14.

Plaintiff references the related case, and states that her ADA claims against Judge McGinty were dismissed in Orr v. McGinty, without prejudice and with leave to replead. Id. at 15. According to Plaintiff, she is pursuing her “right to replead and add ongoing violations in current proceedings against Judge Antony McGinty and his ongoing abuse to me and my son C.A.B.” Id. She explains that she “didn't continue at that time to fight this case because my son was returned to my sole custody on September 17, 2017[, ] and we were healing from the damages and severe trauma.” Id.

Plaintiff states that she was diagnosed in 2016 and “orally and in writing has requested ADA Accommodations” “numerous” times to “let the court know” that Defendant has “withheld” her child's “full service therapy dogs” since October 2, 2020, amounting to “intentional and deliberate indifference.” Id. at 15.

According to Plaintiff, “Anthony McGinty continues his abuse in the form of retaliation, abuse of power, extreme harm and pain and suffering, violations of ADA title ii [which resulted] in a final order dated October 2, 2020. Granting Patrick Beesmer sole physical custody [of C.A.B.] and all decision making power . . . .” Id.

Plaintiff lists several ways Judge McGinty has “denied” her “reasonable accommodations” and “basic rights.” Id. at 16-17. For example, she claims Judge McGinty 8 failed to recuse himself and denied her a fair trial. Id. at 16. He also denied C.A.B. his “full service therapy dogs since October 2, 2020.” Id. Judge McGinty denied and restricted communication between Plaintiff and C.A.B., conspired with C.A.B.'s and Beesmer's attorneys, and omitted “strong evidence off the record, ” and “pushed several emergency motions out far past their legal requirements.” Id. at 16-17. She also complains of “ongoing discrimination.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges Judge McGinty failed to replace C.A.B.'s attorney with an “ethical” attorney. Id.

She further alleges Judge McGinty lied in the October 2, 2020, Order which cited “concerns” in Plaintiff's home, without evidence, and falsely stated C.A.B.'s father's home “has no domestic violence.” Id.

Additionally, on June 3, 2021, Judge McGinty denied C.A.B.'s “rights to his service dog again” and “showed preference to fathers” in that he gave C.A.B.'s father a “courtesy call” when he missed “virtual court” but did not extend the same courtesy to Plaintiff on March 8, 2021, when she failed to appear in court. Id. at 16. When she questioned Judge McGinty, he “falsely” explained that “virtual court is different from physical Court when someone doesn't show up we call them.” Id.

Under a section of the amended complaint labeled “Damages” Plaintiff lists twelve “counts.” Id. at 17-19. Plaintiff also lists five “counts” under Title II ADA Violations. Id. at 19. Plaintiff also devotes several pages to what appears to be excerpts and summaries of what she refers to as “Title II ADA Case Law re: Accommodations.” See id. at 19-26.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, a permanent restraining order, and preliminary injunction. Id. at 26, 28. Plaintiff is “seeking injunctive relief and a permanent restraining order against [Judge McGinty] to stop his abuse and allow us to have a fair trial with 9 an unbiased Judge without any connections to him whatsoever to avoid any further harm.” Id. at 9. She requests declaratory relief “to the effect” that Defendant's “actions were illegal and violative of Plaintiff's right to due process of the law and to equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 28.

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of at least $3,000,000. Id. at 27-28. Plaintiff asks this Court to “assume jurisdiction over this matter.” Id. Plaintiff also wants this Court to “restore” her sole custody rights over her minor child. Id. at 28. She also asks for any further relief as the Court shall deem just and proper. Id.

For a complete statement of Plaintiff's claims, reference is made to the amended complaint. (See generally Dkt. No. 6.)

C. Discussion

Initially, the Court finds the amended complaint fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this Rule “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and] prepare an adequate defense.” Hudson v. Artuz, No. 95 CIV 4768, 1998 WL 832708, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (citations omitted). The statement should be “short and plain” because “[u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it 10 because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 365 (1969)). Moreover, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:

(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.

A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too a heavy burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims, ” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). “Dismissal, however, is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The amended complaint contains rambling legal arguments, numerous disjointed sentences, and repeated conclusory allegations. (Dkt. No. 6.) Moreover, while the amended complaint contains some numbered sections, the numbering is of limited value since some of the numbered sections contain numerous sentences, and/or contain multiple paragraphs, and/or are repeated. Id. As a result, it is difficult for the Court to determine the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations, and it would be difficult for Defendant to shape a comprehensive defense. As such, 11 the amended complaint fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, the Court refrains from recommending dismissal on this basis alone because the amended complaint does not quite rise to the level of being “so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Rather, this action represents yet another lawsuit whereby Plaintiff is complaining of Defendant's handing of and decisions issued in family court proceedings. Construed liberally, Plaintiff seeks to nullify family court and custody determinations issued by Defendant, and asks this Court to restore her sole custody, requests declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary compensation. As such, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court will review the sufficiency of the amended complaint.

1. Minor Plaintiff

As Plaintiff is aware, an individual “who has not been admitted to the practice of law may not represent anybody other than himself.” Amato v. McGinty, No. 1:17-CV-00593 (MAD/ATB), 2017 WL 4083575, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017) (quoting Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007))); see also Orr v. McGinty, No. 1:17-cv-1280 (GLS/TWD), ECF Dkt. No. 47 at 1 n.1, 13 (plaintiff-mothers cannot bring an action “as next of friend for their minor children” and directing the Clerk to amend the caption to remove all references to the minor children). Similarly, “a non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.” Amato v. McGinty, 2017 WL 4083575, at *4 (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)). 12

Therefore, the Court does not construe the amended complaint to include any claims or causes of action brought on behalf of C.A.B. The Court also recommends that the Clerk be directed to amend the docket to remove all references to C.A.B.

2.Section 1983

Section 1983 provides redress for a deprivation of federally protected rights by persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

As noted, Plaintiff has named Judge McGinty as the sole defendant in his “judicial” and “individual” capacity. However, and as Plaintiff was previously informed in the related action, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Judge McGinty are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity. See Orr v. McGinty, No. 1:17-cv-1280 (GLS/TWD), ECF Dkt. No. 47 at *4 (dismissing Amato's Section 1983 claims against Judge McGinty with prejudice); Treistman v. McGinty, No. 1:16-cv-1403, 2018 WL 4078262, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2018) (finding the plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants in their official capacity as 13 Family Court employees are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also Amato v. McGinty, 2017 WL 4083575, at *4. The same result is required here.

Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. at 209 (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation [.]” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).

As detailed above, Plaintiff has brought several allegations against Judge McGinty, including that he violated her constitutional rights, conspired with other individuals, endangered the welfare of C.A.B., denied her “accommodations, ” and retaliated against her for being outspoken about Judge McGinty's purported abuses and discrimination against mothers and children. However, all of the acts described in the amended complaint arise out of family court proceedings before Judge McGinty, the functions complained of were ones normally performed 14 by a judge, and Plaintiff was a party who dealt with Judge McGinty in his judicial capacity. Plaintiff has not alleged that Judge McGinty took nonjudicial actions or that he acted in the absence of jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's allegations that Judge McGinty made improper adverse rulings against Plaintiff during the custody proceedings with malice or in retaliation for her “exposing” abuses in Family Court, Judge McGinty was still performing judicial functions and presiding over Plaintiff's custody action in Ulster County Family Court. As stated above, a judge does not lose his or her judicial immunity because he is accused of acting with malice or corruptly. Accordingly, Judge McGinty is entitled to judicial immunity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13; Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210.

