YADAPPANAVAR, Krishna et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 1, 2020

2019002993 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/973,781 12/20/2010 Krishna YADAPPANAVAR A517 2449
152569 7590 10/01/2020
Patterson + Sheridan, LLP - VMware
24 Greenway Plaza
Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77046
EXAMINER
GMAHL, NAVNEET K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2166
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipadmin@vmware.com
psdocketing@pattersonsheridan.com
vmware_admin@pattersonsheridan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KRISHNA YADAPPANAVAR and SATYAM B. VAGHANI
Appeal 2019-002993
Application 12/973,781
Technology Center 2100
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4 and 6–24. See Final Act. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as VMware, Inc.
(Appeal Br. 3).
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method of compressing individual blocks
of data associated with a file, into sub-blocks, according to a compression
type (Abstract). Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method of storing compressed data within a file system,
wherein data of files within the file system are stored in
blocks and sub-blocks, said method comprising:
selecting a first block of data of a file within the file system
for compression;
accessing a file descriptor of the file to identify an address
of the first block of data, wherein the file descriptor of the file is
stored in the file system separately from blocks and sub-blocks
that store data of the file and contains references to the blocks
containing uncompressed data and the sub-blocks containing
compressed data of the file;
compressing the first block of data according to a first
compression type;
allocating a first sub-block within the file system for
storing the compressed first block of data;
storing the compressed first block of data within the first
sub-block; and
updating the file descriptor of the file so that the address
of the first block of data is changed to an address of the first sub-
block, wherein a size of the first sub-block is smaller than a size
of the first block.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Name Reference Date
Dye US 6,879,266 B1 Apr. 12, 2005
Veeraswamy US 7,653,612 B1 Jan. 26, 2010
Throop US 8,478,731 B1 July 2, 2013

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REJECTIONS
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
1 – 4, 6 – 23 112, first paragraph
1 – 4, 7 –23 103(a) Dye, Veeraswamy
6, 24 103(a) Dye, Veeraswamy,
Throop

We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to
make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived
(See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)).
OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph: Claims 1–4 and 6–23
The Examiner determines claims 1–4 and 6–23 fail to comply with the
written description requirement (Final Act. 2–4). Specifically, the Examiner
determines the Specification describes “the file descriptor (inode) and how
[in] using the inode[,] the determination is made of the blocks and their
addresses to process for the compression or input/output function” (id. at 4).
However, the Examiner finds the Specification fails to “mention of wherein
the file descriptor of the file is stored in the file system separately from the
blocks and sub-blocks that store data associated with the file” (id.)
(emphasis omitted). The Examiner additionally points to our Decision of
June 2, 2016 in which the Board stated “[t]he Specification further does not
define explicitly an inode or more specifically, define an inode as requiring
separate storage from its associated data” (Decision of June 2, 2016, 5
(emphasis added)).
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Appellant argues claims 1–4 and 6–23 comply with the written
description requirement (Appeal Br. 8–10). Appellant identifies Figure 4
and paragraph 28 of the Specification as support that an ordinarily skilled
artisan “would recognize an inode as an example of a file descriptor”
(Appeal Br. 8–9). Appellant next asserts “[i]nodes are depicted and
described in the specification as being separate from the blocks that store
data” (id. at 9). Appellant points to description of Figure 3 and paragraph 46
(id.).
We are persuaded by Appellant’s contentions. In our previous
Decision, we stated the Specification does not require an inode have
separate storage from its associated data (Decision of June 2, 2016, 5).
However, the Specification provides examples of an inode being stored
separately from sub-blocks. Additionally, we agree with Appellant that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would understand an inode to be an example of a
file descriptor (Appeal Br. 9). Appellant’s Specification describes a detailed
view of file inode 310(0) (Spec. ¶ 28). We determine both the description in
the Specification and Figure 4A would be understood by an ordinarily
skilled artisan as teaching “the file descriptor of the file is stored in the file
system separately from the blocks and sub-blocks that store data of the file,”
as recited in independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in
independent claims 10 and 19.
Accordingly, Appellant has persuaded us independent claims 1, 10,
and 19 comply with the written description requirement under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Dependent claims 2–4, 6–9, 11–18, and
20–23 thus stand with their respective independent claims.

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35 U.S.C. § 103: Claims 1–4 and 7–23
Appellant contends their invention as recited in claims 1–4 and 7–23,
is not obvious over Dye and Veeraswamy (Appeal Br. 10–17). We agree
with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions and emphasize the following.
Independent Claim 1
Appellant argues independent claim 1 is not obvious over Dye and
Veeraswamy (id.). The issues presented by the arguments is whether the
combination of Dye and Veeraswamy teaches, suggests, or otherwise
renders obvious:
(i) “wherein data of files within the file system are stored in
blocks and sub-blocks”
(ii) “accessing a file descriptor of the file,” and
(iii) “wherein the file descriptor of the file is stored in the file
system separately from the blocks and sub-blocks that store
data of the file”
as recited in claim 1, and whether an ordinarily skilled artisan would have
found it obvious to combine the teachings and suggestions of Dye and
Veeraswamy (id.).

(i) wherein data of files within the file system are stored in blocks and
sub-blocks
The Examiner relies on Dye’s description to teach the disputed
limitation:
The compressed data directory 271 is used for look up of the
address block start location for one of the L3 data cache 291, the
SRAM buffers (located in the Parallel Compression and
Decompression unit 251) or the system memory 110. Thus, the
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compression control unit 281 receives requests from other units
in the IMC 140, translates the location by address, determines the
compression block size, and controls the sub-units of the memory
controller 220 for the proper address and data transactions as
required to read or write data to and from the main system
memory 110
(Ans. 5 (Dye, 19:2–12)).
Appellant first argues “[a] collection of blocks and sub-blocks does
not constitute a file system” (Appeal Br. 11). According to Appellant, Dye
fails to teach a “logical structure on data beyond the mere presence of
physical blocks of data” and thus, Dye’s memory device “simply stores
blocks of data at addresses within the memory device without any file
system, as that term is used in” the Specification (id.).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions. Initially, we note
Appellant provides no cites to the Specification or any other evidence to
support their assertion; thus, proffering only attorney argument.
Additionally, we note the Specification does not explicitly define “file
system” (see generally Spec.). The Specification does teach in one
embodiment “[f]ile system 115 contains a plurality of files of various types,
typically organized into one or more directories” (Spec. ¶ 18 (emphasis
added)). However, this description does not provide an explicit definition.
Appellant next argues Dye does not teach “storing compressed data
within a file system in blocks and sub-blocks” (Appeal Br. 11). According
to Appellant, “Dye uses the term ‘blocks’ to describe units of compressions
for data . . . not a block in a file system” (id. at 12).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions. Dye describes, for
example:
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First, main memory compression increases the effective
size of main memory by compressing and storing a large block
of data into a smaller space
(Dye, 4:4–6).
In the priority compression format, memory address blocks
assigned by the operating system for uncompressed data are used
to store the compressed data
(id. at 7:48–50). Dye further describes data is stored in blocks of data
(uncompressed data) and sub-blocks of data (compressed data) (Ans. 6–7
(Dye 19:1–12)). Thus, Appellant has not proffered sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us Dye fails to teach the disputed limitation.
Appellant further argues “[b]locks and sub-blocks of a file system
have a specific size dictated by the file system, whereas ‘blocks’ in Dye have
variable sizes” (Appeal Br. 12). Appellant has not proffered sufficient
evidence or argument to persuade us blocks and sub-blocks have a specific
size or a fixed size. Indeed, Appellant identifies no disclosure in the
Specification to support this assertion nor does Appellant provide any
evidence that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand a file system to
have blocks and sub-blocks of a specific size (see generally Appeal Br. 11–
13). In particular, the Specification provides no explicit definition of either
term, “block” or “sub-block” (see generally Spec.). The claim recites
compressing a block of data and storing the compressed block of data within
a sub-block, “wherein a size of the first sub-block is smaller than a size of
the first block” (Claim1) but does not recite a specific size. Thus,
Appellant’s contention is not persuasive.
Next, Appellant contends “[t]he ‘blocks’ in Dye are not part of a file
system . . ., but are merely stored at an address of a memory device and not
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referenced by an inode” (Appeal Br. 12). As noted supra, the term “file
system” is not defined explicitly; rather, a description teaches a file system
“contains a plurality of files of various types, typically organized into one or
more directories” (Spec. ¶ 18). Appellant has not proffered sufficient
evidence or argument to persuade us Dye fails to disclose the recited
limitation.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant contends Dye’s “compressed data
directory 271 . . . at best indicates the starting address locations of hardware
components of the computing system, such as a data cache, buffers, and
system memory” (Reply Br. 3). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contentions. Dye describes the compressed data directory “is used for look
up of address block start location” for the various hardware components;
however, Dye further describes determining the proper address required to
read or write data (Dye, 19:2–12). Thus, we are not persuaded this
disclosure would be understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan to mean “the
memory device in Dye simply stores blocks of data at addresses within the
memory device without any file system, as that term is used in the
Appellant’s application” (Reply Br. 4) (emphasis added). As discussed
supra, Appellant has not set forth how or where “file system” is defined
explicitly in the Specification or even pointed out where “file system” is
described in the Specification. “Argument in the brief does not take the
place of evidence in the record” (In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA
1965) (citing In re Cole, 326 F.2d 769, 773 (CCPA 1964))). Accordingly,
Appellant has not persuaded us Dye fails to teach “wherein data of files
within the file system are stored in blocks and sub-blocks,” as recited in
claim 1.
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(ii) “accessing a file descriptor of the file”
Appellant argues:
Appellant respectfully submits that Dye does not teach accessing
a file descriptor of a file, as disclosed in the present application.
The address bus in Dye may not be identified as a file descriptor,
because a simple address bus, such as that in Dye, does not
reference blocks of a file system. No person of skill in the art
would identify an address bus as an inode or file descriptor
(Appeal Br. 13). Appellant provides no cites or evidence and proffers
insufficient argument to persuade us Dye fails to disclose “accessing a file
descriptor of the file” (id.). Moreover, upon a cursory inspection of the
Specification, we are unable to find any explicit definition or discussion of a
file descriptor (see generally Spec.).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant repeats the argument discussed above,
that the compressed data director “indicates the starting address locations of
hardware components of the computing system” and “is not a descriptor of a
file” (Reply Br. 4). However, the Examiner additionally relies on Dye’s
Figures 21–25 as teaching this limitation. Appellant has not addressed this
disclosure. Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that Dye
fails to teach “accessing a file descriptor of the file,” as recited in claim 1.

