Worthington Pump and Machinery Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 19, 1952

99 N.L.R.B. 189 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

WORTHINGTON PUMP AND MACHINERY CORPORATION 189
WE WILL NOT engage in any acts in any manner interfering with
the efforts of TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS , LOCAL UNION No. 144, A. F.. L., to negotiate for, or
represent, the employees in the bargaining unit described above.
MID-CONTINENT PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
Employer.
By ----------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
WORTHINGTON PUMP AND MACHINERY CORPORATION and INTERNA-
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF FIREMEN , OILERS, HELPERS AND MAIN-'
TENANCE MEN, LOCAL 55, PETITIONER . Cases Nos. KC-2433 and
2-RC-3198. May 19,1952
Supplemental Decision and Order
On February 28, 1951, the Board issued its Decision and Direction
of Elections in the instant case, finding that the contract 1 between the
Employer and the United Steelworkers of America, CIO, and its
Local No. 1833, herein referred to jointly as the Intervenors and
separately as the International Union and Local No. 1833, contained
an unlawful union-security clause and therefore was not a bar to the
proceedings.2 In so deciding, the Board found it unnecessary to pass
upon the other contract bar issues involved in the case . On March
20,1951, the Board denied the motions of the Employer and the Inter-
venors to reconsider its decision. On March 30, 1951, elections were
held; the Petitioner obtained a majority of the valid votes cast in the
two units found appropriate, one consisting of powerhouse employees,
the other of yard service employees. As the result of court litigation
instituted thereafter by the Employer challenging the legality of the
Board's holding that the contract was not a bar; the Petitioner was
not certi-ied.
On December 31, 1951, the Board issued its decision in Charles A.
Krause Milling Co., holding that the Worthington Pmrip decision
'The contract in question , dated June 15, 1950, was for a 2 -year term , with a 60-day
automatic renewal clause.
2 93 NLRB 527.
8 97 F. Supp. 656 ( D. C. S. D . N. Y.).
' 97 NLRB 536.
99 NLRB No. 24.
190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "
was erroneous to the extent that it had held that a union-security
contract is not a bar unless it provides a 30-day grace period for
employees who were members of the union on the effective date of
the contract. On January 22, 1952, the Board issued a notice to
show cause in the instant proceeding, affording all parties an oppor-
tunity to show :
why the Board should not reconsider its finding that the con-
tract is not a bar in the light of [Krause Milling] and why it
should not take such action on the record in this proceeding, as
may be appropriate.
On March 11, 1952, the Board's Executive Secretary informed the
parties by letter that the notice to show cause embraced not only
reconsideration of the Board's decision in the light of the Krause
Milling holding, but also "all other aspects of the contract bar issue
raised and litigated in this proceeding." All parties filed replies.
As the record, briefs, and replies to the notice to show cause adequately
present the issues involved, the requests for oral argument by the
Petitioner and the Employer are hereby denied.
Upon the entire record in this case, the briefs, and the replies to
the show cause notice, the Board makes the following supplemental
findings :
1. The Petitioner opposes application of the rule in Krause Milling,
on the ground that its certification is mandatory following the results
of the elections. However, certification is not a ministerial act,
and the Board may refuse to certify a successful union where, upon
its own motion or other proper procedures, the legality of any stage
in a representation proceeding is called into question.5 As certifica-
tion has not issued herein, the question concerning representation has
not been finally determined and remains subject to reconsideration.
In view of our express reversal in Krause Milling of the basis for
the original 1951 finding that the contract herein involved was not
a bar, failure now to reconsider our decision in the light of present
policy would serve to perpetuate an error. Accordingly, we shall
apply the Krause Milling rule herein. The union-security clause
of the existing contract is therefore found to be valid, and the contract
a bar to the two petitions herein on that ground.
We must next ascertain whether the Petitioner's requests for recog-
nition were timely made with respect to the execution date of the
contract. The history of bargaining between the Intervenors and
the Employer discloses that from 1942 contracts were entered into
by the "United Steelworkers of America, C. I. 0., on behalf of" Local
5 See Inland Empire District Council v. Millis , 825 U . S. 698, 707; Warehouaemen's
Union v . N. L. R. B ., 12' F. 2d 84 , 94, cert. den., 314 U . S. 674.
WORTHINGTON PUMP AND MACHINERY CORPORATION 191
Union No. 1833. The contracts were signed by the president and
secretary-treasurer of the International Union, officials of Local Union
No. 1833, and the director and the representative of District No. 2
of the International Union. The constitution of the International
Union provides that the International Union shall be the contracting
party in all collective bargaining agreements and that such agree-
ments shall be signed by the International officers defined as the
president, secretary-treasurer, and vice president.
Beginning in April 1950 negotiations on the terms of a new con-
tract were conducted for the Intervenors by the negotiating com-
mittee of Local No. 1833 and a representative of the International
Union assigned to District No. 2. An agreement incorporating the
changes made in the prior contract was initialled on June 13 by the
employer representative, Local Union No. 1833 officials, and the Inter-
national Union representative, and was ratified by the employees at
a union meeting . On June 14' copies of the contract were made and
on June 15 the contract was formally' signed by the individuals who
had previously affixed their initials. Later the same afternoon, the
'district director of the International Union added his 'signature tQ
the contract and sent it to the headquarters of the International Uniort
for signature by the International Union officers. In accordance with
past practice, the Employer placed in effect the changes called for by
the new contract on June 15, the expiration date of the previous coil
tract, without waiting for the signatures of the International Union
officers. Sometime in June the contract was returned signed by the
International Union president and secretary-treasurer.
On June 14 the Petitioner made a telephonic request 'upon the
Employer for recognition on behalf of the powerhouse employees, and
filed its petition for this unit late in the afternoon of June 15.
The Petitioner contends that no validly executed contract existed
until signed by the International Union officers, and therefore that
its oral request of June 14, followed by the filing of a petition on
June 15, prevented the subsequent contract from being a bar. The
Employer and the Intervenors maintain that'there' existed an agree-`
ment on June 13 which was adequate to bar the petition.
The Board has held that later execution of a formal instrument
does not impair the contractual validity of an informal but written
and signed record of the entire understanding between the parties,
and further, that the signatures may be adequately subscribed by the
use of initials." In the circumstances of this case, we find that on
June 13 there existed a written, signed document sufficiently compre-
hensive to stabilize bargaining relations. The question arises whether,
Super Service Motor Freight Co., Inc., 98 NLRB 444 ; Bemis Bros. Bag. Co., 97 NLRB 1.
192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the absence of any requirement in the contract that to be validly
executed it had to be signed by International Union officers, the union
constitution imposed such a requirement .7 We think not.
It is clear that in practice the parties regarded the signature of the
International Union representative as sufficient to place the terms of
the agreement in effect. Moreover, under the union constitution, an
international representative is appointed by the president to aid in
carrying out the affairs of the International Union, one of which is to
participate at the local union level in the negotiation of bargaining
contracts to which the International Union is a party. It is apparent
therefore that a literal construction of the provisions of the union
constitution in question would be inconsistent with the manner in
which the Intervenors themselves construed these provisions.8 In
these circumstances, we do not read the union constitution as denying
the apparent authority of the International Union representative, as
an agent of the president, to bind the International Union contrac-
tually.' Furthermore, we are convinced that stability of bargaining
relations, an objective of contract bar rules, would be promoted by
refusing to permit such an agreement to be vulnerable to rival union
claims during the delays inherent in obtaining the signatures of the
international officers who were not present where the agreement was
negotiated and signed by their agent. We conclude therefore that on
June 13 there existed a validly executed agreement, which preceded
the oral request of the Petitioner on June 14 and consequently barred
the petition filed on June 15.
3. The petition for yard service employees, which was not filed until
July 10, constituted a claim for a unit embracing classifications of
employees substantially different from the employees sought in the
first petition. The July 10 petition was therefore a new petition as to
which the contract of June 13 constituted a bar.'10
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and the entire record in this
case, we conclude that the contract between the Intervenors and the
Employer barred the determination of representatives. We shall
therefore set aside the elections conducted on March 30, 1951. How-
ever, in view of all the circumstances in these particular proceedings,
including the original decision which was later reversed, the extended
court litigation, and the delays arising from our reconsideration, re-
sulting in the inability of the Petitioner to establish its status as bar-
gaining representative, the Board is of the opinion that equities exist
"Cf. Filtration Engineers, Incorporated, 98 NLRB 1210; Electro Metallurgical Com-
pany, 72 NLRB 1791.
See New Jersey Oyster Planters and Packers Association, Inc., 98 NLRB 1187.
New Jersey Oyster Planters and Packers Association, Inc., supra; cf. Avco Manu-
facturing Corporation, 97 NLRB 645. "
10Ameriean Suppliers, Incorporated, 98 NLRB 692; Hyster Company, 72 NLRB 937.
BARBER MOTORS, INC. 193
in favor of the Petitioner which call for modification of the usual
contract bar rules in this case. Accordingly, although the April 15,
1952, automatic renewal date of the agreement has passed, we dismiss
the petitions herein without prejudice to the right of the Petitioner
to file a new petition timely with respect to the June 15, 1952, expira-
tion date of the contract.
Order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the elections conducted on March 30,
1951, be, and they hereby are, set aside and that the petitions filed.
herein be, and they hereby are, dismissed without prejudice to the
right of the Petitioner to file a new petition at any time before June
15, 1952.
BARBER MOTORS, INC., BENNETT YURICK BUICK, INC., B. W. BLAUSHILD
MOTORS, IN c., BLAUSHILD MOTOR Co., BROADWAY BUICK SALES &
SERVICE, INC., BROOKLYN CHEVROLET CO., BROWNLEE CHEVROLET,
INC., TONY DITz PONTIAC, INC., DORNER CHEVROLET CO., DOWNTOWN
CHEVROLET MOTORS, INC., FORD AND PAE NASH, INC., FRANKEL CHEV-
ROLET CO., GEIGER-SIRL, INC., GROFF-TRIPP, INC., GUTHERY-
SCHREIBER CHEVROLET, INC., HEWITT CHEVROLET, INC., HIGHLAND
OLDSMOBILE, INC., HIGH LEVEL MOTORS, INC., GEO. KEIPER,MERCURY,
INC., KINSMAN SQUARE CHEVROLET, INC., AL LAMAN MOTORS, INC.,
MEISEL MOTORS, METROPOLITAN BUICK, INC., MORRISON-BARNHART
MOTORS, INC., MURRAY OLDSAIOBILE CO., OHIO MOTORS CO., OLEN
MOTORS, INC., PACKARD CLEVELAND, INC., SNYDER-GRIEDER BUICK
Co., TILLMAN MOTOR CO., KEITH WEIGLE MOTORS, INC., WEST PARK
CHEVROLET, INC., WEST SIDE PONTIAC, INC. and INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT No. 54, LODGE No. 1363, AFL,
PETITIONER
MICHAEL'S INC.' and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS,
DISTRICT No. 54, LODGE No. 1363, AFL, PETITIONER . Cases Nos.
8-RC-1570 and 8-RC-1-571. May 19, 1952
Decision and Direction of Elections
Under petitions duly filed, separate hearings were held before Henry
G. Gieser and David C. Finlay, hearing officers. The hearing officers'
1 The name of the Employer appears as amended at the hearing.
99 NLRB No. 33.