MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER

GEORGE DANIELS, District Judge

Plaintiff, an African-American female, brought this suit against defendant alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq, as well as violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Plaintiff opposed that motion. For the following reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

Background

Plaintiff worked as an Accounting Manager for defendant from around September 1997 until she resigned in July 1999. Initially, plaintiffs supervisor was defendant's Director of Finance. In January of 1998, defendant hired an Executive Director for Operations. Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that four months later, in April 1998, she went into the Executive Director's office to hand her some papers. Plaintiff alleges that shortly after she left the office, the Executive Director said to plaintiffs supervisor, who was also present in the office, that "the company had too many people who could not speak English and that something had to be done in order to change that." Complaint at ¶ 16. Plaintiffs supervisor left defendant's employ one month later in May 1998 for unrelated reasons, and after that, the Executive Director temporarily supervised plaintiffs work.

Plaintiff alleges that the Executive Director, as her new supervisor, effectively "demoted" plaintiff by directing her to work on data entry tasks, rather than accounting and other financial tasks. Plaintiff also alleges that on May 12, 1998, another employee with no supervisory authority over plaintiff asked her to do data entry work. Plaintiff alleges further that sometime in mid 1998, defendant re-assigned portions of plaintiff s supervisory responsibilities to other employees, promoted another employee to the position of Senior Accountant over her, and relocated the entire accounts payable department as well as employees previously assigned to her supervision to the 17^th floor, while keeping plaintiff alone on the 20^th floor.

Plaintiff had two conversations in May and June 1998 with the Executive Director regarding her work assignments and the inordinate amount of clerical work she felt she was performing. However, according to plaintiff, her work assignment did not change. Plaintiff contends that she also had a conversation with the Human Resources Director wherein plaintiff complained that her supervisory responsibilities had been taken away, and that she was now exclusively being assigned clerical work. Thereafter, plaintiff contends that her work assignment remained clerical in nature.

On August 1, 1998, plaintiff began a pregnancy related leave of absence, and did not return to work until mid-December 1998. While plaintiff was still out on leave, defendant hired a new Controller. In addition to other duties, the Controller was to assume direct supervisory responsibility over plaintiff when plaintiff returned from leave. On November 23, 1998, while still out on leave, plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that defendant had discriminated against her because of her race and national origin by reducing her job responsibilities. On April 13, 1999, plaintiff filed the above captioned action alleging race and national origin discrimination and retaliation.

Plaintiff returned from leave around mid-December 1998. Plaintiff alleges that the Controller, her new supervisor, sent her a series of e-mails commencing in January 1999 and continuing until plaintiff resigned around June 1999. Plaintiff identifies two of those emails as being harassing. On June 14, 1998, plaintiff commenced a disability leave, alleging work-related stress. One month later, on July 5, 1999, plaintiff resigned from employment with defendant.

Discussion

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine factual dispute exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). A court will resolve all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass'n. Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). If there is evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, then summary judgment is not appropriate. See Tri-State Employment Serv., 295 F.3d at 260. However, the non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Caldarola v. Calabrese 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original), quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

A. The Title VII Discrimination Claim

Title VII prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2002). A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Graham v. Long Isl. R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000),citing Texas Dep't of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show:

(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Defendant argues that plaintiff has not met the third and fourth elements of the prima facie case, in that plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that the circumstances alleged constitute an adverse employment decision. Defendant further contends that even if they do, they do not give rise to an inference of discrimination. "A plaintiff may support an inference of race discrimination by demonstrating that similarly situated employees of a different race were treated more favorably." Norville, 196 F.3d at 95. Other circumstances that can also give rise to an inference of discrimination are criticism of a plaintiff s performance in ethnically degrading terms, racial comments about other individuals in the plaintiffs same protected class, the sequence of events leading up to the adverse employment decision, and the timing of the adverse employment action. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Cntrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994).

In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that the circumstances she complains of give rise to an adverse employment decision. Plaintiff argues that the Executive Director, as her supervisor, reduced plaintiffs job duties to exclusively clerical functions. However, plaintiff testified in her deposition that as of June 16, 1998, one month after plaintiff was allegedly demoted, plaintiff was still performing accounting functions that plaintiff felt were appropriate for an accounting manager. See Tr. at 189-90. One month later around July 29, 1998, plaintiff summarized in a memorandum for the Executive Director the work plaintiff had performed in connection with defendant's June 1998 closing financials. Plaintiff testified that the work she performed in this instance was also work proper for an accounting manager. See id. at 85-87. Plaintiff then left for maternity leave on August 1, 1998. Plaintiff admitted that when she returned from maternity leave in mid-December she was not exclusively performing clerical work, but rather was performing a mixture of both her normal accounting functions and other related clerical functions.See id at 109-112. This nevertheless is not actionable because assigning additional job duties that are within a plaintiff s job responsibilities, even if clerical in nature, does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Monica v. N.Y. City Off-Track Betting Corp., No. 93 cv 6371, 1995 WL 117879, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 20, 1995).

Plaintiff further claims that the Executive Director stripped her of her supervisory functions over four subordinates. However, plaintiff admitted in her deposition the first individual was hired to report directly to the Director of Finance and Business Operations, not to plaintiff. See Tr. at 51-52; McMannus Aff. Ex. L. The second individual was hired to report directly to plaintiffs original supervisor as a receptionist. See McMannus Aff, Ex. K. According to the company's organization chart, the third individual was hired for the company's Home Video Division and also reported directly to plaintiffs original supervisor. See McMannus Aff., Ex. J. With respect to the fourth individual, plaintiff admitted that sometime around April 1998, the company filled the newly created position of Business Manager for Home Video. Since those duties related to Home Video operations, from then on, the fourth individual reported directly to the newly hired Manager for Home Video. See Tr. at 24-27; Rosenthal Aff. at ¶ 16. In all four instances, the named individuals were never hired to report directly to plaintiff, or in the final instance, there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the defendant to shift the supervisors.

Plaintiff also identified four non-minority individuals whom she alleges earned more than her, and whose duties were not altered, but who were less qualified. However, in her deposition, plaintiff conceded that she did not know if the job duties of these employees ever changed from time to time. See Tr. at 338-40, 352. Further, plaintiff also testified that she had no knowledge concerning the hiring of these employees, their experience, or their job performance. See Tr. at 339-352.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant's failure to move her cubicle from the 20th floor to the 17th floor raises an inference of discrimination, since she contends that everyone else in the accounting and finance department was moved to the 17^th floor. In June 1998, defendant restructured its office space and leased the 17^th floor of the office building it occupied, in addition to retaining the 20^th floor that it was already renting. Certain employees' work stations were moved from the 20^th floor to the 17^th floor. Plaintiffs deposition testimony reveals that her cubicle initially was on the 20^th floor when she began employment. After the reorganization, she remained on the 20^th floor. The company's president and other programming-related divisions also either remained on the 20^th floor or moved to the 20^th floor. Further, plaintiffs office space was located next to that of the company president. See Tr. at 169-170. The company's corporate functions and attendant staff, including the corporate accounting functions which plaintiff performed, also remained on the 20^th floor. See Rosenthal Aff. at ¶ 17. Additionally, when the company hired its new Controller, that person moved into an office on the 20^th floor near plaintiff. See Rosenthal Aff. at ¶ 19. The evidence and plaintiffs deposition testimony both reveal, therefore, that she was not isolated on the 20^th floor. There was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff to remain on the 20^th floor, as her boss and the division for which she performed certain work kept their offices on the 20^th floor.

Plaintiff additionally argues that defendant's failure to give her an annual performance evaluation creates an inference of discriminatory animus. A recommendation for a pay increase may be made upon the completion of an employee's annual performance evaluation. However, the evidence shows that plaintiff was hired in September 1997. Therefore, her first annual performance evaluation was due sometime around September 1998. Plaintiff, however, went on a pregnancy related leave on August 1, 1998, which continued through mid-December 1998. Therefore, she was not physically present in the company during the month of September to receive a performance evaluation. Furthermore, prior to her leave, her initial supervisor left defendant's employ around May 1998. The Executive Director, thereafter, temporally, supervised plaintiff but only for approximately eight weeks before plaintiff took her leave. During plaintiffs absence, the new Controller joined the company and was assigned to supervise plaintiff when she returned from leave. Therefore, when plaintiff returned from leave, her initial supervisor was no longer at the company, the Executive Director had only supervised plaintiff for eight weeks, and the new Controller had not had any exposure to plaintiffs work product. Consequently, under these circumstances, defendant's failure to provide plaintiff with an annual performance evaluation does not raise an inference of discrimination.

