Opinion
Case No. C-2-01-0822
September 19, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff asserts claims under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., Ohio's handicap discrimination statute, Ohio Rev. Code *4112 et seq., and Ohio common law for violation of public policy. Defendant moves for partial summary judgment (Doc. 3). seeking dismissal of plaintiff's FMLA claim with prejudice, and dismissal of her state law claims without prejudice. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendant's motion.
I. Summary Judgment
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will beat the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Although the Court views the entire record, it disregards all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Id. Stated otherwise, the Court must credit evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as evidence favorable to the moving party that is uncontroverted or unimpeached, if it comes from disinterested witnesses. Id.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Liberty Lobby, Celotex, and Matsushita have effected "a decided change in summary judgment practice," ushering in a anew era" in summary judgments. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476 (6th Cir. 1989). The court in Street identified a number of important principles applicable in new era summary judgment practice. For example, complex cases and cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment. Id. at 1479.
Additionally, in responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party "cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.'" Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257). The nonmoving party must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the summary judgment motion. Id. It is not sufficient for the nonmoving party to merely "`show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586).
Moreover, "[t]he trial court no longer has a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 1479-80. That is, the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court' s attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact. In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
II. Discussion
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on plaintiffs FMLA claim because plaintiff cannot adduce evidence to show that she was an "eligible employee" for purposes of the FMLA. The parties do not dispute that to be eligible for protection under the FMLA, the employee must have worked for the employer at least 1250 hours during the twelve month period before the date upon which the leave began. 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(A); Butler v. Owens-Rrockway Plastic Prod., Inc., 199 F.3d 314, 316 (6th Cir. 1999). Defendant maintains that plaintiff cannot show that she worked for defendant the required 1,250 hours in the twelve months before she her leave beginning on April 2, 2001. In support of this factual assertion, defendant presents the affidavit of its Business Administrator Coordinator in Payroll, who records and maintains work attendance information at defendant. Her records indicate that plaintiff worked 1131.55 hours during the relevant period of April 2, 2000 to April 2, 2001.
At the outset, plaintiff invokes the protection of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (f), and maintains that without discovery she cannot properly respond to defendant's summary judgment motion. Rule 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). (Emphasis added). Plaintiff's brief affidavit does not supply any reason she cannot present the relevant facts. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that failure to submit an adequate affidavit as required by the plain language of Rule 56(1) is fatal to a request to postpone ruling on a summary judgment motion pending discovery. Klepper v. First Am. Bank, 916 F.2d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1990); Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1989);Shavrnoch v. Clark Oul and Refining Corp., 726 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1984). The Court therefore rejects plaintiff's request to defer ruling under Rule 56(f).
As a result, the only evidence in the record concerning the number of hours plaintiff worked in the year before she took leave on April 2, 2001 is the uncontroverted affidavit of defendant's Business Administrator, who avers plaintiff worked fewer than 1,250 hours during that period. Plaintiff is therefore not an eligible employee under the FMLA as a matter of law, and defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on plaintiffs FMLA claim.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court should not examine the twelve months before April 2, 2001 because plaintiff made an earlier request for leave on December 7, 2000, and during the twelve months before that date plaintiff worked the required 1250 hours. In essence, plaintiff argues that once she satisfied the 1250 hour requirement for her December 7, 2000 leave all requests for leave after that time were sufficient because they related to the same condition. The Court disagrees. The plain language of the statute and relevant implementing regulation tie the 1250 hour requirement to the time leave begins. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (a). The relevant leave began on April 2, 2001.
Plaintiff also argues that her leave beginning on April 2, 2001 should be deemed intermittent leave under the FMLA. Plaintiff has not, however, made any attempt to show that she was qualified for intermittent leave under 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (b)(1). See 29 C.F.R. § 825.117, 302(f).
Having determined that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's FMLA claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3).
III. Disposition
Based on the above, the Court grants defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (Doc.3).
The Clerk shall enter final judgment in favor of defendant, and against plaintiff, dismissing plaintiff's FMLA claim with prejudice, and dismissing plaintiffs state law claims without prejudice.
The Clerk shall remove this case from the Court's pending cases and motions lists.
The Clerk shall remove Doc. 3 from the Court's pending motions list.