Waycross Journal-Herald, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 7, 1966

157 N.L.R.B. 1486 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

1486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
representative of a unit composed of all employees at our St. Louis, Missouri,
facility, except for office clerical and professional employees , guards, and super-
visors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, with respect to rates of
pay, wages , hours of employment , and other conditions of employment; and WE
WILL, if an understanding is reached , embody any such understanding in a signed
agreement.
'WE WILL NOT threaten employees with the loss of privileges , promise them
benefits more favorable than might be achieved through a labor organization,
or promise them or establish a procedure for handling complaints , for the pur-
pose of discouraging self-organization among them.
WE WILL NOT, by any refusal to bargain or in any other manner, interfere
with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to organize;
to form, join, or assist a labor organization ; to bargain collectively through a
bargaining agent chosen by themselves ; to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; or to
refrain from any such activities (except to the extent that the right to refrain is
limited by the lawful enforcement of a lawful union security requirement).
MORRIS NOVELTY CO., INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 4459 Fed-
eral Building , 1520 Market Street, St. Louis, Missouri , Telephone No. Main 2-4142.
Waycross Journal -Herald , Inc. and Savannah Typographical
Union No. 183. Case No. 10-CA-6017. April 7, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 7, 1965, Trial Examiner Jerry B. Stone issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint
and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as
set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the
General Counsel and Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs, and the Respondent filed
a brief in support of the Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision and the entire record in this case, including the
exceptions and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
157 NLRB No. 123.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1487
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order 'dis-
missing the complaint.]
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on March 4, 1965,, by Savannah Typographical Union No.
183 (herein sometimes called the Union or Charging Party), the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 10
(Atlanta, Georgia), issued a complaint dated May 12, 1965, against Waycross
Journal-Herald, Inc. (herein sometimes called Respondent, Employer, or Company),
alleging violations of Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act. Respondent's answer and
concessions at the hearing and in its brief place in issue only the question of whether
the conduct complained of is violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
Pursuant to appropriate notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Jerry B.
Stone at Waycross, Georgia, on June 28, 29, and 30 and July 1 and 2, 1965. All
parties were represented at the hearing, participated therein, and were afforded the
right to present evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to offer oral argu-
ment, and to file briefs. Briefs were filed by all parties and have been considered.
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses, the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and, recommendations are made.'
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER INVOLVED
The facts pertaining to the business of the Employer involved are based upon the
pleadings and admissions therein and are undisputed and are so found.
Waycross Journal-Herald, Inc., is and has been at all times material herein, a
Georgia corporation, with its principal office and place of business at Waycross,
Georgia, where it is engaged in the publishing of a daily, except Sunday, newspaper.
Waycross Journal-Herald, Inc., during the 12 months preceding May 12, 1965,
which period is representative of all times material herein, had a gross volume of
business in excess of $200,000. During this same period Waycross Journal-Herald,
Inc., held membership in, or subscribed to, various interstate news services, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Associated Press and Newspaper Enterprise Association;
published various syndicated features, including, but not limited to, Abigail Van
Buren, James Marlow, Ray Cromley, and Hal Boyle; and advertised various nation-
ally sold products, including, but not limited to, Pontiac, Cadillac, General Electric's
TV and Weathertron, Mary Carter's Paint, Pittsburgh Paints, and Seiberling Tires.
As conceded by the Respondent on the foregoing, it is concluded and found that
Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The facts pertaining to the labor organization involved are based upon the plead-
ings and admissions therein and are undisputed and so found.
Savannah Typographical Union No. 183 is now, and has been at all times mate-
rial herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issues
The issues in this case are essentially (1) whether Respondent has engaged in bad-
faith bargaining while pretending to be engaging in good-faith bargaining, and (2)
whether a strike by employees which commenced on January 6, 1965, was an unfair
labor practice strike or had been converted and prolonged by unfair labor practices.2
1 All credibility resolutions made with respect to the witnesses' testimony are based on
a composite evaluation of witness demeanor and logical consistency of evidence. The
facts are largely undisputed. As to the areas of minor dispute the basis for resolution of
credibility is set out at appropriate points hereinafter.
2I find no merit to Respondent's position in its brief that the issues as to the strike
being caused and prolonged by alleged unfair labor practices are narrowed to a date as of
January 6, 1965.
1488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL, LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B.' Appropriate unit, secret election determination, certification, exclusive bargaining
representative status, and Union's demand for bargaining
The pleadings, admissions therein, and Respondent's concessions at the hearing
and in its brief established, and I so find, the following facts:
All full-time and regular production employees of Respondent at its newspaper
and commercial printing operations plant at Waycross, Georgia, performing work
beginning with the markup of copy and continuing until the finished product is ready
for delivery, but excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, professional
employees, any mailer who is entirely within the area of circulation and distribution,
news department, circulation department, business department, guards, and super-
visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
On August 4, 1964, in an election by secret ballot, conducted under the supervi-
sion of the Regional Director for Region 10 of the Board, a majority of the employ-
ees in the unit described above designated and selected the Union as their repre-
sentative for the purposes of collective bargaining with Respondent with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of
employment.
On August 12, 1964, the Regional Director for Region 10 of the Board certified
the Union as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of all the employees
in the unit described above.
At all times since August 12, 1964, the Union has been, and is, the representative
of a majority of the employees in the unit described above for the purposes of
collective bargaining and, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been, and is, the
exclusive representative of all the employees in the said unit for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining.
On or about September 10, 1964, and at all times thereafter, the Union requested
Respondent to bargain collectively with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of employment with the Union as the
exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit described above.
C. The alleged bad-faith bargaining
The pleadings, statements, and briefs by all counsel, and the overall evidence
reveal that the General Counsel's case is postulated on a theory that the totality of
the Company's conduct at the bargaining sessions and elsewhere reveals that the
Company has bargained in bad faith with the Union since on or about October 1,
1964. As the evidence in General Counsel's case was introduced, it became appar-
ent that many of the proposals and counterproposals differed only in minor degree
and that the negotiators at the sessions had viewed those differences as indications
of bad faith when in fact the differences reflected what appeared to be merely differ-
ent interests. In trials of this nature there are many facts which are relevant but
relatively of insubstantial materiality. On several occasions the parties were advised
to point out in their briefs or statements those points they deemed to be of real per-
suasive value and apparently have done so. The facts, as to the issues involved in
this case, and the evaluation thereof, are herein set out.
1. The question of animus
Supporting the General Counsel's contention as to animus are facts based upon
the credited uncontradicted testimony of Grantham and Smith which establish that
(1) Foreman Black, a few days before the election (held August 4, 1964), stated to
employee Grantham that "the union would never go into the plant because the Journal
Herald would not stand for it," and (2) President and Publisher Williams, in the
first part of December 1964, after interviewing a prospective employee (Ronald
Smith) in his office, took Smith into the plant and introduced him to several employ-
ees, took the prospective employee back to his office, and told him that he would
like Smith to stop in during the latter part of December to get familiar with the
job department. As Smith was leaving, Publisher Williams called him back and told
him that there was one more thing, that some of the boys were wanting a union, and
that he would like to know what Smith thought about it. Smith told Publisher Wil-
liams that he did not know much about the Union and that for the time being he
would be neutral 3
,3 This event was not alleged or litigated as an alleged violation of Section 8(a) (1) but
was litigated only in the nature of background.
WAY CROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC 1489
Also supporting the General Counsel's contention is a statement by Foreman Nuss
to employee Waters around the latter part of October or first of November 1964
made in connection with a discussion of a company notice relating to use of the
telephone Nuss told Waters that he understood that there would be other changes
the employees would not like, that he understood that if employees came in 5 minutes
late they would have to wait until the quarter hour to punch the timeclock
The General Counsel contends that statements made by General Manager Markey
to employee Howell, apparently during the week of November 9 through 14, regard-
ing an incident relating to a question of overtime pay, reveal union animus on the
part of the Employer The General Counsel does not contend otherwise that the
question of overtime pay has any bearing on the incident and all parties stipulated
that the matter of overtime was later settled satisfactorily to all
The General Counsel contends and adduced testimony through witness Howell to
the effect that he ultimately, around November 9, 1964, complained to Markey that
his pay had not been computed correctly and that Office Manager Markey told him
that the Union was not in here yet, and that things were rough but not as rough as
they were going to be Markey's version of the same event was to the effect that
Howell complained about his pay and stated that the Union said he should be paid
time and a half on a daily extra-hours basis, that he (Markey ) told Howell that
Respondent was, as it had been , going by wage and hour laws, and was not under
union laws at the time Markey testified to the effect that he told Howell that the
only way he could figure time and a half was on hours in excess of 40 hours and that
was the way the Respondent had been operating and was going to continue to operate
until such time as it had a contract to do otherwise
From my observation of Howell and Markey s demeanor as witnesses and their
total testimony, I am convinced that both were attempting to tell the truth as they
knew it Markey impressed me as being more complete and objective in his testimony
and I find his version of the incident more complete and reliable than that of Howell's
and credit Markey's version as set out I do not credit Howell's version of the event
to the extent that it is inconsistent with Markey's testimonial version
The Respondent contends that certain of its acts unrelated to the actual bargaining
sessions constitute evidence indicating the Company s good-faith motivation in bar-
gaining These facts which are undisputed are that ( 1) After receiving the Union's
demand for recognition, the Company filed an RM petition with the National Labor
Relations Board designed to determine the question of representation , (2) the Com-
pany entered into a consent-election agreement determining the procedures and elec-
tion arrangements , and (3 ) the bargaining sessions ( 18 in number and each lasting
several hours) were conducted in an atmosphere, without reference to the actual
negotiations , of courtesy and congeniality as might be exhibited by participation in
coffee breaks, etc
In considering all of the facts and contentions in this case , I have considered all
facts in composite relationship with all other facts including the above facts relating
to the Company's propensity to oppose the Union I do not find the evidence of
animus as indicated from the foregoing facts or other facts when considered with all
the evidence in this case as being sufficient to persuade that the Company's bargain-
ing was motivated in bad faith or that the Company has engaged in bad-faith
bargaining
2 Alleged unilateral acts
As indicated previously, the General Counsel contends that the Company engaged
in certain unilateral acts which revealed bad-faith motivation and bad-faith bargain-
ing The facts and evaluation as to these alleged unilateral acts are herein set out
a The alleged unilateral wage increase
Steven V Carter was initially employed by the Respondent in June 1963 Car-
ter s rate of pay when hired was $1 90 per hour which was lower than that of the
other employees doing similar work Carter was told that in January 1964, after he
had proven himself, he would be raised to the wages of the other employees In
January 1964 Carter was raised to $2 05 per hour and the other employees were raised
to $2 10 and $2 15 per hour In June 1964 Carter spoke to Foreman Nuss and com-
plained that he had not received the nickel increase that he was due Foreman Nuss
told Carter that there would be no raises until January 1965, the annual time for
raises
At the December 17, 1964, bargaining session Attorney Bennett told International
Union Representative McFee that the Company would like to give a wage increase
and Christmas bonuses Bennett stated that it had been the custom for the Company
1490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to review employees' wages about the first of the year Bennett stated that the Com
pany had taken a look at the situation and felt that the employees were entitled to a
wage increase Bennett asked if the Union had any objections McFee asked Ben-
nett what wage increase he was talking about, whether 5, 10, or 15 cents an hour,
and whether he had any figure in mind Bennett replied that he did not know, that
it might be 7 cents or it might be more or less, that he thought the Union should
permit the Company to put the increase in
McFee told Bennett that the Union could not agree to the Company's putting in an
unspecified wage increase at this time Bennett replied that he thought the Union
was being unreasonable McFee told Bennett in effect that if the Company were
sincere that it would be easy for the Company to do so by arriving at an agreement
with the Union, that the Union would certainly propose an increase and that if the
parties could speed agreement on the contract the wage increase would then be put
into effect McFee reminded Bennett that this came as a surprise since the Company
had not up to that time made a wage proposal Bennett replied that he still thought
the Union was being unreasonable
McFee told Bennett that as far as the Christmas bonus was concerned, if this had
been past practice the Union had no objection McFee told Bennett that if it were
company policy as a regular thing to give increases, either on the basis of merit or
commensurate with the training of apprentices, which in turn would be commensurate
with their increased skills and advancement in apprenticeship, the Union had no
objection to such increase Bennett told McFee that the Company would be guided
by what the Union had said, that the Christmas bonus would be given
Around the last week in December 1964 Foreman Nuss told Carter that Office
Manager Markey wanted to talk to him about money Carter went to see Markey
Office Manager Markey told Carter it had been brought to his attention that when
Carter was hired in June 1963, he was to have started at $1 90 an hour and when he
had proven himself, by January 1964 at the time of annual raises, he would be
brought (in wages) to the other employees Markey told Carter that since this had
been brought to his attention, he would like to give him the raise Carter received
his raise 4
The evidence does not reveal that the Company consulted with the Union about
Carter s specific wage increase and it is noted that no other employees received wage
increases in January 1965
Considering all of the foregoing facts and circumstances, I find the incident of the
granting of a wage increase to Carter in January 1965 to bring his wage rate in line
with its prior promise to him to have no probative value as evidence relating to the
question of whether the Company has bargained in bad faith or not
b Alleged change in policy relating to discharge-garnishment
The General Counsel contends that she has established that the Company initiated
a change in policy relating to garnishment by commencing a policy of discharging
employees whose wages had been garnisheed
McFee's testimony as to what was said at the October 12, 1964, bargaining ses-
sion relating to the foregoing issue reveals that he made statements of what he under-
stood a foreman had said and done with respect to an employee who had been gar-
nisheed Respondent's counsel objected to this testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay testimony The Charging Party's attorney stated that the testimony was not
proffered for the truth of the matter asserted but merely for the purpose of showing
what was said at the October 12, 1964, session The General Counsel made no com-
ment thereto and obviously revealed concurrence Relying on the foregoing, I over-
ruled the objection to the receipt of such testimony
McFee testified to the effect that he understood that Foreman Johnson had severely
reprimanded employee Carswell Carter concerning a garnishment and had told Car-
ter that the Company had a policy of discharging an employee who had had his wages
garnisheed McFee told Bennett that he understood that Foreman Johnson had told
Carter that the Company had helped him in the past and that what he should do now
was to go to the Union and that he would pretty quick find that the Union would not
help him McFee told the company bargaining representative that Carter had felt
so bad about this that he had not reported back to work 5 McFee told the company
4 Although the specific raise was not revealed, it would appear that the raise brought
Carter's wages in line with the other employees, apparently a nickel increase
'There was no contention by the General Counsel that the evidence reveals that Carter
was discharged
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC 1491
bargaining representative that the matter of discharging an employee was subject
matter for collective bargaining and that to his knowledge, no one had been dis-
charged in the past because of garnishment McFee told the company bargaining
representative that this was a policy of the Company about which the Union knew
nothing McFee told the company bargaining representative that his purpose in
bringing this matter up was to ask the Company to refrain from discussing these
matters with the employees in the future but rather to discuss them at the bargaining
table if this was going to be a cause for discharge
McFee asked Office Manager Markey to explain the situation relating to Carter
Office Manager Markey made an explanation of the Carter situation 6 McFee told
Bennett that they were not sitting as jury and judge to make a determination as to
whether the individual was guilty of anything, that Markey had evidently done a
better job of investigating the matter tnan he had, that the Union did not know for
a certainty that Carter had been discharged, but intended to make a further investi
gation and take the matter up later if needed
The General Counsel questioned McFee as to whether Attorney Bennett had told
him what the policy of the Company was in regard to the discharge for nonpayment
of debt or garnishment McFee testified in effect that Bennett had told him what
such policy was
McFee's testimony in this regard is as set out herewith
He did say that it had been the policy of the company that whenever an
employee had his wages garnisheed, that this was a matter of concern to the
company, and a matter of embarrassment to it, and too that the merchants
would come down and try to enlist their help in the collection of these debts,
and the company had a relationship with the merchants
They just could not afford this sort of thing
I think that they went further, to the extent of saying, I believe, if my memory
serves me correctly, that it was-it was Mr Williams who said that the coin
pany had loaned money to Mr Carter in the past to pay off an original garnish
ment, and that they probably would be stuck with it
So, we told Mr Williams that we did not know anything about that, but
certainly, if Mr Carter owed them any money that we would endeavor to see
that it was paid back
The General Coonsel contends that "Attorney Bennett did not tell McFee the
policy of the Company in regard to discharge for nonpayment of debts or garnish
ment, or deny this unilateral change in working conditions, or submit evidence by
Morris Johnson " Since the evidence relating to what Foreman Johnson allegedly
said was not offered for the truth thereof but merely to -effect what McFee had said
at the bargaining session, it appears that General Counsel is contending that statements
made or not made by Attorney Bennett and Respondent's representatives reveal in
effect an admission of the truth of the statements asserted by McFee I am not
persuaded, under all the circumstances, that McFee s recitation of what Bennett said
reveals fully or reasonably clearly what Bennett had stated was company policy
Accordingly, I do not find that the General Counsel has established what the Com-
pany's policy was or is I find and conclude that the General Counsel has not estab-
lished that the Company made a unilateral change in its policy relating to garnishments
Although not argued in General Counsel's brief, in view of arguments made as to
the totality of the evidence, I conclude and find that when the Union mentioned bar-
gaining about the Carter matter, the Company expressed willingness to do so There
is no evidence that this matter was ever brought up later, except possibly by McFee's
arguments that the Company had refused to bargain by making unilateral changes
I find nothing in the evidence relating to garnishment or the Carswell Carter matter
to reveal the Company's bad faith in bargaining
c Alleged change in telephone policy
The General Counsel contends that around October 1964 the Company changed
its policy relating to use of the telephone by employees
6 There is no eN idence of the explanation that Markey made to McFee The Respondent
did however offer into evidence a separation notice which referred to the fact that a
garnishment had been served on Carter that Carter had been asked to go by the "J P "
and straighten the matter out, that the "J P " called and Carter's money was released
to him, and that Carter had later picked up his money and informed the bookkeeper that
he was working elsewhere and would not be back
221-3 74-66-vol 15 7-9 5
1492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The facts are undisputed that prior to sometime in July 1964 the company policy
relating to employee use of telephone was as follows- If the switchboard operator for
the Company received a telephone call for an employee, the switchboard operator
walked to the composing room door and called for the' employee. The employee
thereupon went to the circulation department and used the telephone The facts
are disputed as to whether the Company posted a notice on its bulletin board relating
to the use of telephone in July 1964 or around the latter part of November 1964.
The notice as posted was to the following effect:
All outgoing calls made by employees, will be made on employees' own time,
except in cases where an emergency exists.
Phone numbers or messages will be taken for employees on incoming calls and
passed on to employees, except in cases of emergency when it is imperative that
the employee be called to the phone.
By order:
Management, Waycross
Journal Herald
The General Counsel attempted to fix the timing of the posting of the notice or
change in policy through witnesses Linton E. Waters and Ida Elizabeth Sutton.
Waters' testimony, construed as a whole, was to the effect that he checked the bulletin
board daily and did not see a copy of the notice on the bulletin board until around
the latter part of October 1964.7
Sutton's ultimate testimony revealed that she was cognizant of a change in the
telephone policy around October 21, 1964, because of the manner in which she
received information about a telephone call at that time, that prior to that time she
could not specifically recall her last telephone call received at the Company.
The facts are undisputed that after the Company initially changed its telephone
policy, messages of telephone calls were given to the employees by the switchboard
operator or the foreman until around November 1, 1964, when the messages were left
on a hook placed next to the bulletin board.
Waters testified to the effect that toward the latter part of October 1964 or first part
of November 1964 he had a conversation with Foreman Nuss about the company
telephone policy.8 Waters' testimony is revealed by the following excerpts from the
record in this proceeding:
The latter part of October or early November, I talked to Mr. Nuss in the wash-
room, and asked him what was this new policy on phone calls, that I noticed that
people were not getting them, and it disturbed me, because I had small children
at home and a wife, and I wanted to be in contact with them if any emergency
came up.
He went on to say that he knew the people were getting upset about it, but it
was not the switchboard operator's idea or his, that she had been given instruc-
tions not to call anyone out of the composing room unless it was an emergency.
Q. What did you say to him?
A. Well, I told him that if this was the company policy, why didn't they put a
notice on the bulletin board, or something, to let us know what the situation was.
We didn't know what it was, and we were concerned about it.
Q. What did he reply, if anything?
A. Well, he went on and continued the conversation that a few people were
having to suffer because of one or two.
He understood if the union got a contract, why, there would be other changes
that we might not like.
He went on and said he understood-
Q. He stated that to you?
A. Yes, he stated that.
He said that he understood that if people came in five minutes late to work,
they would have to wait until the quarter hour was up to punch the clock.
McFee raised the question of telephone privilege at the December 17, 1964, bar-
gaining session. McFee related to Bennett that the employees had informed him that
their longstanding telephone privileges had been removed, that now messages were
taken and hung on an undefined hook in the production department and that the
employees only learned of their telephone messages by accident. Bennett told McFee
7 As indicated later I credit Williams' and Nuss' testimony to the effect that the notice
relating to telephone usage was posted in July 1964.
s Waters testified that this conversation took place after he learned of the way Sutton
received a telephone call on October 21, 1964.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1493
that the Company had a right to change such privileges when there was a misuse of the
privilege. McFee asked Bennett what was the misuse of the privilege. Bennett
replied that a number of the employees had been making an undue number of outside
calls, and had also received calls in the plant, and as a result the Company had seen
fit and considered it necessary to change this practice. McFee asked Bennett who the
employees were that were misusing the telephone privilege. Attorney Bennett told
McFee that Zeigler had made a number of telephone calls, including two long-distance
calls. McFee told Bennett that not only had the Company instructed the switchboard
operator to stop giving employees their telephone calls but evidently had instructed
the operator to monitor the calls. Office Manager Markey told McFee that the
switchboard operator had not been given instructions about monitoring calls and that
the Company knew nothing about it. McFee told Markey that if the calls were sepa-
rated as to local and long-distance calls and who made them somebody was bound to
have instructed the operator to monitor the calls.
Attorney Bennett said that it did not make any difference, the calls were made and
the Respondent had decided to eliminate the privilege. McFee told Bennett that he
might not be aware of it but the calls that Zeigler had made were the result of
Bennett's calls to Zeigler in connection with setting up a bargaining session 9 Bennett
replied that he had Zeigler's permission to call him. McFee told Bennett that he
failed to see where this had anything to do with it, that the long-distance calls Zeigler
made were for the purpose of setting up bargaining sessions . McFee asked Bennett if
he could name anyone else who had misused the telephone privilege. Bennett told
McFee that offhand he could not think of anyone. McFee asked Bennett if the
Company under these circumstances would withdraw their telephone restrictions and
reinstate the telephone privileges. McFee told Bennett that the employees had
enjoyed these privileges over a long period of time and that he felt the privileges
should be reinstated.
Attorney Bennett told McFee that the company decision (about telephone restric-
tions) stood and that they did not want to make an issue of this. Union Representa-
tive McFee told Bennett that whether he wanted to make an issue of the matter or not,
Bennett had made an issue of it, that this involved a practice,and policy enjoyed by
the employees in the past and the Union felt this was a matter of collective bargain-
ing. McFee wrote out a proposal to the following effect:
Section 4, art. II Submitted 12-17-64
The employer agrees to place a telephone in the production department for. the
use of production department employees.
McFee handed the foregoing proposal relating to telephone usage to Bennett. Attor-
ney Bennett read the proposal and indicated that he was not going to discuss the
proposal.
At the bargaining session of February 26, 1965, the parties again discussed the
Union's proposal relating to usage of the telephone Company President Williams
stated that the rule had been placed in effect because of misuse of the telephone and
that the Company thought it had a right to do it. McFee told the Company that this
was a change in condition of employment and that the Union wanted to discuss the
matter. Bennett told McFee that the Company was not going to discuss the matter
because it had a perfect right to make the change.
The factual dispute centers around the timing of the posting of the Company's
notice relating to use of the telephone. Foreman Nuss credibly testified to the effect
that he posted a notice relating to telephone usage in July 1964, before the union elec-
tion, and that the notice remained on the bulletin-board until the last of the year and
that the notice disappeared about that time. Nuss credibly testified on cross-
examination that he could not remember the wording of the notice word by word but
that he remembered the substance of the notice. Nuss credibly testified to the effect
that the substance of the notice was the same as Waters had testified to. President
Williams credibly testified to the effect that the Company had been having trouble
with telephone calls (by employees) during business hours and had warned the
employees, that the warning had done no good, and that Foreman Nuss posted a
notice the substance of which was to the same effect as testified to by Nuss and
Waters.10 President Williams credibly testified to the effect that he saw the telephone
notice posted on the bulletin board in July 1964.
9 Considering the evidence as a whole , this is with apparent reference to the setting
up of the October 12 and 13 bargaining sessions
10 General Counsel witness Waters had testified that the written language on General
Counsel's Exhibit 30 was the wording of the telephone notice as posted . The exhibit was
not identified as the "notice" posted but merely as containing the words that were on
the posted notice.
1494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As indicated, I credit the testimony of Nuss and Williams as to the time that the
notice relating to the usage of the telephone was posted. I am convinced that Waters,
Sutton, Nuss, and Williams were all attempting to tell the truth as each knew it.
All of the forenamed witnesses appeared frank, forthright, truthful, and honest in
their testimony. The testimony of Nuss and Williams as to the timing of the posting,
however, appeared more sure and reliable as to the event. McFee's testimony as to
what was said at the December 17, 1964, bargaining session would appear to indicate
that the parties were discussing a recent change and that Ziegler's use of the telephone
between October 1 and 13, 1964, was the cause of such change Considering the
ring of sureness of Nuss and Williams in their testimony as to the timing of the post-
ing, I am of the opinion that the parties' statements at the December 17, 1964, bar-
gaining sessions encompassed reasons pertaining to incidents before and after July
1964 for the institution of the change in condition Considering the evidence in total,
I am absolutely convinced that the testimony of Nuss and Williams as to the timing
of the posting of the notice is reliable and I have so credited their testimony. Finding
Waters' and Sutton's testimony as to the timing of the posting of the telephone notice
not to be reliable to the extent that it was to the effect that the notice was posted in
October 1964, their testimony is discredited in that respect.
Conclusions as to Alleged Change in Telephone Policy
As to the General Counsel's contention that the policy reflected by the posted
telephone notice reflected a unilateral change in conditions violative of Section
8(a) (5) of the Act, the facts reveal that the change occurred in July 196411 and
prior to either the NLRB election wherein the union majority status was determined
(August 4, 1964) or the certification of the Union (August 12, 1964). The facts do
reveal that in October 1964 the Company commenced leaving messages relating to
telephone calls on a hook next to the bulletin board instead of the personal notifica-
tion to the employee.12 All changes of any nature would appear to have some effect
on an employee's working conditions and to some extent might be arguably better
or worse than the old conditions 13 I am not convinced that the change relating to
usage of a hook upon which to leave telephone messages constitutes a unilateral
change in working conditions within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
As to General Counsel's contentions that the Company has refused to bargain with
respect to the matter of the telephone notice, the facts reveal that the parties dis-
cussed the problems and practices and adequately set forth their reasons for their
contentions. The evidence does not reveal that the Company bargained in bad faith
with respect to proposals relating to usage of the telephone. I so conclude and find.
3. In general ; the bargaining
A consideration of the composite credited aspects of the testimony of McFee,
Markey, McKinney, and Williams, stipulations and the various written proposals and
evaluation of the specific incidents contended by the General Counsel and Respond-
ent as having bearing on the question of good or bad faith reveal that the summa-
tion of bargaining position by the parties is proper as set forth in the following
paragraphs.
On October 1, 1964, the union negotiator for 1 hour and 45 minutes explained the
proposed union contract to Attorney Pedrick (sitting in for Bennett who was ill),
and the latter made notes thereof.
On October 12 and 13, November 10 and 11, and December 1, 1964, the parties
discussed the Union's contract proposal. Union Representative McFee explained
the Union's position or interpretation of the various paragraph sections in the Union's
proposal and Company Representative Bennett indicated those areas where the
Company agreed, agreed in principle, had little objection, or opposed. On Decem-
ber 1 the parties completed discussion of the Union's contract proposal except for
major economic issues such as wages and agreed to go back through the Union's
proposal to attempt to reach agreement on noneconomic matters. It may be sum-
marized that the company negotiator, Bennett, had indicated that the Company had
11 The only issues in this case concern simple pleadings to the effect that Respondent
has refused to bargain in good faith since on or about October 1, 1964. All parties were
on notice that the pleadings would be strictly construed.
12 Apparently the messages were that someone had telephoned and left a telephone
number to call.
18 The notice posted by Respondent concerning the change in policy on telephone calls
showed that emergency calls could still be made and received.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1495
no serious disagreement or objection to the Union's preamble clause, to recognition
of the Union, to a clause pertaining to noninterference with the operation of the
union chapel, and to a clause relating to sanitation . Although Bennett indicated
some lack of complete agreement as to certain other clauses, he indicated that there
should be little difficulty to the parties reaching agreement on substantially similar
clauses. Among these clauses of indicated possible agreement were the ones relating
to a joint standing committee, holiday clause, call-back pay clause, jury pay clause,
seniority as applied to decrease-in-force clause, discharge and appeal fights clauses,
vacations, priority (seniority) clause, sick leave, funeral leave, hospital plan, joint
apprentice committee, and related clauses. Bennett indicated that "holiday" clauses
were to be contingent upon the ultimate wage agreement. Bennett indicated that the
Company was opposed to agreeing that employees in the unit were either journey-
men or apprentices, that the Company was strongly opposed to clauses requiring
work to be reproduced, that the Company opposed setting up the production depart-
ment under a foreman who had to be a member of the Union, that the Company
opposed incorporating the General Laws of the International Typographical Union
in the contract by reference, that the Company opposed certain clauses relating to
not requiring employees to perform "locked out" or "struck work" or to cross cer-
tain authorized picket lines, that the Company opposed changing from a week of
six shifts to five shifts, that the Company opposed limitation on the right to employ
employees for less than a full shift, opposed language relating to "civil rights" and
company rules, and that the Company opposed severance pay and a pension plan.
As to certain items in the Union's proposals, the discussion thereto had apparently
revealed that the Union would accept the Company's present practice. Thus the
Union indicated willingness to accept the Company's sick leave or injury compen-
sation practice. As to actual concession, however, the Union's only point of con-
cession appears to be that the Union was willing to decrease its overtime rate demand
from double time to time and a half. The Union also expressed willingness to add
language in several places to reveal that the meaning of agreement to certain clauses
depended on agreement to other clauses, or to qualify its proposal relating to work-
ing less than a full shift in extreme situations.14
On December 17, 1964, the Company requested the right to determine and grant
a wage increase around the first of the year. The company negotiator would not
indicate exactly how much the wage increase would be but asserted that the Com-
pany felt the employees were entitled to a wage increase. The union negotiator
opposed an unbargained wage increase and stated in effect that as soon as a contract
was reached it would appear that a wage increase would be included.
On December 30 Company Negotiator Bennett and Union Negotiator McKinney
discussed certain sections of the General Laws of the International Typographical
Union.
On December 31 the parties discussed certain contract proposals that the Company
had submitted on November 11 and December 17, 1964, relating to a no-strike
clause, leave-of-absence clauses,, management rights, and operation of the production
department. On December 31 Union Negotiator McFee indicated to the Com-
pany that he felt that the Company was bargaining in bad faith and that unless a
meeting date could be agreed to before January 13, 1965, a strike would ensue.
An earlier meeting date was not agreed to and certain of the Company's employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit went out on strike on January 6, 1965.
On January 13, 1965, at a bargaining session attended by a Federal mediator,
Company Negotiator Bennett stated in effect that the Company was not rejecting
any proposal but was offering a complete proposal of its own. The company pro-
posal in effect included the substance of its various proposals submitted on Novem-
ber 11 and December 17, 1964, plus other clauses. Some of the other proposed
clauses related to recognition of the Union, hours of work, overtime rates, call-back
pay, vacation proposal, suspension and discharge, joint standing committee, current
wage rates and classification, apprentice clauses, and sick leave. The Company's
January 13, 1965, proposal did not have clauses similar to the union proposal relat-
ing to the operation of the union chapel, to sanitation, or to jury pay. Nor were
the Company's proposed work rules attached thereto.
The negotiating sessions of January 13 and 14 and February 4 and 5 concerned
the discussion of the Company's January 13 proposal and certain other related pro-
posals of the Union and the Company. The parties indicated their agreement on
14 M1cFee's testimony as to qualifying a proposal in extreme circumstance was with
reference to "call back" pay. I am convinced from reading the proposal that he was
referring to the "full shift" proposal.
1496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the use of the union proposal 's introductory language , on call-back pay , on the fact
that employees would be employed full shifts except in emergency , on work rules,
and a lunch period for employees . As to many areas of the contract proposals, it
appeared that there was no disagreement in major principle but only as to certain
specific points . There appeared to be major areas of disagreement as to the union
clauses requiring reproduction of items, to the Company's management rights type
clauses, to incorporating the General Laws of the ITU by reference , to overtime
computed on a daily basis, to suspension of employees , and to no-strike, no-lockout
provisions.
The Union' s original proposal contained a wage proposal relating to a 371/2-hour
week which for the top paid employees reflected a weekly increase (on the basis of
the same hours ) of approximately 50 percent. The top paid employees ' current
weekly wage rate for 371/2 hours was $ 80 as compared to the Union's proposed rate
of $120. The Union on February 5 reduced its wage proposal in effect to a weekly
wage (371/2 hours ) of $118.
At the sessions between February 5 and June 17 the parties discussed , among other
items, proposals relating to joint standing committees , to use of a bulletin board,
and to no-strike , no-lockout clauses. During the sessions Company Negotiator Ben-
nett argued against the Union's contract proposal on the basis that it was antiquated
particularly with respect to the reproduction clauses and argued against incorpo-
rating by reference the General Laws of the International Union. Bennett stated in
support of the Company' s proposal that it contained some clauses similar to a
Charleston, West Virginia, ITU local union contract . McFee , the union negotiator,
argued that the Charleston contract was not an ITU-approved contract.
At some place in the bargaining , apparently in May 1965, Bennett requested
McFee to go over the proposals and to attempt to consolidate the points of agree-
ment as to both proposals.15
In summary as of the end of the June 17 bargaining session the parties appeared
(1) to be strongly opposed to each other over management rights, reproduction pro-
posals, no-strike, no-lockout proposals , (2) to be slowly agreeing to an apprentice-
ship proposal and to procedures to handle grievances , ( 3) to have agreed on some
minor provisions such as jury pay, call-back pay, and recognition clauses, and
(4) to have made little progress on the economic issues overall.
4. Scheduling of meetings
The General Counsel contends that the Company's conduct with respect to avail-
ability for and the scheduling of bargaining sessions reveals bad-faith motivation
and bad-faith bargaining . The essential facts with respect to the scheduling of bar-
gaining sessions and the evaluation of such facts are herein set out.
The representation election conducted by the Board among the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit was held on August 4, 1964 . Shortly after the election
International Representative McFee (who represented the Local Union in negotia-
tions herein) asked Attorney Bennett and Publisher Williams for the Company to
agree to setting the time for starting negotiations . Attorney Bennett informed
McFee that he preferred to wait for the certification of the Union and that a bar-
gaining session could be arranged later. On September 12, 1964 , pursuant to instruc-
tions from McFee , President McKinney of the Local Union submitted copies of a
proposed contract for study . Thereafter and prior to October 1 the parties agreed
to meet for the first bargaining sessions on October 1 and 2.
The parties stipulated to various bargaining sessions , dates, and the hours con-
sumed therein. Publisher Williams credibly testified to the effect that the bargain-
ing sessions held and the hours utilized therein were agreed upon prior to each
session . McFee credibly testified to the effect that after bargaining commenced that
the starting time was changed from 2 to 2 : 30 p.m. to allow bargaining committee
employee members additional time between worktime and bargaining and that on
December 1, 1964, the parties agreed to extend the ending time of each session from
5 to 5:30 p.m. The stipulation reveals that on February 25, 1965, the ending time
was extended to 6 p .m. The evidence is undisputed that scheduled meetings for
December 2 and for February 25 and March 18 and 19 were canceled for reasons
ss I credit Williams' testimony to the above extent. McFee denied that such a request
was made. I am convinced that in general both McFee and Williams attempted to tell
the truth as they knew it. I am convinced that in recollecting many bargaining sesssions
and the details thereof including instances where the parties became-aroused as to their
respective interests that McFee has honestly forgotten such a request Under such cir-
cumstances I discredit McFee's denial as to this point.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1497
clearly not attributable to the Company but primarily because of problems besetting
the Union. Considering the stipulation and the credited testimony of the witnesses,
the following resume of scheduled meetings and hours, meetings held and/or can-
celed is herein found to constitute the facts and is set out therewith.
SCHEDULED-CANCELED-HELD
Time scheduled Time held
October 1----- 2 15-4 p in ------- 2 15-4 p m.
2----- Unknown ------- Canceled by Company 16
12---- 2-5-------------- 2-5;
13_____ 230-5 ----------- 230-5
November 10 ----- 230-5 ----------- 230-5
11_____ 230-5 ----------- 230-5 17
December 1----- 230-530 --------- 2 30-5 30
2----- 230-530 --------- Canceled by Union 18
17_____ 2.30-530 --------- 2 30-5 30
30 ----- 230-530 --------- 2 30-5 30
31 ----- 230-530 --------- 2 30-5 30
January 13 ----- 330-530 --------- 2 30-5 30
14 ----- 230-530 --------- 2 30-5 30
February 4----- 230-530 --------- 2 30-5 30
5----- 230-530 --------- 2 30-5 30
25_____ 230-600 --------- Canceled by Union 19
26 ----- 230-600 --------- 2 30-6 00
March 18_____ 230-600 --------- Canceled by Union w
19 ----- 2 30-6 00_ ------ Canceled by Union.20
May 27 ----- 230-600 --------- 230-600
28 ----- 230-600 --------- 2.30-6 00.
June 16_____ 230-600 --------- 230-600
230-600 --------- 2 30-6 00
The parties met at the Ware Hotel in Waycross, Georgia, on October 1, 1964.
This bargaining session commenced at 2:15 p.m. and ran until 4 p.m. Attorney
Pedrick, a member of Attorney Bennett's law firm, appeared for the Respondent
and informed McFee, chief negotiator for the Union, that Bennett was sick, that in
order not to waste time the Union could explain its proposal, that he would take
notes and turn the notes over to Bennett who would appear for the Respondent later
in negotiations. McFee went through the contract proposal making explanations as
Pedrick took notes. McFee then suggested that Respondent continue bargaining, as
scheduled originally, on October 2, with Pedrick substituting for Bennett 21 Pedrick
10 It is clear that Bennett was the Company's chief negotiator and spokesman and there
is no suggestion that the reason offered for cancellation-Bennett's illness-was not
bona fide.
"The parties' stipulation reflected some uncertainty as to whether the sessions went to
5:30 p.m. on November 10 or 11, 1964. McFee credibly testified to the effect of the
change in ending time from 5 to 5:30 p in. as occurring on December 1.
"It is clear that McFee was the Union's chief negotiator and spokesman and there is
no suggestion that the reason offered for cancellation-McFee's other conflicts-was not
bona fide McFee offered to allow McKinney and the union committee to continue negotia-
tions. The facts clearly reveal, however, that both parties were agreeable to the
cancellation.
10 There is no suggestion that McFee's reasons for cancellation-weather and transporta-
tion problems-were not bona fide.
20 There is no suggestion that the Union's reasons for cancellation-illness in McFee's
family and negotiation conflicts by McKinney-were not bona fide.
21 Throughout negotiations, except for October 1, Bennett was Respondent's chief negotia-
tor and spokesman. The other members of Respondent's negotiating team throughout
negotiations were Publisher and President Williams and Office Manager Markey. The
Union's chief negotiator and spokesman at all negotiating meetings except on December 30
was Donald McFee. On December 30 President McKinney of the Local Union was chief
negotiator and spokesman. Employees Junior Grantham, Earl Waters, and J. W. Zeigler
along with McKinney and McFee composed the Union's negotiating team.
1498 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Williams asserted that they preferred to wait to negotiate until Attorney Bennett
was able to participate. The scheduled meeting of October 2 was not held. The
parties tentatively agreed to meet on October 12 and 13 and later confirmed the
agreement.
The parties met on October 12 and 13.22 Apparently on October 12 the parties
agreed to move the starting time for the sessions from 2 to 2: 30 so as to allow
employee bargaining members to have time for lunch after getting off work at 2 p.m.
At the end of the October 13 bargaining sessions the parties agreed upon meeting
dates of November 10 and 11.23 On November 11 toward the end of the session
McFee asked Bennett if the Company could cut down the spread between meetings
and meet the following week. Bennett conferred with Williams and Markey and
told McFee that he could not. McFee asked about the next week. Bennett told
McFee that December 1 and 2 were the first available dates.24
During the bargaining session on December 1, McFee told Bennett that the change
in starting time (agreed to on October 12, from 2 to 2:30 p.m., for the convenience
of the employee members of the bargaining committee) resulted in an elimination
of 30 minutes from bargaining time. McFee asked Bennett about the possibility of
longer sessions , morning sessions , and night sessions . Markey stated that the Com-
pany had a paper to get out and Bennett stated that it was not his practice to have
night sessions. Bennett stated that the Respondent might bargain until 6 p.m.
Bennett consulted with Publisher Williams who stated that he had to be home by
6 p.m. but could probably stay until 5:30 p in. Bennett told McFee that the Com-
pany was agreeable to extending the bargaining time to 5:30 p.m. Toward the end
of the bargaining session McFee informed Bennett that he had a conflict in his plans
and desired to be excused from bargaining on December 2; that if the Company
wanted to meet, McKinney and the committee could meet and bargain with the
Company. Bennett told McFee that it would be all right to cancel the meeting,
that he had some work he had to do. The parties agreed on future meeting dates
of December 17, 30, and 31.25
The parties met on December 17 as scheduled. Prior to the scheduled meeting
on December 30 McKinney, for the Union, telephoned Bennett for the Company,
and informed him that McFee would not be able to attend the bargaining session
because his plane had been grounded. The parties met on December 30 with
McKinney handling the negotiations for the Union. The parties again met, as
scheduled, on December 31 with McFee back as the principal negotiator for the
Union.
Toward the end of the December 31 bargaining session , Bennett asked when the
Union wanted to meet again. McFee stated that the Union would like to meet the
next day (January 1, 1965). Bennett told McFee that the day mentioned was a
holiday and the Company did not want to meet on a holiday. McFee argued that
the plant was working and that he was sure Markey and Williams would be there.
23 Publisher Williams credibly testified to the effect that the meetings held and the hours
observed were agreed upon. McFee credibly testified pertaining to a change in the sched-
uled hours from 2 to 5 p in., to 2: 30 to 5: 30 p.m. Based upon a composite evaluation of
the stipulations of the parties and the credited testimony of the witnesses, elsewhere I
have set out the agreed scheduled meetings and scheduled hours, as well as the cancella-
tions thereof of certain meetings.
21 Although McFee impressed me as a credible witness in general, I am convinced that
he confused the arrangements for the November 10 and 11 meetings with the arrangements
on December 1 for the later meetings in December. According to McFee, on October 13,
the second meeting at which Bennett appeared and in actuality a part of the October 12
and 13 meetings, McFee complained that on prior occasions he had tried to get the Com-
pany to meet longer and suggested a break and a night session. I am convinced that
McFee has confused the meeting dates.
21 Williams testified that it was after the first of the year (1965) when McFee requested
"more" meetings. I am convinced that both McFee and Williams attempted to tell the
truth as they knew it I am convinced that Williams might not construe this incident
as more than normal discussion relating to the next session date. I credit McFee's
version as indicated.
2 Williams testified to a scheduled meeting on December 18, 1964. McFee credibly testi-
fied that no meeting was scheduled for December 18. ' A letter from Bennett to McFee,
dated April 14, 1965, referred to specific meetings canceled prior to that date and omitted
reference to December 18, 1964. I am convinced that Williams' memory to this point is
inaccurate.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1499
Bennett stated that it was a holiday and that he did not want to meet on a holiday.
McFee asked Bennett about meeting on Saturday, January 2. Bennett told McFee
that he tried to confine himself to Monday through Friday and that he could not
meet then. McFee asked about a meeting that night. Markey stated that he could
not meet that night, that he was going to a church meeting. McFee commenced a
long discussion of how he evaluated the company conduct and the status of negotia-
tions. Ultimately McFee asked when a meeting could be arranged. Bennett sug-
gested a date around January 11. McFee could not accept this date and the parties
ultimately agreed to future bargaining dates of January 13 and 14, 1965.
The parties met on January 13 and 14. Toward the end of the January 14 bar-
gaining session the parties discussed the time for the next meeting. McFee asked for
a meeting within a few days. Bennett, after consultations with Williams, stated that
the earliest available dates were February 4 and 5. The parties agreed to these
dates. The parties met on February 4 and 5. At the February 5 meeting the parties
agreed to meet on February 25 and 26 and apparently to extend the hours of nego-
tiation so as to be 2:30 to 6 p.m.
The scheduled meeting of February 25 was not held because McFee could not
attend as a result of a grounded airplane. The parties met on February 26 and at
the end of the session decided to meet on March 18 and 19, 1965.
The scheduled meetings of March 18 and 19 were not held because McFee and
McKinney (for the Union) could not attend. There was illness in McFee's family
and McKinney was involved in negotiations elsewhere. The Union notified the
Company on March 18 through Zeigler, an employee member of the bargaining
committee, that the March 18 meeting was canceled.
On March 19 Zeigler notified Publisher Williams that the March 19 meeting was
canceled and asked about arranging an early meeting date. Zeigler and Williams
went to Attorney Bennett's office and Zeigler told Bennett of the reasons for the
canceled meeting and gave Bennett suggested dates for the week of March 29, 1965.
Bennett and Williams discussed the matter and Bennett told Zeigler that because of
personal appointments the week of March 29 would have to be omitted. Zeigler
gave a suggested date in the week of April 5. Bennett and Williams were agreeable
to April 8 and 9, but said they would have to confer with Office Manager Markey.
Attorney Bennett called Markey and discussed the matter with Markey. Apparently
Markey was opposed to the April 8 and 9 dates and gave Bennett reasons therefor.
Bennett told Markey that he knew he did not have to meet now, that he was not to let
anything go undone . Williams asked Zeigler when McFee had to know and Zeigler
said as soon as possible. As they left Bennett's office, Williams told Zeigler that he
would let him know by 12:30. At 12.30 of that day Zeigler saw Williams, appar-
ently leaving the plant, and Williams did not speak to him about the matter. On
Saturday, March 20, at 12:30 p.m. Zeigler saw Williams and asked him what the
Company had decided about a meeting. Publisher Williams told Zeigler that since
the dates were prior to Easter he could not see how they could meet, that Zeigler
should see Bennett . Zeigler called Bennett that night, apparently at home, and asked
him about the meeting dates. Bennett told Zeigler that he did not have his work
calendar with him, that Zeigler should call him Monday. On Monday, March 22,
Bennett telephoned Zeigler and told Zeigler that he was trying to contact Federal
Mediator Kazin 26 and that a tape-recorded answer in Kazin's office 27 stated that
Kazin was in Savannah, Georgia, and that he could not reach Kazin. Bennett stated
that he was mailing out suggested dates to the parties concerned and that Zeigler
should get his the next day.
Attorney Bennett transmitted, on March 23, a letter to Federal Mediation Com-
missioner Kazin, McFee, and Zeigler. Bennett's letter referred to the canceled
March 18 and 19 meetings, to Zeigler's request for a new bargaining date, to Ben-
nett's inability to contact Kazin, and to a business trip on March 24 necessitating the
letter approach . Bennett's letter referred to his engagements during the week of
March 29 to the 2 weeks prior to April 18 being in the Easter season and being busy
weeks for the Company, and to Bennett' s engagements during the weeks of April 19
and 26. Bennett 's letter suggested as the first available dates as being on May 6 and
7, 1965.
2' Kazin had been involved in the meetings from January 13, 1965, on.
2 'Apparently, from Bennett's letter of March 23, Kazin's office was in Jacksonville,
Florida.
1500 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
McFee replied by a letter of April 7, which set forth in effect that McFee recog-
nized that Easter was a busy season but that a delay of lih months in the negotiating
period was unreasonable. McFee's letter constituted an argument that Bennett and
Williams had indicated no objection to early April when contacted by Zeigler.
McFee's letter proposed bargaining dates on April 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20, 1965.
Bennett, by letter dated April 14, replied to McFee's letter of April 7. Bennett's
letter reiterated the Easter problem and referred to a wage and hour investigation
currently underway at the Company. Bennett's letter referred to the cancellation of
meetings by the Union and reiterated the proposal of May 6 and 7, 1965, as being
the first available dates for bargaining.
McFee, by letter dated May 7, replied to Bennett's letter of April 14, setting forth
that the Union was unable to meet with the Respondent on May 6 and 7 because of
commitments with Region 11 of the NLRB, that Federal Mediation Commissioner
Kazin had advised the Respondent of this and had suggested numerous dates prior to
May 27 and 28, that the Union would appreciate a reconsideration of future dates;
however, that the Union would confirm the bargaining dates of May 27 and 28,
1965. McFee's letter also stated that with rare exception as to the aborted hearing
dates the Local Union scale committee either met with the Company or offered to
do so.
The parties met on May 26 and 27 as scheduled. Toward the end of the May 27
session, around 6 p.m., McFee asked Bennett if the parties could meet longer or pos-
sibly have a night session. Bennett told McFee that they could not do so. McFee
asked Bennett as to setting up the next session whether it was possible to have an
afternoon and night session. Bennett stated that this might be done and then stated
that the Company could not, that they would meet from 2:30 to 6 p.m., and that the
Company was unavailable until June 17 and 18, 1965. McFee asked Bennett to set
the meetings earlier. Bennett told McFee that the Respondent had commitments
and could not meet earlier. McFee told Bennett that he had a conflict on June 18,
and Bennett agreed to meetings on June 16 and 17.
The parties met on June 16 and 17 as scheduled. Toward the end of the meeting
the parties discussed arrangements for the next meeting and agreed to meet on July 21
and 22. McFee asked Bennett if the parties could meet longer or have a night ses-
sion. Bennett told McFee that they could not, that they had said that they would
meet from 2:30 to 6 p.m. McFee asked Bennett about longer sessions on July 21
and 22. Bennett replied that the Company had agreed to meet on July 21 and 22,
and would not meet longer than 2.30 to 6 p.m., that McFee could put this in his
notes.
In the meantime the General Counsel had issued complaint in the instant case,
setting the hearing to start on June 28, 1965.
Considering the Company's conduct as a whole as revealed by the foregoing and
all of the evidence in this case, I am not convinced that the Company's conduct
relating to the scheduling of the bargaining sessions reveals that the Company was
bargaining in bad faith with the Union. It is noted that the Company canceled only
I bargaining meeting out of a total of 23 scheduled meetings and that the reason
for such cancellation appeared genuine. There is nothing revealed by the evidence
to indicate that the Company's refusal of other suggested dates or proposal of dates
or proposal of bargaining hours on its own was not dictated by legitimate and bona
fide reasons. The evidence reveals that Respondent was cooperative as to adjust-
ments regarding union problems (re cancellation, changing of time to allow employ-
ees lunch, or to avoid union conflicts). In sum I conclude and find that the Com-
pany in the scheduling of meetings met its bargaining obligations thereto.28
5. Specific contentions-otherwise
In support of its general contention that the Company bargained in bad faith the
General Counsel contends certain specific points to be persuasive of bad-faith bar-
gaining. As best determined from General Counsel's statements and brief and
apparent contentions, these specific contentions, the facts relating thereto, and the
evaluation thereof are set forth in the following paragraphs.
281 note with respect to all of the foregoing that the testimonial contention of McFee
was to the effect that atthe end of the agreed-to bargaining sessions Markey grabbed his
papers and left. Since the incidents occurred after the parties had utilized the agreed-to
bargaining time, I see nothing about Markey's action thereto to reveal bad-faith motivation.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC 1501
a Alleged change in position or reneging
1 The General Counsel contends that the Company changed its position with
respect to agreement about the introductory clauses and preamble to the Union's
proposed agreement The facts reveal that at the October 12, 1964, bargaining ses-
sion the Company indicated that it was interested in the substance of the proposal
and not the exact words The Company indicated that the Union's language as to
the preamble and term of the contract was fine and that it desired a contract term of
1 year This was agreeable to the Union On January 13, 1965, the Company's
contract proposal as to the introductory clause was in substance similar to that of the
Union except the Company' s proposal included language relating to the extension of
the contract After discussion by the Union and the Company, the Company agreed
to use the Union's introductory language but disagreed as to the terms relating to
extension of the contract In my opinion the Company's action herein does not
reflect a change in position but reflects an attempt to resolve by contract a problem
left in the air by the initial proposal Considered separately or in total context of
all the evidence , this does not reveal bad-faith motivation or bargaining on the part
of the Company
2 The General Counsel contends that the Company changed its position with
respect to the Union's proposal relating to recognition , work, and jurisdiction The
evidence relating to this issue is substantially intertwined with the evidence relating
to an issue concerning alleged refusal to bargain for employees in the bargaining
unit The facts and evaluation thereof of both issues are set forth in the section of
this Decision described as "Alleged refusal to bargain for all employees" ( see section
III, C, 5, b) It is sufficient to say at this point that the facts reveal that Resopnd-
ent consistently took a position against the Union 's proposals insofar as they required
the recognition of employees as journeymen or apprentices The Respondent on
December 1 indicated agreement with the Union's language on jurisdiction which in
major effect was similar to the Board 's certification language as to the appropriate
unit There is nothing in the evidence to reveal that Respondent by indicating agree-
ment to the Union's jurisdictional language intended to modify the Board 's certifica-
tion insofar as recognition of the appropriate unit, or as to jurisdiction of the Union
The Respondent's use of slightly different language which in fact tracked the Board's
certification language pertaining to the appropriate unit in its January 13 proposal
as regards its recognition clause or as to the Union's jurisdictional clause does not
reveal bad-faith motivation on the part of the Company or bad-faith bargaining
3 The General Counsel contends that Respondent made a proposal on October 12,
1964, relating to operation of the production department and when the Union offered
on December 31 to accept such a proposal that the Company withdrew said proposal
The Union's initial contract proposal contained a clause which in effect vested the
operation authority and control of the production department in a foreman who
was required to be a journeyman member of the Union In the discussion of this
proposal the Company argued that its office manager was over the production employ-
ees and argued that a foreman should not be required to be a member of the Union
During the discussions Union Representative McFee questioned Office Manager
Markey Markey commented that the Company did have a foreman and might be
able to live with the provision if the requirement about the foreman being a union
member were eliminated
The General Counsel contends in effect that Markey made the statement that
he made as indicated above but added that he made this as a proposal The facts
are clear that McFee was the principal spokesman and negotiator for the Union and
that Bennett was the principal spokesman and negotiator for the Company Markey
denied that he made the statement as a proposal or so said All witnesses in this
proceeding impressed me as honest and truthful witnesses attempting to tell the
truth As to this incident , I was impressed that Markey while testifying appeared
thoroughly convinced about his testimony Considering the foregoing , all of the
evidence, and the facts immediately following herein , I am persuaded that Markey's
testimony , of all the witnesses , is more reliable on this point and credit his testimony
thereto
No agreements or concessions were made at the October 12 bargaining session
with respect to the Union's clause relating to operation of the production depart-
ment Subsequently on November 11 the Company submitted a management rights
clause proposal and on December 17 submitted a proposal relating to the operation
and control of the production department
1502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On December 31, 1964, the parties discussed the Company's December 17 pro-
posal relating to the operation of the production department . McFee told Bennett
that the Company had another proposal dealing with the same subject matter and
referred to the Company's November 11 proposal relating to a management clause.
McFee told Bennett that the Company had several proposals on the subject and
asked if the Union had a choice of these proposals . Bennett told McFee , "Well, yes,
I reckon so." McFee told Bennett that if this were the case, the Union accepted the
proposal made by Markey on October 12 in which he had proposed to delete from
the Union's proposal the requirement that the foreman be made a member of the
Union . Markey told McFee that he had not made such a proposal . Bennett told
McFee that he (Bennett ) was the chief negotiator and the only one empowered to
make a proposal for the Company. Bennett stated that if such a proposal had been
made that it was withdrawn. McFee argued that the Company was reneging on a
proposal and that he could not see how ultimate agreement could be reached. McFee
ended by stating that the Union was withdrawing its proposal that the foreman had
to be a member of the Union.
I credit Williams' and Markey's testimony to the effect that Bennett was the chief
negotiator and the one empowered to make proposals.
Considering all of the foregoing concerning the proposals relating to the opera-
tion of the production department and the management clauses, I do not find that
the evidence thereto separately or in context with all of the evidence reveals bad-
faith motivation or bad -faith bargaining on the part of the Respondent.
4. The General Counsel contends that the Company's positions and proposals
relating to contract clauses pertaining to establishment and operation of a joint
standing committee reveal that the Company changed its position thereto and thereby
reveal bad-faith bargaining.
The parties discussed the Union's initial contract proposal on a joint standing com-
mittee on October 13, 1964. Bennett stated that he had no serious objection to the
union contract proposal. Bennett questioned the method of selection of arbitrators
and the length of time required to bring the dispute before the joint standing com-
mittee. On January 13, 1965, the Company submitted ( in its proposed contract)
clauses relating to a joint standing committee. The Union's proposed clause provided
that "To this Joint Standing Committee shall be referred all disputes which may arise
as to the construction to be placed upon any clause of this agreement, except as pro-
vided otherwise herein, or alleged violations thereof, which cannot be settled other-
wise ...... The Company's proposed clause in effect added "or regarding suspended
or discharged employees and all other questions which are in dispute arising out of
this contract." The Union's proposed clause provided in effect that the decision of
the committee as to the disputes referred to in accordance with the provision would be
final and binding. The Company's proposed clause on January 13 added in effect that
"Pending a decision of the Joint Standing Committee, the directions and orders of the
employer shall be maintained, carried out and given full effect until such dispute has
been finally disposed of as provided herein, so long as such directions or orders do not
change conditions expressly established by this agreement. The joint standing com-
mittee may not, by its decision, provide new or different provisions of the agreement
or scales of wages between the parties or add to, subtract from or modify any of the
terms thereof. Regularly established office rules of the employer, not in conflict with
this agreement, shall not be subject to arbitration, but the applicability of such office
rules shall be subject to arbitration ." The Company's proposed contract clause did
not contain, as did the Union's, a clause to the effect "that local union laws not affect-
ing wages, hours or working conditions and the General Laws of the International
Typographical Union shall not be subject to arbitration."
The Company's and the Union's proposed clauses differed as to the number of men
on the joint standing committee and as to the precise way to select the arbitration
board.
On February 4 the parties discussed the Company's joint standing-committee clause.
McFee stated that the Union did not know what the Company meant by its clause and
that he felt the clause had excess language, that the reference to office rules constituted
a substitution for the Union's language relating to local union laws, etc Bennett stated
that he thought the language was necessary for the arbitrator's decision.
On February 4 the Union gave the Company a written counterproposal on a joint
standing-committee clause.
The Union's February 4 counterproposal relating to the joint standing committee
substantially was similar to its initial proposal. The Union's proposal of February 4
continued to have language exempting local union laws and the General Laws of ITU
from arbitration, and the proposal included the Company's proposed method of selec-
tion of the arbitration board except that it set qualifications on the panel of names to
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1503
be received from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service so as to eliminate
business or labor representatives as arbitrators, and countered with a proposal that
conditions prevailing prior to the dispute shall be preserved prior to decision of the
joint standing committee or the board of arbitration.
At the February 4 bargaining session Bennett told McFee that he agreed to the
Union's new proposal in principle but would have to study it. At the bargaining
session on February 26 the parties discussed the Union's February 4 joint standing-
committee proposal Bennett (for the Company) objected to (1) the Union's provi-
sion relating to the disqualification of business or labor representatives as the proposed
fifth member of the arbitration board, (2) the clause relating to exemption of the local
union laws and the General Laws of the ITU from arbitration, and (3) the clause
providing for the preservation of conditions prevailing prior to dispute pending deci-
sion of the joint standing committee or board of arbitration.
McFee agreed to modify his proposal relating to disqualification of business or
labor leaders by eliminating such provision, to make the exemption of local union
laws and the General Laws of the International Union from arbitration a separate
section, and continued to pursue his proposal relative to preservation of conditions
prior to dispute pending ultimate decision by the joint standing committee or board
of arbitration.
It should be noted with regard to the parties' discussion and positions relative to
the joint standing-committee clauses that the Union in another clause had proposed
and the Company strongly opposed incorporation of the General Laws of the Inter-
national Typographical Union by reference. It may also be noted that the Union had
proposed another clause relating to discharges but that the Union's contract proposal
was silent as to suspensions except that the General Laws of the International Typo-
graphical Union proposed as an addendum provided that suspension, was prohibited
as a method of discipline.
Considering all of the foregoing and all of the evidence in the case, I find that the
Company's proposal reflected a proposal consistent with Bennett's statement that he
had no serious objection to the Union's proposal on the joint standing committee.
The added language or added effect of the Company's proposal and the omission of
certain aspects of the Union's proposal are entirely consistent with Bennett' s initial
stated position. It is cleai that the language in both parties' proposals relating to
selection of the arbitration board reflects an attempt to reach a reasonable solution on
the same. It is also clear that both parties with respect to their proposal or positions
relating to office rules, local union laws, or to the General Laws of the International
Union were pursuing their position on the same in a legitimate bargaining manner.
Both parties' positions relative to the continuation or the carrying out of the
Employer's decision or orders, or to the preservation of conditions prior to the dispute,
pertain to an area of inteiest not determined by the initial Union's proposal or the
Company's position thereto and neither was inconsistent with the parties' initial
proposals or positions.
Considering all of the foregoing and all of the evidence in this case, I am convinced
that the Company's position and proposals on a joint standing-committee clause to
not when considered separately or in total context with all of the evidence reveal bad-
faith motivation or bad-faith bargaining.
5. The General Counsel contends that the Company accepted the Union's proposal
relative to overtime rates on a daily basis at the October 13, 1964, bargaining session
but reneged on this agreement when it proposed on January 13, 1965, an overtime
provision which provided for overtime on a weekly basis.
The facts do not support the General Counsel's contention. The parties discussed
the Union's overtime proposal on October 13. The Company argued against this
proposal which was to the effect that double-time rates would be paid for overtime on
a daily basis. The Union agreed to drop its overtime rate from double time to time
and a half. McFee credibly testified the Company was agreeable to the Union's
reducing its demand from double-time rates to time and a half for overtime. McFee
also credibly testified as follows: "But, the Company did not agree to that section as
it is written."
On January 13 the Company made in its contract proposal a proposal relating to
overtime at time-and-a-half rates on a weekly basis.
Considering the above and all of the evidence in the case, I am convinced that the
Company's position and proposals on overtime rates do not when considered sepa-
rately or in total context with all of the evidence reveal bad-faith motivation or bad-
faith bargaining.
6. The General Counsel contends that the Company changed is position and
reneged on agreements relative to proposals relating to holidays.
1504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Union's initial holiday proposal was as follows:
Union Proposal
Article II Section 4
All work performed on holidays shall be paid for at double price.
The recognized holidays are: Memorial Day (last Sunday in May), Inde-
pendence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day and New Year's
Day, or days legally observed as such. The holiday shall begin at 7 a.m. on the
holiday or day observed as such and continue for the succeeding 24 hours. All
situation holders and apprentices scheduled to work on above named holidays
shall receive straight time pay when not required to report. If required to work
they shall receive double time. Any shift which begins on a holiday, or day
observed as such, shall be considered a holiday shift. All situation holders and
apprentices who are not scheduled to work on a holiday or day observed as such
shall be given a holiday off, at the paid holiday premium rate if required to work
the first day after posted slide days. The regular starting time of any shift shall
not be changed to avoid holiday pay or the holiday premium rate.
The parties initially discussed the Union's holiday proposal on October 13. Accord-
ing to McFee's credited testimony, Bennett stated that he had no real objection to the
Union's proposal,29 that he (Bennett) objected to the number of holidays as the
Company only observed four, that Bennett wanted a provision to the effect that
employees be required to work the day before and the day after a holiday, that the
matter dealt with economics and that whatever was agreed to in this section would be
contingent upon the wage agreement finally agreed upon, that the Company would
make a proposal on holidays.
On November 11, 1964, the Company made a proposal on holidays which was
as follows:
Company Proposal
The following paid holidays will be given by the Company July 4th; Labor
Day; Thanksgiving; Christman [sic]; Christmas Eve or New Years Days (at the
option of the Union.)
To be entitled to any or all of the above holidays, an employee is required to
work the last scheduled day before and the first scheduled day following such
holiday.
In the event work is scheduled for a Saturday which is the day preceding or
following a holiday, notice will be given on the Monday preceding such a holiday.
When no work is performed on any of the aforementioned holidays, employ-
ees who have worked continuously for 90 days or more preceding such holiday
the employees shall be paid for such holiday a sum equal to eight hours work
at their base hourly rate.
Employees who perform work for the Company on any of the above holi-
days will be paid for work performed on such holidays and in addition will be
paid holiday pay as above stated.
In the event any holiday falls on Sunday, the holiday will be observed on
the day designated by the local authorities of Waycross.
On January 13 the Company made a complete contract proposal which included a
holiday proposal as follows:
Company Proposal
Article IV
The following are recognized as holidays : July 4th ; Labor Day; Thanksgiving
Day and Christmas.
All employees scheduled to work on the above stated holidays shall receive
a day's pay at their straight time hourly rate, when not required to report, pro-
vided they work the day before such holiday and the day after such holiday.
If required to work on such holiday they shall receive a day's pay as above
stated , and time and one-half for each hour worked on the holiday.
2D Considering the totality of the evidence including the Company's opposition to over-
time rates at double time with respect to earlier sections in the Union's proposed contract,
I find it hard not to believe that the Company did not oppose the Union's proposed holi-
day work overtime rates. The Company's proposals, it is noted, proposed such rates for
holiday work at time-and-a-half rates as compared to double-time rates. I am convinced
that McFee's testimony as to the entire negotiations was generally in substance and gen-
erally correct but not in all particulars.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1505
It is noted that the Company 's holiday proposal of January 13, 1965 , as compared
to its proposal of November 11, 1964 , ( 1) reduces the number of holidays proposed
from five to four, and ( 2) increases the rate of pay of employees working on the
holiday from the regular rate to time -and-a-half rates.
On January 14 the parties discussed the Company 's January 13 holiday proposal.
McFee pointed out to the Company the difference in language of the Company's Jan-
uary 13 proposal as compared to its November 11 proposal . McFee pointed out that
there was a reduction in the number of holidays offered. McFee told Bennett that the
Union felt the Company was going backward and not forward . Bennett told McFee
that he was not aware of this, that this was now the Company's proposal.
On May 28, 1965, the Union gave the Company a new proposal relating to holidays
as follows:
Union Proposal
The recognized holidays are:
July 4th, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas and New Year's Day.
The holiday shall begin at 12:01 a.m on the holiday or day celebrated as
such and continue for the succeeding 24 hours.
All employees scheduled to work on the above stated holidays shall receive a
day's pay at their regular straight time hourly rate when not required to report
for work. If required to work on any of the above holidays, they shall receive
a day's pay as above provided and time and one-half.
If a holiday shall fall during an employee's regular vacation, he shall receive
pay for the holiday in addition to his regular vacation pay or an additional
day off.
It is noted that the Union's May 28, 1965, holiday proposal as compared to its
initial proposal reflects a decrease in demand for overtime rates from double time
to time and a half, and in number of holidays from six to five. It is also noted that the
Union's May 28 proposal does not include a provision requiring employees to work
the day before and after a holiday as McFee had indicated he would agree to on
October 13, 1964. The Union's May 28 proposal included language with reference
to holidays during vacation time, which had not formerly been in its proposal.
Bennett (for the Company) told McFee that the Union's proposal (of May 28)
looked all right except for New Year's Day, that the Company could not accept that.
McFee (for the Union) told Bennett in effect that the Union was proposing what the
Company had at one time proposed. Bennett told McFee in effect that he would
have to think about this and study the matter.
On June 16, the next bargaining session, the Company gave the Union a proposal
on holidays as follows:
Company Proposal
The recognized holidays are:
July 4th
Labor Day
Thanksgiving Day
Christmas Day
The holiday will begin at 12.01 A.M. on the holiday or day celebrated as
such holiday, and continue for the next succeeding 24 hours. All employees
scheduled to work on any of the above stated holidays shall receive a day's pay
at their straight time hourly rate, provided they work the day before such holi-
day and the day after such holiday, unless absent because of sickness or other
recognized excuse. If required to work on such holiday they will receive a day's
pay at their straight time hourly rate, and in addition they will receive time
and one-half for each hour worked on the holiday.
It is noted that the Company's June 16 holiday proposal is substantially the same
as its January 13 proposal except that the Union's language in its May 28 proposal
relating to the commencement of the holiday at 12:01 a.m. etc., is also incorporated.
It is also noted that the Company's proposal of June 16 is substantially similar to
that of the Union's (of May 28) except that (1) the company proposal is for four
instead of five holidays, (2) the company proposal contains reference to an employee
working the day before and after the holiday, (3) the company proposal explicitly
sets forth that if the employee works on the holiday the employee would be paid
at the rate of time and a half per hour worked whereas the Union's proposal did
not specify whether the time-and-a-half rates were per hour or per day, and (4) the
company proposal contained no reference to holidays during the employee's vaca-
tion time.
1506 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At the June 16 bargaining session McFee argued that the Company had agreed in
effect to the Union's May 28 proposal and that this June 16 company proposal was
different in, that it provided that employees were required to work the day before
and after the holiday in order to be entitled to the holiday-clause benefits, and the
Company's proposal would indicate that employees could be called in for less than
a shift's work. McFee argued to Bennett that if this was the vein in which the Com-
pany treated compromise language the Union was at a loss to consider any proposal
submitted by the Company and have any expectation that it would stand up.
McFee testified that Bennett said, "I honor no oral agreements. The company
agreement was not in writing and I want to further state that I am not bound by that."
McFee further testified to the effect that Bennett said that any agreements (oral or
in writing) by the Company were subject to be withdrawn; agreements could be
traded off on another section later on or modified; be (Bennett ) did not consider any
individual agreement to be an agreement; and there were no agreements until such
time as a complete agreement was reached. McFee testified to the effect that under
these circumstances where the Company had reneged on an agreement he did not
see how the Union could possibly accept the Company's proposal.
McFee's testimony to the above effect as to the statements made stand uncontra-
dicted. The Respondent, however, attacked McFee's testimonial reliability by ques-
tioning McFee with reference to an incident concerning an employee named Adams
Edward near the picket line. Without going into the details thereof, I am con-
vinced from observing McFee's demeanor and his testimony as to the Edward inci-
dent that he did display a propensity for telling a version of facts in a light most
favorable to his and the Union's viewpoint in a slightly unobjective manner and
with a lack of candor. As a whole, however, McFee's testimony is uncontradicted
and consistent with the totality of established facts. As to the particular testimony
involved herein concerning the incident on June 16, I am persuaded from all of the
evidence that McFee's testimony did not reveal completely all of the significant state-
ments made by him and Bennett and I am not convinced that the words attributed
to Bennett were the exact words used. The facts reveal that on May 28 Bennett had
indicated that the Union's proposal except as to the number of days looked all right
except for the fifth day (New Year's Day), that Bennett stated that he would have
to look at the proposal and study it. It must be noted that the holiday proposals
all appear somewhat similar. Bennett's statement on May 28 does not reveal agree-
ment to the Union's proposal, but merely indicates that it looked all right. Consider-
ing the fact that the Company in all of its proposals and positions thereto had desired
a provision relating to employees working prior to the holiday and the day after the
holiday, the facts do not reveal a conscious relinquishment of such a position. I find
it hard to believe and do not believe from all the foregoing facts relating to the
holiday proposals that Bennett would make a statement on June 16 which indicated
that he had agreed to the Union's proposal and was telling the Union that he did
not honor oral agreements. I find it more proper to believe that Bennett felt that
McFee was unfairly arguing that he had agreed to deleting the provision relating to
employees working before and after the holidays when in fact he had not made such
an agreement . Under such circumstances I am convinced that Bennett argued that
statements made in the free give and take of bargaining were not to be considered
as an agreement when agreenlent was not intended and that he would not honor
such as an agreement , that Bennett further told McFee that any proposal or agree-
ment by the Company was subject to being withdrawn, traded off, or modified, that the
Company did not consider agreements on individual proposals as a final agreement,
until a complete agreement was reached.
Considering all of the foregoing and all the evidence in this case separately and in
total context, I am convinced that the only evidence relating to holiday proposals
which has real probative value toward revealing the Company's motivation as being
bad-faith motivation or as revealing that the Company has bargained in bad faith
is the fact that Respondent's total contract proposal on January 13 contained a holiday
proposal less in value than its November 11 proposal on the matter of holidays Con-
sidering the Company's holiday proposal in the latter respect it may be stated that a
withdrawal or reduction in benefits offered standing alone is insufficient to establish
bad-faith motivation or bad-faith bargaining.
Considering the Company's January 13 holiday proposal as compared to its Novem-
ber 11 proposal, it has been noted that the proposal reflects a decrease in the number
of holidays proposed but an increase in the rate of pay of employees working on such
holidays. It would appear that the recognition of holidays would connote an intent
not to schedule work on such holidays and thereby would reveal that the question of
overtime rates on such holidays would constitute a benefit not expected to be a major
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD INC 1507
benefit Under such circumstances I am convinced that the Company 's January 13
proposal relating to holidays did in fact constitute a reduction in holiday benefits
offered
It is noted that Respondent in its discussion of its holiday proposal on October 13,
1964, apprised the Union that its holiday proposal was contingent on the wage
agreement finally agreed upon Considering all of the evidence in this case, the
Union's arguments directed to the Company relating to alleged bad-faith bargaining,
the Company 's indications that it believed the employees ' eabtlement to a wage
increase, and the Company's complete proposal on January 13 relative to wages, etc ,
I am persuaded that the Company 's position on January 13 reflected merely an
attempt to set up a bargaining position on sages and economic items which was
flexible and which appeared flexible and from which the other party could reason-
ably believe that the Company would grant concessions in the give and take of
bargaining Considering the Company 's positions and proposals relating to holi-
days, I am convinced that the totality of the evidence does not reveal bad-faith
motivation or bad faith bargaining
7 The General Counsel contends that the Company' s positions and proposals
relating to clauses pertaining to discharges , decrease of the labor force , and to appeal
rights re discharges reveal that the Company changed its position and reneged on
agreements
The Union's initial contract proposals relating to discharges, decrease in labor
force, and appeal rights in discharges were as follows
Union Proposal
DISCHARGES
Article II
Section 9 The foreman may discharge (1) for incompetency, (2) for neglect
of duty, (3) for violation of office rules, which shall be kept conspicuously
posted, and which shall in no way abridge the civil rights of employees or their
rights under accepted International Typographical Union Laws A discharged
employee shall have the right to challenge the fairness of any reason given for
his discharge
Section 10 When it becomes necessary to decrease the force such decrease
shall be accomplished by discharging first the person or persons last employed
either as regular employees or as extra employees, as the exigencies of the
matter may require Should there be an increase in the force the persons dis-
placed through such cause shall be reinstated in reverse order in which they
were discharged before other help may be employed, if his competercy permits
Upon demand, the foreman shall give the reason for the discharge in writing
Persons considered capable as substitutes by the foreman shall be deemed
competent to fill regular situations, and the substitutes oldest in continuous
service shall have prior right in the filling of the first vacancy This section
shall apply to incoming as well as oatgoing foreman Demand for written
reason for discharge shall be made within seventy-two hours after employee is
informed of discharge
Section 11 Any employee who has been discharged and believes the discharge
unjustified shall have the right to appeal to the Chapel Either party may appeal
from the Chapel decision to the Local Union From the decision of the Local
Union appeal may be made by either party to the local Joint Standing Commit-
tee, the decision of which shall be final and binding
The parties discussed the foregoing union proposals at the November 11 bargaining
sessions As to Section 9 the parties argued over the interpretation given to "civil
rights " There was no agreement made with respect to the Union 's section 9 clause
on November 11 30
It is noted that there is no reference to power to suspend in the Union 's proposal
relating to discharge The Union's proposal relating to the General Laws of the
International Typographical Union reveals, however , a somewhat similar proposed
clause setting forth that "suspension is prohibited as method of discharge "
On January 13 the Company included in its contract proposals a provision relating
to discharges worded substantially similar to the union proposal article II, sec 9
excepting that ( 1) the power to suspend was also added to the power to discharge
for the reasons set forth, and ( 2) the Company s proposal omitted reference to rights
under accepted International Typographical Union laws
30 The General Counsel's argument as to the Company 's position on "civil rights" 19
discussed in section III C 6 d of this Decision
221-374-66-vol 157-96
1508 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Considering the foregoing and all of the evidence relating to the "discharge"
clauses, separately or in total context, I am convinced that the evidence does not
reveal that the Respondent changed its position relative to the "discharge" clauses but
reflects that its positions and proposals are consistent with an attempt to reduce to
contract form a determination of possible items of dispute. The evidence as to the
discharge clauses does not reveal that Respondent had bad-faith motivation or bar-
gamed in bad faith with respect to such clauses.
At the November 11 bargaining session Bennett stated that he pretty much under-
stood article II, section 10 which related to decrease in the work force. Bennett told
McFee that he believed in seniority and had no serious objections to article II, section
10. As McFee credibly testified, the Company made no commitment on this section
on November 11. On January 13 the Company's contract proposal included a pro-
vision relating to decreases in work force which were worded somewhat similar to
the Union's proposal but which added a condition that "such persons are available
for reemployment" and which provided under certain conditions for the expiration
of priority (seniority) rights.31
Considering the Company's position and proposals relating to "decrease in work
force" separately or in total context with all of the evidence, I am convinced that the
facts do not reveal a change in position that constitutes evidence of bad-faith motiva-
tion or bad-faith bargaining.
At the November 11 bargaining session Bennett told McFee that (1) he did not
object to the Union's proposal relating to right to appeal (article II, section 11), and
(2) he desired a limitation on the time for the procedure. McFee told the Company
that he had no objection to this suggestion and proposed that a limitation on the
appeals procedure be set so that the procedure be consummated within 15 days.32
Bennett told McFee that the section was all right with the change. The Company's
January 13 proposal contained clauses similar in nature to the Union's proposal
relating to "appeal from discharge." The Company's proposal provided for the right
to appeal suspensions or discharges to the joint standing committee whose decision
thereon would be final and binding.
In essence the difference between the parties' proposals are (1) the company pro-
posal is designed to cover discharge and suspension situations and the Union's pro-
posal does not, (2) the Company's proposal eliminates the use of the Union's chapel
or local union as separate decisional bodies, and (3) the Company's proposal is
silent as to the number of days within which a matter of appeal had to be
consummated.
It is noted also that the Company's November 11 proposals included a proposal
relating to grievance procedure and arbitration and that at the time the parties dis-
cussed the Union's decrease-of-forces provisions, the parties had not agreed upon
the proposals relating to the joint standing-committee procedures.
On January 14 the parties discussed the Company's proposal relating to "appeals
from discharge." McFee told Bennett in effect that the parties had agreed to the
union proposal (article II, section 11) on November 11. Bennett told McFee that he
had not agreed to anything and that if the Union thought that he had he was making
it quite clear that he had not agreed to anything.
Considering the Company's position and proposals relating to appeals rights, sep-
arately or in total context of all the evidence, I am convinced that the evidence does
not reveal bad-faith motivation or bad-faith bargaining. The Company's proposal
on January 13 was presented after a discussion of the Union's various contract pro-
posals and reflects in general a position as to the items proposed.
As noted, the Union's contract proposals included a proposal to incorporate the
General Laws of the International Typographical Union in the contract by reference.
In the General Laws of the International Union reference is made to the prohibition
of suspension as a means of discipline. The Company had not agreed on Novem-
ber 11 to the Union's proposal relating to "discharges" or "decrease in force" or to
the Union's clause relating to the General Laws of the International Typographical
u McFee's testimony relating to what was said at the February 4 bargaining session
relating to agreement on "reduction in force" appeared confused. It would appear that
his argument and discussion on February 4 as to what had been agreed pertained to the
Union's proposal relating to "right to appeal discharge," and to the Company's similar-
type proposal provisions.
32 Whether the time element referred to was from time of discharge or demand to appeal
to the chapel, to the Union, or to the joint standing committee is not revealed, or whether
it refers to time between appeal and decision of the joint standing committee.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1509
Union. There is no evidence to reveal that the Company was not legitimately moti-
vated in attempting to determine by contract the rights relative to suspension of
employees.
As indicated, the major difference between the Union's and the Company's pro-
posals appears to relate to whether the appeal procedure proposed by the Union
envisioned an appeal directly from employees to the local chapel, an appeal there-
from to the Union, and appeal therefrom to the joint standing committee, or as
proposed by the Company envisioned a direct appeal by the employee to the joint
standing committee. As indicated, Bennett had stated on November 11 that he did
not object to the Union's proposed clause and after the incorporation of the time
limitations provision had stated that it was all right.
It is certainly reasonable to believe that McFee honestly inferred that the import
of Bennett's statements on November 11 was to the effect that the Company agreed
to the Union's proposal relating to the "appeal from discharge" clauses. It is also
reasonable to believe that Bennett's statement on January 14 to the effect that he
had not agreed to anything reflected his honest belief when considered in light of
the total evidence reflecting his various statements to clauses to the effect that he
agreed in principle or that he had no objection, etc., to such clauses. The real question
that is presented is whether the company proposal on January 13 was motivated by a
desire to offer a different proposal relating to "appeal rights re discharge" for a bad-
faith purpose. Although the Company's proposal relating to "appeals from discharge"
is different and as to the Union's viewpoint might constitute an undesirable change,
it is not different in its basic purpose in that it provides what would appear to be a
fair means of settling a dispute as to a discharge or suspension. Considering the
foregoing and all of the evidence, separately and in total context with all of the
evidence, the evidence does not reveal bad-faith motivation on the part of the
Respondent or bad-faith bargaining with respect to the "appeal from discharges"
provisions.
8. The General Counsel contends that the Company's position and proposals relat-
ing to the joint apprentice committee shows a change in position which reveals bad-
faith motivation and bad-faith bargaining.
The Union's initial contract proposal contained various clauses relating to appren-
tices. Among the proposed clauses was the following.
Art. III Section 2. A Joint Apprenticeship Committee composed of three
representatives of the Union and three of the Employer shall be selected by the
parties to this agreement. All provisions of this agreement affecting apprentices
shall be under the jurisdiction of this committee which shall have control of
and be responsible for the selection of apprentices and shall be vested with full
power and authority to enforce all conditions outlined herein. Should the com-
mittee fail to agree on any question the matter shall be submitted to an arbi-
trator as provided in the Joint Standing Committee section hereof whose deci-
sion shall be final and binding.
It is noted that on November 11, 1964, the Company proposed a management-
right clause which accorded the Company absolute authority over hiring, discharg-
ing, etc.
At the December 1 bargaining session the parties discussed the above-proposed
clause. Specific discussion touched upon the selection and number of joint appren-
tices committee members. Bennett stated that he had no objection to the Union's
proposed clause (set out above) but did not specifically say whether or not the
Company accepted the Union's proposal.
On January 13 the Company gave the Union a contract proposal which set out
among other things that "the Employer shall have exclusive direction and respon-
sibility in the selection and hiring of new employees, whether such new employees be
hired as regular situation holders or as substitutes." This proposal also provided
that the joint standing committee would set up an apprentice training program and
would in effect serve as a joint apprentice committee.
On May 28 while the parties were discussing the Union's joint apprentice-commit-
tee proposed clauses, Bennett inquired as to who would hire the apprentices and was
told that the proposed clause was to the effect that the joint apprentice committee
would do such hiring. Bennett told McFee that the Company wanted to retain the
right to hire and discharge employees. On June 16 Bennett gave the Union a com-
pany proposal relating to the joint apprentice committee which specifically provided
that "apprentice may be employed by the foreman, with the approval of the Com-
pany manager."
1510 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Considering all the foregoing and all of the evidence, including the Company's
various proposals relating to the right to hire and fire, I am convinced that the
Company's indication that it had no objection (on December 1, 1964) to the Union's
proposal relating to the joint apprentice committee did not reveal that the Company
was agreeing that the joint apprentice committee should have the right to hire
apprentices. The evidence as a whole does not reveal that the company proposal
(relating to the joint apprentice committee and specifically providing that apprentices
may be employed by the foreman, with the approval of the company manager, rather
than the joint committee) constitutes a change in position revealing bad-faith motiva-
tion or bad-faith bargaining.
b. Alleged refusal to bargain for all employees
The General Counsel contends that the Company refused to bargain for all the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. The facts relating to this issue are
intertwined with the facts relating to the General Counsel's contention that the Com-
pany changed its position relative to the Union's jurisdiction clause in bad faith.
Accordingly, the facts and evaluation of these two issues are herein set out.
The Union's proposal (initially discussed on October 1 through December 31,
1964) contained three separate clauses relating to recognition, to requirements that
work be performed by journeymen and apprentices, and to jurisdiction of the Union.
In the jurisdiction clause the Union in effect tracked the certification language with
respect to the appropriate bargaining unit but did not include the exclusion thereto
which revealed that "mailers" were excluded from the unit. The Company's position
revealed that it was contesting that employees were journeymen or apprentices and
that it desired to use the Board's certification language. The Company's position
revealed that it was attempting to agree on the unit as determined by the Board. The
Union's three clauses (recognition, work, and jurisdiction) were to the composite
effect that the bargaining unit was composed of journeymen and apprentices. The
Company's January 13 proposal contained clauses which tracked the language of the
Board's certification in complete detail as to the unit and exclusions and recognized
the Union as the representative of the employees in such unit. The Company's Jan-
uary 13 proposal set forth classification of work including Teletype punch operators
and proofreaders and provided that journeymen and apprentices would be recognized
in every department except proofreaders and Teletype punch operators.
In the discussion of the union clauses relating to recognition, work, and jurisdic-
tion on October 12, the Company argued against the language pertaining to journey-
men and apprentices in the clauses At the December 1 bargaining sessions the
Company argued that the recognition language should be the same as the Board's
certification, that the Union's language re union jurisdiction was all right, and argued
against journeymen and apprentices language. Bennett argued that Teletype oper-
ators and proofreaders were not journeymen and apprentices, and indicated that he
doubted that they should be in the unit. As indicated previously, the Company's
January 13 proposal tracked the Board's certification language as to the recognition
clause, related the Union's jurisdiction to the recognized unit, set forth recognized
classifications including Teletype operators and proofreaders, provided that journey-
men and apprentices would be recognized in all departments except proofreaders and
Teletype punch operators. The Respondent's January 13 proposal provided clauses
relating to recognition and qualifying examination of journeymen and for employing
of apprentices and a training program.
At the January 13 session McFee argued that the Company had agreed to its
language relating to the jurisdiction of the Union. Bennett was agreeable to deletion
of the exclusionary language (from the Board's certification) excepting that the pro-
vision pertaining to the exclusion of mailers should be retained. On February 4
McFee gave the Company a proposal relating to the inclusion of mailers in the
bargaining unit. McFee argued in effect that the Board's exclusionary language
relating to mailers pertained only to eligibility to vote in the Board's election and
not as to the bargaining unit complement.
During the bargaining session in February 1965 the parties discussed whether the
Company had journeymen and apprentices. Bennett argued that the Company did
not have journeymen and apprentices and did not recognize journeymen and appren-
tices. McFee argued that the Company had journeymen and apprentices and named
some employees he contended were journeymen and apprentices.
The General Counsel contends in effect that the Company has refused to bargain
for all employees in the certified unit. As to the question of the journeymen and
apprentices there is no evidence that the Company has ever recognized employees as
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC 1511
journeymen and apprentices or that the employees who work for the Company have
the qualifications of journeymen and apprentices There is no evidence of standards
upon which to determine that employees are journeymen and apprentices
Considering the foregoing and all the evidence, I am convinced that the facts
reveal that the Company consistently claimed that it did not recognize journeymen
and apprentices but was willing to and did bargain about contract provisions pertain-
ing to the recognition of and qualifying of journeymen and apprentices The facts
do not reveal that the Company has failed to bargain about recognizing journeymen
and apprentices Nor do the facts reveal that the Company had journeymen and
apprentices and that the Company failed to bargain about such employees As to
the Teletype operators and proofreaders, the facts reveal that the Company contended
that they were not journeymen and apprentices and contended that there was doubt
as to whether they should be in the certified unit 33 In any event the Company's
January 13 proposal included the proofreaders and Teletype operators in recognized
classifications Considering the foregoing and all the evidence, I am convinced that
the facts do not reveal that Respondent has failed to bargain about the Teletype
operators and proofreaders as employees in the certified unit
As indicated, the General Counsel contends that the Respondent agreed to the
Union's jurisdictional clause on December 1, 1964, and thereafter offered a proposal
thereto which was different on January 13, 1965 The General Counsel contends
that this reveals bad-faith motivation and bad-faith bargaining
It is noted that there is no basis from the discussion in December or from the
written proposals to reveal that Respondent's agreement to the Union' s jurisdictional
language was other than an attempt to agree to union jurisdiction consistent with
the Boards certification language There is no evidence to reveal that the parties'
discussion or the language of the proposal broadened or narrowed the scope or
effect of the Board's certification language Accordingly the use of language actually
tracking the Board's certification language as to the recognized unit and relating the
Union's jurisdiction thereto does not reveal a change in effect from what the Com
pany had indicated its agreement thereto That the Union may have intended by
its proposal to create agreements from which arguably `mailers" could be included
in the unit is not the question The question involved is the Company's intent and
motivation 34 Considering all of the foregoing and all the evidence, I am convinced
that the facts do not reveal that the Respondent has been motivated by bad faith
or has bargained in bad faith by virtue of its pioposals or positions relating to recog-
nition or as to the Union's jurisdiction
I find it proper to set forth at this point that the contentions of General Counsel
and the Charging Party with respect to the question of alleged refusal to bargain
over employees in the bargaining unit have all been considered and discussed In
view of the fact that the parties were specifically requested to set forth their conten-
tions as to points of persuasion, and have not done so as to the facts discussed in the
following paragraphs and in view of the fact that my consideration of the evidence
as a whole reveals that the evaluation of certain other facts do not in fact constitute
evidence of bad-faith motivation or bad-faith bargaining, I do not construe that the
parties are raising a contention thereto However, the testimony of McFee in many
respects appeared to raise some contention in and of itself Accordingly, although I
do not find the evidence persuasive as to revealing bad-faith motivation or bad-faith
bargaining, I find it proper to briefly set forth certain of the areas of discussion
because of the apparent testimonial contention
The Company and the Union on November 10, 1964, discussed clauses relating to
employment of employees for less than a full shift The Company's position against
the Union's proposal was to the effect that this limited its right to employ part-time
employees, that it had part-time employees but not in the bargaining unit, and that it
desired to retain the right to hire part-time employees in the bargaining unit
On December 17 the parties discussed job classifications McFee told Bennett
that the Union had no objections to the classifications except as to the one classified
as a helper McFee asked Bennett to define what a helper was Bennett replied that
he did not know McFee told Bennett that if he had such a classification he certainly
should know what a helper did and asked who the helpers were Bennett replied that
he supposed the helpers were part-time people McFee asked who the part-time
From the very nature of the composite effect of the Union's proposal to the effect
that the recognized unit consisted of journea men lid apprentices it appears very lii ely
that the argument was against inclusion of the'Ielctcpe operators and proofreaders in a
journeymen and apprentices unit
84 It is unnecessary to discuss otherwise McFee s interpretation that certification Ian
guage concerns eligibility and not composition of the baigaining unit
1512 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
people were . Bennett replied that he did not know whether the Company had any,
that he did not think so. McFee asked if the Company had any part-time employees
in the bargaining unit . Bennett told McFee that the Company did not have part-time
employees in the bargaining unit but might have some ( in the future).
McFee's testimony as to the classification list is slightly confusing . McFee testi-
fied to the effect that the Respondent presented a classification list to the Union on
December 30, 1964.35 McFee also testified to the effect that the Respondent mailed
a list of classifications on which it appears employees ' names had been placed along
with their classification.36 On February 5, 1965, McFee testified that he referred to
the classification lists submitted by the Company. From the foregoing it appears
that at the December 17 bargaining session McFee must have requested and the
Respondent must have agreed to furnish a classification list of its employees.
On February 5 when McFee referred to the classification previously submitted by
the Company in reference to the Company's January 13 proposal (including classi-
fications and wage rates), he told Bennett that the Union had no objection to the
classifications except as to job printer and helpers. Apparently on December 17 the
parties had discussed the job printer classification with reference to being a floorman
or journeyman. McFee argued on February 5 that Bennett had conceded that the
job printer was a floorman and that now the classification was back in issue.
On February 5 McFee asked Bennett what the definition of helper was and Bennett
again told McFee that he supposed helpers were part-time people. McFee told
Bennett that this was the same thing he had told him earlier and asked if the Company
had part-time employees. Bennett asked Markey about this matter. Markey told
Bennett in effect that the Company did but that he didn't think they would be con-
sidered in the bargaining unit.
On the list of classifications and names of employees submitted by the Company in
December 1964 to the Union after the December 17 bargaining session there appeared
the name of Ronald C. Smith with a learner classification. It would appear from
McFee's testimony as to what he said at the December 17 and February 5 meetings
that his argument and objection in December 17 was to the classification of helper.
As to the classification list mailed to the Union after December 28, in listing the
employees the term "helper" was not used and Smith was designated as a "learner."
McFee objected to this classification in the same view as he had objected to the
helper terminology. The January 13 proposal with respect to wages, classification,
and rates had the term "helper" but not "learner."
McFee on February 5 asked about Smith's job. Bennett asked Markey what
Smith's job was. Markey stated that the boy had been there less than 2 weeks and
that he did not know exactly how to classify him, that he had put him down as a
learner. McFee asked Markey where Smith was working. Markey told McFee that
Smith was hired to take Carswell Carter's place. McFee told Markey that the parties
had been discussing apprentices. McFee asked Markey if Smith were an apprentice,
a helper, or learner, or just what was he. Markey replied that he just did not know,
that Smith was one of them.
Considering all of the foregoing and all the evidence, the facts do not reveal that
Respondent with respect to its proposals or positions on helpers, part-time employees,
or learners was motivated by bad faith or engaged in bad-faith bargaining.
c. Alleged bypassing of Union in negotiation
The General Counsel contends that the direction of questions by the company
negotiator on several occasions toward employee members of the Union's negotia-
tion committee reveals bad-faith motivation and bad-faith bargaining.
It is noted that the facts are undisputed that, at the bargaining sessions, Bennett
was the chief spokesman for the Company (excepting for October 1, 1964), and
McFee was the chief 'spokesman for the Union (excepting for December 30, 1964).
The overall evidence clearly reveals that all parties and persons at the bargaining
sessions clearly knew who were the chief spokesmen for the parties. The undisputed
facts reveal that the other members of the Company' s negotiating committee were
President Williams and Office Manager Markey, and that the other members of the
Union's negotiating committee were President McKinney and employees Grantham,
Waters, and Zeigler. The facts also reveal that the Company's chief spokesman on
October 1 was Attorney Pedrick, and that the Union's chief spokesman on Decem-
ber 30 was Union President McKinney.
35 The bargaining session at which McFee was not present . McFee may have been
referring to the classifications orally presented on December 17.
36 This list referred to Ronald C. Smith who was employed on December 28. It must
have been presented after December 28.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1513
At the bargaining session on October 12 it is noted that while discussing the
Union's proposal relating to operation of the shop under a union member foreman,
Office Manager Markey and McFee engaged in a discussion relating to the operation
of the shop and McFee directed questions to Markey about the same.
At the bargaining session on October 13 the parties discussed a union proposal
relating to a 5-day workweek. During the discussion Office Manager Markey talked
about increased operational cost and that he did not know of anyone who was
unhappy about the current 6-day workweek. Employees Zeigler and Waters, mem-
bers of the Union's bargaining committee, stated that they were dissatisfied and
wanted a 5-day week instead of a 6-day week and argued that in the past they had
been led to believe that they would get a 5-day workweek. Bennett asked Zeigler and
Waters if they thought the Union's proposed clause was really fair.37 Zeigler and
Waters told Bennett that they thought the clause was fair.
On December 30 at the bargaining session in which McKinney was the chief
spokesman for the Union, the parties discussed part of the Union's proposal relating
to the General Laws of the International Typographical Union. The parties also
discussed the Union's proposal relating to a 5-day workweek. Bennett asked Zeigler,
Grantham, and Waters whether this was something they wanted or was something
that McFee said that they wanted.38 Zeigler, Grantham, and Waters told Bennett
that they had helped prepare the Union's proposal and that the 5-day workweek (law)
was recognized throughout the industry, and by many of the industries in Waycross,
Georgia, and that they thought it right that they have a 5-day workweek.
Apparently about the same time in the December 30 discussion Bennett referred
to the Union's wage proposal as being ridiculous. Bennett asked the union commit-
teemen if Company President Williams had not been good to them, if Williams had
not taken care of them on their needs, were they not satisfied with the present arrange-
ments, and did they not know that a 5-day workweek would cause everyone to lose.
McKinney's testimony on direct examination was silent as to any protest he may
have made. On cross-examination McKinney's testimony ultimately was to the
effect that he did not object to Bennett's questioning the employee members of the
bargaining committee, that the employees had a right to answer the questions freely,
that he objected to the questioning because he felt that it "low rated" the Union.
McKinney's testimony does not clearly reveal that he told the Respondent that the
questioning "low rated" the Union or exactly what he said to Bennett with respect
to his objection. Considering all the foregoing, the facts appear more probable that
McKinney objected to the characterization of the Union's wage proposal as
ridiculous.39
On December 31 McFee had returned as the Union's chief spokesman at this
session.
On this date McFee argued that Markey on October 12 had made a contract pro-
posal on behalf of the Respondent with respect to operation of the shop under a
foreman, and Bennett and Markey argued that such a proposal had not been made
and that Markey lacked the power to make a proposal on behalf of the Company.
On December 31 the parties discussed a Company's "leave of absence" proposal
and in connection therewith discussed certain sections in the General Laws of the
International Typographical Union and the Union's basic contract proposal relating
to priority (seniority). Bennett asked the union committeemen if they thought the
union proposal was fair. Bennett argued that the Company's proposal relating to
cessation of seniority rights after a length of time 40 was fairer to employees The
union committeemen told Bennett that the Company's proposal was unfair and the
Union's proposal was fair.
37 The proposed clause read as follows:
Art II Section 2. No employe covered by this agreement shall be required or per-
mitted to hold a situation of more than five shifts in one financial week. When any
employee is required to work on a regular off day or off night, or the sixth or
seventh shift in any financial week, he shall be paid the overtime rate for such work.
11 It is noted as indicated elsewhere that the Union 's proposal included a provision that
the General Laws of the International Typographical Union be incorporated by reference
into the agreement, that McFee was a representative of the International Typographical
Union, and that the Union's proposal contained language with reference to approval of
the contract 'by the International Union.
3° It is noted that the Union 's wage proposal in effect proposed a 50-percent increase
in wages over current rates in existence
a The Company 's proposal , among other things, provided for expiration of priority after
6 months' absence if continuous.
1514 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On February 4 the parties again discussed the Union's 5-day-week proposal. Ben-
nett told McFee and the Union that the Company did not see how it could publish
a paper on a 5-day workweek. Bennett told McFee and the whole union committee
that if they could tell the Company how to operate on a 5-day workweek the Com-
pany might be willing to try it. Bennett asked questions of McFee, McKinney, and
the union committeemen as to how the Company could operate on a 5-day
workweek 4'
On February 5 McFee for the Union directed questions to Markey as to whether
Ronald C. Smith was a helper, apprentice, or learner. It is also noted that one of
the key bargaining issues between Bennett and McFee was whether or not Respond-
ent had journeymen or apprentices.
Considering the foregoing and all the evidence , I am convinced that the facts
reveal that the parties considered Bennett and McFee the principal spokesmen for
their respective parties but also considered that all persons present were actively
participating in the bargaining insofar as attempting to explain and understand posi-
tions. The facts do not reveal that the Company was motivated in bad faith or
bargained in bad faith by directing questions to employee members of the Union's
bargaining committee. 1 find no reason to doubt that the Company was sincerely
motivated in Bennett's characterization of the Union's wage proposal as being
ridiculous.42 In sum the evidence does not establish that Bennett's characterization
of the Union's proposal was motivated by bad faith nor does it reveal that Respond-
ent bargained in bad faith with the Union.
6. Miscellaneous other contentions or issues
As indicated previously, the pleadings simply placed in issue issues of a general
refusal to bargain and of an alleged unfair labor practice strike. The parties were
requested to set forth in their statements and briefs those facts and factual conten-
tions that they believed constituted persuasive evidence. Apparently the parties
have done so. In evaluating or considering all issues, all facts have been considered
in relationship to the evidence as a whole. Although not necessarily contended by
the parties, the testimony and evidence reveal some facts which appear to have been
offered as supporting various contentions. Many of the contentions specifically
argued have been based on rather nebulous and insignificant facts. This being so I
find it proper to have considered and set forth other facts as being contended,
although not clearly specifically contended, on the basis that consideration of such
is consistent with the consideration of specific contentions.
a. Alleged lack of sufficient concern for bargaining
The General Counsel contends that the Company did not display a sufficient con-
cern for the seriousness of bargaining by the manner that it offered certain contract
proposals. The facts contended in support of this contention essentially are as
follows: On November 10, 1964, Attorney Bennett tendered to the Union a number
of contract proposals including a list of proposed company rules. On November 11
Bennett advised the Union that the Company's November 10 proposals had been
submitted in error and gave the Union a substitute number of proposals. The appar-
ent error was that the November 10 proposals related to rules of another company.
In general effect the Company's November 11 proposals were the same as the
November 10 proposals otherwise. The General Counsel and the Charging Party
disavow any contention that this mixup was intentional. The contention is that
this reveals a lack of serious disposition to bargain in good faith. I find no merit in
this contention. A comparison of the group of proposals submitted on November 10
and 11 convinces me that a reasonably alert and conscientious person could easily
have mistaken one group of proposals for the other. Accordingly, the facts as to
this incident do not reveal evidence of bad-faith motivation, bad-faith bargaining,
or lack of serious disposition toward bargaining
In like vein it may be said that the General Counsel's contention of lack of serious-
ness of bargaining is revealed by the Company's resubmission of the same proposals
on June 16 as included in its January 13 proposal. Thus the Company submitted on
June 16 its same proposal relative to a management clause and relating to no -strike,
41 The facts as a whole reveal that the Company's position in general was that a 5-day
workweek would require more employees and that the Union contended that it would not
or at least would not greatly increase manpower needs
42 This does not constitute my evaluation that the Union's proposal was ridiculous but
merely that the evidence convinces me that Bennett was sincere in his characterization of
the proposal
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1515
no-lockout clauses. It may be summarized that as of June 16 the bargaining posi-
tions of the parties were as follows . The Company 's proposals as a whole were
directed toward the retention of management control over hiring, firing , and sub-
contractmg or related matter and opposed to giving up potential rights over the same
or to agree on restrictions on the use of tape from other sources . The Company's
position was in effect also to retain the right to issue orders and in the event of
dispute to continue in effect its orders subject to final determination of disputes.
The Union 's position was to limit the company rights as to management authority
and in the event of disputes to maintain the status quo prior to the dispute. Both
parties' bargaining positions revealed that they were attempting to get the other bar-
gaining party to bargain on their proposals as a point from which to start resolution
of the issues . Primarily this appears to be a point of strategic position of bargaining
and one from which each party seemed to think it would have a point of advantage.
Under such circumstances , the resubmission of the January 13 proposals appears to
me to be no more than an attempt to get the Union to start the resolution of the
issues from a point of departure of using the Company's proposed language. Under
such circumstances I do not find that the evidence relating to the resubmission of the
same bargaining clauses reveals bad-faith motivation or bad-faith bargaining.
b. Position and proposals relating to perforated tape
The General Counsel contends that the Company 's conduct in regard to the
Union 's proposal relating to perforated tape reveals bad-faith motivation and bad-
faith bargaining.
The Union 's proposal provided in effect that the teletypesetter tape from Associated
Press and United Press International regular newswire could be used but that all
other tape must be perforated by employees covered by the agreement . The Com-
pany opposed this provision on the ground that it would prevent it from getting tape
from other sources. The Company , however, admitted that it did not receive perfo-
rated tape from sources other than Associated Press and United Press International.
The Company 's December 17 proposal relating to this matter in effect provided that
the Company would have the right to use tape from any wire service. The Union
opposed the Company's proposal because it was not limited to use of the Associated
Press or United Press International wire services . At the December 1 bargaining
session the Company had opposed the Union's proposal about the use of wire serv-
ices but had stated that it would consider it further . Thereafter the parties continued
to argue the merits of their proposals.
It is not the function of the Board or the Trial Examiner to determine what pro-
posals the parties should agree on. The only issue is whether the Company 's posi-
tion on the proposals indicates a closed mind on the subject . The facts, in my
opinion, reveal no more than that the Company opposed the Union's proposal and
preferred a proposal giving the Company freedom to use tape from various sources.
Bennett, for the Company , indicated during the bargaining sessions that he considered
the contract proposals as a whole to be related one to another and that economic
benefits were to be considered in context with other proposals . Although the Com-
pany did not utilize other wire services , it is clear that prior to the advent of the
Union the Company had the potential right to do so. Considering all of the fore-
going and all of the facts in this case , I am convinced that the evidence does not
reveal that the Respondent had a closed mind with reference to the Union 's contract
proposal but that Respondent was opposed to the same and offered its own proposal
relating to the matter . In my opinion the facts merely reveal that the parties have
different proposals on the same subject and were bargaining strongly for their own
proposals.
c. Alleged refusal to furnish information
The General Counsel contends that the Company has refused to furnish informa-
tion concerning reproducible advertising . The Union 's bargaining proposal was as
follows:
Section 8. Matrices, plates , cuts or type of local advertisements , or other
local paid matter, furnished to newspapers , may be used by such newspaper
provided such matter shall be reproduced as nearly like the original as possible,
within two weeks from the time of publication . It is understood that this rule
does not apply to national advertising , nor to printed supplements , magazines,
or other syndicate feature matter , in matrices , cuts or plates , in page size or
smaller. This section shall not be constructed as prohibiting the loaning, bor-
rowing, exchanging , purchasing or sale of matter in matrices , cuts, plates or
type occasioned by extraordinary emergencies such as fire , floods, explosions,
1516 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or other unforeseen disasters , including the "pi" of a form or forms, when it
shall be permitted without penalty. It is understood and agreed that a local
advertisement is: Any advertisement originally set within the jurisdiction of
Savannah Typographical Union No. 183; any advertisement wherever set, adver-
tising the business of any concern that is in the local field, but does not apply
to advertisements originally drawn up by hand and reproduced . The addition
of names and addresses of branch stores or local selling agents to any advertise-
ment not falling within these definitions does not make the advertisement a local
advertisement . Provided that overtime work shall not be required on reproduc-
tion , but matter not reproduced within the time limit specified shall not be can-
celed . The office reserves the right to "pickup" both machine and hand set.
Matter once paid for shall remain the property of the office in type or other
forms, to be used in all editions or as many times as desired with such changes
as the office may wish to make. "Kill " marks shall not deprive the office of
"pickups."
At the November 10, 1964 , bargaining session Office Manager Markey spoke con-
cerning the Union 's proposal , contending that it constituted a "bogus" or "feather-
bedding" provision . Both Markey and McFee gave their interpretation of what the
clause meant. Markey stated that the section would prevent the Company from
getting mats , cuts, or plates and seriously hamper the Company 's operations. McFee
told the Company that the clause would not hamper the Company's operation, that
there was not that much reproduction work being done. McFee asked Markey to
tell the Union what advertising he considered to be reproducible and the amount of
those ads . Markey told McFee that he did not know what the amount would be.
McFee told Markey in effect that by his statements he certainly had indicated knowl-
edge of the reproducible ads and the amount . Markey showed McFee a copy of a
newspaper and inquired as to whether certain ads would be reproducible. McFee
told Markey that he did not think certain ads pointed out were reproducible but
pointed out an ad that he thought would be reproducible . McFee told Markey that if
the Union were to consider anything else than what it had produced , it would need
information concerning the ads that were reproducible and the amount , and McFee
requested that Markey transmit such information to him.
Thereafter, although the Company furnished other information ( lists of classifica-
tion , etc.) to the Union , it never furnished information relating to reproducible ads
or the amount thereof.
On January 13, 1965, the Company included in its proposal a provision which in
effect gave it the absolute right to use Teletype tape from any syndicate and to use
local or national advertising mats without reproducing the same 43 The Union
opposed the Company's proposal at the January 14 bargaining session on the grounds
that the proposal with respect to the Teletype tape allowed farming out of work, that
the proposal encompassed both the question of Teletype tape and advertising mats,
and that the Union could not consider both of the Union 's proposals with the Com-
pany's own proposal.
On June 16 the Union submitted a counterproposal to its own proposal relating to
the use of local advertising mats which allowed the resetting of type within 30 days
instead of 2 weeks. It may be said that the Union 's proposal continued to require
the resetting of various advertising mats. The facts do not reveal that the Union or
its spokesman in the discussion or bargaining on the question of reproduction of local
advertising ever mentioned the submission of information on reproducible ads after
November 10, 1964 . The facts reveal in my opinion that the Union 's proposals and
position were designed to require the Company to have certain advertising mats,
when used , reproduced . The facts reveal that the Company 's proposal and positions
were designed to allow the Company to retain the right to use advertising mats with-
out having to pay for their reproduction later. The facts clearly indicate that prior
to the advent of the Union the Company has used such mats without later having
them reproduced . It is obvious that the Union 's clause would result in some added
cost or hampering of the Company's operation . The facts reveal that the real con-
tention between the Union and the Company was whether the Company would retain
its right to use such mats without reproduction or not. Markey credibly testified to
the effect that he did not "get the information up" because it involved a great amount
of work and the Union did not ask for it after November 10. Considering all the
foregoing , it appears to me that the real bargaining issue was that the Company
insisted on retaining freedom to utilize mats without restrictions and that the Union
continued to contend for restrictions on use of mats . Essentially the Union's con-
'",The Respondent on December 17, 1964, had submitted a proposal in similar vein
limited to the Teletype tape issue
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1517
lention was designed to secure more work for the - employees in the unit and the
Employer's contentions were designed to continue on the same basis as it had. With
respect to the Employer's contention , it is noted that the possibility for abuse exists.
Considering all of the foregoing , I am convinced that the evidence does not reveal
that the Employer was motivated in bad faith or was refusing to bargain by its
failure to furnish the information requested 44
d. Alleged stalling
The General Counsel contends that Bennett 's argument concerning the meaning of
"civil rights" reveals a stalling technique.
It may be summarized that on November 11 the parties discussed a union contract
provision which provided in effect , among other things, that a foreman might dis-
charge an employee for violation of office rules which did not abridge the civil rights
of employees . Company Attorney Bennett argued in effect that he did not under-
stand the term "civil rights" and that he thought something else was meant by the
Union 's proposal . McFee told Bennett that the interpretation placed upon the term
"civil rights" was the individual's rights under the Constitution and Federal statutes
and that was all. Bennett told McFee in effect that a person reading the term "civil
rights" would put the same interpretation as the interpretation in Georgia, that he
frankly thought something else was meant , and that he was scared of the clause.
The Company 's January 13 proposal included language with respect to the foreman's
right to discharge or suspend concerning office rules which did not abridge civil
rights of employees.
I find nothing in the evidence to reveal that Bennett was not sincerely questioning
the meaning of "civil rights " or that he was not concerned about a contract provision
concerning "civil rights." The evidence as to this matter is completely insufficient
to reveal that Respondent was stalling by virtue of its position on civil rights, or acted
with bad-faith motivation thereto.
e. Alleged refusal to go back over proposals
The General Counsel contends that the Company's refusal on December 17 to go
back over the contract and indicate agreement on the points agreed to reveals bad-
faith motivation or bad-faith bargaining.
The facts may be summarized as follows: The parties discussed the Union's con-
tract proposal on various dates between October 1 and December 1, 1964. On
December 1 the parties had completed discussion of the Union 's contract proposals
except for the wage proposals. At that time the parties agreed to attempt to get the
noneconomic issues decided first The parties on December 1 discussed again article I,
sections 1 through 4 of the Union 's proposal . Up to this time the Respondent had
indicated those areas that it was in agreement with in substance and the areas of
disagreement . On December 17 McFee for the Union proposed that the parties
commence again and indicate the areas of agreement . Bennett for the Company
started speaking of the area of disagreement about journeymen and apprentices and
then spoke strongly against the Union 's clauses pertaining to Teletype tape and
similar clauses.
Since the parties had completed discussion of the Union 's proposals on December 1
and at that time had gone over article I, sections 1 through 4 of the proposal again,
and since it may be said that discussion about the area of disagreement in essence
reveals the area of agreement also, I am convinced that the facts do not reveal that
the Respondent 's conduct on December 17 was that of bad -faith motivation or bad-
faith bargaining.
Although not specifically mentioned in this regard , I find it proper to also set out
at this point two other areas of the testimony concerning statements by the Respond-
ent's negotiators With respect to the discussion on December 31 concerning the
parties' disagreement as to whether Markey had made a proposal on October 12
concerning the operation of the production shop by a foreman , President Williams
testified to the effect that it was not in writing . From the overall evidence and the
testimony of the witnesses , I am convinced that the facts reveal that Respondent con-
strued the manner of bargaining and the meaning of statements made as follows-
Statements and discussions in bargaining sessions were to be made freely and spon-
taneously in an effort to reach understanding and without the hampering effect of
feeling that the statements should be considered as actually the finished written
proposal.
"The factual situation herein is unlike a plea of inability to give a wage increase.
1518 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As indicated in the section of this report concerning the holiday proposal, Bennett's
statements concerning the honoring of agreements in the total context of the evidence
reveal a similar construction of the bargaining discussion. I am convinced as indi-
cated that with respect to the holiday proposal Bennett had not intentionally agreed
to the Union's holiday proposal and felt that the Union's argument thereto was'
an unfair argument.
f. Positions and proposals relating to no-strike, no-lockout provisions
The General Counsel contends that the Company's conduct with respect to no-
strike, no-lockout proposals reveals an attitude of bad-faith bargaining.
On November 11 the Company tendered to the Union several proposals including
a no-strike, no-lockout proposal. This provided in effect that with respect to
disputes subject to the grievance procedure of the agreement the Union would not
encourage or sanction strike, stoppage, slowdown, or other interruption of work and
would actively discourage the same. The proposal in effect provided that during the
term of the agreement the Company would not lock out employees and that in the
event of unauthorized strikes, stoppages of work, slowdown, or other interruption of
work during the term of the agreement neither party would negotiate upon the merits
of the dispute until the illegal action had terminated. It is noted that the Company's
proposal regarding strikes ( etc.) is not limited by language to strikes (etc.) arising out
of disputes concerning the contract.
The parties discussed the above-referred-to proposal on December 31 and the
Union gave the Company a counterproposal on that date. The Union's counter-
proposal in effect provided that all disputes would be settled in accordance with the
contract provisions and that working conditions (etc.) prevailing prior to the dispute
be preserved until final disposition of the dispute according to the contract.
The differences of the contract proposals touch on the issue of whether the
Company could issue directions which stood until the dispute was settled or whether
the conditions existing prior to the dispute would prevail. It would appear also that
the company proposal provided in total effect for a broader no-strike, no-lockout
provision than the Union's proposal did.
The parties discussed the Company's and the Union's proposals on no-strike, no-
lockout on December 31. Thediscussion, as best gathered from McFee's testimony,
touched on the interpretation of the, parties as to work stoppage, interruption of
work, and lockout. There was no agreement as to the proposals on that date
Bennett in effect told McFee that he did not believe the Union understood its proposal
and was afraid that if the employees read the Union's proposal they might go out
on strike anyway.
On January 13, 1965, the Company in its relatively complete contract proposal
had a clause which was simpler in form than its earlier proposal as regards no-strike,
no-lockout. The Company's January 13 proposal in essential effect continued to
provide that disputes over the contract's interpretation or application be resolved by
the contract's procedures, and broadly that there be no strikes, work stoppage, slow-
down, or other interference with operations and no lockouts during the term of the
agreement. In the contract provision relating to the joint standing committee the
Company had language giving effect to the Employer's decision until disputes were
finally settled in accordance with the contract.
On February 26 the Union gave the Employer a new proposal on no-strike, no-
lockouts which was worded in essence similarly to its earlier proposal The Union's
proposal in effect continued to provide that disputes as to rights be resolved in
accordance with the contract provisions and that such controversies be resolved with-
out resort to strikes, lockouts, or interruptions of any kind. The language of the
Union's proposal, by total implication, appears to be to the effect that the referred-to
disputes, rights, no-strike, no-lockouts, or interruptions were all with reference to
rights arising out of the contract. The language, however, is not specifically clear
in that regard.
On June 16 the Company resubmitted its January 13 proposal and the parties dis-
cussed the fact that it was the same proposal and discussed whether interpretations of
work stoppage, etc., had changed. On June 17 the Union submitted another proposal
relating to no-strike, no-lockouts. In effect the Union's proposal clearly revealed
that all rights or disputes as to construction of the contract would be resolved by the
contract procedures, and that such disputes would be settled without strike, lockouts,
or interruptions of any kind. It is noted that in effect the Union's no-strike, no-
lockout clause is limited to disputes concerning the contract.
As of the hearing in this matter (July 1965) the parties had not agreed upon a
no-strike, no-lockout clause.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1519
The testimony of McFee does not clearly reveal that the parties argued about the
difference in effect between the no-strike, no-lockout provisions insofar as one pro-
posal appears broad and the other narrow. McFee's testimony was to the effect that
each was arguing for his own language.
The language of the Company's proposal relating to no-strike, no-lockout provi-
sions may be said to be relatively simple and directly to the point. The language of
the Union's proposal relating to no-strike, no-lockout reflected language of an
explanatory nature to show the desirability of resolving disputes according to the con-
tract and the elimination of fruitless controversies and the maintaining of good feel-
ings and harmonious relations, as well as language directed toward the agreement of
the parties as to setting of disputes and of the no-strike, no-lockout provisions.
If it is General Counsel's contention that the language of the two proposals is so
similar that in effect the parties have agreed in principle but that Respondent's refusal
to accept the Union's exact language is indicative of bad faith, the answer would be
that such agreement in principle would reveal that Respondent's willingness to sign
a contract with its language proposal reveals good faith. If the parties' failure to
reach agreement on the contract term is that they have attributed a different meaning
to their own wording as to the no-strike, no-lockout provisions, as appears from the
language of the proposal, it would appear that the parties have been relatively con-
sistent in these positions, have discussed their clauses, and have bargained on the
same. As to the fact that Respondent tendered the same contract proposal on June 16
as it had on January 13, it is noted that the Union's proposals on the same subject
matter have been relatively the same, and I am convinced from all of the evidence
that this technique of the Company was merely an attempt to get the Union to
discuss the terms of the contract from Respondent's proposal and with its language
rather than a point of departure from the Union's proposal.
Considering the foregoing and all the evidence in this case, the facts do not reveal
that the Respondent's conduct relative to the no-strike, no-lockout proposals con-
stitutes that Respondent was bargaining with bad-faith motivation or was bargaining
in bad faith.
g. Positions and proposals relating to management clauses
The General Counsel contends that the Company by its conduct and proposals
relating to management clauses revealed bad-faith bargaining by the Respondent.
Briefly stated, it may be said that the Union's proposal submitted to the Company
prior to and at the commencement of bargaining and discussed thereafter did not
contain management-rights type clauses. The Union's proposal, however, contained
clauses which provided that the production department be operated under a foreman
who would be a member of the Union, that the Employer be restricted in the use .,i
tape and certain related manufacturing devices, restricted the Employer's right to use
suspension as a means of discipline, and placed the control of hiring and firing of
journeymen in the hands of a joint standing committee. The Company's November 11
management-clause proposal in essence constituted a broad retention of management
rights excepting that all of the provisions in the management clause were subject to
any applicable terms of the agreement. The Company's January 13 management-
clause proposal was similar in nature to its November 11 proposal excepting that it
referred specifically to the operation of the production department through a company
manager and that foremen would not be required to join the Union. The Company's
January 13 proposal again provided that its provisions relating to the management
clause would be subject to any applicable terms of the agreement. The Union on
February 4 gave the Company a management-clause proposal which provided that
"The Employer shall have the right to determine and effectuate all matters of com-
pany policy not covered by, or in conflict with the terms of this agreement." On
June 16 the Company tendered a proposal relating to the management clause which
was the same as its January 13 proposal. McFee told Bennett that this was the same
proposal as previously submitted, and that if the Union accepted this proposal there
would be no necessity for any other section in the contract. Bennett in effect agreed
to McFee's statement.
As indicated previously, the totality, of the evidence reveals, in my opinion, that
both parties attempted to get the other party to bargain about various points using as
a point of departure their own worded proposals. Thus the Union's proposals were
upon a basis of a simple management clause, reserving management rights not cov-
ered by or in conflict with the agreement, and with other clauses constituting a limita-
tion on management rights. The Company's management clause reserved manage-
ment rights in a more specific way but made the management clause subject to the
terms of the agreement. Considering all of the evidence, I am convinced that the
resubmission of the same management clause was merely an attempt to bargain on
1520 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the issues from the management 's proposal as a point of departure . An examination
of the Company's management clause does not reveal that in fact it would eliminate
the necessity of other contract provisions but does reveal that on the issues as to
the use of tape and the management of the production department acceptance of
the management clause would constitute a concession as to areas of the Union's
proposal relating to restrictions on the use of tape or similar production methods, and
as to the management of the production department.
Considering all of the foregoing, and all of the evidence, the company conduct
relating to its management clause reveals only that the Company was strongly bar-
gaining as to those areas of the contract proposals in which it sought its proposals as
contrasted to its opposition to the Union's proposals.
h. Proposals and positions relating to wages
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent by its conduct and proposals
relating to wages reveals that Respondent 's wage proposal was aimed at defeat of
any agreement.
It may be briefly stated that the Union's wage proposal included, in its original
contract proposal submitted prior to the bargaining session , wage proposals which
in effect constituted an increase of approximately 50 percent in the rate of pay for
the top-rated employees . The parties essentially discussed noneconomic aspects of
the Union's proposal between October 1 and December 1, 1964, and decided at that
time to continue discussing noneconomic items in an attempt to remove such items
from contention prior to wage discussions . In the discussion of holidays the
Respondent informed the Union that all such proposals involving economic matters
would be contingent on the ultimate wage agreement. On December 17 the parties
discussed a company request that it be allowed to give a wage increase, as customary,
around the first of the year. Since the Company wanted to give the increase without
negotiation as to the amount , the Union refused, stating in effect that the parties
would negotiate on the same in the contract. At the time of this discussion Bennett
stated that the Employer thought the employees deserved a raise increase but indicated
that he did not know how much, whether it should be 7 cents, or more, or less. On
January 13 the Respondent included in its relatively complete contract proposals a
proposal providing for the current wage rates. In the same proposal the Respondent
had a holiday provision which was slightly more than its current holiday policy but
less than it had previously offered. The Respondent's January 13 proposal omitted
reference to sick leave or disability insurance proposals, although Respondent in fact
had practices relating to the same.
Considering all of the foregoing and all of the evidence, I am convinced that
Respondent's positions on wages and related items reveal that its January 13 proposal
relating to wages was an initial proposal to which the Respondent was prepared to
bargain upward depending on the Union's future positions on its economic pro-
posals and other proposals such as the proposals relating to restricted use of tape
and no-strike, no-lockout clauses.
In this respect I note that the Union's February 5 proposal to reduce its wage
demands on the basis of a 371h-hour week from $120 to $118 reflects a concession
that still left the Union's wage proposal as a very substantial increase over current
rates. The failure of the Company to make an increased wage proposal of its own
at this point does not indicate that the Company would not make a wage proposal or
agree to an increase in wages with reference to a more moderate demand.
Considering the evidence as to Respondent's proposals and positions relating to
wages in total context with all of the evidence , the facts do not reveal that Respond-
ent's wage proposals were aimed at defeat of any agreement.
i. Positions and proposals relating to past practice
The General Counsel contends in effect that the Company's conduct in not accept-
ing proposals based upon current practice, in not making counterproposals to some
of the Union's proposals, and in not taking positions on proposals reveals that
Respondent's overall conduct was that of bargaining in bad faith.
The Union's initial contract proposals had provisions relating to sick leave, to
sick-pay benefits for on-the-job injuries, to funeral leave, to severance pay, to a
pension plan , to seniority , and to apprentice training programs . During the discus-
sion of the Union's proposals by the parties there was little agreement of a definite
nature by the Respondent but rather the Respondent indicated the areas of agree-
ment , of disagreement , or agreement in principle.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1521
As to sick leave, Bennett told McFee that the Company would have to study the
Union's proposal. Markey told McFee that the Company had sick leave in effect,
that there was a policy of 7 days per year accumulative to 14 days. Employee Waters
(on the Union's committee) stated that they had not understood sick leave quite
like that, that they knew that some of the people had been getting sick leave and
some had not, that the stated policy sounded good to him. McFee told the Company
that the Union would be receptive to that type of arrangement. Markey stated that
while the Company had such a policy he did not think the Company would be able
to afford 14 days per year of sick leave. Bennett told McFee that the sick leave pro-
posal was a matter of economics and would have to be viewed in the light of what-
ever wage agreement was arrived at.
As to the Union's funeral leave proposal (3 days), Bennett indicated that the
Company had a policy on funeral leave (1 day) and that the parties should not have
a problem on reaching agreement on a clause. As to the Union's severance pay
proposal, Bennett stated that the Company took a dim view of such a proposal. As
to the Union's pension plan proposal, Bennett asked McFee if he were serious and
McFee told Bennett that the Union was serious but did not expect to get all that
it asked.
During the bargaining sessions when the parties discussed the Union's sick-pay
benefits for employees injured on the job, Bennett told McFee in effect that he did
not know whether the Company could agree to the Union's method of computing
the benefits. Markey told the Union that the Company in the past had paid the
employee in full for time that an injured employee was out. Bennett indicated by a
facial expression that this statement by Markey surprised him and questioned Markey
as to details relating to claims for disability insurance. Markey stated in effect that
under company practice no claims were made. McFee told the Company that the
Union would accept company practice. Bennett told McFee that he did not believe
that the Company was willing to embody such a practice in a contract.
During the discussions on the Union's proposals relating to seniority and to training
of apprentices, Bennett indicated that he believed in seniority and had no serious
objections to the seniority section and thought the training of apprentices was fine.
Contrary to General Counsel's factual contention, at the time of discussion of senior-
ity provision the Respondent had proposed on November 11 a proposal relating to
seniority.
On January 13 Bennett told the Union that he was not rejecting any of their pro-
posals but that he had a complete proposal that he was presenting. The Company's
January 13 proposal included provisions relating to sick and injury leave which were
not as generous as the Union's written proposal nor as good as Markey had stated
was the current practice.45 The Company's January 13 proposal did not contain
reference to funeral leave, severance pay, or pension plan. The Company's Jan-
uary 13 proposal included clauses relating to seniority (priority) and to a training
program for apprentices.
Considering all the foregoing and all of the evidence, I note that the Company
clearly revealed to the Union that its position on economic items such as sick leave -
and disability pay was contingent on the ultimate wage agreement. It thus follows
that its current sick leave and sick-pay benefits for injured employees must be
weighed in connection with its current wage rates. The overall evidence reveals, in
my opinion, that Respondent's position on wages and other economic benefits was
to the effect that it was willing to give wage increases depending on the contract
proposals. Under such circumstances Respondent's position on all of its economic
issues must be viewed as initial bargaining proposals from which it was willing to
move toward more generous benefits provided concessions were made as to other
proposals. It very well may be that an employer with a generous sick-pay benefit
program that could be terminated at will might be reluctant to enter into a binding
agreement thereto. Considering all of the evidence, I am convinced that the facts
reveal merely that Respondent was attempting to use its position on economic
matters as an attempt to further its position on other Respondent contractual desires
such as to attempt to get the Union retreat on the restricted tape and related type
4- It is not clear whether the General Counsel contends that the Respondent's in-
corporating in one section its provision relating to sick leave and sick-pay benefits is
evidence of bad-faith bargaining In any event I do not consider a party's tying in of
subjects which appear somewhat similar in nature in a contract provision to reveal bad faith
1522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contract provisions . The Respondent 's position on economic issues must be viewed
in the light of the Union's economic proposals which included wage increases for
top-rated employees of approximately 50 percent of current rates.
Considering the evidence as a whole, I am convinced that Respondent's statements
as to provisions ( funeral leave , etc.) to which it had no serious objections , in connec-
tion with its statements on January 13 as to not rejecting any proposal, reveal that
Respondent was attempting to get the Union to argue for such provisions as quid
pro quo for concessions by the Respondent.
Considering the General Counsel's contentions that Respondent took no position
on seniority, apprentice training programs, etc., the overall evidence reveals that
Respondent did make proposals and bargain over such issues46
Considering the foregoing contentions and the evidence relating thereto in con-
text with all of the evidence, the facts do not reveal that Respondent's conduct
(relative to sick leave and sick-pay benefits, to the making of proposals, or to the
taking of positions) was that of bargaining in bad faith.
j. Position relating to struck-work clause
The General Counsel contends in effect that the company position with respect to
a union proposal relating to struck work revealed that the Company was motivated
in bad faith.
The Union 's proposal was as follows:
Article I Section 9. The employer agrees not to require employees to execute
any work received from or destined for another employer whose employees are
locked out or on strike authorized by the International Typographical Union
under circumstances which make the Employer an ally of such other employer,
and such work shall not be within the scope of the employment of employees
covered by this agreement
On October 13, 1964, the parties discussed the Union's proposal set out above.
Bennett stated that he thought the Union 's proposal set out above was illegal, that
it was quite confusing , and that he just did not think that he could accept it. McFee
argued that the Union 's proposal was not illegal , that it was not unreasonable, and
was in accordance with Board decision and determination in the field , that any work
that was ordinarily and customarily performed would continue to be performed, that
it applied when the Company put itself in the position of being an ally with another
employer by accepting work when a strike was in progress . Bennett told McFee
that he still felt the clause was illegal and did not think the Company would be
required to negotiate on the clause . There is no evidence that the parties discussed
the above -mentioned union proposal after October 13.
In connection with the foregoing it is noted that the Union 's proposal relating to
the General Laws of International Typographical Union contained the following
provision:
Art. IV Section 1. Subordinate unions at all times have the right to define
as struck work composition and mail room work executed wholly or in part in
shops not under contract relationship with a subordinate union of the I.T.U.,
and composition , mailing room , or other work coming from or destined for
printing concerns which have been declared by the union to be unfair, after
which employees may refuse to handle the work classified as struck work.
It is also noted that the parties ' discussion concerning no-strike, no-lockout provi-
sion, recognition , and jurisdictional clauses revealed that their understanding of vari-
ous subjects was in a complex manner different from what might be supposed from a
normal understanding of the words used.
The General Counsel contends that at least the Union's proposal was a "permissive"
subject of bargaining . The Charging Party contends that the Union 's proposal was
a "mandatory " subject of bargaining , and contends that an "erroneous " position that
the proposal was not a bargainable subject reveals that the employer could not
approach the discussion of this subject with an open mind and willingness to reach
an agreement.
46 In similar vein I note the following , With respect to article I, section 6 of the Union's
proposal , McFee testified that Bennett on October 12 stated that he did not understand
this section and that McFee explained the section . Exactly what McFee said in ex-
planation was not testified to. Viewing the written section and considering the testimony
of the witness as to difference in understanding about other sections of the proposals, I
find nothing in the evidence to reveal that Bennett was not sincere in his statement that
he did not understand the Union 's proposal.
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC 1523
Considering the simplicity with which the alleged refusal to bargain in the com-
plaint was pled,47 counsel's statements pertaining to evidence being considered in total
context as revealing an entire course of illegal conduct, and the above positions of the
General Counsel and the Charging Party, I am convinced that the General Counsel
and Charging Party directed their contentions with respect to the Respondent's posi-
tion on the Union's proposal (on struck work) toward the question of whether
Respondent's position revealed bad-faith motivation
Considering all of the foregoing facts and all of the evidence, I am not persuaded
that the facts reveal that Bennett was insincere in making the statement that he
believed the Union's proposal to be illegal and that he did not believe that the
Respondent would have to negotiate on the clause The legality of the clause pro-
posed by the Union depends, in my opinion, on the way the word "ally" is inter-
preted The discussions that the parties had during the sessions concerning the certifi-
cation language , recognition clauses, jurisdictional clauses, the word "lockout" reveal
a basis for not readily accepting the normal meaning of words In addition the
General Laws of the International Typographical Union' s clause relating to struck
work reveals that the word did not necessarily coincide with Board's decisional law
as to what an "ally" situation would be
With respect to Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 96 NLRB 850, enfd 205
F 2d 131 (C A 1), cited by the Charging Party, I note the following Reed & Prince
involved a case where the respondent at all times took the position that it was under
no legal obligation to bargain on the subject of checkoff The Board stated that the
Board had held that checkoff was a bargaining issue The Board further stated as
follows 48
The Respondent at all times took the position that it is under no legal obli-
gation to bargain on the subject of checkoff Contrary to this position, the
Board has held that checkoff is a bargainable issue Although the Respondent
proceeded to give the Union reasons why it would not grant a checkoff provision
even if it were a bargainable issue, we are convinced that the requisites for
good-faith bargaining cannot be found to exist when the lack of a legal require-
ment to bargain is uppermost in the Respondent's mind An employer who
takes such a position on a bargainable subject can hardly approach the discus-
sion of this subject with an open mind and a willingness to reach an agreement
Although no one of the separate elements in this case is in itself conclusive
evidence of bad-faith bargaining, when the entire bargaining pattern of the
Respondent is viewed in its totality and the individual items are appraised
together, the picture is clear We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion
because, after a careful study of this difficult record, we are convinced that the
Respondent did not participate in the bargaining negotiations with the good
faith required of it by law Unlike our dissenting colleague, we are convinced
that the record, taken as a whole, demonstrates a lack of good-faith bargaining
on the Respondent's part
The Respondent is not experiencing labor relations difficulties for the first
time More than 10 years ago, a predecessor of the Union sought recourse to
the Board in a not too dissimilar situation, and it was not until the Board issued
an Order and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit enforced the Order that
the Respondent negotiated a collective bargaining agreement We have scru-
pulously avoided prejudging the Respondent because of its rather unsavory
labor relations history, but the Board is not required by law to ignore this his-
tory Accordingly, in evaluating the evidence in this case, we have given some
weight to this factor
Considering the totality of the Board's decision in Reed & Prince, I am convinced
that the taking of a position that a clause is illegal does not automatically reveal
that such a position is one taken in bad faith but must be evaluated with a consid-
eration of the particular type clause involved and with all of the circumstances of
the case Considering the evidence as a whole, I find no basis to doubt that Ben-
nett was sincerely motivated in his statement that he believed the Union's proposed
clause to be illegal and that he was not honestly discussing the clause, giving his
reasons therefor In sum, considering all of the evidence, I am not persuaded that
the General Counsel has established that the Respondent was illegally motivated by
Bennett's statement to the effect that he believed the Union's proposal to be illegal
and that he did not think he would have to negotiate on it
47 The complaint did not allege specific acts of violative conduct such as a refusal to
bargain over the clause relating to struck work
ke Footnotes omitted
2 21-3 74-6 6-v o f 15 7-9 7
1524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
k. Positions relating to proposal relating to General Laws of the ITU
The Charging Party contends that the Company's conduct with relation to the
Union's proposal concerning the General Laws of the International Typographical
Union revealed bad-faith bargaining.
The Union's proposal was as follows:
Article I Section 7. It is understood and agreed that the General Laws of the
International Typographical Union in effect at the time of signing this agreement,
not in conflict of law or this agreement, shall govern relations between the parties
on conditions not specifically enumerated herein.
The copy of the General Laws of the International Typographical Union, effective
January 1, 1964, was submitted to the Company on October 13, 1964. It may be
briefly stated that the General Laws touched on many of the subjects included in the
basic contract proposal, covered as much or more detail concerning the bargaining
issue as compared to the basic contract proposals, and included provisions sub-
stantially similar but with added detail as compared to related issues in the basic
contract proposals. As an example the basic contract proposal relating to foremen
and discharges was substantially similar to a provision in the General Laws of the
International Typographical Union excepting the latter included a provision prohibit-
ing suspension as a method of discipline.
On October 13, 1964, McFee gave Bennett a copy of the General Laws of the
International Typographical Union at the point where the parties commenced dis-
cussing the Union's basic contract proposal relating to the General Laws. Bennett
told McFee that the Company was not going to agree to anything by reference, that
if they would consider anything it would have to appear above the signature of the
parties. McFee argued that the provision in the contract appeared before the signa-
ture and that any agreement about the General Laws would be attached to the con-
tract, that the General Laws were subject to negotiations, section by section, if he
chose to do so. Bennett told McFee that he was still opposed to putting anything into
the contract by reference, that the Company would not accept such a proposal, that he
would study the proposal but was not prepared to discuss the proposal during that
session.
On December 1 the parties rediscussed the Union's contract proposals preceding the
proposal relating to the General Laws of the International Typographical Union. On
December 17 the parties discussed and argued about the area of disagreement con-
cerning journeymen and apprentices, about a proposed wage increase, and about a
garnishment question. The parties did not discuss the Union's proposal relating to
the General Laws of the International Typographical Union.
On December 30 it appears that the next bargaining issue not having been redis-
cussed was the Union's proposal relating to the General Laws of the International
Typographical Union. At this session McFee, principal negotiator for the Union,
was not present, and McKinney (union president) served as the Union's principal
negotiator. The parties discussed the first four sections of article I of the General
Laws of the International Typographical Union. These sections related to ap-
prentices. No agreement on these clauses was reached.
As to the December 31 meeting it is not clear as to how the parties decided to pro-
ceed. In any event McFee testified that the Union took up some of the Company's
proposals. One of the-Company's proposals taken up was the one concerning leaves
of absence. McFee argued against the Company's proposal. Bennett told McFee
that the Union had not made a proposal on this subject. McFee told Bennett that
the Union had made a proposal on this subject in the General Laws of the Interna-
tional Typographical Union and referred Bennett to the pertinent sections. Bennett
read the referred-to sections of the General Laws, asked the employees on the bargain-
ing committee if the Union's proposal was fair, and argued about the effect of the
Union's proposal that was being discussed. On January 13, 1965, the Company
submitted its relatively complete proposal and the parties commenced discussing the
Company's proposal. It is noted that in the Company's January 13 proposal, the
Company proposed a clause relating to foremen and to suspension and discharge
of employees. This proposal, excepting for the power to suspend, is substantially
similar to the Union's basic contract proposal relating to foremen and discharges as
well as the similar provision in the General Laws of the International Typographical
Union.
On February 4 the parties discussed the Company's proposal relating to foremen,
discharges, and suspensions . Bennett showed McFee a copy of a contract relating to
a company in Charleston, West Virginia, which appeared to have been an approved
and signed TTU contract and which had a clause worded similarly to the Company's
WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, INC. 1525
proposal. McFee told Bennett in effect that he knew that the referred-to contract
was not an aproved (by ITU) contract.
On May 27 after discussing some of the Company's proposals, Bennett asked that
the parties take up article I, section 7, of the Union's basic contract proposal which
provided in effect that the General Laws of the International Union in effect at the
time of signing of the agreement would govern relations of the parties on conditions
not specifically enumerated in the agreement. Bennett told McFee that he would not
agree to the proposed section, that he was not going to incorporate anything into the
contract by reference, that the General Laws did not come before the signature, and
that he was not going to agree to them. McFee argued in effect that section 7 did
come before the signatures and that the Union had proposed the General Laws.
Bennett told McFee to propose those sections of the General Laws that it wanted in
the contract and the Company would be glad to consider them. McFee told Bennett
that the Union had proposed and was proposing the general and individual sections
of the General Laws, that they were subject to negotiations and the Union was pre-
pared to negotiate upon them.
Considering all the foregoing and all the evidence in the case, I am convinced that
the facts reveal that Bennett discussed and gave his reasons for not accepting the
Union's proposal relating in effect to an incorporation of the General Laws of the
International Typographical Union into the contract by reference. I find nothing
from Bennett's position that agreed contract provisions should be embodied in the
basic contract proper to reveal bad faith. It would appear further that Respondent
in fact did consider the General Laws in its contract provisions and discussions.
This appears also from the fact that at the apparent time with respect to the parties'
order of discussion that the General Laws or the basic contract proposal relating
thereto came up for bargaining the Company did discuss the same. On the occasion
that McFee referred to the General Laws provisions relating to leaves of absence,
Bennett read the same and discussed the proposal. In my opinion, the related nature
of the Union's basic contract provisions and the General Laws and the Company's
proposal reveal that the subject matter of the General Laws proposal was in fact con-
sidered by the Respondent in bargaining. The Company's January 13 proposal
relating to foremen, discharges, and suspensions reveals that the Respondent in effect
was counterproposing on a similar provision in the General Laws of the ITU. The
Union's basic contract proposal was silent as to the power to suspend employees.
The General Laws explicitly prohibited suspension as a means of discipline. The
Company's proposal affrmatively accorded the Company the right to suspend.
Considering all of the foregoing and the nature of the dispute as to whether the
General Laws would be incorpoiated by reference or not, I am convinced that the
facts do not reveal that Respondent's conduct with respect to the Union's proposals
relating to the General Laws was motivated in bad faith.
1. Position relating to signatory parties
The General Counsel contends that the Employer's conduct in insisting that the
International Union sign the contract revealed bad-faith motivation.
In addition to the facts as revealed in section k, above, the facts reveal that the
Union's contract proposal commencing with article IV, section 6, was as follows:
Article IV Section 6. It is agreed that the only parties to this agreement are
the Employer and the Union. It is further agreed that the approval of this
agreement by the International Typographical Union as complying with its laws
does not make it a party hereto.
Signed this day of
19,
For the Employer:
For the Union:
This agreement is approved as being in compliance with the laws of the Inter-
national Typographical Union, as limited by the Taft-Hartley Law, and the
Undersigned, on behalf of the Executive Council of the International Typo-
graphical Union, hereby pledges, as a matter of Union policy only, its full
authority under its laws to the fulfillment thereof and without becoming a party
thereto and without assuming liability thereunder.
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION
President.
1526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Union's principal negotiator herein was Donald McFee, an international
representative of the International Typographical Union. At the bargaining session
on October 12, 1964, the parties discussed the procedure for ultimate approval. The
negotiated contract would be submitted to the Company's board of directors for
approval, and to the International Typographical Union where it would be reviewed
by the ITU bureau of contracts to make certain that everything in it was legal and
then presented to the local union with a favorable recommendation wherein it could
be accepted or rejected.
As indicated previously the parties prior to and on May 27 argued as to whether
the General Laws of the International Typographical Union would be included in the
terms of the contract by reference. On May 28 the parties discussed the writing on
the Union's proposed contract relative to the approval of the contract as being in
compliance with the International Typographical Union laws and the signatures of
the parties to the contract. Bennett told McFee that the Company would not agree
to the language of the Union's proposal relating to approval by the International
Union unless the International Union became a party to the contract.
Considering all of the foregoing facts in total context with all of the evidence I am
not convinced that the facts reveal that Respondent was acting with bad-faith motiva-
tion in asking that the International Union become a party to the contract. The facts
reveal a reasonable basis for employer concern that the Union by its proposals and
position was involving the International Union and its laws (general and otherwise)
in the negotiations. In view of the Union's proposals and positions as indicated, the
Respondent's position was no more than a legitimate bargaining position in opposition
to the inclusion of the Union's language concerning approval by the International
Typographical Union,
in. Alleged probing and not firm offers
The General Counsel contends in effect that the Company's counterproposals were
merely probing and not considered by the Company as firm offers ready for insertion
in the contract, that the Company would not stay with a provision under discussion
until negotiated, and that this reveals bad faith on the part of the Company.
. The facts relative to a consideration of these issues have been set forth in connection
with all of the other contentions herein. The totality of the evidence, in my opinion,
reveals that the Respondent made proposals and, as negotiations revealed points of
different. interest related to various proposals, modified or made different proposals.
Suffice it to say that the totality of all of the evidence does not convince me that the
Respondent was insincere in the proposals made at the time made, nor that the
Respondent was insincere in its modification or clarification of proposals as points of
different contentions developed 4s
7. Summary
Considering all of the foregoing and the totality of all of the evidence, I am con-
vinced that the facts do not reveal that the Respondent has engaged in bad-faith bar-
gaining in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. I so conclude and find.
With respect to the General Counsel's allegation that the strike of certain employees
commencing on January 6, 1965, was caused and prolonged by unfair labor practices,
it suffices to say that the necessary proof of unfair labor practices by the Respondent
has not been established. I so conclude and find.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the case,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Waycross Journal-Herald, Inc., the Respondent, is, and has been at all times
material herein, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. Savannah Typographical Union No. 183 is, and has been at all times material
herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. It has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respond-
ent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint, nor that the employees' strike commencing
on January 6, 1965, and continuing thereafter was caused by or prolonged by unfair
labor practices by the Respondent.
40I note that the testimony of McFee appeared to raise a testimonial contention that
the difference In the party's proposals relating to bulletin boards, etc., reveals bad faith.
The testimony and proposals as to bargaining issues not set forth specifically In this Decision
have been considered but evaluated as clearly not revealing bad-faith motivation on the
part of the Respondent.
NEWBERRY EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. 1527
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in this case , I recommend that the complaint herein be dismissed in
its entirety.
Newberry Equipment Company, Inc. and The International
Union, District 50, United Mine Workers of America . Case No.
26-CA-1987. April 7,1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 14, 1965, Trial Examiner Alba B. Martin issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and cross-exceptions thereto, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, con-
clusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, except as mod-
ified herein.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent, without notice to the
Union and while wages remained an item to be negotiated between the
parties, hired new employees in the appropriate unit at wage rates that
exceeded those paid to individuals previously hired to perform identi-
cal work. Based on the record herein, we are unable to agree that,
after the Union was certified and during the period of negotiations,
Respondent changed its hiring practices. Both before and during the
period here in question, employees were hired at varying wage rates.
Some of the "older" employees were paid at rates which equaled or
exceeded those of the highest paid employees hired during negotia-
tions, while others were paid less. Moreover, the record does not
indicate, with any particularity, what tasks the employees were hired
to perform other than that they were employed as "welders" in various
departments of the Respondent's plant, nor does it establish that the
new hires enumerated by the General Counsel represented all employ-
157 NLRB No. 125.