Rickman, Judge.

David John Hungeling, Craig Herrington Kuglar, Adam S. Rubenfield, Atlanta, for Appellant in A17A0303.

Marlie Anne McDonnell, David Gregory Michell, Bruce G. Hart, Garrett E. Land, for Appellee in A17A0303.

David Gregory Michell, Bruce G. Hart, Garrett E. Land, for Appellant in A17A0539.

David John Hungeling, Craig Herrington Kuglar, Adam S. Rubenfield, Atlanta, for Appellee in A17A0539.

Rickman, Judge.

After Alpha Balanced Fund, LLLP (an investor) requested a full withdrawal/redemption of its balance in the hedge fund Irongate Performance Fund, LLC ("the Fund") and waited the requisite time period for its right to its investment balance to purportedly vest, Irongate DPS, LLC ("the Fund Manager" ) suspended all Fund withdrawal requests indefinitely and terminated the Fund five months later, consequently depriving Alpha of its purportedly vested Fund balance. Alpha sued the Fund and the Fund Manager (collectively "Irongate"), alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment. As of the last hearing in the trial court, the Fund was still in the process of winding-up and more than $4 million had thus far been dispersed in cash distributions to all Fund members/investors, including Alpha, which had received $430,000 of its purportedly vested Fund balance of $1,008,229.78. The gravamen of Alpha's complaint was that since it had submitted a withdrawal request before the decision was made to suspend all withdrawal requests, and its right to withdraw had vested, it should have been, but was not, treated as a creditor of the Fund and given priority (i.e., paid first) over other Fund members/investors; instead, Alpha asserts, it was "forced" to share in Fund losses that diminished its investment balance in the Fund.

The trial court granted Irongate's motion for summary judgment and denied Alpha's cross motion for partial summary judgment. In Case No. A17A0303, Alpha appeals the summary judgment rulings. In Case No. A17A0539, Irongate appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss Alpha's appeal/Case No. A17A0303. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in both cases.

Case No. A17A0539

In Case No. A17A0539, Irongate appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss Alpha's appeal in the underlying action, Case No. A17A0303. The material facts are undisputed. On October 26, 2015, Alpha timely filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's summary judgment rulings, and said notice of appeal included direction to the trial court clerk that "No portion of the record shall be omitted from the record on appeal," and a notice that "A transcript of evidence and proceedings WILL be transmitted as part of the record on appeal."

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-42, absent the grant of an extension of time, it was Alpha's responsibility to "cause [the motions for summary judgment transcript] to be filed within 30 days after filing of the notice of appeal [,]" or risk possible dismissal of the appeal. See In the Interest of D. M. C ., 232 Ga. App. 466, 467 (2) (b), 501 S.E.2d 305 (1998). Although the transcript should have been filed by November 25, 2015, it was filed on August 18, 2016, about nine months late, and the appeal was thus docketed on September 15, 2016, almost one year after the notice of appeal was filed. Notably, it was in April 2016 (six months from when the notice of appeal was filed), however, that Alpha discovered that the transcript had not been filed; Alpha was alerted to the problem after Irongate filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the transcript had not been filed. Apparently, Alpha attempted to have the transcript filed in April 2016, but Irongate objected, and the court reporter was prohibited from filing the transcript until the matter was resolved. In August 2016, a hearing was held on the matter.

At the hearing, Irongate argued that Alpha's appeal should be dismissed due to Alpha's failure to ensure that transcripts were timely filed in the trial court. But the trial court issued an order denying Irongate's motion, and finding that the delay in filing the transcript was excusable and was not caused by Alpha.

If a trial court finds that the delay in filing a transcript was: "(1) unreasonable; (2) inexcusable; and (3) caused by appellant, it can dismiss the notice of appeal." (Citations omitted.) In the Interest of D. M. C. , 232 Ga. App. at 467 (2) (b), 501 S.E.2d 305 ; OCGA § 5-6-48 (c). "The trial court has discretion in passing on these questions, [and] that discretion is subject to appellate review for abuse." (Citation omitted.) Atlanta Orthopedic Surgeons v. Adams , 254 Ga. App. 532, 535, 562 S.E.2d 818 (2002). "The court must find all these conditions before an exercise of discretion is authorized." (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Inthe Interest of D. M. C ., 232 Ga. App. at 468 (2) (b), 501 S.E.2d 305 ; Hall v. Bussey , 200 Ga. App. 311, 408 S.E.2d 430 (1991).

Here, the trial court's findings that the delay in filing the transcript was excusable and was not caused by Alpha are supported by the record. The record reflects that before Alpha filed its timely notice of appeal, Alpha asked the court reporter to prepare the summary judgment hearing transcript, and to file it with the clerk of court and send Alpha a copy; Alpha paid the court reporter for a copy of the transcript; and Alpha received an emailed copy of the transcript from the court reporter. And well within 30 days after filing its notice of appeal, Alpha paid invoices from the clerk of court, for appeal costs. Alpha's counsel stated that he had had cases in the trial court's judicial circuit "that have taken two months, six months ... for the record to get transmitted after the transcript has been filed," and he had had cases "that took over a year for the record from the notice of appeal being filed until it is docketed at the Court of Appeals." Consequently, according to counsel, he had no reason to suspect any problem with the transcript until Irongate filed a motion to dismiss the appeal about six months after the notice of appeal was filed.

The court reporter testified that she had received Alpha's written request to file the transcript with the clerk; that she thought that she had filed the transcript on the 8th or 9th of October 2015; that the e-filing system was "very new," and that "[t]his may have been the first or one of the very first transcripts that I filed through e-filing"; and that when this matter was brought to her attention and she started looking into it, she realized that the transcript had not been filed and instead "had gone to the draft folder." The court reporter also testified that she did not recall whether she had communicated to Alpha either that she would file the transcript, or that she had in fact filed the transcript; and she affirmed that the error could be corrected "in a matter of minutes." It is, in part, based on this latter testimony that Irongate argues that Alpha caused the delay in filing the transcript.

True, "[t]he statutory duty to file timely a transcript does not rest with the court reporter." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of D. M. C ., 232 Ga. App. at 468 (2) (b), 501 S.E.2d 305. But it is also likewise true that pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-48 (f), "the failure of a court reporter to [timely] file the transcript will not constitute cause for dismissal 'unless it affirmatively appears from the record that the failure was caused by the appellant.' " (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Welch v. Welch , 212 Ga. App. 667, 668, 442 S.E.2d 857 (1994). The trial court found that when the court reporter tried to file the transcript, "we [had] just switched over to the electronic filing system.... [T]he attorneys asked for the transcript to be filed, submitted a check for the transcript.... [T]he attorneys received a copy of the transcript." The trial court stated to counsel,

You each have dealt with the Fulton County clerk's office in getting appeals up to the higher courts, and it is not a 30-day ritual. It sometimes does last 4 months, 6 months, a year to get a transcript to go up from the clerk's office; and I think in this case since they received the transcript, they had every indication that everything was good, that there was a reliance on the court reporter, but not an unjust reliance on the court reporter given her track record in this courthouse."

The trial court iterated the court reporter's good record for following through with tasks, and concluded that whether it was "her glitch" or a "system glitch," the transcript "didn't get filed where it should have," but that she "tried to do it," and was "mortified when she found out that it didn't go through."

Given the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Alpha did not cause the delay in filing the transcript and that the delay in filing the transcript was excusable. See generally Brandenburg v. All–Fleet Refinishing , 252 Ga. App. 40, 43-44 (6), 555 S.E.2d 508 (2001) (finding that delay was not inexcusable when it appeared to have been caused by an insurance company, rather than the party); Welch , 212 Ga. App. at 667-669, 442 S.E.2d 857

(holding that trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appeal where the record did not affirmatively establish that the appellants were the cause of the delay). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Irongate's motion to dismiss Alpha's appeal.

Case No. A17A0303

In Case No. A17A0303, Alpha appeals the trial court's grant of Irongate's motion for summary judgment and denial of Alpha's motion for partial summary judgment.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine dispute as to a specific material fact and that this specific fact is enough, regardless of any other facts in the case, to entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. When a defendant moves for summary judgment as to an element of the case for which the plaintiff, and not the defendant, will bear the burden of proof at trial, the defendant may show that he is entitled to summary judgment either by affirmatively disproving that element of the case or by pointing to an absence of evidence in the record by which the plaintiff might carry the burden to prove that element. And if the defendant does so, the plaintiff cannot rest on his pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue. We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Because this opinion addresses cross-motions for summary judgment, we will construe the facts in favor of the nonmoving party as appropriate.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Maree v. ROMAR Joint Venture , 329 Ga. App. 282, 283, 763 S.E.2d 899 (2014).

It is undisputed that the parties' relationship is governed by the terms of the Fund's Operating Agreement, and that by investing in the Fund, Alpha became a signatory to the Operating Agreement, which formed the contract between Alpha and the Fund Manager and set forth the Fund's withdrawal procedures. The following material facts are also undisputed. On September 23, 2010, Alpha submitted a written request for a full withdrawal of its balance in the Fund; Alpha was subsequently informed that its withdrawal request would be fulfilled; on December 22, 2010, the Fund Manager suspended all withdrawal requests, including Alpha's; and in May 2011, the Fund Manager terminated the Fund and began the winding up process to close the Fund.

1. Breach of contract . Alpha contends that Irongate breached the terms of the Operating Agreement, specifically Section 4.2 (a) (i), when: (a) Alpha's right of redemption purportedly vested, but Alpha was not given priority over other Fund members during the wind-up process; and (b) Irongate failed to exercise good faith in its decision to suspend redemptions and terminate the Fund before satisfying Alpha's redemption request.

To establish a breach of contract claim, a party must prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the breach of an obligation imposed by the contract; and (3) damages that the plaintiff suffered as a result of the breach. See VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co ., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del.2003). In this action, the existence of a valid contract is uncontested.

(a) Purportedly vested redemption right . Alpha contends that Irongate breached the terms of the Operating Agreement, specifically Section 4.2 (a) (i), when Alpha's right of redemption purportedly vested, but Alpha was not given priority over other Fund members during the wind-up process.

In contract interpretation, this [Delaware courts] give priority to the parties' intentions as reflected in the four corners of the agreement. [The] Court construes the agreement as a whole, giving effect to all provisions therein. The meaning inferred from a particular provision cannot control the meaning of the entire agreement if such an inference conflicts with the agreement's overall scheme or plan. [The] Court will interpret clear and unambiguous terms according to their ordinary meaning.

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) La Grange Communities, LLC v. Cornell Glasgow, LLC , 74 A.3d 653, 2013 WL 4816813, *9 (11) (2013).

Even assuming that pursuant to Section 4.2 (a) (i), Alpha had a right to a full withdrawal/redemption because 70 days had passed from the time of its request, which Irongate disputes, said right was not absolute. The beginning clause of Section 4.2 (a) (i) states that the right to a withdrawal applies "Except as otherwise provided herein," and was limited by other provisions of Section 4.2 (a) which, the evidence showed, applied here and authorized the suspension of withdrawal requests. See generally

Bartley v. Holden , 338 A.2d 137, 141, n. 4 (Del.Super.1975) (noting that the phrase "unless otherwise provided" limited the effect of statutory provision where a contrary statute existed); United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc ., 937 A.2d 810, 833 (III) (C), n. 106 (Del.Ch.2007) (terms such as "subject to" imposed hierarchy among contract provisions).

The record shows that the Fund's investment manager was Irongate Capital Management ("ICM"), and that the person who managed ICM deposed that the Fund was experiencing liquidity issues and that, although he tried, he was unable to generate sufficient liquidity—and particularly from an option related to the separate, reference entity (Irongate Diversified Fund, LLC)—to pay the various pending withdrawal requests, including Alpha's request. According to the Fund's memorandum of offering, the investment objective and strategy of the Fund was to earn its returns primarily by entering into a particular type of "option" with a designated counterparty whereby the Fund would "obtain, on a leveraged basis, the investment returns of Irongate Diversified Fund, LLC (the "Reference Entity") without directly investing in the same ." According to the ICM manager, the counterparty that entered into the option contract with the Fund owned the reference entity to "serve the purpose of meeting the agreement that was the option.... [The counterparty] was invested on behalf of [the Fund] investors in order to meet the obligations of that option agreement, that derivative agreement." Under the agreement between the counterparty and the Fund, the counterparty had the right to allow or deny the withdrawal of cash from the reference entity, and, in this case, did not allow the release of cash from the reference entity to satisfy redemption requests from the Fund because the reference entity was not meeting set goals related to its liquidity of underlying investments, or its diversification or concentration of the total pool.

Alpha labels the ICM manager's explanation for the decision to suspend withdrawals and terminate the Fund as "false and pretextual." But the only evidence Alpha points to refute the evidence establishing the insufficiency of the Fund's cash balance is the cash balance of the separate reference entity, faulting the Fund

Manager for refusing to "allocate cash" from said reference entity to pay Alpha's withdrawal request. However, Alpha points to no provision authorizing such action; and we found none. Instead, as set out above, the evidence established the indirect nature of the Fund's relationship to the reference entity, and the inability of the Fund to liquidate its option related to the referenced entity. Section 4.2 (a) (iv) and (v) of the Operating Agreement permitted the Fund Manager to suspend withdrawal requests due to the inability to liquidate securities and/or its option related to the reference entity.

Furthermore, Section 7.1 of the Operating Agreement permitted the Fund Manager to terminate the Fund "at any time" before the automatic termination date in the year 2054. And pursuant to Section 7.2 (a) (i) and (b) (i), Alpha's withdrawal request which, at the time, had not been paid in any amounts, was "deemed suspended in favor of the winding up process," and distributions of Fund assets would be made first to creditors, the description of which expressly excluded Alpha ("Members' interests in withdrawals that were suspended under Sec. 7.2 (a) (i)," i.e., "whether or not such withdrawal requests have been accepted" by the Fund, Fund Manager, any Affiliate, or duly appointed administrator).

(b) Implied covenant of good faith . Alpha contends that Irongate breached the terms of the Operating Agreement when Irongate failed to exercise good faith in its decision to suspend redemptions and terminate the Fund before satisfying Alpha's redemption request. Specifically, Alpha asserts that because Fund Manager members who comprised the majority members of the Fund and were the Fund's general partner, were involved in the decision to suspend withdrawal requests and later terminate the Fund, and non-managing Fund members were not, it is "apparent" that Irongate's "ulterior motive" and "true motivation" in suspending withdrawal requests and terminating the Fund was to "serve their own self-interests" and that of their family members who were Fund members. The foregoing, Alpha argues, demonstrates a "bad faith breach of the Operating Agreement."

"Under Delaware law, bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will." (Punctuation and footnoted omitted.) SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc ., 67 A.3d 330, 346 (III) (B) (Del.2013).

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves a "cautious enterprise," inferring contractual terms to handle developments or contractual gaps that the asserting party pleads neither party anticipated. One generally cannot base a claim for breach of the implied covenant on conduct authorized by the agreement. We will only imply contract terms when the party asserting the implied covenant proves that the other party has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, thereby frustrating the fruits of the bargain that the asserting party reasonably expected. When conducting this analysis, we must assess the parties' reasonable expectations at the time of contracting and not rewrite the contract to appease a party who later wishes to rewrite a contract he now believes to have been a bad deal. Parties have a right to enter into good and bad contracts, the law enforces both.

(Footnotes and punctuation omitted.) Nemec v. Shrader , 991 A.2d 1120, 1125-1126 (Del.2010). "A party does not act in bad faith by relying on contract provisions for which that party bargained where doing so simply limits advantages to another party." Id. at 1128.

At the outset, we note that the uncontroverted evidence showed that the decision to suspend withdrawals was unanimous and included involvement by the Fund Manager, as well as by non-Fund members. The decision to terminate the Fund also included input from a non-Fund member, the ICM manager. The Operating Agreement expressly permitted the complained of actions; uncontroverted evidence revealed the financial position in which the Fund had found itself—investors seeking to bail and an inability to sufficiently liquidate; and Alpha pointed to no specific evidence showing that Irongate's decisions were arbitrary, unreasonable, or undertaken with conscious doing of a wrong because of a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.

According to the ICM manager, Alpha's redemption request was not the only one that was suspended and not given priority in the winding up process; all pending redemptions were treated in the same manner, with investors receiving, inter alia, cash on a pro rata basis. And Alpha did not offer any evidence to support a reasonable expectation at the time it entered into the Operating Agreement that it could require Irongate to redeem Alpha's interest during a time of financial insecurity. Under the circumstances, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not apply. See generally Nemec , 991 A.2d at 1122-1128 (company did not violate good faith covenant by exercising option to redeem retired stock holders' shares to the benefit of working stock holders; company, whose directors stood to benefit from redemption, exercised an express contractual right); Ross Holding & Mgmt. Co. v. Advance Realty Group, LLC , 2013 WL 764688, 1–2 (2), 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, 4-7 (2) (2013) (applying New Jersey law).

As Alpha has failed to meet its burden of pointing to any evidence giving rise to a triable issue on the element of breach, the trial court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Irongate and in denying Alpha's motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.

2. Breach of fiduciary duties . Alpha contends that Irongate breached its fiduciary duties for the same reasons that it allegedly breached the contract.

Delaware law is clear that, under traditional principles of equity, a manager of an LLC would qualify as a fiduciary of that LLC and its members. This Court has held that an LLC manager owes fiduciary duties because it has more than an arms-length, contractual relationship with the members of the LLC, and is vested with discretionary power to

manage the business of the LLC.... As a general matter, corporations and other business entities can owe fiduciary duties, as most easily exemplified in the situation where a corporation, LLC, or other entity is the managing member of an LLC[.]

(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) CMS Inv. Holdings, LLC v. Castle , 2015 WL 3894021, 18–19 (V) (A) (2), 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 169, 65-68 (V) (A) (2) (2015). Fiduciary duties may involve studying proposed action, determining the appropriateness of the proposed action, setting forth a dissenting view to appropriate parties if necessary, and informing those who would be effected about potential adverse affects of the proposed action. See Ross Holding & Mgmt. Co. , 2013 WL 764688, 3 (3), 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, 10 (3). In this case, as allowed by statute, the Operating Agreement exculpated the Fund Manager from liability to "any Member ... for action ... which [the Fund Manager] reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the Company[.]"

Notably, as a matter of law, the Fund owed no fiduciary duties to Alpha. See generally Onex Food Svcs. v. Grieser , 1996 WL 103975, 7–8 (4) (D), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2797, 23-24 (4) (D) (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (under Delaware law, a corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders nor may it be held vicariously liable for breaches of fiduciary duty committed by its officers). Regarding the Fund Manager, no member of the Fund Manager was identified as being a member of the counterparty, which entity held the right to allow or deny the withdrawal of cash from the reference entity and, in this case, did not allow proceeds to exit the reference entity; and multiple meetings and discussions were held to address the liquidation issues the Fund was facing. Alpha did not point to any competent evidence showing that the Fund Manager did not study the choice of actions and that its decisions were not informed. See generally Ross Holding & Mgmt. Co ., 2013 WL 764688, 3 (3), 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, 8-11 (3).

Moreover, this claim is foreclosed as it arises from a dispute related to the exercise of a contractual right. See generally Nemec , 991 A.2d at 1128-1130. Consequently the trial court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law to Irongate.

Alpha's reliance on Caspian Select, etc. Ltd. v. Gohl , 2015 WL 5718592, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 246 (2015), for the proposition that its breach of fiduciary duty claim should survive summary judgment is misplaced, as in that case, fiduciary duty claims survived a motion to dismiss, which involves a different standard than summary judgment. Caspian Select, etc. Ltd ., 2015 WL 5718592, 1, 7–8 (III) (C), 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 246, 2-3, 23-24 (III) (C) (2015). Alpha's reliance on Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund,LLC , 2011 WL 3505355, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116 (2011), is also misplaced, as that case involved admitted self-dealing by a fund manager. Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC , 2011 WL 3505355 at 32–35 (4), 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS at 119-127 (4).

3. Conversion . Alpha contends that Irongate converted Alpha's money by refusing to "surrender" Alpha's purportedly vested Fund balance, upon demand.

Alpha's conversion claim is based on the same grounds as alleged in its breach of contract claims. Alpha has not pointed to any evidence establishing that Irongate violated an independent legal duty, apart from the duty imposed by contract. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Irongate and denying Alpha's motion for partial summary judgment on this claim. See generally Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co ., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 157, 32-33 (III) (D) (2) (2015); Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, LLC , 971 A.2d 872, 890 (II) (F) (Del.Ch.2009) ("to establish a claim for conversion apart from the contract claim, [complainant] would have to show that he had a right to the money—other than a right pursuant to the contract—that was violated by the defendants' exercise of dominion over the money").

4. Unjust Enrichment . Alpha's challenge to the trial court's summary judgment ruling on the unjust enrichment claim is deemed abandoned due to Alpha's failure to present any argument or authority regarding this issue in his appeal brief. See generally Roca v. E. I. du Pont, etc. Co ., 842 A.2d 1238, 1242 (Del.2004) ("The failure of a party appellant to present and argue a legal issue in the text of an opening brief constitutes a waiver of that claim on appeal.") (punctuation and footnote omitted); Nguyen v. Barrett , 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 147, 8 (2016).

Judgments affirmed.

Ellington, P.J., and Andrews, J., concur.