Plaintiff also contends that two e-mails she received from the Controller after she returned from leave were harassing, in that they were critical of her work performance. In the first e-mail, dated May 17, 1999, the Controller criticized plaintiffs work performance as "sloppy," and indicated that some budget numbers that plaintiff had submitted were either incorrect or missing. See McManus Aff, Ex. N. In the second e-mail, dated June 4, 1999, the Controller said that she had just spent over two hours trying to determine why the June Outlook was not consolidating properly, and that she felt that it was because plaintiff "deleted the operating income cell for the May column . . . to hide your [plaintiffs] error." The Controller concluded the e-mail by rhetorically asking plaintiff "What were you thinking?" See McManus Aff., Ex. O. From these two e-mails, plaintiff concludes that the Controller was harassing her on the basis of race and/or national origin.

However, these e-mails, either by themselves or in total with the other circumstances alleged, do not constitute an adverse employment decision, nor are they, in any event, sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination. The Controller was plaintiffs supervisor, and therefore, had the authority to criticize plaintiffs work. Further, on their face, the e-mails reveal legitimate, non-discriminatory critiques of plaintiff s work performance. That is not to say that these emails did not cause plaintiff some embarrassment or anxiety. Rather, it is only to say that negative evaluations that are unattended by a demotion, or other tangible loss do not materially alter employment conditions. See Castro v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 96 cv 6314, 1998 WL 108004, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. March 12, 1998) (finding that negative evaluation and written reprimand that was not attended by a demotion or tangible loss did not materially alter plaintiffs employment conditions);Henriquez v. Times Herald Record, No. 97 cv 6176, 1997 WL 732444, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1997) (criticisms and threats of disciplinary action not adverse employment actions), aff'd 165 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 1998).

Lastly, plaintiff alleges that the comment the Executive Director made to plaintiffs original supervisor in April 1998 that "the company had too many people who could not speak English and that something had to be done in order to change that" evinces discriminatory intent. However, this comment is directed at non-English speakers, and does not raise an inference of discriminatory intent towards plaintiffs protected racial class, African-Americans. With respect to her national origin claim, plaintiff does mention in the complaint that she is of "Ethiopian ancestry." However, in the same sentence, she also states that she is a United States citizen. See Complaint at ¶ 6. It is unclear from the record whether or not plaintiffs national origin at birth is that of the United States, or whether she is a naturalized citizen, born in Ethiopia. At one point in her deposition, plaintiff does mention that she speaks with a foreign accent. Regardless, one isolated stray remark, without more, is not normally actionable. See e.g. O'Conner v. Viacom, Inc., No. 93 cv 2399, 1996 WL 194299, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1996) (three isolated remarks by supervisor insufficient to establish discrimination); Sergilus v. Covenant House under 21 No. 96 cv 6210, 1999 WL 717274, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1999) (one isolated racial epithets made by plaintiffs supervisor not actionable). Here, other than the remark allegedly made by the Executive Director, plaintiff has not proffered any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any adverse employment actions were taken, or that the circumstances alleged raise an inference of discriminatory animus.

This Court, therefore, grants summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs Title VII discrimination claim as plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that she suffered from an adverse employment action, or that the circumstances alleged raise an inference that she was discriminated against on the basis of race and/or national origin.

B. The Title VII Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff next claims that defendant unlawfully retaliated against her after she engaged in protected activity by continuing to discriminate against her, and by forcing her into a constructive discharge. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee for opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII or for filing an EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Under the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of retaliation. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: 1) protected activity known to the alleged retaliator; 2) an adverse employment action; and 3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000); Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff conceded in her deposition that although she voiced her complaints to the Executive Director and the Human Resources Director that she felt she was being assigned too much clerical work, she never told them or anyone else at the company that she felt she was being discriminated against due to her race and/or national origin.See Tr. at 309-12. Therefore, plaintiffs protected activity did not occur until she filed her EEOC complaint in November 1998. Plaintiff only alleges one incident that occurred post November 1998 that she claims is retaliatory, namely the e-mails from the Controller. As noted above, however, the e-mails were written by plaintiffs direct supervisor, who had the authority to comment on plaintiffs work performance. Further, as noted earlier, the e-mails on their face are supported by a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the criticism of plaintiff s work. Therefore, they do not constitute an adverse employment action. Further, there is no causal connection between the e-mails and the protected activity. The Controller did not send the first e-mail until May 1999, six months after plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint, and five months after plaintiff returned from her leave of absence. The e-mails, therefore, are simply too far removed temporally from the filing of the EEOC complaint to raise an inference of retaliation.

Therefore, plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that defendant retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity.