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concluding that the Peralta Community College District was immune from suit consistent with Mitchell
Summary of this case from Santos v. Merritt CollegeOpinion
No. C 02-5532 MJJ
March 12, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants Peralta Community College District ("District") and Peralta Federation of Teachers ("Union") move to dismiss Plaintiff Steven Nur Ahmed's ("Plaintiff) Complaint of Negligence and Misrepresentation ("Compl.") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331. The Court GRANTS the District's Motion to Dismiss because the District is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Court GRANTS the Union's Motion to Dismiss because plaintiff fails to show a federal question of law sufficient to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; since the federal laws cited by plaintiff do not apply to the Union.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for a full-time faculty position at the College of Alameda, a community college within the Peralta Community College District. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff was interviewed on June 4, 2002, but was not hired for the position. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that a form disclosing the identities of the members of the Advisory Selection Committee ("ASC") was not posted at the entrance of his interview room and his attention was not directed to the form, contrary to Instruction #3 on the form. (Compl. at 4, Ex. 1.) Because of this omission, plaintiff was not aware of a "hostile member on the advisory selection committee." (Id. at 4:13.) Plaintiff claims that since he did not know of this person's presence on the committee, he was therefore unable to recuse this person. (Id. at 4:20.) But for the failure to exercise his right to recuse a member of the committee, plaintiff avers that he would have been hired for the position. (Id. at 4:23-25.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Eddie Loretto, as the ASC Chair, signed the form pursuant to Instruction #4, which certified that, to the best of the Chairperson's knowledge, the screening and interviewing process was conducted in accordance with all the [bargained for] Committee Guidelines. (Compl. at 4, Ex. 1.) Therefore, plaintiff alleges that the interview process was improper, and the District's refusal to hire him was also improper. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff also claims that the individual defendants are friends and conspired and colluded to control who would be hired for the teaching position in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the District and the Union. (Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that the Union failed to represent him in pursuing his grievances against the District, violating the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a), and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), 160(b). (Compl. at 9-11.) Plaintiff further alleges financial loss as a result of the defendants' actions and seeks monetary damages, arguing that he otherwise would have been hired as a full-time faculty instructor. (Compl. at 8.)
Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in San Francisco on November 20, 2002. Based on the foregoing facts, plaintiff a4vances the following causes of action:
Count I: fraudulent misrepresentation by Eddie Loretto, in his official capacity as Chairperson of the ASC for the District, (Compl. at 3-4.)
Count II: negligence by the District through its employee, Eddie Loretto, in his official capacity, and negligence by the Union for violation of the ASC guidelines, (Compl. at 4-5.)
The ASC Guidelines are set out on the Advisory Committee Commitment Form (Compl., Ex. 1.), which states in its instructions:
"3) Post this form at the entrance of the interview room. All interviewees must be directed to review this form and the names of the committee members.
4) After the interviews are completed, the Chairperson must sign the statement below[*] certifying that all of the Committee Guidelines were adhered to during the interview process."
[*] "I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the screening and interviewing process was conducted in accordance with established policies and procedures."
Count III: negligence by the District and the Peralta Community College's Academic Senate ("Senate," a division of the District, in its official capacity to administrate District hiring), via its employee, Eddie Loretto, in his official capacity, for violation of "a bargained for agreement" with the Union, (Compl. at 5-6.)
Count IV: conspiracy by Eddie Loretto, Bob Grill (President of the Alameda Academic Senate), and J. Chichester (a retired Sociology instructor for Alameda College) to control who would be hired at Alameda College by violating ASC guidelines, (Compl. at 6-7.)
Count V: collusion by Eddie Loretto, Bob Grill, J. Chichester, and a classified person on the ASC to violate District Hiring Policies under a collective bargaining "Agreement" between the District and the Union, (Compl. at 7-8.)
Article 9(A)(3) and (B)(5)(c) of the "Agreement" alleged by plaintiff between the District and the Union. (Compl., Ex.3.)
