W. S. Ponton, of N.J. Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 26, 1951

93 N.L.R.B. 924 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

924 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
June 24 letter, I cannot say such statements constituted a threat of reprisal
against the emjployees. Any plant closed by a strike needs some period of read-
justment before it can reopen. The Hannibal plant occupied a very peculiar
position. Apparently its sole function was to supply INS' numerous shoe fac-
tories with rubber heels and soles. If the Hannibal plant closed and the
supply of heels and soles became exhausted, INS would necessarily have to
obtain its supply from other sources or seriously handicap its main manu-
facturing business!
I find therefore that by the above acts and statements of Hawkins, the
Respondent has not interfered with, restrained, or coerced its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record
in the case, I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. Local 198, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America,
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. International Shoe Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
3. International Shoe Company, the Respondent herein, has not engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), or (5) of
the Act. . 11.1 i
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
6 The record fails to disclose whether the supply on hand was exhausted during the
lockout period from June 25 to August 1. But whether the supply did hold out or whether
the INS during that period had to reinforce its stock by purchases from other sources is
not too material here. There is nothing to indicate that Hawkins' statement in each of
his June letters as to what might happen in the event of a prolonged strike was a mis-
statement, or even an exaggeration.
W. S. PONTON , OF N. J. INC. and OFFICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION LOCAL 32, AFL, PETITIONER . Case No. O-RC-2606. March
26, 1951
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Lloyd S. Greenidge, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Reynolds and Murdock].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent employees
of the Employer.
93 NLRB No. 182.
W. S. PONTON, OF N. J. INC. 925
3. The contract bar issue :
The Petitioner and the Employer seek a unit of production em-
ployees at the Employer's Englewood, New Jersey, plant. The Inter-
venor, Direct Mail Local 14, District 65, DPOWU,1 and the Direct
Mail Master Contract Association, Inc., contend that their current
contract is a bar to this proceeding.
The Employer, -whose principal office is in Englewood, New Jersey,
is engaged in the business of compiling, addressing, and shipping mail-
ing lists throughout the country. Since 1943, the Employer's parent
company, W. S. Ponton, Inc., a New York corporation, has bargained
with the Intervenor on a multiemployer basis through the Association,
consisting of some 40 employers engaged in similar businesses in the
New York area. The first contract between the Association and the
Intervenor was executed December 28, 1944, and was renewed with
modifications in 1946 and 1948. The 1948 contract was for a 2-year
term from November 6, 1948, through November 6, 1950. It provided
for reopening on wages, after 1 year upon 90 days' notice, but con-
tained no automatic renewal provision. The contract Was opened in
the fall of 1949, and during the negotiations the parent company,
W. S. Ponton, of New York, organized the Employer herein. The
current contract, which was executed January 13, 1950, was made
-retroactive to November 1949, and extended the 1948 contract to No-
vember 1951. The Employer ratified this contract in January 1950.
The Petitioner which filed its petition October 20, 1950, contends that
the current 1950 contract is a premature extension of the 1948 contract
and therefore not a bar.2
As noted above, the 1948 contract, which would have terminated
at midnight November 6, 1950, was extended by the current agreement
executed January 13, 1950, approximately 10 months in advance of
the expiration date of the 1948 contract. The Board has held that
where an agreement is prematurely extended, the extended agreement
constitutes a bar only until the expiration date of the original contract.3
In the present case, therefore, the 1948 contract could have constituted
a bar only until its original expiration date of November 6, 1950.
Consequently, as the instant petition was timely filed prior to such
expiration date, we find that neither the 1948 contract nor the agree-
ment of 1950 is a bar to this proceeding.'
'The Intervenor claims to be a successor of United Office and Professional Workers of
America, Local 16, signatory to the current contract. We find no merit in Petitioner's
allegation that the Intervenor has failed to prove its successorship, inasmuch as the
Intervenor has made a sufficiently colorable showing of successorship to warrant interven-
tion In this proceeding. International Harvester Company, West Pullman Works, 90^
NLRB No 240
2 The Petitioner contends that the current contract is not a bar for the further reason
that it contains an illegal union-security clause. As we find the contract not a bar on
other grounds, we do not pass on the legality of that clause in the contract.
3 Republic Steel Corporation, 89 NLRB 500.
4Phelps-Dodge Corporation, Morenci Branch, 92 NLRB 1564.
926 DECISIONS- OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. The appropriate unit :
The Petitioner and the Employer contend that the production em-
ployees at the Employer's Englewood, New Jersey, plant, constitute
an appropriate unit. The Intervenor and the Association urge that
the only appropriate unit is an association-wide unit which the In-
tervenor has represented for many years.
As indicated above, the Employer's parent corporation was a mem-
ber of the Association since its inception and participated in multi-
employer bargaining since 1944. On December 16, 1949, the day
after the organization of the Employer as a New Jersey corporation,
the Employer executed an agreement with the Intervenor making the
Association contract applicable to the employees of the New Jersey
plant. Thereafter, following its ratification of the 1950 contract, in
January of that year, the Employer continued to deal with the In-
tervenor through the Association, until it resigned from the Asso-
ciation on June 26, 1950. It is clear that until its resignation,-the
Employer intended to be bound by group rather than individual ac-
tion, and that at the date of resignation the current contract was and
still is in force. The Employer chose to enter into a contract which
had been negotiated jointly with other employers. It thus clearly
manifested an intent at that time to be bound in collective bargaining
by group rather than by individual action. Thereafter, it sought to
reverse its position. We have held that although an employer is free
to abandon participation in group bargaining, this must be done at
an appropriate time. To permit the Employer to alter its course
from joint to individual action during an existing contract would not,
in our opinion, make for that stability in collective bargaining which
the Act seeks to promote. Our conclusion herein is further strength-
ened by the fact that, under the contract, members of the Association
are bound by the contract for the duration of its term, whether or
not an employer ceases to be a member of the Association before the
expiration of the contract. We find, therefore, that the Employer's
attempt to withdraw from the Association was not made at an ap-
propriate time.'
We find that the single-employer unit sought by the Petitioner is
not, at the present time, appropriate for purposes of collective bar-
gaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. Accord-
ingly, as no question concerning representation exists within an ap-
propriate unit, we shall dismiss the petition.
Order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition herein be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.
' Engineering Metal Products Corporation, 92 NLRB 823 ; Purity Stores, Ltd., 93
NLRB 199; Edward Reinell, d/b/a Reinell Boat Works, 93 NLRB 16.