Yellow Cab Co. of California

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 12, 1951

93 N.L.R.B. 766 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

766 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and LEONARD P. REGAN
LOCAL 640, CHAUFFEURS UNION, AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN &
HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL and LEONARD P. REGAN. Cases Nos.
21-CA-389 and 21-CB-135. Marcia 12,1951
Supplemental Order
On August 15, 1950, the Board issued a Decision andOrder,1 dis-
missing the complaint in these cases on the ground that it would not
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over the opera-
tions of the Respondent Yellow Cab. After the issuance of that de-
cision the Board reexamined its policy concerning the exercise of
jurisdiction and announced certain criteria for the assertion of juris-
diction 2 On November 21, 1950, the Board issued its decision and
Direction of Election in the case of Red Cab, Inc.' where, in applying
the announced criteria, it asserted jurisdiction over taxicab operations
similar to those of the Respondent Yellow Cab, and overruled its de-
cision in the instant cases insofar as that decision conflicted with the
decision in Red Cab, Inc.
Thereafter the General Counsel filed a motion to remand the instant
cases to the Trial Examiner for issuance of an Intermediate Report
covering the issues raised by the pleadings. The Respondent Union
filed an opposition to the motion to remand.
The Board has considered the contentions of the parties, and hereby
denies the General Counsel's motion to remand. In the opinion of
the Board, sound policy precludes reconsideration of complaint cases
which were disposed of before the adoption of the present jurisdic-
tional standards .4 The original decision in the instant cases was made
in accord with practice in effect at that time concerning the exer-
cise of jurisdiction. The Board will not disturb that decision or the
dismissal of the complaint. This ruling, however, is not to be taken
as a holding that the Board would not assert jurisdiction in proper
new complaint or representation proceedings involving the Re-
190 NLRB 1884.
'For these criteria see : WBSR, Inc, 91 NLRB 630; W. C. King d/b/a Local Transit
Lines, 91 NLRB 623; The Borden Company, Southern Division , 91 NLRB 628, Stansslaus
Implement and Hardware Company, Limited , 91 NLRB 618 ; Hollow Tree Lumber Company,
91 NLRB 635 ; Federal Dairy Co., Inc., 91 NLRB 638; Dorn's House of Miracles, Inc.,
91 NLRB 632; The Rutledge Paper Products , Inc., 91 NLRB 625; Westport Moving c6
Storage Co , 91 NLRB 902.
3 92 NLRB 175.
4Cf. Skyview Transportation Co., et at, 92 NLRB 1664 , where, in a representation
proceeding , which has only prospective effect, the Board reconsidered a decision in which
it had declined to assert jurisdiction before the announcement of its present jurisdictional
criteria , and in accordance with the present criteria , asserted jurisdiction over the
operations of the employer involved.
93 NLRB No. 114.
YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 767
spondent Yellow Cab or other employers involved in previously de-
cided complaint cases whose operations meet present jurisdictional
criteria.
Order Dismissing Complaint
Upon charges duly filed by Leonard P. Regan, an individual, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for
the Twenty-first Region (Los Angeles, California), issued his consolidated
complaint dated December 27, 1949, against the above-named Respondents,
alleging that they had engaged in and were engaging in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2), Sec-
tion 8 (a) (1), (2), and (3), and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended. The Respondents thereafter filed their answers
denying that they were engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and
denying that they had engaged in any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held from January 24 to 27, 1950, inclusive,
at Los Angeles, California, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, and evidence
was received on all issues raised in the pleadings. During the hearing counsel
for each of the above-named Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint because
of the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Board, and ruling upon said motions
was reserved by the undersigned. The said motions are herein considered and
are disposed of in accordance with the findings and order hereinafter made.
