William Fitzgerald et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 30, 201913677114 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/677,114 11/14/2012 William Fitzgerald 101908.00068 2331 23619 7590 07/30/2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP PHX-IP&T-SPB 8000 Towers Crescent Drive 14th Floor Tysons Corner, VA 22182 EXAMINER SABOURI, MAZDA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2641 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/30/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PHXIPDOCKET@SquirePB.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte WILLIAM FITZGERALD, WILLIAM LYNN, and PETER BERMINGHAM1 ____________________ Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 Appellants identify YOUGETITBACK LIMITED as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 2 Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1– 8 and 31–38. Claims 9–30 and 39–54 are withdrawn. Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. INVENTION The claims are directed to systems and methods for recovering low power devices. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method, comprising: querying a near field communication chip of a power- limited device; and performing at least one retrieval function with respect to the power-limited device based on a response from the near-field communication chip. REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1, 3–8, 31, and 33–38 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Smith (US 2006/0199534 A1, published Sept. 7, 2006). Claims 2 and 32 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Finkenzeller et al. (2008/0296978 A1, published Dec. 4, 2008 “Finkenzeller”). CONTENTIONS AND ANALYSIS Independent Claim 1 Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding Smith discloses “performing at least one retrieval function with respect to the power-limited Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 3 device based on a response from the near-field communication chip,” as recited in independent claim 1. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Smith discloses “performing at least one retrieval function with respect to the power-limited device based on a response from the near-field communication chip,” as recited in claim 1, for the following reasons. Smith describes a process where a Bluetooth device finds out what other Bluetooth devices are in range. Smith ¶ 31. A device uses an inquiry process to see if other devices are in range, and if so, the device will answer the inquiry. Id. The system uses at least two devices, a “parent” device and a “kid” device. Id. ¶ 28. When the parent device wakes up, it reads RSSI. Id. ¶ 32. Appellants point out that RSSI, which stands for “Relative Received Signal Strength,” is an indication of received power of a signal based upon the ratio of a received power level and some reference power level. App. Br. 10. “The parent device also sends a message to all the connected kid devices and remains awake to receive a response.” Smith ¶ 32 (emphases added). “If any of the connected kid devices have a read RSSI that is below a set threshold, the parent device transitions to the alarm state 607.” Id. Appellants argue the Examiner has mischaracterized Smith in rejecting claim 1. Appellants argue The Office Action characterizes the Smith reference in an erroneous manner, when it states that Smith teaches “a response indicating a low RSSI received.” No part of Smith teaches that any response is sent by any device that contains an RSSI; instead, in Smith the RSSI is calculated by Smith’s parent device. Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 4 App. Br. 10. Appellants also argue that claim 1 requires a response, and not just a timeout where a message is not answered. Id. at 10–11. According to Appellants, there is no “response” disclosed in Smith, because there was no related inquiry. Id. at 11. We agree with the Examiner, however, that Smith discloses “performing at least one retrieval function with respect to the power-limited device based on a response from the near-field communication chip,” as recited in claim 1, because Smith’s parent device transitions into an alarm state (i.e., the retrieval function, which Appellants do not dispute in their Briefs), based on a “response” from the near-field communication chip. Appellants’ argument that an “RSSI measurement, as measurement of signal strength in Smith is not ‘an answer to an inquiry’ by a Bluetooth device, but a spontaneous measurement of signal strength when Smith’s parent device wakes up” (App. Br. 12) is contradicted by the later text of paragraph 32 and by Figure 6A in Smith, which shows “‘RSSI is low or any kid device does not respond’” in the same step and not merely when the parent device wakes up. Further, Appellants do not address the remainder of paragraph 32 in their Briefs, but merely address the first few sentences. Smith makes clear that a query takes places to a near field communication chip of a power-limited device, and a response is received, based on which, Smith’s parent device performs a retrieval function (transitioning to the alarm state, which is not disputed). We note that even assuming without agreeing with Appellants’ characterization of Smith, i.e., that it performs an RSSI read and then a separate query-response-timeout process, Smith’s read of RSSI is itself sufficient to disclose the claimed Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 5 query; a response to this query is received, based on which Smith’s parent device transitions to an alarm state. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Rejection and Answer. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, and independent claim 31, which was argued together with claim 1. Dependent Claim 3 Claim 3 recites the method of claim 1, further comprising “contacting an owner or agent for the power-limited device.” The Examiner finds Smith discloses, “once in the alarm state, ‘the user is alerted with the name and address of the lost kid devices’.” Ans. 3–4 (citing Smith ¶ 32). We agree that this discloses the claimed “contacting an owner or agent for the power- limited device.” The Examiner also explains that this “user” sufficiently reads on the claimed “owner or agent,” as said user is disclosed as the operator of the parent device and thereby the logical owner of both the parent and kid device. Id. Furthermore, even if said user/parent did not own the kid device, they would still qualify as an “agent” of that device as they are actively involved in the overall process of determining the status of said kid device as disclosed in Smith. Id. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that Smith’s user is not defined as being the “owner” of the power-limited devices and that there is no teaching that would impute ownership. Reply Br. 5. The claim states “owner or agent.” Appellants do not rebut the finding that Smith’s user, who is searching for an “attached” kid and parent devices (Smith ¶ 30 “The Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 6 system is initialized by ‘attaching’ the kid and parent devices), would constitute an “agent,” as claimed. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 3, and we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Rejection and Answer. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 3, and dependent claim 33, which was argued together with claim 3. Dependent Claim 4 Dependent claim 4 recites the method of claim 1, wherein the response comprises details regarding an owner or agent for the power- limited device. The Examiner finds that the user of the parent device is at least one of an owner or agent of the kid device (i.e., the power-limited device). Ans. 4. The Examiner points out that any unique identifier associated with kid device would also be associated with the user of the parent device, and paragraphs 39 and 45 of Smith disclose that the system associates a unique device ID with the kid device, which is in turn associated with said user/parent as disclosed in paragraph 32. Id. Therefore, the Examiner finds that Smith teaches the response comprising “details regarding an owner or agent for the power limited device,” as recited in dependent claim 4. Id. Appellants argue “this identifier is of hardware, and is not associated with any particular owner or agent, instead, it is associated only with a device.” Reply Br. 6. Moreover, Appellants argue Smith at paragraph 45 states that the “central computer 805 is capable of tracking any Bluetooth device with the kid tracker application enabled whose unique device ID is Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 7 known to the administrator.” Id. Therefore, Appellants argue the ID is associated with the device and not with an owner or agent even if that owner or agent was a parent. Id. We are not persuaded by these arguments because we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Smith discloses “details regarding” an owner or agent of a power limited device, as recited in claim 4. Appellants’ argument that the device ID is not “associated with” the owner or agent is not commensurate in scope with claim 4, which does not recite that a unique identifier of an agent be included in a response, but merely that “details regarding” the agent be included in the response. The Examiner’s finding regarding the unique identifier of a kid device paired with a parent device is sufficient to encompass “details regarding” an owner or agent for the power-limited device. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 4, and we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Rejection and Answer. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 4, and dependent claim 34, which was argued together with claim 4. Dependent Claim 5 Dependent claim 5 recites the method of claim 1, further comprising reporting an identity of the power-limited device contained in the response to a network operator. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that paragraph 44 of Smith states that the parent device notifies an administrative authority of the ‘unique identifier of the kid device.” Ans. 4. This is clearly the identifier of the kid device (power limited device) and not the sniffer, as argued by Appellants. Id. Smith states “the unique identifier of the kid Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 8 device can be entered into a central system.” Smith ¶ 44. We find Appellants’ characterization of Smith’s paragraph 44, i.e., that “it is the responses from the sniffers, not the power-limited device, that contain any ID information,” to be attorney argument and not supported by any evidence. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 5, and we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Rejection and Answer. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 5, and dependent claim 35, which was argued together with claim 5. Dependent Claim 7 Dependent claim 7 recites the method of claim 1, further comprising “wherein the response indicates whether the power-limited device is in a recovery mode of operation.” We agree with Appellants that the Examiner has admitted that “Smith is silent on what exact state the kid device is determined to be in when a response having a low RSSI is received,” and that the cited portions of Smith do not explicitly disclose that the response itself indicates whether the power-limited device is in a recovery mode of operation, such as a lower-power level, as discussed in the Specification. Reply Br. 7, 8. Accordingly, constrained as we are by the record before us, we do not sustain the anticipation rejection of dependent claim 7, or dependent claim 37, for the same reasons.2 2 We make no conclusions in this Decision regarding whether dependent claims 7 and 37 would be obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may wish to reevaluate these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on this Decision. Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 9 Dependent Claim 8 Dependent claim 8 recites the method of claim 1, “further comprising waking up the power-limited device from a lower power state upon an alarm event.” Smith states that “[u]pon initially losing the parent device signal, the kid device may also audibly alarm speaker 413 with ring tones and/or vibrate.” Smith ¶ 38. The Examiner finds that using the speaker of the kid device to audibly sound an alarm and having the kid device vibrate requires an increase in battery usage. Ans. 6. Appellants argue the cited portions of Smith do not disclose waking up a power limited device from a lower power state upon an alarm event. App. Br. 16; Reply Br. 9. We agree with the Examiner, however, that an alarm condition (i.e., when Smith’s kid device initially loses the parent device signal as described in Smith’s paragraph 38) causes the device to “wake up” the device to transition from a lower power state (i.e., no alarm) to an alarm state that consumes more power by sounding the audible alarm or vibrating the device. See Final Act. 5; Ans. 6. Absent persuasive rebuttal of these findings to show reversible error in the rejection, we sustain the anticipation rejection of dependent claim 8. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claim 38, which was argued together with claim 8, for the same reasons. Dependent Claim 2 The Examiner rejects dependent claim 2 based on Finkenzeller. Dependent claim 2 recites the method of claim 1, wherein the retrieval function further comprises wirelessly charging the power-limited device. Appellants argue that in Finkenzeller, “device 1 merely receives notification that device 2 has completed its charging, but not in response to the query.” Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 10 App. Br. 18–19. We are not persuaded by this argument because Finkenzeller describes determining if charging is needed using “a handshake or a polling between the devices 1 and 2 at least in cyclic interval.” Finkenzeller ¶ 53. Thus, a cyclic interval of queries and related charging based on the response to the queries is disclosed by Finkenzeller. Appellants argue this handshake is merely an inquiry regarding whether device 2 remains present and not a retrieval function. Reply Br. 9, 10. We disagree, because Finkenzeller discloses determining if charging is needed using “a handshake or a polling between the devices 1 and 2 at least in cyclic interval,” and because the broad language of claim 2 does not limit the query to an initial or first query. Therefore, any query and response resulting in charging based on the handshake or polling of Finkenzeller discloses the disputed limitation. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 2, and we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in the Final Rejection and Answer. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 2, and dependent claim 32, which was argued together with claim 2. DECISION For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–6, 8, 31–36, and 38. We reverse the rejection of dependent claims 7 and 37. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2009). Appeal 2018-005567 Application 13/677,114 11 AFFIRMED-IN-PART Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation