ORDER

LEWIS KAPLAN, District Judge

Plaintiff was terminated as a family practice resident by Bronx Lebanon Hospital in September 1993 after being accused of performing an unauthorized pelvic examination on a thirteen year old girl. He subsequently sued unsuccessfully in the state courts. See Amadasu v. Bronx Lebanon Hospital Center, Inc., 10 A.D.3d 571, 782 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1st Dept. 2004). He commenced this action while the state court case still was pending.

The matter now is before the Court principally on plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation of Chief Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck, dated January 21, 2005 (the "RR"), which recommended that defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) be granted.

The procedural history of this action is complex. Some elements may be gleaned from the Report and Recommendation of Chief Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck, dated January 21, 2005 (the "RR") and from prior orders by the undersigned dated April 30 and November 15, 2004. But it is not necessary to prolong this order by repeating all that has been said before.

Chief Magistrate Judge Peck recommended dismissal in part of statute of limitations grounds, in part on grounds of former adjudication, and in part under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff has submitted (1) a 21-page, single space declaration in support of his objections as well as in support of his cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings or by default in his favor, (2) two volumes of exhibits, and (3) a 50-page memorandum in support of his objections.

The Court has reviewed plaintiff's objections, all of which are without merit. In view of Chief Magistrate Judge Peck's thorough RR, it writes only to make a few basic points.

1. To the extent that plaintiff relies, in support of his objections, on materials that were not submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court declines to consider them. As the Court wrote in Morris v. Amalgamated Lithographers of America, Local One, 994 F. Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1998):

"The first issue presented by the objections is whether the Court should consider the extensive affidavits and evidentiary materials the union has submitted in support of its objections. In this connection, it should be noted that the union's application before Judge Peck for leave to submit affidavits in support of a motion for reconsideration was denied on the ground that `any additional evidence is for trial, not a 2d bite at the apple.' (Endorsement, Jan. 5, 1998).

"Section 636(b)(1)(C) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), which provides for district court reviews of reports and recommendations by magistrate judges provides in Part that `[t]he judge may also receive further evidence . . .' in the course of such a review. (Emphasis added) But the statute is permissive, not mandatory. While there may be cases in which the receipt of further evidence is appropriate, there are substantial reasons for declining to do so as a general matter. First, permitting such piecemeal presentation of evidence is exceptionally wasteful of the time of both the magistrate and district judges, the former having been compelled to write an arguably useless report based on less than the universe of relevant evidence and the latter being deprived of the benefit of the magistrate judge's considered view of the entire record. Second, opposing parties would be put to the burden of proceedings which, to a considerable degree, would be duplicative. Third, there would be instances in which parties would be encouraged to withhold evidence, particularly evidence which might be embarrassing as well as helpful on the merits, in the expectation of using it before the district judge only if they failed to prevail before the magistrate judge on a more abbreviated showing. Finally, the routine consideration of evidence in support of objections which could have been presented before the magistrate judge would reward careless preparation of the initial papers.

"In this case, the defendant was well aware that its burden under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 was to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In view of the plaintiff's claim that the union failed to represent him fairly and adequately in the grievance proceeding, the union was on notice that the details of exactly what it did and when — which is the focus of the evidentiary materials it now seeks to submit — necessarily were at the heart of its motion for summary judgment. It has offered no excuse whatever for failing to offer them in its initial papers. The Court therefore declines to consider them. Judge Peck was entirely correct in declining to afford the union a second bite at the apple."

So too here. The Court declines to consider plaintiff's materials to the extent they were not before the magistrate judge.

2. The RR relies on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for the proposition that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's claim that the state court judgment in his previous case was obtained by fraud. (RR 26-27) Subsequent to the filing of the RR, the Supreme Court decided Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 125 S.Ct. 1517 (2005), which restricted the reach of that doctrine. Without intimating a view as to the effect of Exxon Mobil on this case, the Court finds it unnecessary to rely on Rooker-Feldman to dispose of this claim. Count 40 of the amended complaint alleges in the most conclusory of terms that the defendants made false and fraudulent statements to and concealed evidence from the state court. (Am Cpt ¶ 433) He nowhere alleges what each defendant allegedly did, what false statements allegedly were made, when all of this occurred, and a host of other required details. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Nor does he allege any reliance by the state court or any causal connection between any misstatements that may have been made and the final outcome. Accordingly, this claim is insufficient without regard to Rooker-Feldman.

3. Plaintiff's opposition to the defendants' motion was joined with a cross motion for judgment on the pleadings or by default and for a hearing on damages. (Docket item 75) The RR did not specifically address the cross motion. Nevertheless, the cross-motion is entirely without merit.

Accordingly, plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation are overruled. Defendants' joint motion to dismiss the action is granted. Plaintiff's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings or other relief is denied. Upon entry of final judgment of dismissal, the Clerk shall close the case.

SO ORDERED.