Wayne A. Beebe, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 23, 2002
01A15029 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 23, 2002)

01A15029

09-23-2002

Wayne A. Beebe, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Area), Agency.


Wayne A. Beebe v. United States Postal Service

01A15029

September 23, 2002

.

Wayne A. Beebe,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Great Lakes Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A15029

Agency No. 4-J-606-0317-97

Hearing No. 210-AO-6323X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's final order in the above-entitled matter.

Complainant alleged that he was discriminated against in violation of

Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> on the basis of his disability

(learning disability, organic brain dysfunction) when on he was issued

a letter of removal on July 3, 1997, effective June 27, 1997.

Many of the facts which precipitated the instant complaint are not

disputed. The agency employed complainant as a Christmas Casual on

December 18, 1996. Complainant, who has attention deficit disorder,

brain dysfunction and motor in-coordination, was hired through the

agency's Diversity Development Program. Complainant performed his job

well. Complainant's appointment naturally expired at the conclusion

of two 89-day appointments, on June 27, 1997. Complainant's mother,

and representative, states that the agency promised that complainant's

appointment as a causal would lead to a full-time position. Believing

that complainant was discriminated against as referenced above,

complainant filed a formal complaint of discrimination on September

29, 1997. Following an investigation, complainant requested a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge, who concluded, following a hearing,

that complainant failed to establish that she was discriminated against.

The agency issued a notice of final action dated July 26, 2001, fully

implementing the Administrative Judge's decision.<2> This appeal

followed. For the purpose of the following analysis, we assume, without

finding, that complainant is an individual with a disability within the

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding

regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual

finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

An Administrative Judge's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo

standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

In this case, the agency has articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory

reason for its termination of complainant; namely, that his casual

appointment expired. The Administrative Judge credited the agency's

Manager of Personnel Services' testimony that it was a violation of

the Collective Bargaining Agreement to retain an casual employee beyond

two periods of eighty-nine days. The complainant relies on the alleged

promise made by the agency to retain him in a full time position upon

the expiration of his casual appointment. The agency flatly denies that

such a promise was made. On this evidence it is not possible for us

to conclude that complainant has proven by preponderant evidence that

disability discrimination occurred.

Therefore, after a review of the record in its entirety, including

consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision

of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to affirm the final agency

order because the Administrative Judge's ultimate finding, following

a hearing, that unlawful employment discrimination was not proven by a

preponderance of the evidence, is supported by the record.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 23, 2002

__________________

Date

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992

to apply the standards in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

to complaints of discrimination by federal employees or applicants

for employment.

2 In what appears to be a clerical oversight, the agency's Notice of

Final Action, dated July, 26, 2001, incorrectly states the issues and

bases of complainant's complaint. However, there is sufficient evidence

that the agency was intending to fully implement the Administrative

Judge's final order with respect to the complaint filed under agency

number 4-J-606-0317-97.