(iii) “wherein the file descriptor of the file is stored in the file system
separately from the blocks and sub-blocks that store data of the file”
Appellant contends that “Veeraswamy does not teach a file descriptor
being stored separately from the blocks and sub-blocks of a file system
because the shallow file is not an inode or file descriptor” (Appeal Br. 13).
According to Appellant,
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Veeraswamy teaches a shallow file to contain “data block
mapping metadata of a primary file containing the electronic
document” so that the “file system manager” can back up data by
using the “data block mapping metadata to access directly the
data blocks of the primary file in storage.” But, even though the
shallow files contain data block mapping metadata and link
target addresses, the shallow files are files and not inodes or file
descriptors and, in fact, have their own inodes. To claim
otherwise is to misread the clear teachings of the reference, i.e.,
that inodes and files are different entities.
(id. (citing Veeraswamy, 1:48–63, 7:21–32) (citations omitted)).
Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the claim language. Indeed,
the claim language does not prohibit different files: “wherein the file
descriptor of the file is stored in the file system separately from blocks and
sub-blocks that store data of the file” (see Claim 1). Veeraswamy teaches
“[t]he shallow file includes the data block mapping metadata of a primary
file containing the electronic document but not the data blocks of the
primary file. Instead the shallow file includes a link to the primary file”
(Veeraswamy, 1:57–60). Appellant contends the shallow file is not a file
descriptor (id.). As set forth supra, Appellant has not shown the term “file
descriptor” is defined explicitly in the Specification or shown any use of the
term in the Specification.
Appellant is reminded that a general allegation as to the purported
benefits of the claimed invention, and a general discussion of the prior art
relied upon by the Examiner in the rejection, are not tantamount to a
responsive argument. Such a response to the Examiner’s findings is
insufficient to persuade us of Examiner error, as mere attorney arguments
and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are
entitled to little probative value (In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed.
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Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that
the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art.”); cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater
detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over
the prior art.”)).
Appellant has not persuaded us the combination of Dye and
Veeraswamy fails to teach or suggest “wherein the file descriptor of the file
is stored in the file system separately from the blocks and sub-blocks that
store data of the file,” as recited in claim 1.
(iv) Motivation to combine
Appellant argues “(a) Veeraswamy and Dye do not appear to be in the
same field of art and . . . (b) the teachings of the two references conflict with
each other” (Appeal Br. 14). According to Appellant, the two references
do not appear to solve the same problem. Dye is in the field of
compression in volatile memory while Veeraswamy is in the field
of backing up files without interfering with a user's access of the
file. In addition, Dye gives no reason to use a shallow file to back
up memory data and Veeraswamy gives no reason to apply a
shallow file to volatile memory. Therefore, one of skill in the art
would not have combined Veeraswamy with Dye.
(Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 5). A reference qualifies as prior art for a
determination under § 103 when it is analogous to the claimed invention (In
re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). “Two separate tests define the
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scope of analogous art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of
endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not
within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is
involved” (In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). “A reference
is reasonably pertinent if . . . it is one which, because of the matter with
which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s
attention in considering his problem” (Clay, 966 F.2d at 659).
The Examiner has set forth that the references are in the same field of
study ––“intelligent storage using compression” –– as the present application
(Final Act. 7). Appellant would define the field of study of each reference
more narrowly than that set forth by the Examiner (Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br.
5). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention. We agree with the
Examiner that the current application is directed toward intelligent storage
through use of block compression (Spec., ¶ 1, Title). We further agree that
Dye describes a “memory module including parallel data compression and
decompression engines for improved performance” (Dye, Abstract) ––
intelligent storage using compression. Veeraswamy is directed to “file
systems . . . and data protection services that use shared access to a file in
order to protect computer data stored in the file” in a data processing system
(Veeraswamy, 1:6–11). The data protection services may include
compression (id. at 1:31–34). Thus, Veeraswamy is also directed to
intelligent storage using compression. Accordingly, we determine the art,
Dye and Veeraswamy, are from the same field of endeavor.
The Examiner points to the Abstract of Veeraswamy to support the
contention an ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined the teachings
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of Veeraswamy and Dye. Appellant’s contends “Dye gives no reason to use
a shallow file to back up memory data and Veeraswamy gives no reason to
apply a shallow file to volatile memory” (Appeal Br. 14). Appellant proffers
insufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
findings. In particular, Appellant provides insufficient evidence that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would not have combined Veeraswamy’s teaching
of using a shallow file to Dye’s system.
(v) Conclusion
Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Dye and Veeraswamy teaches or suggests the limitations as
recited in independent claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim
1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Dye and Veeraswamy.
Independent Claim 10
Appellant argues Dye and Veeraswamy fail to teach the elements of
claim 10 and, in particular, “wherein data of files in the file system are
stored in blocks and sub-blocks,” “accessing a file descriptor of the file,”
and “wherein the file descriptor of the file is stored in the file system
separately from the blocks and sub-blocks that store data of the file” (Appeal
Br. 15–16). For the reasons discussed supra, Appellant has not persuaded us
the combination of Dye and Veeraswamy fails to teach these elements.
Appellant additionally contends the combination fails to teach
“dividing the first block of data into a plurality of substreams [and]
compressing each substream included in the plurality of substreams” and
“storing each compressed substeam into a different portion of a first sub-
block,” as recited in claim 10.
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(i) “dividing the first block of data into a plurality of substreams [and]
compressing each substream included in the plurality of substreams”
The Examiner finds Dye teaches the disputed element (Final Act. 10–
11 (citing Dye, 19:6–12, 45:13–40)).
Appellant contends Dye fails to teach the disputed limitation; rather,
“Dye merely teaches compressing all the data of a memory transaction. As
such, the invention in Dye does not provide the advantage of a processor
compressing a portion of data while not compressing other portions”
(Appeal Br. 15). Appellant is arguing limitations not recited in the claim.
The claim limitation does not preclude compressing all data of a memory
transaction.
Appellant additionally contends:
Dye teaches a memory device receiving data from a requesting
agent before compressing the received data in its entirety. The
data is stored in a memory device and not in sub-streams of a file
system. As such, when a memory transaction occurs in Dye,
there is not motivation for a processor to divide the data of the
transaction into substreams and to individually compress those
substreams
(Appeal Br. 15–16). Again, Appellant provides no cites nor does Appellant
specifically address the Examiner’s findings set forth in the Final Action
(id.). The Examiner further cites additional description of Dye in the
Answer (Ans. 7–8), including that Dye teaches a compression reordering
algorithm in which “the block is reordered so that the segment(s) most likely
to be accessed in the future, e.g., most recently used, are placed in the front
of the block” (Dye, 8:14–35) and techniques of Memory F/X Technology
(Ans. 8 (citing Dye, 7:8–19)). Appellant does not address the Examiner’s
findings, but rather, repeats the contentions set forth in the Appeal Brief
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(Reply Br. 6). Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us Dye fails to
teach the disputed limitation.

(ii) “storing each compressed substream into a different portion of a first
sub-block”
The Examiner cites Dye as teaching the disputed element (Final Act.
11 (citing Dye, 22:36–62, 29:64–30:13, 35:61–64, 36:16–31); Ans. 8 (citing
Dye 19:1–12)).
Appellant argues “storing compressed data at different addresses of a
memory device is different from storing substreams of compressed data into
different sub-blocks of a storage device” (Appeal Br. 16). According to
Appellant, Dye fails to teach “storing those compressed substreams into the
same sub-block, the substreams having originated from the same block of
file data” (id.). We are not persuaded. Again, Appellant provides no cites
but rather provides conclusory arguments in response to the cited teachings
of Dye. Indeed, the Examiner has set forth specific teachings which
Appellant has not addressed. Moreover, we note that Dye teaches reordering
of a block so that the segment most likely to be accessed is placed in the
front of the block (Ans. 7 (citing Dye, 8:14–35)). Thus, the segments of a
block (compressed substream) are stored into a different portion of the block
(sub-block). Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us Dye fails to teach
the disputed limitation.
(iii) Conclusion
Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding Dye and
Veeraswamy fail to teach or suggest claim 10.
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Independent Claim 19
Appellant argues claim 19 based on the same arguments set forth with
respect to claim 1 (Appeal Br. 16–17). For the reasons set forth supra,
Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions. Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us the combination
of Dye and Veeraswamy fails to teach or suggest the limitations as recited in
independent claim 19.

Dependent Claims 2–4, 7–9, 11–18, and 20–23
Dependent claims 2–4, 7–9, 11–18, and 20–23 are not separately
argued and thus, these claims fall with their respective independent claims.

Conclusion
Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Dye and Veeraswamy teaches or suggests the limitations as
recited in claims 1–4 and 7–23. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims
1–4 and 7–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Dye and
Veeraswamy.
35 U.S.C. § 103: Claims 6 and 24
Appellants contend their invention as recited in claims 6 and 24, is not
obvious over Dye, Veeraswamy, and Throop (Appeal Br. 11).
Claim 24
Appellant argues Dye, Veeraswamy, and Throop fails to teach claim
24 (Appeal Br. 17–18). The issue presented by the arguments is whether the
combination of Dye, Veeraswamy, and Throop teaches, suggests, or
otherwise renders obvious “storing the compressed first block of data within
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the first sub-block” and “the file descriptor containing references to blocks
containing uncompressed data and sub-blocks containing compressed data.”
Appellant argues these elements based on the arguments set forth with
respect to claim 1 (id.). For the reasons set forth supra, Appellant has not
persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Dye and
Veeraswamy teaches the disputed limitations.
Appellant further argues Dye fails to teach “wherein the reference to
the first block of data is updated to refer to the first sub-block,” as recited in
claim 24 (Appeal Br. 18). Specifically, Appellant argues “in none of the
cited portions of Dye is there a teaching of updating a reference to a block to
refer to a sub-block” (id.).
The Examiner finds Dye teaches the disputed limitation (Final Act. 20
(citing Dye, 22:36–62, 29:64–30:13, 35:61–64, 36:16–31); Ans. 11 (citing
(Dye, 7:8–19, 8:4–14, 35:61–64, 36:27–31, 38:57–59, 38:10–27, Fig. 21)).
Appellant has not addressed the Examiner’s findings. Again,
Appellant provides no cites but rather sets forth attorney argument without
persuasive evidence or argument. For example, the Examiner cites to Dye to
teach compressing data and writing back a pointer to the compressed data
block (Ans. 11 (Dye, 38:10–27)), but Appellant does not distinguish this
teaching from the limitation “wherein the reference to the first block of data
is updated to refer to the first sub-block,” as recited in claim 24.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention.
Claim 6
Claim 6 is not argued separately. Claim 6 depends from independent
claim 1 and thus, falls with independent claim 1. Therefore, for the reasons
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set forth supra, Appellant has not persuaded us the combination of Dye,
Veeraswamy, and Throop fails to teach claim 6.
Conclusion
Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Dye, Veeraswamy, and Throop teaches or suggests the
limitations as recited in claims 6 and 24. Therefore, we sustain the rejection
of claims 6 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Dye,
Veeraswamy, and Throop.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection is AFFIRMED.
More specifically, we affirm the rejections of claims 1–4 and 6–24 for
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We, however, reverse the rejection of
claims 1–4 and 6–23 as failing to comply with the written description
requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6–23 112, first
paragraph
1–4, 6–23
1–4, 7–23 103(a) Dye, Veeraswamy 1–4, 7–23
6, 24 103(a) Dye, Veeraswamy,
Throop
6, 24
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–24

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED