Opinion
NO. 2018-CA-001218-ME
05-22-2020
A.G. APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; S.A.A., A MINOR CHILD; AND K.M. APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: John H. Helmers, Jr. Corey Shiffman Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES: Jennifer Ellen Clay Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE GINA KAY CALVERT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-AD-500594 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KRAMER, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES. KRAMER, JUDGE: A.G. (Father) appeals from the Jefferson Family Court's order terminating his parental rights to S.A.A. (Child), arguing his parental rights could not be terminated where there was no evidence that he ever abused or neglected Child. Upon careful review, we affirm.
At the start of the termination hearing, Mother voluntarily terminated her rights to Child and consented to his adoption by his foster parents. Hence, she has not appealed.
Factual and Procedural History
Father and Mother are originally from Somalia and separately fled to Kenya to avoid the civil war in Somalia. They met in a refugee camp in Kenya and married in 2001. They came to the United States legally as refugees in 2004, with their oldest daughter, who was born in 2002. Thereafter, Child, who is the subject of this action, was born in Kansas City, Missouri, in 2005. Father and Mother had three additional children after Child was born (i.e., Child has four siblings).
In October 2013, Mother left Father and brought the children to Louisville, Kentucky; Father remained in Kansas City. In June 2014, Father filed for dissolution from Mother before the Jefferson Family Court and requested custody of the children or visitation. Throughout the various proceedings, Mother maintained that she left Father due to domestic violence; Father has maintained that he believes Mother left due to the influence of others.
In 2015, Mother filed two different petitions seeking domestic violence orders (DVOs) against Father. Although both times she was granted an emergency protective order (EPO), the first DVO was dismissed after a hearing and the second was dismissed without prejudice because Father was never served.
While the dissolution petition was pending, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services became involved with the family in August 2014. The Cabinet received a report that the children were being abused by their babysitter, who allegedly burned them with cigarettes and hit them, and filed a dependency, neglect, or abuse (DNA) petition. The petition also alleged that Mother was aware of this abuse and was also hitting the children. The babysitter was charged with a crime and an emergency custody order was granted which temporarily placed the children in the custody of the Cabinet. The children were returned to Mother's custody at the pretrial conference held on August 27, 2014. Father, who was still living in Missouri, was granted unsupervised visitation.
Indeed, Father has never lived in Kentucky during the entire time Child has lived here.
At the trial on October 1, 2014, the county attorney moved to dismiss the DNA petition without prejudice over the objection of the guardian ad litem. The family court dismissed the action and also entered orders which included granting Father unsupervised visitation. Father was not present for the pretrial conference or for the trial.
On December 15, 2014, the parents' marriage was dissolved by decree. Father and Mother were awarded joint custody, with Mother to be the primary residential parent. The family court found that Father was "currently unavailable to care for the children in the evenings and his home cannot adequately accommodate such a large family." Father was to have parenting time during spring break, fall break, three weeks during the summer, and other times in Louisville with adequate notice to Mother, and Father was allowed to speak to the children on the telephone. The record shows that Father's visitation was inconsistent at best. However, Father testified during the termination hearing that he did not exercise his visitation time because Mother was consistently uncooperative. Father was also ordered to pay child support.
In September and October of 2015, the Cabinet began receiving reports that Child (who was ten years old) frequently ran away with one of his younger siblings (who was six years old), committed crimes, and missed an excessive amount of school. The Cabinet filed a DNA petition regarding Child and his younger sibling in December 2015. Child was placed in the custody of the Cabinet where he has since remained. Father's case plan with the Cabinet (which is reflected in orders of the family court and in Father's brief before this Court) required Father to complete two tasks: (1) cooperate with the evaluation for placement of Child pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC); and (2) maintain contact with Child. However, Father refused to cooperate with the ICPC, stating that he wanted all of his children in his custody, not just Child. As a result, Child could not be placed with Father. Father was granted unsupervised visitation with Child, which he did not exercise.
Child's younger sibling was returned to Mother's care. However, all of Child's siblings were eventually removed from Mother's care following subsequent DNA petitions filed by the Cabinet.
On February 17, 2016, Mother admitted Child was dependent, and Child was committed to the Cabinet. Father was granted unsupervised visitation with Child while Mother was granted supervised visitation. On December 21, 2016, the Cabinet filed a petition for involuntary termination of Father's and Mother's parental rights to Child on three grounds pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 625.090(2)(a), (e), and (g), arguing the parents abandoned Child for more than ninety days, failed to provide Child essential parental care for not less than six months, and failed to provide essential food, clothing, and shelter to Child.
During the termination proceedings, Father cooperated with a second ICPC; however, placement was denied because Father was living with his sister and there was not enough space in the home.
Father eventually moved to Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In October 2017, Child's four siblings were placed with Father there.
On May 10, 2018, the termination trial was held regarding Child. The Cabinet called only Allison Miller, the ongoing worker for the Cabinet who assumed responsibility of Child's case in November 2017. Child, at age fifteen at the time of the trial, testified in camera, wherein he told the court that he desired to be adopted by the foster family with whom he had lived since his removal from Mother's home in 2015. Father also testified. Father's parental rights to Child were terminated by the family court by an order entered June 19, 2018. Father filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, or alternatively, for additional findings of fact. Father's motion was denied. This appeal followed. Further facts will be developed as necessary.
Although this matter was ordered expedited by this Court, the rendition of this opinion was delayed administratively for several reasons. First, Father filed a motion before our Court to supplement the record on appeal to include the Cabinet's proposed findings of fact and order of termination. Our Court remanded for the family court to address this motion, and then Father filed a motion before the family court. The family court denied this motion, with an order entered on January 31, 2019. Upon review once this case was assigned to a merits panel of this Court, the Court determined that the circuit clerk failed to include the exhibits introduced at trial in the record on appeal. Therefore, this Court ordered that a supplemental record including these exhibits be certified, which was done on February 6, 2020. Finally, the case was reassigned to Judge Joy A. Kramer for the purpose of writing the majority opinion after the record and all exhibits were received by her chambers on April 27, 2020.
Analysis
Father makes three arguments on appeal: (1) the family court's finding of abuse or neglect is not supported by the record; (2) the family court relied on improper evidence contained in Child's DNA file; and (3) Father asks this Court to revisit the holding in A.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 362 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. App. 2012) regarding compensation for attorneys appointed to represent parents in termination of parental rights cases.
In Kentucky, termination of parental rights is proper upon satisfaction, by clear and convincing evidence, of a tripartite test. Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Ky. 2014). First, KRS 625.090(1) requires that a child be adjudged neglected or abused. Second, KRS 625.090(1)(c) requires that termination must be in the child's best interest. Third, at least one of the conditions set out in KRS 625.090(2) must be established. The family court's termination decision will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous. Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Ky. 2010). Such a decision is clearly erroneous if there is no substantial, clear, and convincing evidence to support the decision. Id.
Father first argues that "[t]he Cabinet failed to produce even a shred of evidence at trial that [Child] was abused, neglected, or harmed in any fashion by his Father." We disagree. Although Father was not named in the underlying DNA petition as the person responsible for the abuse and/or neglect of Child, KRS 625.090(1)(a)2 provides that the family court may make a finding of neglect in the termination proceedings, which it did. As previously stated, Father's case plan required two tasks: cooperate with and complete an ICPC and maintain contact with Child. Father initially failed to cooperate with the ICPC and when he finally did, placement was not approved. Allison Miller testified that, although Father had limited telephone contact with Child, the only time he had face-to-face contact with Child was at family court proceedings. He did not have visitation with Child, nor did he request it. The family court found that
[Child] has been further abused or neglected by [Father's] failure or inability to comply with this Court's remedial orders and the Cabinet's court-approved case treatment plan so that [Child] could be safely returned to parental custody, and by the failure or inability of the Respondent father to do what is necessary to materially support his child. While [Father] consistently testified that [Mother] left Kansas City, Missouri with their children "in the dead of night" and he did not know where they had gone, [Mother] has consistently testified that she fled with the children to Kentucky in order to escape domestic violence perpetrated by [Father]. During the time until [Child] was placed into the custody of the Cabinet, the parents shared joint custody and [Father] did not request custody of [Child] even after the Cabinet was involved and he was aware of the concerns with [Mother's] parenting.
Allison Miller testified that Father gave Child money for shoes, upon Child's request, approximately two to three times. Child testified that he has repeatedly asked Father for money, but he has not sent any. The family court also found that, "On the day of trial, it was reported that [Father's] tax refund of some $5,000 had been intercepted by either Missouri or Kentucky due to his failure to pay child support. Although capable of working, either [Father] has not done so or, when working, he has not offered any meaningful financial assistance to meet the material needs of his child. It is clear that [Father's] ongoing failure or inability to provide [Child] with the material necessities of life is 'for reasons other than poverty alone.'"
The record before us supports the family court's determination that Child was abused or neglected by Father pursuant to KRS 625.090(1)(a)2. Child has lingered in foster care since December 2015 due, in part, to Father's failure to cooperate with his case plan and remedial orders of the family court. Indeed, Child has been in the care of the Cabinet for over five years, without support, visitation, or even regular telephone contact from Father. From the inception of Child's interaction with the Cabinet due to criminal behavior at the tender age of ten, his needs appear different than his siblings. Child has now spent over one-third of his young life in the care of the Cabinet and in the same foster home, without any support from and little contact with Father. Father has had over five years to get his life and home in order, such that it was appropriate for this Child. Father has unquestionably failed to do that. The record supports the family court's finding that Child is abused or neglected. Accordingly, we discern no error.
Father's second argument is an extension of his first in that he continues to assert that there was no evidence at trial to support a finding of abuse or neglect. However, he further contends that the family court improperly considered hearsay evidence as contained in the DNA files of Child and his siblings. We disagree.
When the Cabinet moved to admit the DNA files into evidence at the termination hearing, it did so only for the purpose of the orders contained therein. The family court stated that it would not consider any improper hearsay contained in the files. When the family court asked if Father objected to the admission of the DNA files, counsel stated affirmatively that he had no objection. Because Father failed to object at trial, his argument is unpreserved.
"[W]hen a party fails to raise an issue before the trial court, our review is limited to determining if the claimed error is so egregious as to constitute palpable error under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 61.02." V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 194 S.W.3d 331, 333 (Ky. App. 2006). CR 61.02 states:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
However, Father did not request palpable error review before this Court. "Absent extreme circumstances amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate court will not engage in palpable error review . . . unless such a request is made and briefed by the appellant." Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008), as modified on denial of reh'g (May 22, 2008) (citations omitted). Thus, we review only to the extent of determining whether there are extreme circumstances in this case amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice. After careful examination of the record before us, we conclude this case does not meet the standard for palpable error review. There is nothing in the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order terminating Father's parental rights to suggest the family court considered any hearsay contained in the DNA files of Child or his siblings. We agree with Father that allegations contained in the DNA petitions are hearsay. However, although the family court referenced the allegations contained in the two DNA petitions, it did not make a finding that those allegations were true. Moreover, the allegations contained in the DNA petitions are wholly unrelated to whether Father cooperated with his case plan or has materially supported Child. Hence, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice.
Finally, Father urges this Court to revisit A.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 362 S.W.3d 361, as it regards ongoing appellate representation for indigent parents. However, we are presently bound by A.C. unless it is overturned en banc by this Court, overruled by the Kentucky Supreme Court, or legislation is passed governing funding.
"It is our policy that a decision by a panel of this court may only be reversed by the entire court sitting en banc." Monyhan v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 709 S.W.2d 837, 837 (Ky. App. 1986). See Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR) 1.030(7)(d). We have no inclination to request that this matter be heard en banc.
We note that discretionary review was not sought in A.C. However, counsel in numerous other appeals have sought the same relief that present counsel does to no avail.
KRS 625.080(3) allows for a fee of up to $500 on appeal, so long as that fee has not been exhausted at the trial level. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 699 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Ky. App. 1985).
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, we accordingly AFFIRM the Jefferson Family Court's order terminating Father's parental rights to Child.
LAMBERT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
K. THOMPSON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent. "When the facts reveal a fundamental basis for decision not presented by the parties, it is our duty to address the issue to avoid a misleading application of the law." Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991). Therefore, although A.G. (father) did not raise the issue, I believe it is our duty to reverse for lack of a court-approved written case plan based upon father's "fundamental liberty interest" in raising his own child as enforced through "fundamentally fair procedures" and the "vital interest" that S.A.A. (child) and father share in "preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 760, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 1398, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
Our statutes provide reasonable procedures for the removal of children from parental care, efforts to reunite parents with their children, and ultimately, for termination of parental rights if sufficient progress is not made to safely return children to their parents. However, if those statutory mandates are not enforced against the Cabinet, the process is rendered fundamentally unfair. When the Cabinet removes children from their parents' care it must engage in appropriate permanency planning pursuant to a written court-approved case plan which must be filed within thirty days, it must file written case progress reports with the family court every six months, and the family court must hold permanency hearings that the Cabinet initiates every twelve months. See KRS 620.180(2)(a)1; KRS 620.020(1); KRS 620.230; KRS 620.240; KRS 610.125(1); 922 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) 1:140 §3(5). The case plan tells the parents what they must do to regain custody of their children and the timelines involved are to facilitate reunification or permanency. A lack of sufficient progress can constitute abuse or neglect and be grounds for termination of parental rights. KRS 600.020(1)(a)9; KRS 625.090(2)(j).
We refer to the statutory requirements of what must be filed with the family court, even though the relevant statutes refer to the district court, because Jefferson County has a family court. In counties with family courts, the family court hears both DNA and termination actions but the concurrent jurisdiction of the district court to hear DNA cases is not limited. KRS 23A.100(1)(g), (2)(c), and (3). In counties without family courts, the district court hears DNA cases and the circuit court hears termination cases.
Although KRS 600.020(1)(a)9 uses the term "court-approved case plan" rather than the term "case permanency plan" which is used in KRS 610.125 and KRS 620.230, I have no difficulty in determining that a "court-approved case plan" is the same thing as a "case permanency plan." There is no other way the statutes can logically be interpreted to form a cohesive whole as to how the Cabinet is to attempt to reunify children with their parents and the consequences if parents cannot or do not complete necessary tasks for improvement.
Another term that is used interchangeably with these two is "treatment plan" which is used in KRS 620.180. The Cabinet consistently uses the term "case permanency plan" in its regulations. 922 KAR 1:140. The family court used the hybrid term "court-approved case treatment plan."
Having reviewed child's DNA file which forms the basis for the justification of termination, many key statutory mandated documents were missing from child's DNA file. There is no evidence the Cabinet ever filed with the family court: (1) a written case permanency plan for father, let alone one within the thirty days mandated by KRS 620.230(1); (2) any progress reports, although one was due after six months as mandated by KRS 620.240; or (3) a case permanency plan. The Cabinet is not exempted from formulating a written case plan for father because child was removed from mother's care for abuse or neglect; even if the Cabinet initially planned to return child to mother's care, the Cabinet also kept father from having custody of child.
Allison Miller's repeated testimony about a case plan is insufficient proof that an appropriate court-approved case plan was ever filed with the family court. At best, her testimony can only establish that perhaps there was an informal oral case plan, or a written non-court-approved case plan in the Cabinet files. There is absolutely no evidence about when such a "case plan" was formulated or when father was informed about its requirements and this "case plan" never received court oversight because the Cabinet never filed any progress reports. This is insufficient to comply with statutory requirements. I suspect that no permanency hearing was ever held on child pursuant to KRS 610.125, at which time the family court would have likely questioned the lack of a case plan and progress reports, because less than a year after child was removed from mother's care, the Cabinet filed its petition for termination of parental rights against father and mother.
I cannot know this for certain as the DNA file for child was certified prior to the elapse of twelve months and the termination was filed before the permanency review was due, but I doubt that any further action was taken in the DNA case after the Cabinet filed for termination of parental rights. I note that there is no provision in KRS 620.240 or KRS 610.125 exempting the Cabinet from filing case progress reports or the family court from conducting annual permanency hearings just because the Cabinet has filed for termination of parental rights.
The failure of the Cabinet to formulate and file a written court-approved case plan in the DNA case is fatal to its termination case. In H.M.R. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 521 S.W.3d 221 (Ky.App. 2017), the father lived out of state and had prior care of the child before the mother moved away with the child. The father in H.M.R. had a criminal history including drug possession and tested positive for marijuana. The father was told that to gain custody of his child, he needed to drug screen when ordered, cooperate with the ICPC process, and complete and follow the recommendations of a substance abuse assessment; he drug screened when ordered, participated in the ICPC process, although his cooperation was not stellar, and did not complete the substance abuse assessment. Id. at 227.
The Court of Appeals determined the father's failure to complete a substance abuse assessment could not "be held against him where the directive was not part of a written, court-approved case plan." Id. The Court faulted the Cabinet for failing to provide the father with a case plan and not working any sort of plan out with the father as to how he should proceed after the ICPC assessment denied placement of the child with him. "The fact that Father's home and situation was not appropriate for temporary placement is not tantamount to a finding that Father would never be able to adequately parent Child[]" and the father's conduct did not show that he intended to abandon his child or was unwilling to work with the Cabinet. Id. The Court reversed the order of termination, explaining "[t]he oral plan given to Father is so lacking in formality and detail that it cannot constitute a plan, and therefore, we cannot conclude that Father was subjected to a fair process in this case." Id. at 228.
I dissent because the same result is required here. Unlike the father in H.M.R., father did not have a drug problem and had no criminal record. Compared to that father, father was an outstanding candidate to have child returned to him. However, like the father in H.M.R., father never received a court-approved case plan, never showed that he intended to abandon the child or was unwilling to work with the Cabinet, and the oral plan he did receive was so lacking in formality as to not constitute a plan at all. Father was never told what to do after the ICPC was not approved because he wanted all of the children to be in his care instead of just child. Later the second ICPC was not approved for all the children because father's home was not adequate for five children, but there is no evidence father was ever told the kind of housing he needed to obtain to be approved. The fact that neither ICPC was approved did not mean that father could never obtain adequate housing or parent child.
Child testified that he had weekly phone conversations with father. Miller admitted she had monthly phone contact with father, father was not asked to pay child support, and father did send child money for shoes, although it took him a long time. In the DNA action parents were found incapable of paying child support. There was absolutely no evidence that it was not poverty alone that prevented father from providing more support to child.
The family court was clearly erroneous in repeatedly finding that father failed to comply with his court-approved case plan, failed to avail himself of services provided by the Cabinet, or failed to fully engage in treatment prescribed by the Cabinet, and concluding that the Cabinet rendered all reasonable services to father. Father could not comply with a court-approved case plan which did not exist; he could not take advantage of services or treatments that were never offered to him. The duration of time that child spent in the Cabinet's care cannot be attributed to father's actions or lack of action; instead it is the Cabinet who is responsible for the amount of time child has remained in its care.
Even if appropriate case planning had taken place in this case, I would still take issue with father being faulted for not engaging in visitation with child and failing to get the ICPC approved. The only evidence is that the Cabinet's efforts to facilitate father's visitation with child were woefully inadequate and unreasonable. The majority opinion faults father for requesting custody of all the children rather than just child, when child was the only one in care; however, I do not. Father consistently sought custody of all the children because mother was not adequately caring for the children and father was ultimately proven right. Father did cooperate with the second ICPC process. It was unreasonable for the Cabinet to return the other children to father after the second ICPC was denied, but then to fault father for failing to have the ICPC approved and use this as a basis for refusing to return child. Miller and father both acknowledged that he was working and supporting his other children, so there was every reason to believe he would do likewise for child if given the opportunity.
Father was granted unsupervised visitation in the DNA case but testified that the Cabinet never permitted him to visit with child. To counter this testimony, Miller was recalled on rebuttal and testified that twice while the termination trial was pending, she tried to arrange visitation on the day prior to a court date, but father told her each time that he could not visit due to his work schedule. There was no evidence to presented showing that father was ever offered any other visitation previous to this time. By the time Miller offered father visitation, father was living in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which according to Miller is a six or eight-hour drive away from child, and was caring for child's four other siblings who had been returned to him. Under these circumstances, considering that father had to both care for his other children and work full time to support them and was relatively poor, it is not unreasonable that he might not be available to visit when Miller proposed which would have required an overnight stay.
Court orders from father's and mother's dissolution case were entered into evidence. Father sought custody and to be the children's primary residential parent alleging that mother was not properly caring for the children. The court awarded mother and father joint custody with mother being designated as the primary residential parent and father receiving timesharing. While the court found father was an involved parent before mother left with the children, it determined that mother had a bigger home and the children were being well cared for by her (by this time the Cabinet had investigated reports against the babysitter and mother and returned the children to mother even though the GAL objected because of abuse by mother). Father testified that mother refused to let him have timesharing with the children and he continued to worry about how she was caring for them. He filed a motion for contempt in the dissolution case to request that the children live with him and to enforce his timesharing. However, the court's order on father's motion for contempt only adjusted the manner of the timesharing rather than giving him the relief he sought. Once the Cabinet had custody of child, it sought to have father approved through the ICPC process to take custody of child. It appears that father may have misunderstood that at that time this was the only child whose custody was being considered and no one explained to him that without an ongoing case involving the other children that the Cabinet could not place those children with him, and that if he did not take placement of child he could eventually lose his parental rights to child. It also appears that the Cabinet then ceased all but pro forma reunification efforts.
While testimony by Miller implied that the Cabinet could not return child to father because the ICPC study was not approved, this is patently false. Pursuant to KRS 615.030(II)(2) and (III)(2)(e) children can be returned to the custody of a noncustodial parent outside of the ICPC process so long as that parent is not the subject of allegations or findings of child abuse or neglect, has a substantial relationship with the child, and it is in the child's best interest to be placed with the parent and the parent does not require oversight. Accordingly, when the Cabinet determined it would be appropriate for the other children to be returned to father, despite the ICPC study not being satisfied, the family court must have determined that KRS 615.030(III)(2)(e) was satisfied to enable their return.
Although child testified that he wishes to be adopted, child also testified that he wants to continue to have phone contact with his father and have contact with his siblings, something that he would no longer have any entitlement to after father's parental rights were terminated. It is my hope that should child be adopted that his parents would honor child's desire to have contact with father and child's siblings as there is every indication it would be in child's best interest to maintain such relationships which should have never been disrupted in the first place.
Accordingly, I dissent. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: John H. Helmers, Jr.
Corey Shiffman
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET
FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES: Jennifer Ellen Clay
Louisville, Kentucky