Judge McGinty is also protected under sovereign immunity. In Gollomp v. Spitzer, the Court held that the New York Unified Court System is an “arm of the State” and affirmed the dismissal of a Section 1983 claim against a judge under sovereign immunity. 568 F.3d 355, 365-68 (2d Cir. 2009). Likewise, Plaintiff has filed her complaint against Judge McGinty, a member of the Ulster County Family Court, which is part of the New York Unified Court System. N.Y. Const. Art. VI, §§ 1, 13. All of Judge McGinty's alleged constitutional violations occurred while he acted within his official capacity as a Family Court judge in adjudicating a custody dispute. Therefore, all claims against Judge McGinty should be dismissed, because “a suit against a state official in his official capacity is, in effect, a suit against the state itself, which is barred.” Walker v. Fam. Ct. Judge Catherine Cholakis, No. 1:19-CV-1288 (LEK/CFH), 2020 WL 3503158, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (citations omitted).

Moreover, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief because she “allege[d] neither the violation of a declaratory decree, nor the unavailability of declaratory relief.” See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999). Nor is Plaintiff entitled to declaratory relief because 15 she alleges only past conduct and does not seek to prevent an ongoing or future violation of federal law. See Shtrauch v. Dowd, 651 Fed.Appx. 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that relief sought was not prospective where the “specific allegations target[ed] past conduct” and the “remedy [was] not intended to halt a present, continuing violation of federal law”)).

The Court therefore recommends dismissing Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Judge McGinty under the doctrines of judicial and sovereign immunity and as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii); see also Montero, 171 F.3d at 760 (“A complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous' when ‘it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.'” (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327)).

3. Title VII

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see Vega v. Hempstead Union Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015) (A plaintiff asserting a Title VII discrimination claim must allege facts showing that “(1) the employer took adverse action against him and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.”).

Here, Plaintiff claims in conclusory fashion that Judge McGinty “discriminates” against women in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff does not, however, allege employment discrimination 16 or that she is or was an employee of Judge McGinty and, therefore, the claim is frivolous. See Jones v. Thomas, No. 20-CV-5581, 2020 WL 5077026, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2020) (dismissing plaintiff's claims pursuant to Title VII where the plaintiff did not allege that he is or was an employee of any of the defendants); Basora-Jacobs v. Palevsky, No. 20-CV-1675, 2020 WL 3868710, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2020) (dismissing the plaintiff's Title VII claims because “[t]he complaint does not list Plaintiff's employer as a defendant in the case caption.”). Since Title VII claims are to be raised against a plaintiff's employer, there is no proper Title VII defendant in this case. Militinska-Lake v. Kirnon, No. 1:20-CV-443 (TJM/CFH), 2021 WL 3569807, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2021) (“As a general rule, the proper defendant in a Title VII case against a State entity is the actual department or agency that employs the plaintiff.”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Title VII claims against Judge McGinty be dismissed.

4. ADA

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To plead an ADA claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that [s]he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that [s]he was excluded from participation in a public 17 entity's services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was due to [her] disability.” Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As discussed, Plaintiff has utilized a form ADA complaint, largely alleges disability due to PTSD, and claims Judge McGinty denied her “accommodations” and “retaliated” against her during family court proceedings. For reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's purported disability-based claims under the ADA must also be dismissed.

First, to the extent Plaintiff asserts ADA claims against Judge McGinty in his individual capacity, such claims fail as a matter of law because there is no individual liability under Title II of the ADA. See Garcia v. SUNY Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that defendants cannot be sued in their individual capacities for violating Title II of the ADA); see also Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (“the retaliation provision of the ADA . . . cannot provide for individual liability”); Myers v. N.Y.-Dep't of Motor Vehicles, No. 06-CV-4583, 2013 WL 3990770, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013) (“[N]umerous district courts in this [C]ircuit have persuasively held that there is no individual liability under Title I or Title II of the ADA, regardless of whether the claim is brought in an individual or official capacity.”); Netti v. Ayers, No. 17-CV-976, 2017 WL 7542494, at *18 (Oct. 5, 2017) (“individuals cannot be held liable under the ADA”) (citing cases). Thus, Plaintiff's ADA claims against Judge McGinty, insofar as he is sued in his individual capacity, must be dismissed. 18

Even if the Court assumes for purposes of initial review only, that Plaintiff was disabled during the state court proceedings within the meaning of the ADA, and Judge McGinty was a proper defendant in his official capacity, her assertions do not show that Judge McGinty discriminated or retaliated against her because of her PTSD. It is not enough for Plaintiff to state that she is disabled and that bad things happened to her in the state court proceedings; she must allege facts from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that these things happened to her because of discrimination on the basis of her disability. The use of “buzz words” such as “disability, ” “accommodation, ” and “retaliation” does not cure a pleading defect such as the one herein. See Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1986) (the Second Circuit has repeatedly held, “complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning”). She does not allege any facts suggesting a plausible connection between her alleged PTSD and “LAS” and the actions that were taken against her in the state court proceedings. Rather, Plaintiff merely states she “has no recollection of being handed a slip” regarding the March 8, 2020, court date that she missed. Moreover, Plaintiff's passing reference that she “requested audio of the court hearings so that I can have time to listen to prepare as pro se for continuing proceedings” or that Judge McGinty “refused to 19 give me enough time to get proper expensive counsel needed to fight such a traumatic 3rd trial” are insufficient to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 6 at 13, 14.)

In light of the foregoing, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff's ADA claims, if any, against Judge McGinty. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

5. Domestic Relations Exception, Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, and Younger Abstention

Due to the nature of Plaintiff's amended complaint, it is difficult to precisely determine exactly which doctrines apply, but based upon the relief sought, even if Plaintiff had sued an appropriate defendant, her claims are also likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, domestic relations exception, and/or Younger abstention.

a. Domestic Relations Exception

Under the domestic relations exception to the jurisdiction of federal courts, cases involving divorce, alimony, and child custody remain outside federal court jurisdiction. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006). This exception is based upon a policy dictating that the states have traditionally adjudicated marital and child custody disputes, developing “competence and expertise in adjudicating such matters, which federal courts lack.” Thomas v. N.Y. City, 814 F.Supp. 1139, 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).

Here, in order to return custody of C.A.B. to Plaintiff, or to “enjoin” the state court's orders, this Court would have to re-determine Judge McGinty's decision in the custody matter. This would also involve resolving factual disputes regarding custody and visitation. This court is divested of jurisdiction to make such determinations. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); 20 Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967) (it has been uniformly held that federal courts do not adjudicate cases involving the custody of minors and rights of visitation); Sobel v. Prudenti, 25 F.Supp.3d 340, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (the domestic relations exception “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”). Accordingly, to the extent the amended complaint is seeking a child custody decree from the Court, the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate such a claim. See, e.g., Amato v. McGinty, No. 17-CV-593 (MAD/ATB), 2017 WL 9487185, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jun. 6, 2017) report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 4083575 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15. 2017).

b. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

In the event the relevant underlying state court proceedings are concluded, such claims may be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine divests the federal court of jurisdiction to consider actions that seek to overturn state court judgments. Fernandez v. Turetsky, No. 12-CV-4092, 2014 WL 5823116, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.”)). The doctrine also bars the federal court from considering claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with a prior state court determination. Fernandez v. Turetsky, 2014 WL 5823116, at *3 (quoting Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1999)).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where the federal court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment, and (4) commenced the district court proceedings 21 after the state court judgment was rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).

Here, it appears Plaintiff “lost” in state court, complains of injuries caused by the state court judgments, and asks this Court to invalidate the state court's judgments regarding child custody. See Dkt. No. 6 at 29. Thus, as currently drafted, the amended complaint is likely barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

c. Younger Abstention

In the event the underlying state court proceedings remain pending, Plaintiff's request for this Court's involvement may also implicate the Younger abstention doctrine. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under the Younger doctrine, “federal courts [must] abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 602 n.16 (1975) (extending the equitable principles that required abstention with respect to injunctive relief in Younger apply to requests for declaratory relief as well).

In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013), the Supreme Court clarified that the Younger doctrine is limited to three exceptional circumstances, including (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement, or “quasi-criminal, ” proceedings; and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions.” Id. at 72-73. “[T]here can be no doubt that a custody dispute . . . raises important state interests.” Graham v. N.Y. Ctr. for Interpersonal Dev., No. 15-CV-459, 2015 WL 1120121, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2015) (holding that plaintiff's claim for 22 injunctive relief was barred by Younger when the plaintiff sought to challenge an ongoing family court custody proceeding) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, to the extent that the child custody issues are continuing in Family Court, the Court should abstain from interfering with that process. See, e.g., Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F.Supp.2d 350, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying Younger abstention in child support matter); Lomtevas v. New York State, No. 03-CV-2359, 2003 WL 22937688, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2003) (same).

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

Generally, when the court dismisses a pro se complaint sua sponte, the court should afford the plaintiff the opportunity to amend at least once, however, leave to replead may be denied where any amendment would be futile. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Futility is present when the problem with the plaintiff's causes of action is substantive such that better pleading will not cure it. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Here, better pleading could not cure the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the immunities described above, which appear to apply to all claims except for Plaintiff's ADA claim seeking prospective injunctive relief.

Nevertheless, in light of Plaintiff's pro se status and in an abundance of caution, as was the case in the related action, better pleading--addressing the deficiencies outlined above--could potentially save Plaintiff's ADA claim for prospective injunctive relief against Judge McGinty from being sua sponte dismissed on initial review. 23 See, e.g., Orr v. McGtiny, No. 1:17-cv-1280 (GLS/TWD), ECF Dkt. No. 47 at 10-11. As such, the Court recommends this claim be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

V. PLAINTIFF'S ADDRESS

Under this Court's rules, an unrepresented litigant is under a duty to inform the Court of any address changes in writing. L.R. 10.1(c)(2). For the orderly disposition of cases, it is essential that litigants honor their continuing obligation to keep the Court informed of address changes. To date, all the Court's Orders mailed to Plaintiff's address on file have been returned as undeliverable. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 12, 15.)

In an extraordinary display of special solicitude to Plaintiff as a pro se litigant, the Clerk was directed to mail a one-time courtesy copy of each Order at the confidential and redacted address indicated on the envelope of Plaintiff's submissions to the Court and as verbally provided to the Clerk on December 1, 2021. (See generally Docket Report; see Dkt. Nos. 11, 14.) However, Plaintiff must file a change of address IN WRITING within thirty days, and she 24 must continue to submit any address changes to the Court as long as her action is pending. “Failure to notify the Court of a change of address in accordance with L.R. 10.1(c)(2) may result in the dismissal of any pending action.” L.R. 41.2(b).

VI. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, after carefully considering this matter, and for the reasons explained above, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 16) is GRANTED; and it is further

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's amended complaint (Dkt. No. 6) be sua sponte dismissed in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further

RECOMMENDED that all claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE except that Plaintiff's ADA claim for prospective injunctive relief be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD; and it is further

RECOMMENDED that the Clerk be directed to amend the docket to remove all references to C.A.B., and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff must file a CHANGE OF ADDRESS within THIRTY DAYS of the date of the Report-Recommendation, and she must continue to submit any address changes to the Court as long as this action is pending; failure to notify the Court of a change of address in accordance with L.R. 10.1(c)(2) may result in the dismissal of any pending action; and it is further 25

ORDERED that the Clerk mail a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation to Plaintiff at the address listed on the docket and to mail a FINAL one-time courtesy copy to the confidential and redacted address indicated on the envelope of Dkt. No. 16 and as verbally provided to the Clerk on December 1, 2021.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Plaintiff has fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a). 26