West Point Pepperell, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 21, 1972

200 N.L.R.B. 1031 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

WEST POINT PEPPERELL, INC 1031
West Point Pepperell , Inc and Textile Workers
Union of America , AFL-CIO Cases 10-CA-9194
and 10-CA-9214
December 21, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On July 18, 1972, Administrative Law Judge'
William Feldesman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, West Point Peppe-
rell, Inc, Lindale, Georgia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in said recommended Order
1 The title of Trial Examiner was changed to Administrative Law
Judge effective August 19, 1972
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM FELDESMAN, Trial Examiner These cases were
consolidated on February 3, 1972, and tried before me in
Rome, Georgia, on April 13, 1972 In Case 10-CA-9194
the charge and first amended charge were filed on
September 8, 1971, and September 15, 1971, respectively,
by Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, and in Case 10-CA-9214 the charge was
filed on September 20, 1971, also by the Union Upon
these charges, a consolidated complaint was issued by the
General Counsel on February 3, 1972, against West Point
Pepperell, Inc, Lindale, Georgia, herein called the Respon-
dent The Respondent filed an answer on February 23,
1972 The complaint alleges that the Respondent, having
discharged 28 of its Lindale, Georgia, plant employees on
or about August 6, 1971, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the National Labor Relations Act by refusing on and after
August 14, 1971, to honor requests of the Union, the
certified collective-bargaining representative of the prod-
uction and maintenance employees of the Lindale plant,
that the Respondent supply the Union "with information
with regard to the specific basis of discharge for each of"
those of the 28 employees "who were not officers of the
Union", and that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by threatening the Union in a letter dated
September 8, 1971, that the Respondent "would file a civil
damage action against the Union if it did not withdraw the
charge filed with the Board in Case 10-CA-9194 " In its
answer, the Respondent denies the commission of any
unfair labor practices
It is undisputed that the Union and the Respondent are
parties to a 3-year collective-bargaining agreement, cover-
ing the production and maintenance workers of the
Lmdale plant, which states that it was "made and entered
into" on December 10, 1969, that the contract contains no-
strike provisions and certain undertakings by the Union
relating thereto, that on July 27, 1971, a large number of
employees of the Lindale plant, in violation of those
provisions, engaged in a strike that lasted until August 5,
1971, that the 28 employees referred to in the complaint
were among the strikers and were discharged by the
Respondent on August 6, 1971, for assigned general
reasons related to the strike, that the Union demanded of
the Respondent and was refused specific information
regarding the grounds for the separation of each of the 28
employees, that the Union also sought from the Respon-
dent the reinstatement of these employees and with the
same objective filed charges with the Board, and that upon
the filing of the charges the Respondent wrote a letter to
the Union threatening a civil suit for damages for its
actions on behalf of the 28 employees premised on the
assertion that the Union was disregarding the commit-
ments it made in the collective agreement and was
therefore breaching the contract The Respondent's princi-
pal defenses rest upon the no-strike provisions of the
contract and the Union's undertakings in connection
therewith Specifically, the Respondent contends that the
Union, by these contractual provisions, waived the right to
obtain detailed information underlying the reasons ad-
vanced for the discharges of the 28 employees, having
bound itself not to take any action to effect their
reinstatement or soften the penalty, and by acting at
variance with such undertakings justified the letter which
the Respondent sent These are in general the facts and
issues involved in this proceeding Later set forth are the
detailed facts and issues, including the specific contractual
provisions on which the Respondent relies and other
relevant particulars
Upon the entire record,' after seeing and hearing the
witnesses and observing their demeanor on the stand, and
i Should there be any doubt of the finality of rulings I made at the affirm those rulings which admitted the contractual provisions in evidence
hearing concerning the admissibility of provisions of ten collective and permitted the oral testimony to be given Both the documentary
agreements between the Union and textile manufacturers and the propriety evidence and oral testimony are relevant and material to the issues in this
of oral testimony of negotiations leading to the inclusion of the no strike case
clauses in the 1969 contract between the Union and the Respondent I
200 NLRB No 147
1032 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General
Counsel and the Respondent , I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
I find, as the complaint alleges and the answer admits,
that the Respondent is and at all material times has been a
Massachusetts corporation with an office and place of
business located at Lindale, Georgia, where it is engaged in
the manufacture and sale of textile products, and that
during the past calendar year, which is a representative
period, it sold and shipped finished products valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the
State of Georgia Upon the foregoing, I also find, as the
complaint further alleges and the answer further admits,
that the Respondent is and at all material times has been
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find, as the complaint alleges and the answer admits,
that the Union is and at all material times has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A The Operative Facts
As indicated above, this case in large part turns on the
validity of the Respondent's defenses-which are predicat-
ed on undertakings the Union assumed in its 3-year
collective-bargaining agreement with the Respondent
"made and entered into" on December 10, 1969
The Respondent admits, and I find, that on January 4,
1967, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of employees in a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act, that this
appropriate unit consists of all production and mainte-
nance employees of the Respondent at its Lindale plant,
including all plant clerical employees, but excluding all
office clerical employees, professional employees, technical
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act,
and that at all times since January 4, 1967, the Union has
been and is the representative of a majority of the
employees in this unit and hence by virtue of Section 9(a)
of the Act the exclusive representative of all the employees
in the unit for the purpose of collective bargaining
Contract negotiations between the Union and the
Respondent began in June 1969 2 After ten bargaining
meetings , they reached agreement and executed the
collective-bargaming contract of December 10, 1969
During these sessions , the Union proposed no-strike
stipulations permitting the Respondent to "impose discipli-
nary measures upon or discharge the employees involved
in an unauthorized strike in accordance with and subject to
the grievance and arbitration provisions [of the Union's
suggested contract] as to the facts of participation by the
2 The Board s January 4 1967 certification of the Union was contested
by the Respondent Affirmed by the Board in an unfair labor practice
employee, incitation and instigation by the Company and
whether the discipline was fair, appropriate and justified
under all the circumstances, such measures [to] be the sole
recourse and exclusive remedy of the Company in the
event of an unauthorized strike " So that these provisions
may be read in proper context, all the relevant portions of
the Union's no-strike proposals are here set forth
ARTICLE XI
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
(1) As to any dispute subject to arbitration under the
provisions of this Agreement, the Union agrees that it
will not authorize any strike (which term includes
stoppages or intentional slowdowns of work by
employees), it being specifically understood and
agreed, however that any strike not expressly author-
ized or ratified in writing by the General President of
the Union (a copy of which shall be sent to the
Company) shall be deemed for all purposes an
unauthorized strike, for which there shall be no liability
on the part of the Union, its Local Unions, or Joint
Boards
(2) As to any dispute not subject to arbitration under
the provisions of this Agreement, the Company agrees
that the Union and those it represents shall have the
right to strike and authorize same and any such strike
shall not be deemed to be a violation of this
Agreement, (which Agreement shall continue in full
force and effect notwithstanding such strike )
(3) In the event of an unauthorized strike, the Union
agrees that upon receipt of proper written notice by
registered mail from the Company to the General
President of the Union at 99 University Place, New
York, New York, 10003, and the Regional Director of
the Union at 2121 Commonwealth Avenue, Room 215,
Charlotte, North Carolina, 28205, or such other
addresses as may hereafter be furnished to the
Company by the Union, it will send to the Company a
written statement addressed to the employees and
signed by the General President, his designee, or the
Regional Director declaring the strike unauthorized
and directing them to return to work Such statement
may be used by the Company in any way it sees fit,
including distribution to the press and the employees
(4) The Company may impose disciplinary measures
upon or discharge the employees involved in an
unauthorized strike in accordance with and subject to
the grievance and arbitration provisions of this Agree-
ment as to the facts of participation by the employee,
incitation or instigation by the Company and whether
the discipline was fair, appropriate and justified under
all the circumstances, such measures shall be the sole
recourse and exclusive remedy of the Company in the
event of an unauthorized strike
But, as the Respondent's attorney, Lovic A Brooks,
testified, he objected to these provisions because he
claimed there was a "long history of unlawful strikes or
wildcat strikes" at facilities in the vicinity of the Lindale
proceeding it was then upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit shortly before the commencement of these negotiations
WEST POINT PEPPERELL, INC 1033
plant, and because he "wanted both parties to exert an
honest effort" to prevent and abort such strikes at the
Lmdale plant The Respondent submitted its own no-strike
proposals which were calculated to deal more strictly with
employees who strike in violation of contract and to curtail
rights to seek or obtain on their behalf moderation of
disciplinary measures that might be taken against them for
this behavior These ultimately found their way into the
1969 agreement, after the Union's bargaining representa-
tive mentioned but did not insist upon retaining the
affirmative and unmistakable language of at least that part
of the Union's proposals requiring the facts of alleged
participation in an unlawful strike to be resolved through
the grievance procedure, and with his knowledge that the
Respondent was attempting to avoid specious factual
disputes, or "swearing matches" by opposing witnesses, as
Brooks testified he characterized them in discussions with
him, concerning improper strike activity of employees, and
"to have without any question," as Brooks further testified,
"the right to discharge an employee for participating in or
committing acts of misconduct during the strike " The
Respondent introduced into evidence no-strike provisions
in 10 other collective agreements between the Union and
textile manufacturers In many but not all of the 10
instances they contain affirmative permissive language
similar to that in paragraph 4 of the Union's precontract
proposals for "Strikes and Lockouts," set forth above, and
in every instance lack the positive confining language of a
particular sentence (subsequently discussed) in the perti-
nent no-strike clauses of the Union's 1969 contract with the
Respondent These latter clauses (with the sentence in
question italicized), which the Respondent terms "unique,"
read as follows
ARTICLE XVIII
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
The Union agrees that for the full term of this
Agreement and any renewal or extension thereof it will
at all times cooperate fully with the Company in
maintaining full production
The Union agrees not to call, authorize, condone, or
support any strike, slow-down, stay-in, or sympathy
strike at the Company's plant covered by this Agree-
ment during the life of this Agreement during the life of
this Agreement, and agrees not to authorize, condone,
or support any interference with production or interfer-
ence with egress or ingress to the Company's property,
except as expressly provided in Articles IX [a grievance
procedure and provisions for arbitration if both parties
consent thereto] or XI [wage reopening and provisions
for striking in connection therewith upon meeting
certain conditions] of this Agreement In the event
there is a dispute and the parties have not agreed to
arbitrate it, and the procedures set forth in Article IX
have been fully complied with, the strike shall be
deemed for all purposes a strike not in violation of this
Agreement
In the event that any employee engages in a strike,
stay-in, sit-down, slow-down, picketing, or boycott of
the Company plant, except as provided in Articles IX
or XI hereof, the Union agrees that upon notification
of the existence of such condition being given by letter
or telegram to the Union's Regional Office at Char-
lotte, North Carolina, that it will issue a written
statement directed to its members, advising them that
the stoppage is illegal, directing them to return to their
jobs, and to cease any action that will adversely affect
production, including maintenance and recognition of
any picket line Such notice shall be signed by an
authorized representative of the International Union
The Union shall further advise the employees mvdlved that
unless they terminate such action, they will be subject to
immediate discharge and the Union will not undertake
any action in their behalf to modify or rectify such
discharge The Union further agrees that it will
promptly take such other action and steps as may be
appropriate in an effort to terminate any such interfer-
ence with production [Emphasis supplied ]
The Company agrees that if the Union carries out fully
the responsibilities assumed by it in the preceding
paragraphs the Company will not institute an action for
monetary damages against the Union as a result of the
breach of the provisions of said paragraph It being
understood, however, that the failure of the Union to
comply with all the conditions set forth above will
relieve the Company of this waiver of its rights to claim
damages
It is further agreed that if any employee or employees
engage in a work stoppage, intentional slow-down of
production, strike, or other interference with prod-
uction, or interference with egress or ingress to the
employer's plant, that such employee and those
participating with him may be disciplined and/or
discharged In administering such discipline, the
Company may distinguish between leaders and other
participants in unauthorized work stoppage, strike, or
slow-down, or interference with production, or interfer-
ence with egress or ingress to the employer's plant
What the Respondent regards as the most extraordinary
feature and as the capstone of this no-strike structure, and
what it especially depends upon to support its position in
this case, is the italicized sentence dictating that "The
Union shall further advise the employees involved that
unless they terminate such action, they will be subject to
immediate discharge and the Union will not undertake any
action in their behalf to modify or rectify such discharge "
The General Counsel argues in his brief that the absence of
a comma following the word "discharge" creates an
ambiguity in this provision, as "it may be interpreted as an
agreement by the Union only to advise the employees that it
would not take action on their behalf to modify or rectify
discharges under the no-strike clause " In a footnote
attached to this statement, the General Counsel observes,
"It is generally recognized that insertion of a comma is
appropriate to separate independent clauses joined by a
conjunction Here, the absence of a comma following the
word `discharge' suggests that the alleged agreement not to
modify or rectify discharges does not have the effect of an
independent clause "
Particularly in the light of the precontract negotiations,
however, I am not impressed with such grammatical
1034 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
niceties and perceive no ambiguity in the provision On the
contrary, I read the stipulation as an express covenant with
the Respondent that the Union will not endeavor to undo
the Respondent's discharge of employees for continuing to
strike in violation of the contract in the teeth of the
Union's warning to cease such conduct Even if the
Union's undertaking were to advise the employees that it
will not take action to alter such a discharge, with no
express promise made to the Respondent to stay its hand,
implicit in such a commitment would be a clear warranty
running to the favor of the Respondent that the Union will
in good faith seek to effectuate the warning instruction
required to be conveyed to the strikers To construe the
provision otherwise, as the General Counsel suggests may
indeed be indicated, would be to accept the notion that the
parties came to the incongruous or devious and highly
improbable understanding that, while the Union must
inform employees striking in breach of the contract that if
they persist and are fired it will do nothing on their behalf,
fulfilling that commitment leaves it perfectly free in actual
practice to do just the opposite and press the Respondent
for relief for them This is an interpretation so patently
unreasonable and unwarranted as to leave no doubt that
the parties intended that the Union is to make no effort to
set at naught or vary a discharge for persisting in striking in
violation of the agreement after the Union's direction to
discontinue such conduct But this is not the end of the
matter of contract interpretation On all the facts as they
developed in this case, much more needs to be said-and
is-later in this Decision
At this puncture, however, it is appropriate to set out
other related provisions of the 1969 collective agreement in
order to consider together the various fragments that
compose the whole contractual mosaic that must be seen to
dispose of the issues in this case Article VIII of the 1969
contract, entitled "Discharge and Discipline," reads
Section 1(A) The right to discipline or discharge
employees shall remain in the discretion of the
Company, except that such discipline or discharge will
only be imposed for just cause Just cause for the
purpose of discipline or for the purpose of discharge, or
either, shall include but not be limited to insubordina-
tion, violation of plant rules, failure to cooperate when
requested to transfer or work over, failure to follow
directions as to manner and method of performing
jobs, failure to obey instructions of supervision, failure
of an employee to properly perform his job in
accordance with Company standards of quality or
quantity, absenteeism, dishonesty, failure to comply
with safety rules or failure to use safety or special
protective devices furnished by the Company, negli-
gence, or misrepresentation of any material fact in
connection with any claim or concerning his employ-
ment or his pay It is understood and agreed that the
degree of discipline, up to and including discharge,
imposed for dust cause, including among others the
reasons listed above, shall be in the sole discretion of
management and shall not be subject to review under
the Grievance Procedure hereof, except upon the proof
that the degree of discipline imposed upon the
employee was inconsistent with the degree of discipline
imposed upon other employees for identical offenses
and under identical circumstances since the effective
date of this Agreement
Section 1(B) In the case of any disciplinary layoff or
discharge, the Company will promptly give the employ-
ee and the Union a written statement specifying the
reason for the discipline or discharge Such matter
subject to the provisions of Paragraph 1(A) hereof may
be made a grievance and handled under the Grievance
Procedure specified in this Agreement provided that a
written protest of such action signed by the employee is
filed with the Company within three (3) working days
of the presentation of the Company's written statement
to the employee specifying the cause of the discipline or
discharge Failure to file such written protest within
three (3) working days will bar the grievance of any
other complaint about the discipline or discharge from
any further consideration under any provisions of this
Agreement
On July 27, 1971, a large number of employees of the
Lindale plant went on strike The General Counsel
conceded at the hearing that "the strike was in violation of
[the] no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the Respondent and the Union " Among the
strikers were the 28 employees mentioned in the complaint
who were discharged at the end of the strike There is
absolutely no dispute regarding their participation in the
strike, nor is there any question that they did not return to
work until the conclusion of the strike As James W
Mathis, then the Respondent's director of employee
relations at the Lindale plant, testified, at the time of the
strike about 1,500 hourly workers were employed at the
Lmdale plant, and during the strike, which lasted until
August 5, 1971, approximately two-thirds of them, or
1,000, engaged in the strike "at one time or another " It
appears that the 28 employees were the only strikers
disciplined
On July 29, 1971, in the course of the strike, the Union in
a telegram notified its Local in Rome, Georgia, (whose
jurisdiction covers the Respondent's Lindale plant), as
follows
This is to advise you that current work stoppage at
West Point Pepperell Langdale Ala [(sic)-intended as
Lindale, Georgia] plant is in violation of contract
Walking or observing picket lines is illegal and should
be stopped Workers should go back to work and use
grievance procedure in contract Continuation of illegal
stoppage could bring discipline including discharge
without contract recourse
Yet, as already noted, the strike continued until August 5,
with the participation of the 28 employees who were
ultimately severed
After the strike terminated, each of the 28 employees
(and the Union) received from the Respondent the
following letter, dated August 6, 1971, addressed to and
naming them all
TO THE FOLLOWING PERSONS
Charles P Chnsman Kenneth F Taylor
Ralph Evans Jean Baker
Grady E Loveless Bessie Baggett
WEST POINT PEPPERELL, INC
Clyde R Rogers
George B Allen
Clara Porter
Louise Hays
Louise Byrd
Frank Abrams
Steve R Harper
Charles E Wheat
Homer C Vincent
Louise Taylor
Flavil B Jones, Jr
L C Cooke, Jr
Robert V Drummond
Beatrice Winn
Joan Barnett
Jay Dee Jones
Radford G Green
Lonnie Griffin
James L Parker
Newton P Wheeler, Jr
Robby C Shumate
Eddie R Gravely, Sr
Our Company has made a very careful investigation
into the illegal strike that began at the Lindale plant at
approximately 2 30 on the morning of July 27, and into
the activity of the above named individuals at the
beginning of and during the course of that strike This
investigation has revealed that the above named
individuals improperly, as officials of the Union,
instigated and participated in the strike in violation of
the Contract or that they engaged in acts of gross
misconduct during the strike The types of acts that
were committed involved the damaging of employees'
automobiles or other property, such as throwing paint,
scratching cars with sharp objects such as beer can
openers, throwing eggs, rocks, or other articles at
employees or their cars, cutting tires on employees'
automobiles, or otherwise damaging the property of
employees
Our Company has in good faith abided by the Contract
that it signed with the Union and we expect the
employees covered by that Contract to abide by the
Contract also Particularly, the officers and officials of
the Local Union have a strong obligation not only to
abide by the Contract but to see to it that other
employees abide by it In addition, we do not intend to
see any employee wilfully and intentionally damage or
destroy the property of the Company or any other
employee We simply cannot tolerate this type of
activity by one employee against another The future of
this mill and the safety of the employees and their
property require that we take whatever steps are
necessary in order to see that Union officers and
employees abide by the Contract and prevent unlawful
strikes and, above all, to prevent employees from
intentionally damaging or attempting to destroy the
property of other employees or the Company
For the above reasons and to accomplish these
objectives, our Company has no alternative but to
terminate the employment of and discharge the above
named individuals This action is expressly authorized
by the Contract itself Article XVIII of the Contract
provides that employees may be discharged for
engaging in an unlawful strike and that in administer-
ing the discharge, "the Company may distinguish
between leaders and other participants in unauthorized
work stoppage, strike, or slow-down, or interference
3 The General Counsel asserted at the hearing that the employees
applied for unemployment compensation and were ultimately awarded it
Brooks testified that he heard some of them received unemployment
1035
with production, or interference with egrees (sic) or
ingrees (sic) to the employer's plant"
/s/ ROBERT F HORSLEY
ROBERT F HORSLEY,
MANAGER
Furthermore, each of these employees (and the Union)
also received from the Respondent a separation notice,
dated August 10, 1971, as required by the Employment
Security Agency of the Georgia Department of Labor and
on a form provided by it, with the explanation for the
Respondent's discharge given as
participation in and or misconduct during illegal walk
out and work stoppage in violation of contract 3
Notwithstanding the Respondent's letter of August 6 in
which it affirmed unequivocally that all of the 28 were
officials of the Union, it was stipulated at the hearing that
only 11 of them (and possibly one more about whom there
was disagreement) were in fact such officials or officers
Thus, at least 16, the bulk of these 28 employees, were only
rank-and-file adherents of the Union at the time of the
strike
On August 11, 1971, the Union's Local filed a formal
grievance with the Respondent covering all 28 in which the
Local asked that they be reinstated with full seniority and
backpay The Respondent apparently rejected this griev-
ance Subsequently, on August 13, 1971, an International
Representative of the Union sent the Respondent the
following letter
This is to protest your letter of August 6, 1971, signed
by Mr Horsley, to twenty-eight of your employees,
loosely accusing them of serious charges, and discharg-
ing them without explaining why they were discharged
We also protest the separation notice you mailed to
each of the twenty-eight discharged, neglecting to state
the particulars each one was discharged for
We state that your actions are in violation of Article
XVIII of the contract, and want from you a detailed
report on why each employee was discharged
Thereafter, representatives of the Union in telephone
conversations and at meetings with representatives of the
Respondent repeatedly and persistently sought to raise and
discuss the matter of the discharges of the 28 and to secure
their reinstatement In addition, they endeavored to effect
some kind of compromise of the controversy, suggesting
also that the Respondent agree to arbitrate the discharges
On some of these occasions, they attempted to obtain a
detailed explanation from the Respondent's representatives
for the discharge of each of the 28 employees As Mathis
testified, he was sometimes told by a union representative
that "so and so over here [is] a kind-hearted person He
wouldn't engage in any misconduct," and Mathis was at
times also asked by a union representative "to connect up
the specific misconduct with any particular individual
employee " But the Respondent's representatives just as
persistently refused to discuss any of these matters or to
accede to any of these requests or suggestions As for
compensation but the Respondent to his knowledge did not present any
evidence at any unemployment compensation hearing
1036 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
additional information about the discharges , Brooks
informed the Union's representative , as Brooks testified,
that under the 1969 contract the Respondent "had the right
to discharge people for participating , instigating or acts of
misconduct ," the Union "had no right to ask for any
further information ," and the Respondent 's representatives
"weren't going to give it " In fact, the Respondent admits
allegations of the complaint that "commencing on or about
August 8 , 1971, and continuing to date , the Union has
requested , and is requesting , Respondent to supply it with
information with regard to the specific basis for discharge
for each of" the 28 employees , and that (except for the
contents of the August 6 letter and the separation notices
of August 10) the Respondent on or about August 14,
1971, "refused , and continues to refuse , to supply the
Union with" this information "with respect to those
employees who were not officers of the Union "
On September 8, 1971, the Union filed the charge in
Case 10-CA-9194, in which it alleged that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act in that
The above-named employer has discriminated against
the twenty-eight employees listed in attachment A in
order to discourage membership in Textile Workers
Union of America
The above-named employer has refused to bargain
collectively with Textile Workers Union of America,
the certified collective bargaining representative of its
employees
That same day the Respondent's attorney, on behalf of
the Respondent , sent the Union the following letter
Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO
99 University Place
New York, New York 10003
Gentlemen
On July 27 an unlawful stoppage took place at West
Point-Pepperell's Lindale, Georgia plant in violation of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement in existence
between the Company and your Union This unlawful
strike caused substantial damages to this Company
Under the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment , your Union agreed that in the event of a strike in
violation of that Contract, your Union would take all
necessary steps to end such action and that the
Company would have the right to discipline or
discharge employees who participated in that strike
and, further , that your Union would "not undertake
action in their behalf to modify or rectify such
discharges"
We have been advised that your Union, through its
General Counsel, has filed an unfair labor practice
charge on behalf of 28 employees who were discharged
for instigating and participating in said strike and/or
committing violent acts during such strike The
Company considers this charge a violation of your
commitment in the Contract and, in addition, considers
your charge and your other attempted actions on
behalf of such discharged strikers as a ratification and
condonation of their actions, if not an admission they
were acting in your behalf during said strike
Unless this charge is immediately withdrawn and other
actions by your Union in violation of the Contract to
rectify or modify such discharges are ceased immedi-
ately, the Company will have no alternative but to file a
substantial damage suit against your Union for the
damages it has incurred from your actions in violation
of the Contract, including the damages suffered by the
Company during said strike
YOURS VERY TRULY,
/s/ Lovic A BROOKS, JR
Lovic A BROOKS, JR
cc Mr Scott Hoyman,
Southern Director, TWUA
2121 Commonwealth Avenue,
Charlotte, North Carolina
On September 20, 1971, the Union filed the charge in
Case 10-CA-9214 In that charge, the Union alleged that
through the letter the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, as the letter constituted "a threat of coersion
[sic] and reprisal and a per se illegal attempt to procure
withdrawal of charges previously filed with the National
Labor Relations Board "
Nine days later, on September 29, 1971, the Regional
Director for Region 10, by two separate letters of action,
refused to issue a complaint in Case 10-CA-9194, and in
Case 10-CA-9214 as well The Union appealed both
rulings to the Office of the General Counsel in Washing-
ton, D C , which on January 20, 1972, also by two separate
letters of action, reversed the Regional Director in Case
10-CA-9194 "as to the alleged refusal to furnish informa-
tion," but sustained him in all other respects , and directed
that a complaint issue for the Board to determine the
questions raised "with respect to the Union 's right to
information concerning the specific grounds relied upon in
the discharge of each of the seventeen employees who were
not Union officials", and reversed the Regional Director in
Case 10-CA-9214 and directed that a complaint issue for
the Board to determine the questions raised by the
Respondent's "threat to file civil suit unless the Union
withdrew its unfair labor practice charge in Case 9194 "
B The Refusal To Bargain by Declining To Furnish
Information
By acknowledging applicable legal principles , the Gener-
al Counsel and the Respondent have narrowed the issues
concerning the Respondent 's alleged refusal to bargain in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act by declining
to furnish the Union with the information it requested as to
the detailed basis for the Respondent 's discharge of each of
the 28 employees who were not union officers Thus, the
Respondent concedes that there is in general a statutory
obligation imposed upon an employer to supply the
collective-bargaining representative of his employees with
the kind of information demanded by the Union N L R B
v Acme Industrial Co, 385 U S 432, 435-436 ( 1967),
among other authorities And the General Counsel
concedes that the right of the employees ' bargaining agent
to obtain this information may be effectively waived by it
WEST POINT PEPPERELL, INC 1037
Clifton Precision Products Division, etc, 156 NLRB 555, 562
(1966), among other authorities But the General Counsel
properly emphasizes that the waiver of a statutory right
will not be lightly implied, but must be clear and
unmistakable Ibid, The Timken Roller Bearing Company v
N L R B, 325 F 2d 746, 751 (C A 9, 1963), cert denied 376
U S 971 For a case in which the Board was pointedly
reminded of this rule, see Intl Union, UA W v N L R B
(General Motors Corporation), 381 F 2d 265, 267 (C A D C ,
1967), cert denied 389 U S 857 Contrary to the General
Counsel's position, the Respondent contends that by
reason of the no-strike provisions in the 1969 contract the
Union waived its right to the information it sought in this
case The Respondent argues that the Union contracted
away the right to seek "to modify or rectify" the discharges
and hence to present grievances looking to the reinstate-
ment of any of the dischargees, who admittedly participat-
ed in a strike in violation of the 1969 agreement, that
wholly dependent upon that right was the Union's right to
obtain information as to the specific basis for the discharge
of each nonofficer among the 28 employees, and that this
latter right was therefore also yielded by the Union
together with the former For its defense of "waiver," the
Respondent relies on not only the express language of the
1969 agreement, but also the precontract negotiations and
the "uniqueness" of the 1969 collective agreement when
compared with others in the textile industry to which the
Union is a party 4
The General Counsel's contentions made at the hearing
and in his brief appear to fall in two broad categories he
insists, under the circumstances of this case, that even if the
Union waived the right to discuss and protest the
discharges and present grievances relating thereto under
the 1969 contract, it was nevertheless entitled to the
information it sought on the ground that the information
was or might be otherwise "relevant," and that the Union
did not in fact clearly and unmistakably waive the right to
discuss and object to the discharges and seek redress for
the employees under the grievance procedure, and hence
the right to the information it demanded was also not
waived
To buttress his first contention of "relevancy" of the
information concerned, notwithstanding an assumed but
not conceded waiver of the Union's right to discuss the
discharges and invoke the grievance machinery-or barga-
in-with the objective of effecting the reinstatement of the
employees in question, the General Counsel suggests in his
brief that the information might reveal "inaccuracies with
respect to the Respondent's selections for discharge and
thus make Article XVIII inapplicable " But this is an
argument that loses sight of the realities of this case The
General Counsel himself concedes that all 28 employees
participated in the strike and the strike violated article
XVIII of the contract Therefore, there cannot be the
slightest doubt that article XVIII was applicable to each of
them He also argues in his brief that the "misconduct"
attributed to the employees other than their mere partici-
pation in the strike "could well affect unemployment
compensation, as well as jeopardize future employment
Information regarding misconduct would enable the
Union to assess the fairness and accuracy of Respondent's
reasons for the discharge The Union could thereafter
advise the dischargees as to their rights, if any, under the
contract or other applicable state or Federal law For
example, information regarding the basis for discharge
would be of assistance to the Union representing the
employees in unemployment compensation hearings Such
information would also be relevant to a determination of
whether or not the Respondent may have violated the
National Labor Relations Act in connection with the
discharges Accordingly, and notwithstanding any waiver
of access to the grievance machinery, the information
would have been relevant and useful to the Union in
carrying out its statutory obligations " Assuming, arguendo,
and contrary to the Respondent's position on this point,
that the Union in its role as bargaining representative was
entitled to the information sought for the "discovery"
purposes specified by the General Counsel, that such
"discovery" for unemployment compensation and unfair
labor practice proceedings and the like would be of use to
it "in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities"
(N L R B v Acme Industrial Co, supra, 385 U S at 437),
the General Counsel's argument deals with matters far
removed from what is demonstrated by the actual evidence
adduced in this case The Union consistently asked for the
information solely in connection with its efforts to discuss
with the Respondent the reinstatement of employees and
to persuade it to agree to some compromise on returning
them to their jobs or at least to arbitrate their discharges
The record facts do not reflect otherwise Furthermore, the
General Counsel asserted at the hearing that the employees
received unemployment compensation And the Regional
Director for Region 10 refused to issue a complaint on that
part of the Union's charge in Case 10-CA-9194, alleging
that the Respondent committed unfair labor practices by
discharging the employees and his determination was
sustained on appeal by the General Counsel's Office in
Washington, D C These simply are not live matters To the
extent, therefore, that the General Counsel contends that
even if the Union waived the right to discuss and contest
the Respondent's discharges-to bargain over the subject
matter and seek direct relief from the Respondent-the
Respondent was nevertheless obligated under the Act to
furnish it with the information it demanded not for use for
such bargaining objectives but for use for some other and
different purposes, I find this contention to be unrelated to
the operative circumstances of this case as shown by the
record and consequently lacking in merit Cf Boston
Mutual Life Insurance Company, 170 NLRB 1672 (1968)
Turning next to the General Counsel's contention that
the Union did not clearly and unmistakably waive the right
to discuss and protest the discharges, considering the
particular circumstances of this case, and thus the right to
the information it requested relative to the discharges also
was not waived, it has already been found that the Union
undertook not to seek to reverse or modify a discharge for
striking in breach of contract after the Union's instruction to
halt such activity, despite the absence of a comma
4 It is now well established that the Board has jurisdiction to interpret a practice has been committed N L R B v C & C Plywood Corp 385 U S
contract insofar as it is necessary to determine whether an unfair labor 421 (1967)
1038 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
following the word "discharge" in the key sentence of
article XVIII reading that "The Union shall further advise
the employees involved that unless they terminate such
action, they will be subject to immediate discharge and the
Union will not undertake any action in their behalf to
modify or rectify such discharge " But the General Counsel
also urges on other grounds that there was no waiver of the
right to discuss and protest the discharges This aspect of
his case hinges on his position that the 28 employees were
discharged for more than striking in breach of contract, and
that the Union did not waive the right to discuss or contest
the discharges on these additional premises, or therefore to
obtain specific information with respect to such premises,
which is precisely what it sought from the Respondent in
regard to the nonofficers among the 28
There can be no serious doubt, and I find, that the
Respondent predicated its discharge of the 28 employees
not merely on their striking in breach of contract but also
on the claimed culpability for the strike of all 28 as alleged
officials of the Union, and on the supposed instigation of
the strike or egregious misconduct during the strike of
unidentified employees among the 28 For these asserted
reasons, all 28 were presumably responsible for and more
conspicuous in the strike activity, some of them were
supposedly more prominent because they were allegedly
guilty of violence and other wrongdoing All 28 in the
course of the strike were singled out by the Respondent for
discharge because of these distinguishing factors In the
Respondent's eyes they were the strike "leaders " The
Respondent's letter of August 6 clearly indicates that this is
the fact Indeed, in that letter it relied for its selection of
the 28 for discharge on the provision of article XVIII of the
1969 contract permitting it to distinguish in administering
discipline "between leaders and other participants in
unauthorized strike or interference with prod-
uction, or interference with egress or ingress to the
plant " Also, the Respondent's separation notices of
August 10 mentioned "misconduct" as well as "participa-
tion " In addition, the September 8 letter sent to the Union
by the Respondent's attorney referred to "the 28 employ-
ees who were discharged for instigating and participating in
said strike and/or committing violent acts during such
strike " (Emphasis supplied) As many as 1,000 employees,
including the 28, were "at one time or another" out on
strike, and thus all were equally blameworthy insofar as
"participation" was concerned To repeat, the Respondent
obviously distinguished the 28 from the rest of the strikers
and designated them for dismissal because their alleged
responsibility for the strike or claimed affirmative miscon-
duct during the strike made them "leaders "
Nor could the Respondent capriciously have chosen
them for discharge because of their mere participation in
the strike They were not "fair game" to be selected
irrationally and at random The contractual provision on
which the Respondent relied to sever them not only
confers rights but also thrusts obligations upon the
Respondent If the Respondent were given the unqualified
right to pick and choose at will among strike participants
unregulated by any contractual standards this provision
would have been quite unnecessary Under the provision
the Respondent has a duty as well as a license, to
distinguish between "leaders" and other participants, if it
elects to distinguish at all, and it has not been granted "sole
discretion" to make such distinctions without challenge
This is confirmed by Section lA of article VIII of the
contract which withdraws from the Respondent the right of
"sole discretion" to determine the degree of discipline
imposed upon an employee for just cause on "proof that
the degree of discipline imposed upon the employee was
inconsistent with the degree of discipline imposed upon
other employees for identical offenses and under identical
circumstances since the effective date of this Agreement "
By these requirements of articles XVIII and VIII employ-
ees are granted protections against arbitrary or disparate
discipline, or arbitrary or disparate degrees of discipline,
by the Respondent
In the face of these affirmative safeguards, the undertak-
ing by the Union that it will not seek to rectify or modify a
discharge for continuing to engage in a strike in violation
of the contract after its warning to stop, is scarcely a
commitment that it will not seek to rectify or modify a
discharge based on the distinguishing ground of alleged
"leadership" of the strike Especially is this true on the
facts of this case, where, as the August 6 letter discloses,
the Respondent was gravely in error in selecting all 28 of
the employees for discharge on the major premise that as
"officials of the Union" they were "leaders" of the strike,
at least 16 having been only rank-and-file union adherents,
and raised serious doubts of the accuracy and reliability of
the other distinguishing grounds it rested on for their
dismissal Needless to say, the statutory right to present
grievances and obtain relevant information-to bargain
-concerning discharges is not contingent upon whether or
not the separated employees exercised a right protected
under Section 7 of the Act, particularly where, as here,
affirmative contractual guarantees of evenhanded treat-
ment, notwithstanding cause for discipline, have been
accorded them
Under these circumstances the Union's right to discuss
and protest the discharges, and to demand a detailed
explanation of the basis for the discharge of each of the 28
who was not a union officer, was not waived, its demand
for specific information was not barred, but was thorough-
ly justified In making these findings, I have carefully
considered the precontract negotiations, the other con-
tracts with textile manufacturers to which the Umon is a
party, and the 1969 agreement itself Apart from any other
considerations, the positive obligations imposed upon the
Respondent under articles XVIII and VIII of the 1969
contract gainsay any waiver by the Umon to discuss and
object to the discharges, premised as they were on strike
"leadership," and hence to obtain specific information
from the Respondent relevant to this basis for severance,
which included alleged instigation of the strike and
claimed acts of misconduct during the strike In fact, the
request for the Respondent's own detailed explanations
and data, which might help to dispel the confusion and
uncertainty it engendered by its letter of August 6, was not
at all the situation of the "swearing match" it wished to
avoid by its precontract proposals, which were inserted in
the 1969 contract as article XVIII All that the Respondent
was called upon to do in this current legal era favoring and
WEST POINT PEPPERELL, INC
encouraging frank disclosure (see, generally, N L R B v
Acme Industrial Co, supra, N L R B v C & C Plywood
Corp, supra, N L R B v Truitt Mfg Co, 351 U S 149
(1956), Federal and State Rules of Procedure dealing with
the subject of "Discovery", and the Federal Freedom of
Information Act of 1966, as amended, 5 U S C Sec 552)
was to reveal fully and candidly the information on which
it relied to single out as "leaders" and fire those of the 28
employees concerned who were not officers or officials of
the Union At the very least, here there was not that "clear
and unmistakable" waiver that the law requires before any
waiver of a statutory right can be said to exist
I find and conclude that on or about August 14, 1971,
and at all times thereafter, the Respondent, in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, refused to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative
of the employees in the appropriate unit found above by
rejecting the Union's request for information with respect
to the specific basis for the discharge of each of the 28
employees listed by name in the August 6 letter who were
not officers of the Union during the strike of July
27-August 5, 1971
C The Threat To Institute Legal Action
As indicated earlier, on September 8, 1971, the same day
the Union filed the charge in Case 10-CA-9194, the
Respondent sent a letter to the Union threatening "to file a
substantial damage suit against" it, unless the charge,
alleging violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in
the refusal to bargain, as well as Section 8(a)(3) and (1) in
the discharge of the 28 employees, were "immediately
withdrawn and other actions by [the] Union in violation of
the Contract to rectify or modify [the] discharges [were]
ceased immediately " The complaint alleges that the threat
in the letter constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act Preliminarily, I am convinced and find from the
timing of the letter in relation to the filing of the charge,
and from the contents of the letter, that the letter was
touched off by the charge and was substantially if not
entirely directed at it
It has already been found that the Union's contractual
undertaking did not prevent it in the circumstances of this
case from seeking to bargain with the Respondent about
the reinstatement of the nonofficers of the Union, or,
related to such bargaining, from obtaining information
from the Respondent as to the specific basis for the
discharge of each of these employees Thus, completely
wanting in substance is the legal foundation asserted in the
letter for the Respondent's threat to institute action against
the Union the Union's ostensible breach of contract in
filing any part of the charge
But there would seem to be a more elementary reason for
rejecting this defense of the Respondent-the Respondent
specifically argues in its brief on this branch of the case
that it did not violate the Act because the charge "was in
violation of [the Union's] contractual commitment" For
I find in agreement with the stipulation of the parties that the
following I1 employees listed by name in the August 6 letter were officers
and officials of the Union during the strike period Ralph Evans Grady E
Loveless Clyde F Rogers George B Allen Jean Baker Bessie Baggett L
C Cooke Jr Lonnie Griffin James L Parker Newton P Wheeler Jr and
1039
assuming, contrary to my finding, that the Union's
contractual undertaking were such that it prohibited in all
respects the Union's filing of the charge with the Board,
that prohibition as a matter of public policy would not be
binding on the Board, nor, it would appear, on the Union
See NLRB v General Motors Corp, 116 F 2d 306,
311-312 (1940) Totally lacking in substance, moreover, is
the Respondent's attempted distinction between a meritori-
ous and an unmeritorious charge "It goes without saying
that the right of access to the Board's processes for
vindication of a statutory violation is fundamental and is
to be kept open without roadblocks or hindrance Neither
employer nor union may restrain, coerce or interfere with
that right, whether or not it deems the charge meritorious
-a question for the Board, not a charged party, to decide
See Local 138, International Union of Operating Engineers,
AFL-CIO (Charles S Skura), 148 NLRB 679, 681 " W T
Grant Company, 168 NLRB 93, 96 (1967) And it does not
matter that, for whatever the reason, the entire proof after
a trial on the merits fails to establish the validity of the
charge Cf Waterman Industries, Inc, 91 NLRB 1041,
1043, fn 8 (1950), Burnside Steel Foundry Company, 69
NLRB 128, 137 (1941), Louis Kramer, et al, 29 NLRB 921,
935 (1941) To permit the charged party to speculate about
the merit or degrees of merit to a charge (the Respondent
suggests it is not unlawful to threaten to sue for the filing of
a charge if the charging party does not have "reasonable
ground to believe" the charge has merit), and on that basis
to restrain and coerce a charging party in the exercise of
the right to file a charge, would be to sanction an
unwarranted intrusion upon that right, founded upon
major public policy, and seriously to freight and weaken it
Just how important is the right to file a charge can be
discerned from the Supreme Court's recent decision in
N L R B v Scrivener, 404 U S 821 (1972), dealing with a
violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act and giving expansive
scope to the protections afforded by that section Quoting
from Nash v Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U S 235,
238 (1967), the Court said "Congress has made it clear
that it wishes all persons with information about [unfair
labor] practices to be completely free from coercion
against reporting them to the Board This is shown by its
adoption of Section 8(a)(4) which makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges And it has been
held that it is unlawful for an employer to seek to restrain
an employee in the exercise of his right to file charges " 404
US 821
To support his contention that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the General Counsel cites as
authority Clyde Taylor, 127 NLRB 103 (1960), in which the
Board held that the employer's threat to institute a libel
action because of the filing of a charge, and unless the
charge were withdrawn, contravened the section In
opposition, the Respondent cites United Aircraft Corpora-
tion (Pratt & Whitney Division), 192 NLRB No 62 (1971),
in which the Board ruled that a threat of civil action in the
Eddie R Gravely I find that with the, possible exception of Bobby C
Shumate as to whose status the parties were in disagreement the remainder
of the 28 employees listed by name in the August 6 letter were not officers or
officials of the Union during the strike period
1040 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
event charges before it were not dropped was not a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) As the Board viewed the facts
in United Aircraft, however, the employer threatened to
proceed with a civil suit only as "part of a good-faith
attempt to negotiate a settlement of the numerous claims
arising out of [a] bitter strike, with each party giving up its
claims against the other " Essentially for this reason it
distinguished its decision in Taylor Here, unlike United
Aircraft, and precisely like Taylor, the threat to bring legal
proceedings was riveted to the notion that the filing of the
charge was itself an invasion of a legal right and itself
constituted a cause of action Unlike United Aircraft, there
was here no implied recognition of the statutory right to
file a charge and in that context a suggested "trade off" or
settlement of conflicting claims growing out of a strike
Instead, the only solution tendered was acceptance of the
ultimatum that the very charge was unlawful and therefore
must be withdrawn, or else face the consequence of a suit
for heavy damages that would deplete the Union's treasury
and thereby adversely affect it and the employees it
represented The threat was thus retaliatory in nature, as in
Taylor, and not remotely connected with a conciliatory
move, as in United Aircraft A direct assault on the right to
file a charge, the threat had a restraining and coercive
effect on the free exercise of that right as guaranteed the
employees and their representative by Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act As Taylor therefore is the apposite precedent, it
will be followed, and not UnitedAircraft
I find, based on Taylor, that the Respondent, by its letter
of September 8, 1971, interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in their right through their bargain-
ing representative to file charges with the Board, and that it
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire
record, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 The Respondent , West Point Pepperell, Inc, is and
at all material times has been an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act
2 The Union, Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO , is and at all material times has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act
3 All production and maintenance employees of the
Respondent at its Lindale , Georgia, plant , including all
plant clerical employees , but excluding all office clerical
employees, professional employees , technical employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act , constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act
4 Since January 4, 1971, the Union has been and is the
certified and exclusive representative of all employees in
the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act
5 By declining on or about August 14, 1971, and at all
times thereafter, to grant the Union's request for informa-
tion with respect to the specific basis for the discharge of
each of the 28 employees listed by name in the Respon-
dent's letter of August 6, 1971, who were not officers of the
Union during the strike of July 27-August 5, 1971, the
Respondent has refused and is refusing to bargain with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its
employees in the appropriate unit, and thereby has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
6 By threatening the Union in the Respondent's letter
of September 8, 1971, that the Respondent would file a
civil damage action against the Union if the Union did not
withdraw the charge filed with the Board in Case
10-CA-9194, the Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced, and is interfering with, restraining,
and coercing, employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
7 The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that
it cease and desist therefrom and from like or related
invasions of the employees' Section 7 rights, and that it
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Act
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended
ORDER6
The Respondent, West Point Pepperell, Inc, Lindale,
Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1 Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the
appropriate unit described in paragraph 3 of the Conclu-
sions of Law
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the
said appropriate unit by declining to grant the Union's
request for information with respect to the specific basis
for the discharge of each of the 28 employees listed by
name in the Respondent's letter of August 6, 1971, who
were not officers of the Union during the strike of July
17-August 5, 1971
(c) Threatening the Union that the Respondent will file a
civil damage action against the Union if the Union does
not withdraw the charge filed with the Board in Case
10-CA-9194
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act
2 Take the following affirmative action which will
effectuate the policies of the Act
6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board the findings its findings conclusions and Order and all objections thereto shall be
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall as provided by Sec deemed waived for all purposes
WEST POINT PEPPERELL, INC 1041
(a) Upon request, bargain with the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the
appropriate unit described in paragraph 3 of the Conclu-
sions of Law
(b) Upon request, furnish the Union with information
with respect to the specific basis for the discharge of each
of the 28 employees listed by name in the Respondent's
letter of August 6, 1971, who were not officers of the Union
during the strike of July 27-August 5, 1971
(c) Post at its plant in Lindale, Georgia, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix "7 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 10, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith 8
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the certified
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all our
employees in the production and maintenance unit
found appropriate by the Board at our Lindale,
Georgia, plant
WE WILL, upon request, furnish Textile Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, with information with
respect to the specific basis for the discharge of each of
the 28 employees we fired on August 6, 1971, who were
not officers of the Union during the strike of July
27-August 5, 1971
WE WILL not threaten Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, that we will file a civil damage
action against the Union if the Union does not
withdraw the charge in Case 10-CA-9194
WE WILL not in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act
WEST POINT PEPPERELL,
INC
(Employer)
7 In the event that the Boards Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals the words in the notice reading Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board shall read Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board
8 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board this
provision shall be modified to read Notify the Regional Director for
Region 10 in wasting within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Peachtree Building, Room
701, 730 Peachtree Street N E, Atlanta, Georgia 30308,
Telephone 404-526-5760
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with Textile