Plaintiff makes no clear statement as to which "Agreement" he is citing from and the attached exhibits only designate Article numbers without formal titles of the source being used. Plaintiff fails to lay the foundation for who has entered into and is thus bound by such "Agreement" or what duties are established.
Count VI: negligence by the Union via its Union representative, Frissal Walker, in his official capacity, for failing to represent plaintiff in pursuing his grievances against the District at the College of Alameda, (Compl. at 8-9.)
Count VII: negligence by Kathy Baur, in her official capacity as Union President, for failing to, represent plaintiff pursuant to Article 1 and 9 of the "Agreement" between the District and the Union and pursuant to the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (granting federal jurisdiction to lawsuits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties), and the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (defining an employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees as an unfair labor practice), 160(b) (governing the procedural aspects of submitting a complaint against an unfair labor practice), (Compl. at 9-11.), and
This is plaintiff's sole alleged cause of action under federal law. Thus, federal subject matter jurisdiction for all other causes of action depends on pendant jurisdiction extending from this one allegation.
Count VIII: negligence by Kathy Baur (Union President), Frissal Walker (Union Representative), and Larry Hardy (Union Associate Vice Chancellor) in violating the terms of the Faculty Grievance Form (Compl., Ex. 8) and in forestalling the grievance process to exceed the federal statute of limitations provided by the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). (Compl. at 11.)
Federal subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint rests solely on Count VII, plaintiff's allegations of violations under the LMRA and the NLRA by the Union President, Kathy Baur. (Compl. at 9-11.) All other allegations arise under state law and depend on supplemental subject matter jurisdiction stemming from Count VII.
The Complaint in the instant case was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in San Francisco on November 20, 2002. The District and the Union each filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 13, 2002. These motions are presently before the Court.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party against whom a complaint has been filed to move for dismissal of the action for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that "Ordinarily, a case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be dismissed without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent court." Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
At the same time, the Supreme Court has held that the pleadings of pro se complaints should be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). See also Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam) (instructing the federal courts to construe the inartful pleading of pro se actions liberally). The Ninth Circuit has further held that "before dismissing a pro se complaint, the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9 Cir. 1992) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that courts must draft a few sentences explaining the deficiencies to the pro se plaintiff)).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The District and Its Representatives Are Immune to Suit in Federal Court.
The District asserts three main arguments for dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity (2) inapplicability of the LMRA and the NLRA to the District, and (3) plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution restricts federal judicial power from extending to "any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The Supreme Court expanded the Eleventh Amendment's restrictions to extend to a suit brought against a state by one of her own citizens. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
California state law governs the "personnel management and employer-employee relations within the public school systems in the State of California." Cal. Govt. Code § 3540. Plaintiff has conceded that he has initiated the process to exhaust all administrative remedies under state law. (Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Opp'n") at 3-4.) The initiation of administrative remedies is not an exhaustion of administrative remedies. The California Court of Appeals has held that "It is the rule that if an administrative remedy is available, it must be exhausted." Leek v. Washington Unified Sch. Dist., 124 Cal.App.3d 43, 53 (Cal.Ct.App. 1981). Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's state claims because plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under California state law.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a California community college school district is an agency of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. See Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College District, 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit found that California state colleges and universities are "dependent instrumentalities of the state" because they are subject to full legislative control [by the state], the Trustees of California State Colleges are a state agency created by the [state] Legislature, and the district's budget is made up of funds received from the state's general fund and some fees charged by the district's colleges go to the state. Id.
The Ninth Circuit based its reasoning on five primary factors: (1) whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds, (2) whether the entity performs central governmental functions, (3) whether the entity may sue or be sued, (4) whether the entity has the power to take property in its own name or only the name of the state, and (5) the corporate status of the entity. Mitchell 861 F.2d at 201.
Thus, the District should also be defined as a "dependent instrumentality of the state," precisely like the Los Angeles Community College District in Mitchell, because it is likewise composed of California state colleges and universities. As an agency of the state, the District is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. Id.
