Xin Feng

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2019

13919492 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/919,492 06/17/2013 Xin Feng RPS920130038USNP(710.235) 6299
58127 7590 09/30/2019
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 BROAD STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15143
EXAMINER
SCHNIREL, ANDREW B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte XIN FENG
________________

Appeal 2018-009011
Application 13/919,492
Technology Center 2600
________________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
BARBARA A. BENOIT, Administrative Patent Judges.

CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 3–10, and 12–19. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 1, 4, 5, 7–10, 13, 14, and 16–19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Nakanishi (US 2010/0238129 A1; Sept. 23, 2010) and
Burrough (US 2010/0156818 A1; June 24, 2010). Final Act. 3–14.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Lenovo (Singapore) PTE. LTD. as the
real party in interest. App. Br. 3.

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Application 13/919,492

2
Claims 3, 6, 12, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over Nakanishi, Burrough, and Shahoian (US 2008/0062145 A1; Mar. 13,
2008). Final Act. 14–18.
We reverse.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to “dynamic tactile feedback that assists
users in operating complex touch surfaces (e.g., those including virtual
buttons and/or icons and/or lacking distinct physical borders) without
encumbering the user with unnecessary tactile feedback such as a fixed
landmark.” Spec. ¶ 23. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below, with
the key limitations emphasized:
1. An information handling device, comprising:
a touch sensitive surface;
one or more processors;
a memory device storing instructions accessible to the one or more
processors, the instructions being executable by the one or more processors
to:
detect one or more non-operational touch inputs to a border area
dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas within the touch sensitive surface;
map the one or more non-operational touch inputs to a predetermined
haptic effect, wherein the predetermined haptic effect is based upon a
context determined from an input type of the one or more non-operational
touch inputs; and
provide the predetermined haptic effect via a haptic layer of the touch
sensitive surface.
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).

ANALYSIS
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 4, 5, 7–10, 13, 14, AND 16–19
OVER NAKANISHI AND BURROUGH
Contentions
The Examiner finds Nakanishi and Burrough teach all limitations of
claim 1. Final Act. 3–5.
In particular, the Examiner finds Nakanishi teaches most limitations
of claim 1 including “detect one or more non-operational touch inputs . . . to
the touch sensitive surface” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 4 (citing
Nakanishi Figure 9, ¶ 131; Figure 2, Element 262, ¶ 42).
In particular, the Examiner finds Burrough teaches “non-operational
touch inputs to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas within
the touch sensitive surface,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 4 (citing
Burrough Figures 6–8B, ¶¶ 74–76).
In particular, the Examiner finds Burrough teaches “wherein the
predetermined haptic effect is based upon a context determined from an
input type of the one or more non-operational touch inputs,” as recited in
claim 1. Final Act. 4–5 (citing Burrough Figures 6–9, ¶¶ 74–77). Regarding
this finding, the Examiner explains
Burrough et al. discloses that the haptic elements can include a
first type of active button icon 602, haptic active slider icon 604
having mobile slider elements 606, keypad 608 formed of a
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number of second type haptic active buttons 610. The examiner
notes that Figures 7 - 8B are based on a first and second type
haptic button icon, where Figures 9A and 9B show a haptic
response for a “slide type” input type that will include a different
haptic profile (See Figures 8B and 9B).
Final Act. 4–5.
The Examiner reasons
it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art
to modify the haptic feedback device of Nakanishi et al. with the
haptic profile of Burrough et al. The motivation to modify the
teachings of Nakanishi et al. with the teachings of Burrough et
al. is to help “lead” a user to a predefined area, as taught by
Burrough et al. (Paragraph 76).
Final Act. 5.
Among other arguments, Appellant presents the following principal
arguments:
i.
[Appellant] respectfully submits that the fact that Burrough
teaches that essentially no haptic effect is provided to a boundary
area does not explain why one skilled in the art would combine
such a teaching with the device of Nakanishi which allegedly
teaches that non-operational touch inputs are mapped to a
predetermined haptic effect.
App. Br. 17–18; see also App. Br. 19 (“Burrough and Nakanishi are directed
to completely separate problems and therefore are directed to completely
separate solutions.”); Reply Br. 19–21.
ii. “Nakanishi teaches a singular haptic feedback to indicate to the
user (e.g., automobile driver) that the user is outside of a functional zone.”
App. Br. 19.
Burrough teaches that haptic effect is quiescent in the space
between controls, Burrough at FIG. 8A, and moreover teaches
use of haptic effect to denote the controls, not the border there-
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between. Thus, Burrough, like Nakanishi, at best teaches that
little or no haptic effect is provided between the buttons.
App. Br. 20; see also Reply Br. 21–22.
In response, the Examiner explains “the haptic profile of Burrough et
al., not just the quiescent state between buttons, is modifying the haptic
feedback device of Nakanishi et al.” Ans. 18. “[T]he advantage of modifying
the haptic feedback device of Nakanishi et al. with the haptic profile of
Burrough et al. would provide the advantage of helping ‘lead’ a user to a
predefined area.” Ans. 19; see also Ans. 19–20 (“the evidentiary support for
modifying the haptic feedback device of Nakanishi et al. with the haptic
profile of Burrough et al. is taken straight from Burrough et al.”).
The Examiner further explains
it is clear to see from Figure 6 - 9 and the above disclosure that
Burrough et al. intends to have several haptic elements (context
determined from the input type) on the same device that will each
have their own haptic profile (predetermined haptic effect
determined from the input type).
Ans. 21.

Our Review
The key limitations require “detect[ing] one or more non-operational
touch inputs to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas.”
Further, the key limitations require “map[ping] the one or more non-
operational touch inputs to a predetermined haptic effect . . . based upon a
context determined from an input type.” Thus, the key limitations require a
non-operational input to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas
to cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the context.
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The Examiner finds Nakanishi does not teach “detect[ing] one or
more non-operational touch inputs to a border area dividing two touch
sensitive sub-areas” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 4; see also
Nakanishi ¶ 131 (“[T]he vibration control part 207 may vibrate the vibration
part 272 with the vibration pattern to notify the operator of the error when
the operator presses the point outside of the domain 910.”). Thus, Nakanashi
does not teach a non-operational input to a border area dividing two touch
sensitive sub-areas to cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the
context as required by the key limitations.
Burrough, in Figure 8B, depicts a haptic response as being in its
quiescent state when a touch input is in an area dividing two touch sensitive
sub-areas. According to Burrough, “in the region between button elements
602, the user’s finger would be moving across a portion of surface 126
associated with a quiescent haptic response. By quiescent it is meant that the
user would feel little or no haptic effects.” Burrough ¶ 76.
Even if Burrough teaches a non-operational touch input to a border
area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas, Burrough does not teach a non-
operational input to a border area dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas to
cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the context as required by
the key limitations. Thus, we are persuaded by Appellant’s argument (ii) that
in both Nakanishi and Burrough, no haptic effect is provided between the
buttons as required by the key limitations.
Further, regarding the collective teachings of the references, on the
record before us, we do not see sufficient reasoning with a rational
underpinning as to why the collective teachings of the references would have
suggested a non-operational input to a border area dividing two touch
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sensitive sub-areas to cause a predetermined haptic effect based upon the
context as required by the key limitations.
The Examiner reasons that, when modified based on Burrough,
Nakanishi would “help ‘lead’ a user to a predefined area.” Final Act. 5; see
also Ans. 19–20. This reasoning does not sufficiently explain why a skilled
artisan would have provided a non-operational input to a border area
dividing two touch sensitive sub-areas to cause a predetermined haptic effect
based upon the context as required by the key limitations. Put another way,
the combination has the same deficiency as the individual references—we
see no explanation on the record as to why a non-operational input to a
border area dividing two sub-areas would have provided a haptic response.
We only see Burrough’s quiescent response to such an input. Thus, we are
also persuaded by Appellant’s argument (i).
We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. We
also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 5 and 7–9, which
depend from claim 1.
Independent claim 10 recites the same key limitations. We, therefore,
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10. We also do not sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 13, 14, and 16–18, which depend from
claim 10.
Independent claim 19 recites the same key limitations. We, therefore,
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19.

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Application 13/919,492

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THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 3, 6, 12, AND 15 OVER NAKANISHI,
BURROUGH, AND SHAHOIAN
Claims 3 and 6 depend from claim 1. Claims 12 and 15 depend from
claim 10. The Examiner’s further findings do not cure the deficiency
discussed above with respect to claims 1 and 10. See Final Act. 14–18.
We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 6,
12, and 15.

ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–10, and 12–19 is
reversed.

REVERSED