Xin FengDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 30, 201913919492 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/919,492 06/17/2013 Xin Feng RPS920130038USNP(710.235) 6299 58127 7590 09/30/2019 FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC 409 BROAD STREET PITTSBURGH, PA 15143 EXAMINER SCHNIREL, ANDREW B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2625 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/30/2019 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte XIN FENG ________________ Appeal 2018-009011 Application 13/919,492 Technology Center 2600 ________________ Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and BARBARA A. BENOIT, Administrative Patent Judges. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–10, and 12–19. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 1, 4, 5, 7–10, 13, 14, and 16–19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Nakanishi (US 2010/0238129 A1; Sept. 23, 2010) and Burrough (US 2010/0156818 A1; June 24, 2010). Final Act. 3–14. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Lenovo (Singapore) PTE. LTD. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2018-009011 Application 13/919,492 2 Claims 3, 6, 12, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Nakanishi, Burrough, and Shahoian (US 2008/0062145 A1; Mar. 13, 2008). Final Act. 14–18. We reverse. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention relates to “dynamic tactile feedback that assists users in operating complex touch surfaces (e.g., those including virtual buttons and/or icons and/or lacking distinct physical borders) without encumbering the user with unnecessary tactile feedback such as a fixed landmark.” Spec. ¶ 23. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below, with the key limitations emphasized: 1. An information handling device, comprising: a touch sensitive surface; one or more processors; a memory device storing instructions accessible to the one or more processors, the instructions being executable by the one or more processors to: detect one or more non-operational touch inputs to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas within the touch sensitive surface; map the one or more non-operational touch inputs to a predetermined haptic effect, wherein the predetermined haptic effect is based upon a context determined from an input type of the one or more non-operational touch inputs; and provide the predetermined haptic effect via a haptic layer of the touch sensitive surface. Appeal 2018-009011 Application 13/919,492 3 PRINCIPLES OF LAW We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). ANALYSIS THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 4, 5, 7–10, 13, 14, AND 16–19 OVER NAKANISHI AND BURROUGH Contentions The Examiner finds Nakanishi and Burrough teach all limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 3–5. In particular, the Examiner finds Nakanishi teaches most limitations of claim 1 including “detect one or more non-operational touch inputs . . . to the touch sensitive surface” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 4 (citing Nakanishi Figure 9, ¶ 131; Figure 2, Element 262, ¶ 42). In particular, the Examiner finds Burrough teaches “non-operational touch inputs to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas within the touch sensitive surface,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 4 (citing Burrough Figures 6–8B, ¶¶ 74–76). In particular, the Examiner finds Burrough teaches “wherein the predetermined haptic effect is based upon a context determined from an input type of the one or more non-operational touch inputs,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 4–5 (citing Burrough Figures 6–9, ¶¶ 74–77). Regarding this finding, the Examiner explains Burrough et al. discloses that the haptic elements can include a first type of active button icon 602, haptic active slider icon 604 having mobile slider elements 606, keypad 608 formed of a Appeal 2018-009011 Application 13/919,492 4 number of second type haptic active buttons 610. The examiner notes that Figures 7 - 8B are based on a first and second type haptic button icon, where Figures 9A and 9B show a haptic response for a “slide type” input type that will include a different haptic profile (See Figures 8B and 9B). Final Act. 4–5. The Examiner reasons it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify the haptic feedback device of Nakanishi et al. with the haptic profile of Burrough et al. The motivation to modify the teachings of Nakanishi et al. with the teachings of Burrough et al. is to help “lead” a user to a predefined area, as taught by Burrough et al. (Paragraph 76). Final Act. 5. Among other arguments, Appellant presents the following principal arguments: i. [Appellant] respectfully submits that the fact that Burrough teaches that essentially no haptic effect is provided to a boundary area does not explain why one skilled in the art would combine such a teaching with the device of Nakanishi which allegedly teaches that non-operational touch inputs are mapped to a predetermined haptic effect. App. Br. 17–18; see also App. Br. 19 (“Burrough and Nakanishi are directed to completely separate problems and therefore are directed to completely separate solutions.”); Reply Br. 19–21. ii. “Nakanishi teaches a singular haptic feedback to indicate to the user (e.g., automobile driver) that the user is outside of a functional zone.” App. Br. 19. Burrough teaches that haptic effect is quiescent in the space between controls, Burrough at FIG. 8A, and moreover teaches use of haptic effect to denote the controls, not the border there- Appeal 2018-009011 Application 13/919,492 5 between. Thus, Burrough, like Nakanishi, at best teaches that little or no haptic effect is provided between the buttons. App. Br. 20; see also Reply Br. 21–22. In response, the Examiner explains “the haptic profile of Burrough et al., not just the quiescent state between buttons, is modifying the haptic feedback device of Nakanishi et al.” Ans. 18. “[T]he advantage of modifying the haptic feedback device of Nakanishi et al. with the haptic profile of Burrough et al. would provide the advantage of helping ‘lead’ a user to a predefined area.” Ans. 19; see also Ans. 19–20 (“the evidentiary support for modifying the haptic feedback device of Nakanishi et al. with the haptic profile of Burrough et al. is taken straight from Burrough et al.”). The Examiner further explains it is clear to see from Figure 6 - 9 and the above disclosure that Burrough et al. intends to have several haptic elements (context determined from the input type) on the same device that will each have their own haptic profile (predetermined haptic effect determined from the input type). Ans. 21. Our Review The key limitations require “detect[ing] one or more non-operational touch inputs to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas.” Further, the key limitations require “map[ping] the one or more non- operational touch inputs to a predetermined haptic effect . . . based upon a context determined from an input type.” Thus, the key limitations require a non-operational input to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas to cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the context. Appeal 2018-009011 Application 13/919,492 6 The Examiner finds Nakanishi does not teach “detect[ing] one or more non-operational touch inputs to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 4; see also Nakanishi ¶ 131 (“[T]he vibration control part 207 may vibrate the vibration part 272 with the vibration pattern to notify the operator of the error when the operator presses the point outside of the domain 910.”). Thus, Nakanashi does not teach a non-operational input to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas to cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the context as required by the key limitations. Burrough, in Figure 8B, depicts a haptic response as being in its quiescent state when a touch input is in an area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas. According to Burrough, “in the region between button elements 602, the user’s finger would be moving across a portion of surface 126 associated with a quiescent haptic response. By quiescent it is meant that the user would feel little or no haptic effects.” Burrough ¶ 76. Even if Burrough teaches a non-operational touch input to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas, Burrough does not teach a non- operational input to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas to cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the context as required by the key limitations. Thus, we are persuaded by Appellant’s argument (ii) that in both Nakanishi and Burrough, no haptic effect is provided between the buttons as required by the key limitations. Further, regarding the collective teachings of the references, on the record before us, we do not see sufficient reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why the collective teachings of the references would have suggested a non-operational input to a border area dividing two touch Appeal 2018-009011 Application 13/919,492 7 sensitive sub-areas to cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the context as required by the key limitations. The Examiner reasons that, when modified based on Burrough, Nakanishi would “help ‘lead’ a user to a predefined area.” Final Act. 5; see also Ans. 19–20. This reasoning does not sufficiently explain why a skilled artisan would have provided a non-operational input to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas to cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the context as required by the key limitations. Put another way, the combination has the same deficiency as the individual references—we see no explanation on the record as to why a non-operational input to a border area dividing two sub-areas would have provided a haptic response. We only see Burrough’s quiescent response to such an input. Thus, we are also persuaded by Appellant’s argument (i). We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 5 and 7–9, which depend from claim 1. Independent claim 10 recites the same key limitations. We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10. We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 13, 14, and 16–18, which depend from claim 10. Independent claim 19 recites the same key limitations. We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19. Appeal 2018-009011 Application 13/919,492 8 THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 3, 6, 12, AND 15 OVER NAKANISHI, BURROUGH, AND SHAHOIAN Claims 3 and 6 depend from claim 1. Claims 12 and 15 depend from claim 10. The Examiner’s further findings do not cure the deficiency discussed above with respect to claims 1 and 10. See Final Act. 14–18. We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 6, 12, and 15. ORDER The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–10, and 12–19 is reversed. REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation