Volkswagen Group of America Chattanooga Operations, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 22, 2019

367 NLRB No. 138 (N.L.R.B. 2019)

367 NLRB No. 138
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Volkswagen Group of America Chattanooga Opera-
tions, LLC and International Union, United Au-
tomobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW), Petitioner. Case
10–RC–239234
May 22, 2019
DECISION ON REVIEW AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS MCFERRAN
AND KAPLAN
The Employer’s request for review of the Regional Di-
rector’s Order Deferring Ruling on Motion to Dismiss Pe-
tition is granted as it raises substantial issues warranting
review.1 On review, we direct the Regional Director to
dismiss the petition.2
On December 14, 2015, the Board certified United Au-
tomobile Workers, Local 42 as the representative of a unit
of the Employer’s maintenance employees in Case 10–
RC–162530. On April 9, 2019, the Petitioner filed a peti-
tion in this case, seeking an election in a unit of the Em-
ployer’s production and maintenance employees. On
April 17, 2019, the General Counsel and United Auto
Workers, Local 42 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
in Case 10–CA–166500. The motion asserts that Local 42
notified all parties, on April 15, 2019, that it wished to
withdraw the petition in Case 10–RC–162530 and that it
disclaimed interest in representing the “employees of
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.,” in the unit certified
in that case. The Board granted the motion on May 3, and
the Regional Director thereafter dismissed the complaint
and revoked the certification in Case 10–RC–162530.
The Board’s longstanding certification year policy pre-
cludes any challenge to a union’s majority status for one
year following its certification, except in unusual circum-
stances. Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., 300 NLRB 278
(1990), enfd. 939 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1991). Thus, the
Board will dismiss election petitions filed before the end
of the certification year that seek to represent some or all
of the employees in the certified unit, including petitions
that seek to include employees in the certified unit as part
of a broader, plant-wide unit. Casey-Metcalf Machinery
Co., 114 NLRB 1520, 1525 (1955). Where an employer

1 Member Emanuel is recused and took no part in the consideration
of this case.
2 The Board’s May 3, 2019 stay of proceedings is lifted as of today’s
decision. Accordingly, the May 9 motion filed by the Petitioner is denied
as moot.
3 See, e.g., Service Employees Local 121RN (Pomona Valley Medical
Center), 355 NLRB 234, 242 (2010) (separate opinion of Member
exercises its right to pursue judicial review of a certifica-
tion, the certification year will begin with the first bargain-
ing session held following court enforcement of the
Board’s order. Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., supra.
In Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), the Su-
preme Court endorsed the Board’s certification bar rule.
The Court identified three exceptions: “(1) the certified
union dissolved or became defunct; (2) as a result of a
schism, substantially all the members of officers of the
certified union transferred their affiliation to a new local
or international; (3) the size of the bargaining unit fluctu-
ated radically within a short time.” Id. at 98. None of these
exceptions applies here: Local 42 is not defunct, there has
been no schism, and there has been no radical fluctuation
in the size of the unit certified in Case 10–RC–162530.
Consistent with these principles, the petition in this case
must be dismissed nunc pro tunc because it seeks employ-
ees within the unit that was then certified in Case 10–RC–
162530. We thus agree with the Employer that the valid-
ity of the petition in this case must be determined without
regard to the disclaimer of interest presented by Local 42
after the petition was filed. We also find that the Regional
Director’s May 6, 2019 Order Revoking the certification
in Case 10–RC–162530 has no effect on whether the peti-
tion in this case was valid when filed, and we do not find
it necessary to pass on whether the Regional Director erred
in directing a hearing for the purpose of determining
whether a certification bar existed when the petition at is-
sue was filed.
Our dissenting colleague admits, as well she must, that
this case presents “unusual circumstances.” Remarkably,
she goes on to boldly declare that the certification bar “has
no application here” all the same. Instead, the dissent ad-
vocates for a newly-fashioned rule under which a certified
union must be allowed to avoid the certification bar at its
option whenever that union seeks a new election, prem-
ised on the notion that the certification bar only exists to
serve the interests of the certified union. This contention
is factually flawed, as it rests on the mistaken premise that
the Petitioner is the same union that was certified in Case
10–RC–162530. In fact, Local 42 is one of the Peti-
tioner’s constituent locals.3 The dissent’s position is le-
gally unsupportable as well.
Contrary to the dissent, the certification bar is supported
by multiple justifications that protect the public interest
Becker, ruling on motions) (“the Federal courts and the NLRB have rec-
ognized that the locals and the internationals are separate labor organi-
zations within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act…”, cit-
ing U.S. v. Petroleum Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989))
(internal quotations omitted)
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and the interest of all parties, not just the union. As rec-
ognized in Ray Brooks, the certification bar: promotes “a
sense of responsibility in the electorate and needed coher-
ence in administration” by insuring that an election binds
voters for a fixed time; affords the union ample time to
carry out its mandate; removes incentives for employers
to undermine union strength through delay; and minimizes
the risk of “raiding and strife” by rival unions. Ray Brooks,
supra, 248 U.S. at 99. It would be inconsistent with these
principles to convert the certification bar into a one-way
device waivable at the certified union’s will, as the dissent
appears to propose.
All of the exceptions to the certification bar identified
in Ray Brooks, in turn, involved changed circumstances
that arose before the petition was filed. This specifically
includes Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 59 NLRB 325
(1944), Nashville Bridge Co., 49 NLRB 629 (1943), and
Rocky Mountain Phosphates, Inc., 138 NLRB 292 (1962),
cases on which the dissent relies. In each of these cases,
Board processed a petition filed after the certified union
became defunct, i.e., ceased to exist, or at least ceased to
function. Here, as stated above, Local 42 is not defunct.
Moreover, its disclaimer of interest in representing the for-
merly certified unit came after the petition was filed, not
before.
We cannot agree with the dissent’s approach, which
would effectively create an exception to the certification
bar whenever a certified union files a disclaimer after the
petition is filed. Entertaining such petitions, as the dissent
advocates, would only encourage parties to file them in
future cases, with the ensuing risk that a certified union’s
majority status would thereby be undermined.4 For these
reasons, our decision to dismiss the petition is entirely
consistent with the purposes for which the certification bar
was created.5 It is therefore irrelevant that the Employer
is the party arguing for application of the certification bar,
or that it previously exercised its right to seek review of
the Board’s now-vacated order requiring it to bargain in

4 We do not share our colleague’s optimism that the Board could con-
fine a decision to process this petition to the specific facts of this case:
“a once-certified union’s own representation petition, where the em-
ployer has consistently refused to recognize the union, and the union has
disclaimed interest in representing the original unit.” Such a decision
would become precedent and, like any precedent, tend to “expand itself
to the limit of its logic.” Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process at 51 (1921).
5 See United Supermarkets, 287 NLRB 119, 120 (1987) (certification
bar is applied strictly; regional office erred in retaining decertification
petition filed 5 months into certification year: “the petition should have
been dismissed and not permitted to remain on record as a continuing
threat to the rightful representative status of the Union.”), affd. 862 F.2d
549 (5th Cir. 1989); Centr-O-Cast & Engineering Co., 100 NLRB 1507,
1508–1509 (1952) (“the mere retention on file of such petitions, although
unprocessed, cannot but detract from the full import of a Board
the maintenance unit at issue in 10–RC–162530, and we
reject the dissent’s unsupported speculation that the Em-
ployer has raised the certification bar issue for the purpose
of delay.
In this regard, we are confident that the interests of all
parties, including the employees, would be ill-served by
processing this petition in the face of the certification bar
issues that have been raised, as our colleague would do.
For the reasons stated above, we are firmly convinced that
dismissing this petition best fulfills the purposes of the
certification bar and the policies of the Act. Our dissent-
ing colleague disagrees, but regardless of how our col-
league perceives it, the Employer has asserted the certifi-
cation bar challenge, and there is no reason to think that
this issue will go away if the petition is processed. Rather
than tee up a likely court challenge to an election that
would unnecessarily tie up this representation matter in a
court battle for years to come, we believe it is the wiser
course to remove that ground for challenge now.
We also reject our dissenting colleague’s baseless
charge that we have abandoned our duty to protect the
right of the employees to “full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing” specified in Section 1 of the National
Labor Relations Act. To the contrary, our dismissal of the
petition is without prejudice to the Petitioner’s right to im-
mediately file a new petition, and any delay is solely due
to its having filed its petition during the certification year.
Accordingly, we direct the Regional Director to dismiss
the petition filed in Case 10–RC–239234, without preju-
dice to the filing of a new petition, and we remand this
case to the Regional Director for further proceedings con-
sistent with this Decision on Review.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 22, 2019
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
certification, which should be permitted to run its complete 1-year course
before any question of the representative status of the certified union is
given formal cognizance by the Board.”).
WTOP, Inc., 114 NLRB 1236 (1955), cited by the dissent, is not to
the contrary. There the Board found no bar to a rival union’s petition
filed with 2 months remaining in the certification year, where the certi-
fied representative later disclaimed interest in the unit. Initially, we note
that the retention on file of the petition in that case stands in considerable
tension with the Board’s decisions in United Supermarkets, supra and
Centr-O-Cast, supra. Even assuming that WTOP remains good law, we
find that it is readily distinguishable. There, the certified representative
had failed to bargain on behalf of the unit and the Board found that it was
essentially defunct by the time the second petition was filed. In contrast,
the Petitioner here has assiduously sought to represent a unit of mainte-
nance employees throughout the proceedings in Cases 10–RC–162530
and 10–CA–166500.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA CHATTANOOGA OPERATIONS, LLC 3
_____________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MCFERRAN, dissenting.
Today’s decision, directing the Regional Director to
dismiss the Union’s representation petition, is inconsistent
with Board precedent, undermines the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, and defies common sense. For
years, the Employer has refused to bargain with the Union
in the unit certified by the Board. Faced with this delay,
and with no end in sight, the Union filed a new petition,
seeking to represent workers in the bargaining unit that
the Employer insisted all along was the only appropriate
one. (The Union also appropriately disclaimed interest in
representing the certified unit.) Now, remarkably, the Em-
ployer has made an about-face, arguing that the certifica-
tion of the original unit—the validity of which it has never
accepted—creates a barrier that prevents workers from
proceeding to an election in the newly-sought (and Em-
ployer-championed) unit. But the Board’s “certification
bar” doctrine has no application here, and the only possi-
ble purpose of the Employer’s manipulation of Board pro-
cesses is to delay a vote.1 By giving credence to the Em-
ployer’s baseless arguments, the majority abandons our
duty (in the word of the statute) to “protect[] the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing.”2
That abdication is not excused by the majority’s sugges-
tion that dismissing the Union’s petition (as the Employer
has demanded) is somehow in the “interests of all the par-
ties” because it removes a possible ground on which the
Employer could challenge the ultimate certification of the
Union, if the petition were processed and the Union won

1 While the majority suggests that it is “unsupported speculation” to
conclude that delay was the Employer’s goal here, it strains credulity to
assume that the Employer is now rejecting the very bargaining unit it
advocated for out of an altruistic desire to protect the integrity of the
Board’s certification bar doctrine.
2 National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 1, 29 U.S.C. §1.
3 There should be no question here that for statutory purposes, the
Board has been dealing with the same collective-bargaining representa-
tive—the United Automobile Workers (UAW) international and an af-
filiated local union—throughout these tortured proceedings. It was
UAW Local 42 that was originally certified, and the UAW international
that filed the current petition, but the two unions are properly treated as
the same because of their organizational affiliation and their legal align-
ment. Although the two unions are separate legal entities, their interests
the election. If that rationale prevailed, of course, then the
Board would always determine representation questions in
line with the employer’s wishes, in the name of protecting
the result of a representation proceeding from the em-
ployer’s challenge. It should be obvious, rather, that the
Board must decide representation cases in accordance
with the law. The irony here, of course, is that there is no
apparent way to neutralize the Employer’s objections in
any case. When the Union effectively conceded victory to
the Employer by petitioning for the unit that the Employer
had demanded, the Employer sought to block the new pe-
tition. And the Employer now prevails. “Heads, the em-
ployer wins; tails, the union loses” cannot be the Board’s
new motto.
I.
The essential facts are straightforward. After the Un-
ion3 won an election, the Board’s Regional Director certi-
fied a bargaining-unit of maintenance employees at the
Employer’s Chattanooga, Tennessee facility—on Decem-
ber 14, 2015, more than 3 years ago.4 The Employer chal-
lenged the certification, refusing to bargain with the Union
and arguing that the maintenance unit was inappropriate,
because it failed to include production employees as well.
Ultimately, the Board found that the Employer’s refusal to
bargain in the maintenance unit violated the Act, the Em-
ployer sought judicial review of that decision, and (after a
divided Board reversed precedent) the unfair labor prac-
tice issue was returned to the Board, where it sat.
In the meantime, the Union continued its organizing ef-
forts in Chattanooga and filed a new representation peti-
tion with the Board, seeking a production-and-mainte-
nance unit—the larger bargaining unit that the Employer
had demanded all along. The Union formally disclaimed
interest in representing the original, maintenance unit.
And joined by the General Counsel, the Union sought to
end the unfair labor practice case involving the original
unit, which was still pending at the Board. The Board re-
manded that case, and it is now closed. Consistent with
the dismissal of the unfair labor practice case, the
are identical: they are hardly rivals competing for the right to represent
the same employees.
Analogous cases bring home the point. The Board has consistently
found “continuity of representation” where employers have sought to
justify a refusal to bargain by invoking the distinction between a local
union and its parent international union. See, e.g., Avante at Boca Raton,
Inc., 334 NLRB 381, 381 & 388 (2001) (affiliation of local’s parent un-
ion with international did not affect continuity); Stardust Hotel & Ca-
sino, 317 NLRB 926, 926 fn. 1 & 929–930 (1995) (trusteeship imposed
by parent international over local union did not affect continuity).
4 The statutory prohibition against directing a Board election within
a 12-month period after a valid election has been held is not implicated
here. National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. §159(c)(3).
More than two years have passed since the maintenance-unit election
was held.
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Regional Director has also revoked the Union’s certifica-
tion in the maintenance unit. The Employer had consist-
ently refused to recognize and bargain with the Union in
that unit. The focus here, then, is entirely on the Union’s
recent effort to represent a larger production-and-mainte-
nance unit. There is no conceivable reason why the Union
should not be permitted to proceed with its petition.
Nevertheless, the majority orders the Regional Director
to “dismiss the petition . . . without prejudice to the filing
of a new petition.” The Union is thus free to file a new
petition, but that option necessarily means additional de-
lay that should never have been necessary.
II.
The Board’s “certification bar” doctrine is more than 70
years old.5 It has never been applied in a situation like this
one to block a once-certified union’s own representation
petition, where the employer has consistently refused to
recognize the union, and the union has disclaimed interest
in representing the original unit. The established purpose
of the certification bar—insulating an incumbent union
from an outside challenge to its status as bargaining rep-
resentative, in order to promote collective bargaining—is
simply not implicated here. The majority fails to plausibly
explain how the doctrine as traditionally understood could
possibly apply in this case, but it still endorses the Em-
ployer’s position that the Union’s petition must be dis-
missed.
In 1954, the Supreme Court endorsed the rationale for
the certification bar in Ray Brooks,6 where an employer
had refused to bargain with a certified union, based on its
contention that the union had lost majority support among
employees. Prohibiting a challenge to the union’s status
during the certification year promotes orderly collective
bargaining and thus “industrial peace,” the “underlying
purpose” of the Act.7 Here, of course, the Union is not
seeking to challenge its own status as the certified repre-
sentative. It is seeking a way around the Employer’s per-
sistent refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union.
Not the Union, but the Employer is invoking the certifica-
tion bar—and not because it wants to bargain with the un-
ion, but because it wants to prevent the union from repre-
senting a larger bargaining unit (indeed, the unit that the

5 See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 NLRB 90, 92 & fn. 4 (1945)
(collecting cases). In Kimberly Clark, the Board dismissed a representa-
tion petition filed by a rival union, where the incumbent union had been
certified only 6 months before. The Board described the “certification
bar” doctrine as “serv[ing] the dual purpose of encouraging the execution
of collective bargaining contracts and of discouraging ‘raiding’ and too
frequent elections.” Id. at 92. Where, as here, an employer has never
recognized the certified union, applying the bar to block the union’s new
petition obviously would not encourage the execution of a contract. Nor
does this case involve either one union’s raid on another (the UAW and
Local 42 are not rivals) or the specter of “too frequent elections” (as
Employer has consistently argued is the only appropriate
unit). This ploy would turn the certification bar inside out
and upside down.
Not surprisingly, the certification bar doctrine has never
been applied when it makes no sense to do so. The Ray
Brooks Court recognized there are “unusual circum-
stances” when applying the “certification bar” would not
serve to vindicate an existing bargaining relationship, in-
cluding where “the certified union dissolved or became
defunct.”8 In those circumstances, there is no existing bar-
gaining relationship to preserve. The same thing is true
here. Of course, the Union is not technically “defunct” (as
the majority points out), but it is not in a position to benefit
from application of the certification bar—and that situa-
tion is a direct consequence of the Employer’s refusal to
honor the certification. The Employer has never recog-
nized and bargained with the Union in the original, certi-
fied unit, and, crucially, the Union (the intended benefi-
ciary of the certification bar) no longer seeks to represent
that unit. There is no existing bargaining relationship to
preserve, and no live prospect of one with respect to the
original unit. Just as a union is free to disclaim interest in
representing a bargaining unit, it surely is free to reject
“benefit” of the certification bar when, as here, the bar
would actually block employees from seeking the union’s
representation.
The Board has never applied the certification bar
against a union that the Board had certified, at the urging
of the employer that contested the union’s certification
and refused to recognize and bargain with it.9 As the Ray
Brooks Court observed, “[t]o allow employers to rely on
employees’ rights in refusing to bargain with the formally
designated union is not conducive to [the] end [of indus-
trial peace], it is inimical to it.”10 Id. Allowing an em-
ployer that has defied the Board’s certification of a union
to invoke the certification bar to block the union’s new
representation petition is every bit as “inimical” to the aim
of the Act. The Board’s decisions in the most analogous
cases make that clear.
noted, the original election was conducted years ago, long past the stat-
utory 1-year bar period).
6 Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
7 Id. at 103.
8 Id. at 98 (footnote collecting cases omitted).
9 The majority points out that UAW Local 42 is the certified unit and
that its parent union, the UAW international, has filed the current peti-
tion, but as already explained (see fn. 3, supra), this distinction is imma-
terial here.
10 Id. at 103.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA CHATTANOOGA OPERATIONS, LLC 5
Take the Board’s 1944 decision in Public Service for
example.11 There, employees voted to be represented by
one union. The employer bargained with the union, with-
out reaching an agreement. Employees then dissolved
their union and affiliated with another. The second union
filed a representation petition with the Board, which the
employer opposed, citing the recently conducted election.
The Board rejected that argument, observing that
“[a]lthough our usual rule is that a certification following
a[n] . . . election must be effective for a period of 1 year,
it is obvious that such a rule if applied in the instant case
would defeat the very purpose of the Act inasmuch as the
certified bargaining representative is no longer in exist-
ence.”12 Had the employer’s position prevailed, employ-
ees would have had no present path to representation: the
certified union was gone, yet its successor could not file a
petition. This case is at least as strong for finding no bar.
Although the Union remains in existence, its certification
does not, and it has disclaimed interest in representing the
original unit. The parallel with the dissolution and affili-
ation in Public Service is clear. And unlike the employer
in Public Service, the Employer here never recognized and
bargained with the Union, so it has no legitimate interest
to avoiding an election.
Rocky Mountain Phosphates,13 decided in 1962, makes
the same point: the certification bar does not apply when
it would not serve to protect an existing collective-bar-
gaining agreement, but instead would interfere with em-
ployees’ statutory right to seek union representation.
There, an independent union was certified by the Board.
It bargained to impasse with the employer. At that point,
employees voted among themselves to dissolve the inde-
pendent union and to support a new, affiliated union,
transferring the original union’s treasury to it. The em-
ployer refused to recognize the affiliated union, invoking
the certification bar. Citing Ray Brooks and the certifica-
tion-bar exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court, the
Board rejected the employer’s position. “[W]here the

11 Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 59 NLRB 325 (1944). The Ray
Brooks Court cited Public Service as illustrating one unusual circum-
stance—where “the certified union dissolved or became defunct”—in
which the certification bar did not apply. 348 U.S. at 98 & fn. 3.
The Ray Brooks Court also cited Nashville Bridge Co., 49 NLRB 629
(1943), involving the analogous “contract bar” doctrine, in which an ex-
isting collective-bargaining agreement is held to bar a challenge to the
union’s status, as a way to preserve an established bargaining relation-
ship. See id. In Nashville Bridge, the employer had entered into a col-
lective-bargaining agreement with a union. During the renewed term of
the agreement, the union ceased functioning. 49 NLRB at 631. Other
unions then filed a joint representation petition with the Board. The orig-
inal union disclaimed interest in representing employees. Id. The Board
accordingly rejected the employer’s invocation of the “contract bar” doc-
trine, observing that the original union was “dormant” and that the case
certified union becomes defunct,” the certification bar
does not apply, the Board explained:
The reason for this exception is obvious. An employer
can hardly be obligated to deal with a labor organization
which has ceased to function. Hence, where an unusual
circumstance such as defunctness arises during the cer-
tification year, the rule must yield to permit employees
to realize the full exercise of their rights under Section 7
to reject a labor organization or select a new one.
138 NLRB at 293–294 (emphasis added). Here, the Union’s
disclaimer of interest and the revocation of its certification is
the equivalent of becoming defunct for purposes of the certi-
fication bar. The bar obviously “must yield to permit em-
ployees to realize the full exercise of their rights” under the
Act.
Indeed, the Board has refused to apply the certification
bar where a union has disclaimed interest in representing
the certified unit. A case closely on point here is WTOP.14
There, the Board certified a union. Shortly afterwards,
employees—“with the consent of the certified” union—
informed the employer that they were repudiating the un-
ion, which “had not bargained for the employees” follow-
ing the certification.15 A new union then filed a petition
with the Board. In turn, the original union “disclaimed
interest in the unit covered.”16 The Board rejected appli-
cation of the certification bar, explaining that because the
certified union “ha[d] to all intents and purposes become
defunct as to representing [unit] employees, it would not
effectuate the policies of the Act to apply” the certification
bar.17 Here, too, the Union is effectively “defunct as to
representing” the original, maintenance unit.
Notably, the procedural sequence in this case is the
equivalent of that in WTOP. There, the certified union
disclaimed interest after the new union filed its petition.
Here, the Union disclaimed interest in the original unit af-
ter it filed its new petition. As in WTOP, the new petition
“was timely filed” even though it came before the certified
union’s disclaimer.18 WTOP decisively refutes the
did “not involve a contest between rival labor organizations competing
for the right to represent employees.” Id. As here, there was no collec-
tive-bargaining relationship to protect from challenge and no reason to
prevent employees from seeking representation.
12 Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
13 Rocky Mountain Phosphates, Inc., 138 NLRB 292 (1962).
14 WTOP, Inc., 114 NLRB 1236 (1955).
15 114 NLRB at 1237.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. Nashville Bridge, supra, which involved the contract-bar doc-
trine is similar. There, the original union effectively disclaimed interest
at the Board’s hearing on the new union’s petition, i.e., after the petition
was filed. 49 NLRB at 631.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
majority’s claim here that the “Board has not recognized
any exceptions to the certification bar based on develop-
ments subsequent to the filing of a petition.”
Public Service, Rocky Mountain Phosphates, and
WTOP all illustrate why the certification bar has no appli-
cation in the unusual circumstances of this case. It would
serve no statutory purpose.19 Applying the bar, rather,
would set up an unwarranted obstacle for employees seek-
ing representation, causing exactly the delay that Congress
wanted the Board to avoid in resolving questions concern-
ing representation.20 As the Board has explained, “Section
9 [of the Act] is animated by the essential principle that
representation cases should be resolved quickly and
fairly.”21 The Board, in turn, “must adopt policies and
promulgate rules and regulations in order that employees’
votes may be recorded accurately, efficiently, and speed-
ily,” in the words of the Supreme Court.22
The majority rejects the “notion that the certification bar
only exists to serve the interests of the certified union.”
But the Supreme Court and the Board long ago made clear
that protecting the status of the certified union—as a
means of vindicating employee free choice and promoting
collective bargaining—lies at the heart of the certification
bar. Where that goal would not be served, the bar does not
apply. As for the other “interests” invoked by the major-
ity, none are implicated here. Dismissing the petition here
does not promote “a sense of responsibility” in the em-
ployees who voted for the Union years ago, only to see the
Employer refused to bargain. The message sent to em-
ployees is that their employer decides whether their vote
will be meaningful. Dismissing the petition here does not
give the Union “ample time to carry out its mandate.” The
Employer has frustrated the Union’s mandate from the

19 The majority’s effort to distinguish these cases fails completely to
engage with the Board’s rationale in these decisions and the statutory
policies applied.
20 See National Labor Relations Board, Representation-Case Proce-
dures; Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 74308, 74316 (Dec. 15, 2014) (examin-
ing Congressional policy against delay).
21 Id. at 74316.
22 NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 331 (1946).
23 The majority asserts that it would not “effectuate the policies of the
Act to recognize an exception to the certification bar whenever a certified
union files a disclaimer after the petition is filed,” because this “would
only encourage parties to file them in future cases, with the ensuing risk
that a certified union’s majority status would thereby be undermined.”
Of course, I do not take that position. My position here is that applying
the certification bar in the circumstances of this case serves no statutory
purpose—and, indeed, undermines the policies of the Act. The Union’s
disclaimer is obviously only one aspect of the case.
24 The majority begins by citing Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co.,
300 NLRB 278 (1990), enfd. 939 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1991). That case
provides no support for the majority’s position. Van Dorn involved an
employer’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition from a certified union
during the certification year. The certification bar was applied to protect
beginning. Finally, dismissing the petition here does not
remove the Employer’s incentive “to undermine union
strength through delay.” The Board’s decision today pos-
itively rewards the Employer for causing delay.23
III.
No certification-bar decision cited by the majority today
has any similarity at all to this case. Indeed, the majority’s
characterization of Board authority is misleading.24 The
Board has never applied the certification bar against a cer-
tified union to block its own representation petition, much
less done so after the employer has refused to bargain in
the certified unit and after the union has disclaimed inter-
est in that unit. In those unusual circumstances, as Board
precedent clearly demonstrates, applying the certification
bar would violate the Act’s policies.
The majority nevertheless expressly agrees with the
Employer that the validity of the Union’s current petition
to represent a production-and-maintenance unit “must be
determined without regard to any disclaimer of interest”
as to the certified maintenance-only unit made “after the
[new] petition was filed.” As we have seen, the majority’s
assertion is flatly inconsistent with WTOP, where the cer-
tified union disclaimed interest after a second union filed
a representation petition.25 But in any event, the two cases
relied upon by the majority—which both involved em-
ployer challenges to certified unions—have nothing to do
with the situation presented here.
In United Supermarkets,26 the issue was not whether to
process a new representation petition filed by the certified
union, but whether the employer had unlawfully with-
drawn recognition from the certified union. The Board
found the violation, explaining that because the union had
the certified union and to require the employer to recognize and bargain
with that union. Van Dorn does not speak to this case.
Nor does the second case cited by the majority, Casey-Metcalf Ma-
chinery Co., 114 NLRB 1520 (1955). There, the Board dismissed an
election petition filed by the employer (a so-called “RM” petition), chal-
lenging the union’s majority status, because the union had been certified
less than a year before. Id. at 1525. The majority says that the case
stands for the proposition that the “Board will dismiss election petitions
filed before the end of the certification year that seek to represent some
or all of the employees in the certified unit, including petitions that seek
to include employees in the certified unit as part of a broader, plant-wide
unit.” That assertion is simply incorrect. As explained, it was the em-
ployer—not the certified union—that filed the dismissed petition in Ca-
sey-Metcalf, which sought to terminate their representation by the certi-
fied union.
25 The majority fails to distinguish WTOP, supra, in pointing out that
there the certified union “had failed to bargain on behalf of the unit,” but
here the Union “has assiduously sought to represent” employees in the
maintenance unit. What matters here is that the Union—in the face of
the Employer’s persistent refusal to bargain—has disclaimed interest in
representing the maintenance unit.
26 United Supermarkets, 287 NLRB 119 (1987), affd. 862 F.2d 549
(5th Cir. 1989).
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA CHATTANOOGA OPERATIONS, LLC 7
only been certified for 5 months, the employer could not
rely on a decertification petition signed by a majority of
bargaining-unit employees to withdraw recognition.27 It
pointed out that none of the “unusual circumstances” rec-
ognized as exceptions to the certification bar in Ray
Brooks (including “defunctness of the union”) was pre-
sent.28
Nor was the issue presented here addressed in Centr-O-
Cast.29 There, the employer filed an election petition chal-
lenging the certified union’s status less than a year after
certification. Not surprisingly, the Board dismissed the
employer’s petition. It described the “dual purpose” of the
certification bar as “encouraging the execution of a collec-
tive-bargaining contract and enhancing the stability of in-
dustrial relations.”30 (Neither purpose would be served
here by barring the Union’s petition.) The Board specifi-
cally disapproved of the Regional Director’s action in the
case before it: instead of dismissing the employer’s peti-
tion, as the certification bar required, he docketed the pe-
tition and “allowed [it] to remain on file[] unprocessed un-
til the full [certification] year had expired.”31 The Board’s
disapproval of that step has no application at all here,
where the certification bar does not apply in the first place.
IV.
There was no reason in this case to prevent the proceed-
ings in the Region—including an election, if one were or-
dered by the Regional Director—from continuing uninter-
rupted. Instead, the majority has chosen to intervene and
require the dismissal of the petition. But its rationale has
no support in Board law or in the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act. Requiring dismissal of the petition
will only further delay these workers’ longstanding quest
for a bargaining representative, effectively rewarding the
employer’s strategic manipulation of the Board’s process
and preventing its workers from getting the opportunity to
vote that they are entitled to and deserve. Accordingly, I
dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 22, 2019
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

27 287 NLRB at 120.
28 Id.
29 Centr-O-Cast & Engineering Co., 100 NLRB 1507 (1951).
30 Id. at 1508.
31 Id.