B. The Union and Its Representatives Are Not Subject to the NLRA or the LMRA
Plaintiff cites violations to the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) , and the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), 160(b). (Compl. at 9-11.) The Union argues that plaintiff's allegations fail to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction because the Union and its representatives are not covered by the LMRA or the NLRA. (Opp'n at 3-5.)
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees hi an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." LMRA as codified in 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." LMRA as codified in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative."
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency . . . shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect . . . Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board." NLRA as codified in 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
1) Plaintiff is not an employee entitled to protection under the NLRA or LMRA.
For plaintiff to sue under the provisions of the LMRA and the NLRA, plaintiff must show that he is an "employee" entitled to protection under the provisions that he cites in his complaint. The NLRA defines "employee" to exclude "any individual employed . . . by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (emphasis added). The NLRA further defines "employer" to exclude "any state or political subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
The plain language of the cited provisions of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a), and the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), 160(b), limit the application of federal law to "employee(s)," "employer(s)," and "labor organization(s)," as defined by the Acts.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a community college school district and its officials, acting within the scope of their employment, are dependent instrumentalities of the state. See Mitchell, 861 F.2d at 201. Thus, the District is excluded from the NLRA's definition of an "employer" because the District is a political subdivision of the state. Therefore, the plaintiff is not an "employee" entitled to protection under the NLRA because he is employed by the District, which is not an "employer" as defined by the NLRA. Similarly, the LMRA states that the terms "employee" and "employer" shall have the same meanings, and thus the same restrictions, as when used in the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 142(3). Hence, the plaintiff is not an "employee" entitled to protection under either the NLRA or the LMRA.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that section 301(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) — the section under which plaintiff seeks to make a showing of federal jurisdiction — does not grant the district court jurisdiction over the claims of an individual employed by a political subdivision of the state. Ayres v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 666 F.2d 441, 444 (9th Cir. 1982). Since plaintiff is employed by the District, a political subdivision of the state, 301(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) does not grant this Court jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.
Therefore, plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action under either the NLRA or the LMRA, and his anchoring claim for a federal cause of action fails to grant this Court subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
2) The Union is Not a "Labor Organization" covered by the NLRA or LMRA.
The Ninth Circuit has held that, "by the plain, unambiguous language of the LMRA [as incorporated from the NLRA in 29 U.S.C. § 142(3)], the definition of `labor organization' excludes an organization of employees of a political subdivision of a state." Pacific Maritime Association v. Local 63, Int'l Longshoremen's Warehousemen's Union, 198 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999). In Pacific Maritime, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a local labor union representing port pilots employed by the City of Los Angeles was not a "labor organization" under 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), because it was "an organization of employees of a political subdivision of the State of California."Id.
This code section ( 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)) is technically part of the NLRA, but the LMRA incorporates the NLRA's definition of "labor organization" by reference in 29 U.S.C. § 142(3).
In the instant case, the Union is also "an organization of employees of a political subdivision of the State of California," excluded from the NLRA's definition of a "labor organization." Pacific Maritime at 1081; 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). The Union is the exclusive representative and bargaining agent for academic employees of the District. (Compl., Ex. 4; Post-Hearing Declaration of Peralta Federation of Teachers Vice President Bill Love ("Love Decl.") at 3, ¶ 8, Ex. A.) Furthermore, the Union is composed of and "represents only public employees" of the District. (Love Decl. at 2, ¶ 2.) (emphasis added). The District is defined as a "dependent instrumentality of the state" under California law by the Ninth Circuit in Mitchell. See Mitchell, 861 F.2d at 201. As such, the Union is not a "labor organization" within the meaning of the NLRA, as codified in 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), or the LMRA, as incorporated by reference in 29 U.S.C. § 142(3), because it is "an organization of employees of apolitical subdivision of [a] state." Pacific Maritime, 198 F.3d at 1081. Hence, the Union is not subject to liability as a "labor organization" under either the NLRA or the LMRA. Id.
Therefore, plaintiff has no cause of action that raises a federal question of law sufficient to grant subject matter jurisdiction because neither the LMRA nor the NLRA apply to the Union. 3) Plaintiff's Authorities Are Clearly Distinguishable.
While plaintiff argues that the Union is not a political subdivision under the law of National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins, 402 U.S. 600 (1971), the case is easily distinguishable. In Hawkins, the Supreme Court refers to the NLRB's test for limiting the political subdivision exemption to entities that are either "(1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate." NLRB v. Hawkins, 402 U.S. 600, 604-605 (1972). The "political subdivision" test set out byHawkins is conceived by the NLRB to limit the political subdivision exemption for the definition of an "employer" under the NLRA and the LMRA. However, the Union is not being sued by plaintiff in its capacity as an "employer."
While the plaintiff continues to argue that the Union and its officials are elected by the faculty and are responsible only to faculty union members, the faculty itself is arguably composed of "individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate," under the second prong of the Hawkins' test. NLRB v. Hawkins, 402 U.S. at 604-605. The faculty who elect and administer the Union are directly employed by and responsible to the District, an agency of the state composed of public officials (such as the School Board and the School Superintendent). See Mitchell, 861 F.2d at 201. Therefore, the Union is a political subdivision under the second prong of the Hawkins' test because the Union is "administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials." NLRB v. Hawkins, 402 U.S. at 604-605.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to expand Hawkins' political subdivision test to apply to the Union in its capacity as a labor organization, the Union would still qualify as a political subdivision of the state under the first prong of the Hawkins test. The state of California directly created the Union under state law by requiring public school employees to join a "recognized organization."See California Government Code § 3546(a). A "recognized organization" is an employee organization which has been recognized by the public school employer as the exclusive representative of the employees. Cal. Gov't Code § 3540.1(1) (2003). Since the Union is the exclusive representative and bargaining agent for academic employees recognized by the District, the Union is a "recognized organization" created by California Government Code § 3546(a). (Compl., Ex. 4; Love Decl. at 3, ¶ 8, Ex. A.) Therefore, the Union is a political subdivision of the state under the first prong of the Hawkins' test because the Union was "created directly by the state." NLRB v. Hawkins, 402 U.S. at 604-605. C. The Court Shall Dismiss All Supplemental Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
The remainder of plaintiff's claims depend on supplemental subject matter jurisdiction stemming from plaintiff's alleged federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, the Court dismisses all claims over which it has original subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to raise a question of federal law sufficient to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES all remaining supplemental claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) because the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, and the state court is the appropriate forum in which to have these matters heard.
D. Pro Se Leniency Fails to Remedy Defects in Plaintiffs Complaint
While the pleadings of pro se complaints should be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, plaintiff's complaint still fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction even when construed most leniently. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Ninth Circuit has held that "before dismissing a pro se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, no opportunity to amend can remedy the deficiencies in plaintiff's complaint because the fatal flaw lies in the substantive inapplicability of federal law. Therefore, granting leave to amend would be futile because there is no way in which plaintiff may resurrect his claims under federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's only remedy lies under state law.
"A statement of deficiencies need not provide great detail or require district courts to act as legal advisors to pro se plaintiff's. Rather, when dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim, district courts need draft only a few sentences explaining the deficiencies." Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-1449 (9th Cir. 1986).
E. Plaintiff's Complaint Should be Dismissed Without Prejudice
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that "[o]rdinarily, a case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be dismissed without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent court." Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, since plaintiff's complaint lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Court GRANTS defendants' Motions to Dismiss without prejudice so that plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent court. Id.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS both the District's and the Union's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because plaintiff's claims are "completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy" sufficient to grant this Court subject matter jurisdiction.Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
[ ] Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.
[X] Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issued have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted w/out prejudice.