Virginia L. Farris, Complainant,v.Condoleezza Rice, Secretary, Department of State, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 7, 2005
01a51901 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 7, 2005)

01a51901

07-07-2005

Virginia L. Farris, Complainant, v. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary, Department of State, Agency.


Virginia L. Farris v. Department of State

01A51901

July 7, 2005

.

Virginia L. Farris,

Complainant,

v.

Condoleezza Rice,

Secretary,

Department of State,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A51901

Agency No. 00-74

Hearing No. 100-2003-07318X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant was a Counselor for Public Affairs

at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok from August 1998 through June 24, 2001.

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, complainant filed a formal

EEO complaint on September 6, 2000, alleging that the agency discriminated

against her on the bases of race (Asian/Chinese) and sex (female):

(1) by not selecting her for the USNATO political counselor vacancy;

by acting unfavorably regarding her vacancy bids for the following

positions: (a) Hague AF political advisor, (b) PAO Athens

assignment/position, and (c) USNATO political counselor/advisor; and

by a sustained pattern of discrimination to deny her multi-functional

assignments or assignments to positions that might qualify her for such

multi-functional assignments.

Complainant also contends that she was subjected to reprisal for prior

EEO activity [arising under Title VII] when:

she was made the subject of an OIG investigation involving issues over

separate maintenance allowance;

she was prevented from proceeding to her assignment in Pretoria, South

Africa because her medical clearance was intentionally delayed;

the Office of Medical Services discussed complainant and her family's

case before a world-wide conference in Boston; and

management breached a signed agreement concerning the condition of

complainant's medical clearance.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The agency filed a �Motion for Summary

Judgment,� to which complainant filed a reply. On November 17, 2004,

the AJ issued a decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The AJ found, as to issue (1), that although complainant established

a prima facie case of discrimination, the record clearly shows that

the selectee was better qualified than complainant. The AJ found that

complainant's contentions that she is better qualified and that there

was a procedural irregularity (that she was entitled to the position

because of her seniority), are not supported by persuasive evidence,

and do not create a question of fact or credibility. As to issue (2),

the AJ found that complainant does not challenge her non-selection per se,

but challenges the conduct of the process. The AJ found that in none of

the positions did complainant present comparative evidence showing that

a similarly situated person, not of her race or sex, was treated more

favorably, or any other evidence from which to infer discrimination.

As to issue (3), the AJ found that complainant is essentially arguing

that because she was an excellent employee she should have been

promoted at some point, however, she has failed to identify specific

timely nonselections or proffer evidence of discrimination. The AJ

found that assuming arguendo that this allegation even states a claim,

there is absolutely no evidence of a prima facie case. With regard to

issues (4) through (7), the AJ found that none of the matters state a

justiciable claim because they do not negatively affect a substantive

term, privilege or condition of complainant's employment. The agency's

final order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant, through counsel, contends that the instant

case should not have been decided without a hearing. Complainant

further contends that the AJ made a credibility determination by

finding that the selectee was better qualified, and by not crediting

her contention that the selectee's qualifications were exaggerated.

Complainant additionally contends that several additional material

factual issues remain unresolved. Complainant also contends that

the statistical analyses in the record support complainant's claim.

Further, complainant contends that the discovery process was truncated,

noting that complainant has been assigned by the agency in South Africa

since November 29, 2001, and has never had an opportunity to meet with

her counsel. The agency replies that the AJ's decision without a hearing

was proper, and requests that we affirm the final order.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision

without a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative

proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without a

hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately

developed for summary disposition.

The agency has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel

decisions, and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority

absent evidence of unlawful motivation. Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259; Vanek v. Department of the

Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (January 16, 1997). Complainant may

be able to establish pretext with a showing that his qualifications were

plainly superior to those of the selectee(s). Wasser v. Department of

Labor, EEOC Request No. 05940058 (November 2, 1995); Bauer v. Bailar,

647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981). As to issue (1), complainant has

not made this showing. In support of her contention that the selectee's

qualifications were exaggerated, complainant presents evidence in the

form of an electronic message from a colleague who expressed that the

selectee was not �popular� and �probably is a pretty poor manager, too.�

We find this evidence insufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact as to the selectee's qualifications for the position in question.

As to issue (2), we agree that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination. We further find that issue (3) does not

state a claim of discrimination as complainant has not specified which

positions she believes were wrongfully denied to her, or when she learned

she was not selected for such positions.

As to issues (4) through (7), we find that complainant has failed to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation. With regard to the claim

that complainant was subjected to an investigation by the IG (claim

(4)), the Commission has consistently held that being the subject

of an IG investigation does not render an individual aggrieved under

the EEOC's regulations. See Mattocks v. Department of the Navy, EEOC

Request No. 05950549 (August 29, 1996). As to (5), complainant has not

established the nexus between her prior EEO activity and the challenged

action. In so finding, we note the lack of temporal proximity between

the two events. As to (6), again, there is no temporal proximity,

and no nexus established. As to (7), complainant contends that the

two psychiatrists who were allegedly involved were aware of her prior

EEO activity, however, the psychiatrists deny having such knowledge,

and complainant has not presented evidence beyond her bare assertion

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Additionally,

we find that the statistical evidence of record does not, by itself,

create a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged actions,

for which a hearing would be required. We note additionally, that we

do not find that the discovery process was truncated, nor that the AJ's

decision was improper on the grounds that complainant has not had the

opportunity to meet with counsel.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of

material fact exists. See Petty v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Further, construing the evidence to be

most favorable to complainant, we conclude that complainant failed to

present evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by retaliation

or discriminatory animus toward her protected class. Therefore, we

AFFIRM the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 7, 2005

__________________

Date