Plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress could have been dismissed on the alternative ground that plaintiff was an at-will employee terminable from her position at any time and for any reason, or even for no reason at all, and was thus without recourse to sue, as she has, for wrongful discharge by means of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (see Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 303).

In any event, the motion court correctly held that defendants' conduct, which included conducting an investigation into the forged signatures of plaintiff's supervisor on plaintiff's expense reports, questioning plaintiff about the forgeries, and thereafter terminating her employment and escorting her from the premises, was not so extreme and outrageous as to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (see Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121; Arrington v. Liz Claiborne, Inc., 260 A.D.2d 267, 268).

Summary judgment was also properly granted dismissing plaintiff's cause of action for defamation, since defendants' statements, even if construed as defamatory, were all made in the course of the investigation and consequent termination of plaintiff, and, as such, were qualifiedly privilege (see Present v. Avon Prods., Inc., 253 A.D.2d 183, 187, appeal dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 1032). The record fails to disclose an issue of fact as to the existence of malice on the part of defendants sufficient to overcome such privilege (see Foster v. Churchill, 87 N.Y.2d 744, 751-752).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.