Respondent Yellow Cab operates a fleet of taxicabs in the metropolitan area
of Los Angeles, under franchises from the municipalities of Los Angeles, Beverly
Hills, and Burbank, and from the County of Los Angeles. In a large portion of
this area it is the only taxicab company presently operating. However, there
are other taxicab companies operating in the communities known as Venice,
Wilmington, and San Pedro, and in the San Fernando Valley area, all of which
are part of the City of Los Angeles. There is also another cab company operating
in the city of Burbank. Likewise, it may be noted that there is nothing in the
ordinance under which Respondent operates to prevent the City of Los Angeleo
from issuing franchises to other companies to operate in the areas where Respond-
ent is at present the only company operating.' Under its franchises it is author-
ized to operate approximately 900 cabs but actually operates an average of 650
per day. It is also authorized to maintain 460 taxi-stands at various points in
its franchised area. It employs approximately 1,960 drivers on all shifts.
The stock of Respondent Yellow Cab is wholly owned by Yellow Cab Company
of San Francisco, which also owns the stock of Yellow Cab Company of Alameda
County. Although these companies have some officers in common, they are sepa-
rately managed and there is no interchange of personnel. They also bargain
with separate unions. The San Francisco company has since the latter part of
October 1948 also owned the stock of Airport Transit Corporation which operates
10 small busses and 10 limousines between certain hotels in Los Angeles and
Hollywood and the Municipal and Lockheed Air Terminals. The latter com-
pany is under a separate manager and there is no evidence of any integration
of its operations with any of the taxicab companies.
In the fiscal year ending July 31, 1949, Respondent's 2 cabs operated over 30
million revenue miles and carried approximately 14 million passengers. The
1 Prior to the period In issue another company was franchised in Los Angeles and
operated in competition with Respondent, but subsequently went out of business.
S Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the business of Respondent are to the
Respondent, Yellow Cab Company of California
768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Company's gross revenues amounted to $10,200,000. During this period its prin-
cipal purchases, consisting of tires, gas, oil, repair parts, meter parts, paints, and
cleaning materials, amounted to approximately $1,500,000. Of this amount, pur-
chases of gasoline and oil account for $944,900. These were purchased from the
Standard Oil Company of California and, so far as appears from the record, these
products were produced and refined entirely within the State of California. It
also receives tires on a rental basis from Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
for which it paid $128,000 during the fiscal year mentioned above. These tires
were manufactured almost exclusively in Goodyear's plant in Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia. It purchased meter rolls amounting to $9,638 and uniforms amounting
to $30,000, both of which were received from outside the State of California.
It expended $42,000 for automobile parts and $22,400 for batteries, both of which
items were purchased from Los Angeles dealers, the point of origin of which
items does not appear from the record. The only purchase of out-of-State equip-
ment in any substantial amount is a purchase of new taxis and parts from the
James F. Waters Company of San Francisco, which products originated in
Detroit, Michigan The record does not disclose what these purchases amounted
to in the fiscal year ending July 31, 1949. However, in the calendar year 1948
the purchases of these taxicabs, apparently for replacement purposes, amounted
to $300,337.64, and the purchases of parts amounted to $44,747. In the calendar
year 1949 the purchase of cabs declined to $18,42137 and the purchase of parts
amounted to $52,712.53 Other expenditures during the fiscal period ending
July 31, 1949, cited by the General Counsel as apparently having some connec-
tion with commerce, were $45,000 for advertising in newspapers, $10,000 for
advertising in the local transit system, $44,700 paid to the Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Company for the lease of call boxes,' and approximately $100,000 for
insurance premiums, mainly to Lloyds of London and to Pacific Indemnity
Company.
Respondent's taxicab operations are confined entirely to the City of Los An-
geles and its environs It makes no trips outside the State of California. Al-
though Respondent, maintains taxicab stands all over the area in which it is
franchised, the principal points of origin of its passenger traffic are the better
residential districts and the various hotels and night clubs. So far as appears
from the record, the overwhelming proportion of Respondent's business is of a
purely local service nature having no connection with interstate commerce.
In seeking to establish the jurisdiction of the Board over Respondent's opera-
tions, the General Counsel relies principally on the fact that some of Respondent's
taxicabs are stationed at various terminals used by interstate carriers in Los
Angeles and that a small percentage of the trips made by Respondent's taxicabs
are to and from these terminals. The record discloses that on an average day,
Respondent's cabs make 25,268 paid trips in the City of Los Angeles and its
environs. Of these 1,407 (5 5 percent) involve the carriage of passengers to
and from the Los Angeles Union Passenger Terminal (railroad station) ; 343
(13 percent) to and from the Santa Fe Bus Terminal; 401 (15 percent) to
and from the Greyhound Bus Terminal; 201 (0.7 percent) to and from the
Los Angeles Municipal Air Terminal; and 369 (14 percent) to and from the
Pacific Electric Company Terminal At the railroad terminal, Respondent
maintains taxi-stands on railroad property for which it pays the Union Terminal
$600 a month and has the exclusive right to solicit and transport passengers
from the station grounds in for-hire vehicles. So far as appears from the record,
the taxi fares are paid exclusively by the passengers, and the railroads' only
3 Respondent leases 176 call boxes in the Los Angeles area which are used by its drivers
to call in to a central switchboard for orders
YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 769
connection with the transaction is that they permit the Respondent to maintain
cabs at the station in consideration of the monthly payments mentioned above.
At the Municipal Airport, Respondent is authorized to stand 6 taxicabs at curb
locations on airport property for which privilege it pays $100 a month. It does
not have any exclusive right at the Airport Terminal, the bulk of the passengers
there being carried by the separate Air Tiansit Corporation in its own busses
and limousines. With respect to the other three terminals mentioned above,
Respondent does not maintain any stands on terminal property, its taxicabs
merely utilizing street-stands located on the public streets adjacent to these
terminals.
No evidence was adduced by the General Counsel to show the extent to which
the above terminals are utilized by interstate carriers. With respect to the
Union Terminal, the only evidence of the railroad traffic at the station is a'
time-table introduced in evidence by the General Counsel which shows the time
of arrival and departure of 29 trains using the terminal. No evidence was,
introduced to show which of these trains move in interstate commerce, although
it may be assumed that in a city the size of Los Angeles a substantial number
of these trains do move in interstate commerce.' With respect to the Santa Fe
and Greyhound Bus Terminals, there is no evidence to show what proportion
of the busses using these terminals are interstate. The Pacific Electric Terminal
is used by the Pacific Electric Company which is a local interurban carrier
operating in the Los Angeles area. It was stipulated at the hearing that the
parties had no way of determining what proportion of the trips to and from
the various terminals were by passengers moving in interstate commerce and
what proportion by intrastate travelers or the general public. With respect to
the bus terminals, since the taxi-stands are located on the public street in busy
downtown districts, it may be assumed that some portion of the passengers are
merely local people who happen to be in the vicinity of the taxi-stands. It may
also be noted that all of the above terminals are served by other and cheaper
means of public transportation.`
In addition to its revenues from cab operations, Respondent received during
the fiscal year ending July 31, 1949, $66,000 for carrying on its cabs, advertise-
ments of the Standard Oil Company of California. Respondent also has an ar-
rangement with the Southern California Telegraph Company to carry its night
operators to and from work. For this purpose,,12 to 15 cabs are used each night.
Respondent is paid the regular meter rate for each cab by the Telegraph Com-
pany.
A review of Board decisions dealing with taxicab companies indicates that the
industry is a marginal one insofar as the matter of the Board's jurisdiction is
concerned. There is a surprising paucity of precedent and such precedent as
does exist is inconclusive. One of the earliest cases in point is Yellow Cab and
Baggage Co., 17 NLRB 469, involving a company with annual revenues of $320,359
whose operations included the transportation of passengers and baggage to,
from, and between three railroad stations in the city of Omaha. Despite the fact
that 241/3 percent of the trips made by the company's taxicabs were to or from
the three railroad stations in Omaha, the Board dismissed the complaint "for
lack of evidence to sustain the jurisdiction of the Board." The Board noted that
the record did not disclose "the number or proportion of passengers who were
The General Counsel conceded that at least three trains identified by Respondent's
counsel operate solely in the State of Califoinia.
5 Directly north of the railroad terminal is a street car and bus stop. Similar means
of public transit exist at the other terminals , except the air terminal which is served
by special busses and limousines operating at a substantially cheaper rate than taxicabs.
943732-51-50
770 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
transported to or from the trains ." The decision in that case also discloses that
the respondent had a contract with two of the railroads for the transportation
of passengers between their terminals but that less than 1/10 of 1 percent of its
revenues were so derived . It also made some trips across State lines but these
accounted for less than 1/10 of 1 percent of its revenues . Although the respondent
transported baggage to , from, and between the railroad stations , the Board
noted that there was no showing as to the amount of its revenues so derived or
as to the point of origin or destination of the baggage transferred.
The Respondents here assert that, relying on the Yellow Cab case and the
absence of other controlling Board decisions , the industry has long assumed that
the Board will not take jurisdiction over taxicab companies merely on the basis
of the transportation of passengers and baggage to and from railroad stations,
where there is a mere incidental part of their business . The General Counsel
contends that the Yellow Cab case should riot be regarded as controlling because
it was decided in the early days of the Wagner Act, before the Board's juris-
dictional principles had been definitely formulated. He argues that the Board's
later decision in The Baltimore Transit Company , 47 NLRB 106, represents its
more considered judgment and is precedent for the assertion of jurisdiction in
this case.
In the opinion of the undersigned the principle which persuaded the Board
to assert jurisdiction in the Baltimore Transit case and in the later cases in-
volving bus , trolley, and other urban and interurban transit companies is not
applicable generally to taxicab companies. In that case the Board noted that
among the passengers carried by the respondent were "substantial numbers of
employees going to and from their work in industrial plants in and around Balti-
more," which plants were receiving and producing interstate goods including
"goods essential to the nation 's war effort ." In holding that respondent 's opera-
tions "affect commerce ," the Board found that "the uninterrupted and undi-
minished operation of these industrial plants, and the consequent flow of inter-
state shipments to and from these plants , are dependent upon the transportation
facilities provided by the respondents ." In enforcing the Board 's order, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ( 140 F. 2d 51 ) held that the Board had
jurisdiction because "it would be absurd to say that its [Congress '] power does
not extend to the labor relations of a street transportation company, upon whose
operations the industrial life of a great city extensively engaged in interstate
commerce is so largely dependent ." [Emphasis supplied ]
It seems evident that the assertion of jurisdiction in the Baltimore Transit
case and in the later bus and trolley cases which follow it is based primarily on
the indispensability of such a transit system to the industrial life of a community
receiving and producing interstate goods. This was made abundantly clear by
the Board 's later decision in the Chicago Motor Coach Company case , 62 NLRB
890, where it stated that "the consideration which led us to take jurisdiction
over the Baltimore Transit Company" was the fact that " important factories and
shipbuilding companies engaged in the production of goods for commerce or in
the prosecution of the war would have been faced with immediate curtailment of
their production schedules had their employees been deprived of the transporta-
tion facilities of the traction system because of a strike of trolley and bus
workers." The ratio decidendi of these cases is hardly applicable to a taxicab
operation of the type here involved. Most areas of any size and importance in
Los Angeles and its environs are served by one of the cheaper public transit
systems. There is no evidence in the record that any significant number of em-
ployees in the various industrial and commercial establishments utilize taxi-
cabs in going to and from work . Considering the rates charged for such trans-
YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 77 1 °
portation , the average employee would hardly avail himself of this method of
transportation . It may also be noted- that there are approximately 1,000,000
passenger vehicles licensed in Los Angeles in a total population of approximately
2,800,000 persons . The number of taxicabs in proportion to the population is one
of the lowest among large cities in the country e In the opinion of the under-
signed a labor dispute in the taxi industry would have no substantial effect on
the industries or establishments producing or receiving interstate goods in the
Los Angeles area.
If there is any basis for the assertion of jurisdiction it must rest primarily on
the fact that a minor portion of Respondent 's business involves the servicing of
various transportation terminals in Los Angeles . Respondents argue that this
is not a sufficient basis for the assertion of jurisdiction , citing , in addition to the
Omaha Yellow Cab Company case discussed above, the Supreme Court's decision
in U. S. v. Yellow Cabs Company , 332 U. S. 218 . The latter case involved the appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to certain cab companies and individuals who had
allegedly conspired to control the principal taxicab operating companies in
Chicago and to exclude others from engaging in the transportation of interstate
travelers to and from the various terminals in Chicago . In dismissing the com-
plaint in this respect , the Supreme Court by the late Mr . Justice Murphy stated:
We hold . . . that such transportation [from homes , offices and hotels
to railroad terminals and the reverse transportation ] is too unrelated to
interstate commerce to constitute a part thereof within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. These taxicabs , in transporting passengers and their luggage
to and from Chicago railroad stations , admittedly cross no state lines ; by
ordinance , their service is confined to transportation "between any two
points within the corporate limits of the city." None of them serves only
railroad passengers, all of them being required to serve "every person"
within the limits of Chicago. They have no contractual or other arrange-
ment with the interstate railroads . Nor are their fares paid or collected as
part of the railroad fares. In short, their relationship to interstate transit
is only casual and incidental.
In a sense , of course , a traveler starts an interstate journey when he
boards a conveyance near his home , office, or hotel to travel to the railroad
station, from which the journey is continued by train ; and such journey
ends when he alights from a conveyance near the home , office, or hotel
which constitutes his ultimate destination Indeed, the terminal points of
an interstate journey may be traced even further to the moment when the
traveler leaves or enters his room or office and descends or ascends the
building by elevator.
But interstate commerce is an intensely practical concept drawn from
the normal and accepted sense of business . . . And interstate journeys are
to be measured by "the commonly accepted sense of the transportation con-
cept." . .
Here we believe that the common understanding is that a traveler in-
tending to make an interstate rail journey begins his interstate movement
when he boards the train at the station and his journey ends when he
9 The ratios of taxicabs to population in various large cities are as follows :
Washington , D. C____________________________________ 1 to each 225 persons.
New York City______________________________________ 1 to each 600-persons.
Philadelphia ---------------------------------------- 1 to each 1 , 000 persons.
San. Francisco--------------------------------------- 1 to each 1, 000 persons.
Los Angeles____________________________________ •____ 1 to each 3 , 000 persons.
° 772 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
disembarks at the station in the city of destination What happens prior
or subsequent to that rail journey, at least in the absence of some special
.arrangement, is not a constituent part of the interstate movement. The
traveler has complete freedom to arrive at or leave the station by taxicab,
trolley, bus, subway, elevated train, private automobile, his own two legs,
or various other means of conveyance. Taxicab service is thus but one of
many that may be used. It is contracted for independently of the rail-
road journey and may be utilized whenever the traveler so desires. From
the standpoints of time and continuity, the taxicab trip may be quite dis-
tinct and separate from the interstate journey. To the taxi driver, it is
just another local fare. [Emphasis supplied.]
The General Counsel urges that the concept of commerce under the National
Labor Relations Act is broader than that found in the Sherman Act and that
the Supreme Court's decision in the Yellow Cab case has no application to this
case. While admittedly the purposes of both Acts are different, they may, to
some extent, be considered in part materia since they both have been construed
as permitting Federal intervention in areas of local activity because of the
effect on interstate commerce. As stated by the Supreme Court in U S. v.
Darby, 312 U S 100, where the appellee argued that cases arising under the
Sherman Act were inapplicable to a proceeding under the Wage-Hour Law.
The Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act are familiar
examples of the exertion of the commerce power to prohibit or control
activities wholly intrastate because of their effect on interstate com-
merce... .
In addition to his reliance on the Baltimore Transit case and other bus and
trolley cases, the General Counsel has cited three decisions of the Board spe-
cifically involving taxicab operations which he contends support his position.
The first of these, Texarkana Bus Co., Inc., 26 NLRB 582, is wholly distinguish-
able from the- facts in the instant case since it involved a company operating
on a State line whose cabs regularly traveled between Texarkana, Texas,
and Texarkana, Arkansas. The respondent conceded, and the Board
found, that it was engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The next
case, Bussard Taxi and Bus Service, 81 NLRB 1181, a decertification proceeding,
is likewise distinguishable since it involved a company whose primary business
was the operation of busses and which incidentally operated 14 taxicabs. From
the case cited by the Board in finding that the employer's operations constituted
engagement in or affected commerce (Gate City Transit Lines, Inc., 81 NLRB 79,
and the cases therein cited), it is clear that the Board was following the rationale
of the bus cases which, as above indicated, the undersigned considers inapplicable
to a pure taxicab operation! The other case cited by the General Counsel,
Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc., 82 NLRB 664, a representation proceeding, is like-
wise distinguishable on its facts. The employer conceded its engagement in
a In the Gate City case, the busses furnished transportation to "a number of large
textile manufacturing plants " The cases cited therein, Amarillo Bus Co., 78 NLRB 1103 ;
El Paso-Ysleta Bus Co , Inc, 79 NLRB 1068; and City Transportation Co , 80 NLRB 270,
all involved public bus and transit companies furnishing transportation to substantial
numbers of employees working in interstate producing plants. While the Amarillo and
City Transportation cases also involved transportation to railroad and bus terminals, it
seems evident that these facts were only incidental to the Board's assertion of juris-
diction. In the Amarillo case the Board stated : "On these facts, and particularly the
dependence of this city's principal industries upon the Employer's services, we find . . .
that the Employer is engaged in activities affecting commerce " [Emphasis supplied l
It may he noted that Board Members Houston and Murdock dissented from the assertion
of jurisdiction in the Bussard case.
YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 773
commerce, and the Board in its decision did not discuss the basis for its asser-
tion of jurisdiction. However, the record in that case discloses that 5 percent of
the employer's passengers were actually transported across State lines, in addi-
tion to the transportation of another 10 percent to and from railroad and bus
terminals in Cincinnati. The extrastate hauling of passengers was alone suffi-
cient to sustain the jurisdiction of the Board and, in the opinion of the under-
signed, this is the primary reason why jurisdiction was asserted e
Since the close of the hearing the Board has issued two other decisions involy-
ing taxicab operations. The first case, B. Royce, etc., d/b/a Yellow Cab Company,
88 NLRB 282, is a representation proceeding involving a taxicab company in Port-
land, Oregon, 3 percent of whose gross revenues were derived from the transpor-
tation of passengers across State lines and 121/2 percent from the transportation
of passengers to and from railroad, bus, and air terminals. The Board took note
of the fact that the employer was licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. It also appears that the employer had the sole taxi-stand concession at the
railroad depot and the sole concession every third day at the bus station. In
support of its finding that the employer was "engaged in commerce" the Board
cited its decision in Taxicabs of Cinctnnati, supra. In view of its finding that the
employer was "engaged in commerce" (rather than that his operations merely
"affect commerce" ) and its citation of the Taxicabs of Cincinnati case, it is the
opinion of the undersigned that the assertion of jurisdiction was based primarily
on the extrastate trips of the employer which, as indicated above, were conducted
pursuant to ICC license. Finally, there is the case of Louts Dtw, d/b/a Hickey
Cab Co., 88 NLRB 327, where the Board asserted jurisdiction in a decertification
proceeding over a taxicab company which conceded its engagement in interstate
commerce . The Board's decision discloses that the employer conducted all of
its operations from the railroad terminal in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and that
72 percent of its trips were to or from this terminal. It also appears that 2.7
percent of the employer's revenues were derived from out-of-State trips.
In the instant case, if there is any basis for asserting jurisdiction, it must
rest primarily on the relatively small number of trips made to and from the
various terminals . Excluding the trips to and from the Pacific Electric Ter-
minal (which the record does not disclose to be used by any interstate carriers),
the evidence discloses that approximately 9 percent of Respondent' s trips are
to or from terminals used to some undisclosed extent by interstate carriers. In
the instance of two of these terminals, the Santa Fe and Greyhound bus termi-
nals, its taxi-stands are stationed on the public streets and it may therefore be
assumed that some portion of the trips originating at these points are by local
passengers who have not utilized the terminal facilities. In the case of the
Union Terminal, accounting for 5 5 percent of the trips, and the Airport Termi-
nal, accounting for 0.7 percent of the trips, it may reasonably be assumed that
the bulk of the passengers traveling to and from these terminals are about to
use or have used carriers departing from or arriving at these terminals . It does
not appear, however, what portion of these have a state destina-
tion or origin. It is thus apparent that the use of Respondent's taxicabs
by interstate passengers accounts for somewhat less than 9 percent of the trips
made by these cabs. There is no showing as to what proportion of Respondent's
revenues or passengers this represents. In any event, it is substantially less than
the terminal trips in the Omaha Yellow Cab case (241/3 percent) where the
8 It may be noted that outside of the Texarkana case, supra, the Taxicabs of Cincinnati
case decided in 1949 is the first case which the undersigned has been able to find where
the Board asserted jurisdiction over a primarily taxicab operation, after its dismissal of
the Omaha Yellow Cab case in 1939.
774 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Board declined to assert jurisdiction. Unlike the Taxicabs of Cincinnati, the
Yellow Cab (Portland) and Hickey Cab cases, there are no interstate trips in-
volved here. In the last-mentioned Case, it may also be noted, the terminal bus-
iness was the employer's principal operation.
It is true that the Respondent here has an exclusive contractual arrangement
with the Union Terminal but, in the opinion of the undersigned, this does not
take these trips out of the category of purely local transportation. This is
not the type of "special arrangement" with the railroads suggested by the
Supreme Court in the Yellow Cab case, as possibly changing the local character
of a taxicab service. It seems evident that the Court there was referring to
an arrangement such as that with Parmelee Transportation Company of Chi-
cago where passengers are carried from one terminal to another pursuant to
a contract with the railroads , or where there is some similar arrangement giv-
ing the passengers transportation rights as part of their fare.' The contract
in this case is a space rental arrangement primarily for the benefit of the taxi-
cab company which pays a consideration therefor, and the benefit received by
the railroad and the passengers is only incidental, unlike the Parmelee type
of arrangement where the railroad pays the taxi company for rendering it
a service in order to enable it to fulfill its interstate contract with the passenger.
Respondent 's operations here are essentially local in character . This is not
a case where the business and industrial life of the community is dependent
upon the transportation facilities afforded by Respondent's taxicabs. Its con-
nection, if any, with interstate commerce is the small percentage of trips to
and from railroad and other terminals . The passengers using these terminals
all have other and cheaper means of public transportation available. A labor
dispute in this Company would cause only the slightest inconvenience to inter.
state passengers . Were the Board to assert jurisdiction over taxicab com-
panies merely because they incidentally serve terminal facilities, almost every
taxicab company in the United States would be subject to the Board's juris-
diction since to some extent they carry passengers to and from bus, railroad,
or air terminals, and undoubtedly in many instances they pay the terminal a
fee for the privilege of maintaining some stands on terminal property. The in-
dustry is essentially a local service industry and has been recognized as such
by State tribunals.10 The fact that a minor portion of Respondent' s normal
purchases originate outside the State does not, under all the circumstances,
warrant the assertion of jurisdiction here.n Nor does the fact that Respondent
9 In the Supreme Court's decision in the Yellow Cab case, it declined to dismiss that
portion of the complaint relating to the operations of the Parmelee Company which had
contracts with the railroads to transport passengers and their baggage between railroad
stations The Court stated that the transportation of passengers and their baggage be-
tween stations in Chicago under such an arrangement "is clearly a part of the stream
of interstate commerce."
10 See Ajax Transportation Co., N. Y. State L. R. Bd. 25 LRRM 1069; Penna. L. R. Bd. v.
Yellow Cab & Bus Co., Pa Ct. Com. Pis., 16 LRRM 539. 'J
11 In the Yellow Cab (Omaha ) case most of the products purchased by the Company
originated from out-of-State sources. As stated by the Board in the Chicago Motor Coach
Co. case , supra, where the Board declined to take jurisdiction although 50 percent of the
purchases were extrastate:
While the flow of such materials across State lines is a salient factor with respect
to manufacturing and distributing industries which are engaged in a business of
conveying or handling materials in the flow of interstate commerce, this aspect of
the case is only incidental to a business devoted entirely to transportation of pas-
sengers. Should such a factor be given controlling weight, it would be difficult to
conceive of even the smallest bus line or taxi company which would be outside the
scope of the Act unless , it 'appeared to be located in one of the petroleum producing
States. [ Emphasis supplied.]
CORNING GLASS WORKS 775
is affiliated with Yellow Cab Company of San Francisco, the Yellow Cab Com-
pany of Alameda, and the Airport Transit Corporation, warrant a different con-
clusion in view of the fact that all of these companies operate as separate enter=
prises and there is no showing of any integration of their labor relations.'2
Moreover, outside of the last-named Company, there is no showing that the
operations of these other companies affect commerce any more than do those of
the Respondent. In the opinion of the undersigned, Respondent is not engaged
in interstate commerce in any substantial sense and, while certain aspects
of its business may not be wholly unrelated to commerce, it is believed that
the effect of any labor dispute in this Company on interstate commerce would
be too remote to justify taking jurisdiction in this case.
After due deliberation, and for the reasons above stated, the undersigned be-
ing of the opinion, without otherwise considering the merits of the case, that
the complaint should be dismissed ; now, therefore,
IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's motions to dismiss the complaint
upon jurisdictional grounds be, and the same hereby are, granted ; and
IT Is HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint against Respondent
Yellow Cab Company of California, and Respondent Local 640, Chauffeurs
Union, Affiliated With the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America, A. F. of L., be, and the same hereby is,
dismissed.
Any party may obtain a review of the foregoing order, pursuant to Section
203.27 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, by
filing a request therefor with the Board stating the grounds for review, and
immediately on such filing serving a copy thereof on the Regional Director and
the other.parties. Unless such request for review is filed within ten (10) days
from the date of this order of dismissal , the case shall be closed.
JOHN LEwis,
Trial Exanviner.
Dated : April 11, 1950.
12 Whitfield d/b/a Whitfield Bus Lines , 88 NLRB 261 ; Acme Corruguated Box Co, 88
NLRB 96. It may be noted that a labor stoppage in the San Francisco and Alameda
operations in the preceding year had no effect whatsoever on the Los Angeles operation.
CORNING GLASS WORKS and FEDERATION OF GLASS, CERAMIC AND SILICA
SAND WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, PETITIONER. Case No. 7-RC-
1151. March 12, 1951
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Harold L. Hudson,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing
are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed." The Em-
1 The Employer moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Petitioner failed
to submit evidence of representation to complete its 30 percent showing within the 48-hour
period specified in the Board 's Statements of Procedure , Section 202 . 16. This motion is
denied As we have repeatedly stated, the adequacy of a showing of interest is a question
for administrative determination, not subject to direct or collateral attack. Stokely Foods,
Inc., 78 NLRB 842, and cases there - cited.
93 NLRB No. 121.