Universal Laundries & Linen Supply

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 2, 2010

355 N.L.R.B. 88 (N.L.R.B. 2010)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
355 NLRB No. 17
88
ABC Industrial Laundry, LLC d/b/a Universal
Laundries & Linen Supply and America Ortiz
Vazquez and Maria Guadalupe Rojas and Mar-
tha Castillo. Cases 28–CA–22133, 28–CA–22219,
and 28–CA–22286
March 2, 2010
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER
On September 28, 2009, Administrative Law Judge
Burton Litvack issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board1 has considered
the judge’s decision and the record in light of the excep-
tions and briefs,2 and has decided to affirm the judge’s
rulings,3 findings,4 and conclusions5 and to adopt the
recommended Order as modified.6

1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act. See Teamsters Local 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d
849 (10th Cir. 2009); Narricot Industries, L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654
(4th Cir. 2009); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir.
2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2009)
(No. 09-328); New Process Steel v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir.
2009), cert. granted 130 S.Ct. 488 (2009); Northeastern Land Services
v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2009) (No. 09-213). But see Laurel
Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.
2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2009)
(No. 09-377).
2 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied
as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and
the positions of the parties.
3 The Respondent has excepted to the judge’s ruling striking portions
of the testimony of Respondent’s CEO Moshe Levy because the Re-
spondent violated the judge’s sequestration order. Having reviewed the
struck testimony, we conclude that it would not affect our findings here
and thus the judge’s ruling was, at most, harmless error.
4 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by selecting for layoff and laying off employ-
ees Maria Guadalupe Rojas and Martha Castillo, we find, in agreement
with the judge, that the Respondent’s selection of Rojas and Castillo to
view a union-related video evinces the Respondent’s suspicion of their
union activities and support. In the absence of evidence of the video’s
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, ABC
Industrial Laundry, LLC d/b/a Universal Laundries &
Linen Supply, Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b).
“(b) Selecting for layoff and laying off its employees
because it suspected they supported the union activities
of their fellow employees.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection

content, however, we do not rely on the video as evidence of the Re-
spondent’s antiunion animus. We do not adopt the judge’s finding that
the Respondent’s failure to recall Rojas and Castillo violated Sec.
8(a)(3) and (1), as that finding would not materially affect the remedy.
The judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent unlawfully
threatened that selecting a union would be futile when Plant Manager
Kobi Levy told employee America Ortiz Vazquez that other laundries
had unions but his did not. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to pass
on the judge’s finding that Moshe Levy’s statement that he was not
“going to give a pay increase because it was a small company” simi-
larly conveyed futility. Any such finding would be cumulative and
would not affect the remedy.
We also adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent, on several
occasions, interrogated its employees regarding their union sympathies
and activities, in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1). We find it unnecessary to
pass, however, on the judge’s finding that Kobi Levy’s solicitation of
questions following the presentation of the union-related video consti-
tuted an unlawful interrogation, as any such finding would be cumula-
tive and would not affect the remedy.
5 There are no exceptions to the judge’s recommended dismissal of
the allegation that the Respondent unlawfully discharged employee
Alejandra Romero.
6 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order and substitute a
new notice to conform to the violations found.
UNIVERSAL LAUNDRIES & LINEN SUPPLY

89
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT discharge you because we suspect you
have engaged in activities in support of a union.
WE WILL NOT select you for layoff and lay you off be-
cause we suspect you supported the union activities of
your fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you regarding your union
sympathies and activities and the union sympathies and
activities of your fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge and/or de-
portation in order to discourage you from engaging in
activities in support of a union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with unspecified reprisals in
order to discourage you from engaging in support for a
union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you that selecting a union to rep-
resent you will be futile.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer America Ortiz Vazquez, Maria Guadalupe
Rojas, and Martha Castillo full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substan-
tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their sen-
iority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed.
WE WILL make America Ortiz Vazquez, Maria Guada-
lupe Rojas, and Martha Castillo whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from their respec-
tive discharge and layoffs, less any net interim earnings,
plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful discharge of America Ortiz Vazquez and the unlawful
layoffs of Maria Guadalupe Rojas, and Martha Castillo,
and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify them in
writing that this has been done and that the discharge and
layoffs will not be used against them in any way.
ABC INDUSTRIAL LAUNDRY, LLC D/B/A
UNIVERSAL LAUNDRIES & LINEN SUPPLY

Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel.
Gregory E. Smith, Esq. and Malani L. Kotchka, Esq. (Lionel
Sawyer & Collins), of Las Vegas, Nevada, for the Respon-
dent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BURTON LITVACK, Administrative Law Judge. The original
and amended unfair labor practice charges in Case 28–CA–
22133 were filed by America Ortiz Vazquez, an individual, on
September 15 and December 30, 2008, respectively; the unfair
labor practice charge in Case 28–CA–22219 was filed by Maria
Guadalupe Rojas, an individual, on November 7, 2008; and the
unfair labor practice charge in Case 28–CA–22286 was filed by
Martha Castillo, an individual, on December 17, 2008.1 Based
upon his investigation of the aforementioned unfair labor prac-
tice charges, on February 23, 2009, the Regional Director for
Region 28 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board),
issued a second consolidated complaint, alleging that ABC
Industrial Laundry LLC d/b/a Universal Laundries & Linen
Supply (Respondent), engaged in acts and conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National La-
bor Relations Act (the Act). Respondent timely filed an answer
to the second consolidated complaint, essentially denying the
commission of any of the alleged unfair labor practices. Based
upon a notice of hearing, the above matters came to trial before
the above-named administrative law judge on May 5 and 6,
2009, in Las Vegas, Nevada. At the trial, the General Counsel
and Respondent were each afforded the opportunity to call and
to examine witnesses on its behalf; to cross-examine its oppo-
nent’s witnesses; to offer into the record any relevant documen-
tary evidence; to orally argue points of law; and to file a
posthearing brief. Both counsel for the General Counsel and
counsel for Respondent filed posthearing briefs, and said
documents have been carefully examined by me. Accordingly,
based upon the record as a whole, including the posthearing
briefs and my observation of the respective demeanor, while
testifying, of the several witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits that, at all times material herein, it has
been a State of Nevada limited liability company with an office
and place of business located in Las Vegas, Nevada, and has
been engaged in the business of providing laundry services to
hotels. Further, Respondent admits that, during the 12-month
period ending September 11, 2008, in conducting its above-
described business operations, it purchased and received at its
facility in Las Vegas, Nevada, goods valued in excess of
$50,000, directly from suppliers located outside the State of
Nevada. Based upon the foregoing, Respondent admits that, at
all times material herein, it has been an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits that, at all times material herein, Culinary
Workers Union Local 226 affiliated with UNITE HERE (the
Union) has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
A. The Issues
In the second consolidated complaint, the General Counsel
contends that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act by, on or about September 10, discharging its employ-

1 Unless otherwise stated, all events herein occurred during 2008.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

90
ees, America Ortiz Vazquez and Alejandrina Romero; on or
about September 29, discharging its employee, Martha Castillo;
and, on or about September 30, discharging its employee,
Maria Guadalupe Rojas. The General Counsel further contends
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interro-
gating employees about their activities in support of the Union;
by threatening employees with discharge because of their ac-
tivities and support for the Union; by warning its employees it
would be futile for them to select the Union as their bargaining
representative; by threatening employees with deportation be-
cause of their support for the Union; and by threatening em-
ployees with suspension and/or discharge because of their ac-
tivities and support for the Union. Respondent generally de-
nied any of the above-described unfair labor practice allega-
tions.
B. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
1. The Facts
Respondent, which commenced its business in 2007, oper-
ates a commercial laundry in a 30,000 square foot facility in
Las Vegas, Nevada, utilizing equipment which permits it to
launder 100 percent cotton fabrics as well as poly-cotton mate-
rials. Moshe Levy, a seven and a half percent shareholder in
the business, is the managing partner and Respondent’s CEO,
and his son, Kobi Levy, has been the plant manager since the
end of 2007. Upon entering the front of Respondent’s building,
the secretary’s office, in which there is a desk against the back
wall and opposite the door, and the office of the chief engineer
are on the left side of a corridor along with a storage room and,
on the right side, are two restrooms. At the end of the corridor
is a door, leading to the laundry plant.2 To the right of the front
door are stairs leading to the second floor of the facility on
which Respondent’s executive offices, including that used by
Moshe Levy, and a lobby area are located. The Wynn Las
Vegas Hotel is the only Las Vegas hotel, which utilizes 100
percent cotton sheets, pillow cases, and table clothes, and,
while Respondent did not launch operations in 2007 with the
assumption that the said hotel would be its only client, the
Wynn Las Vegas immediately began giving it “samples” for
cleaning. At the time, the Wynn Las Vegas contracted its laun-
dry services to another commercial laundry, which had con-
structed a new facility especially adapted to the hotel’s needs;
however, throughout 2007, Respondent performed an increas-
ing amount of the Wynn Las Vegas’ laundry services, correct-
ing problems caused by the existing contractor and doing some
spa and food and beverage laundry. Then, on December 24,
2007, Moshe Levy was summoned to the hotel’s offices and
informed that, commencing the following week, Respondent
would be given the entirety of the Wynn Las Vegas’ laundry
for cleaning. Thereafter, during the initial 7 months of 2008,
Respondent’s facility was extremely busy with all of the Wynn
Las Vegas’ business, and, according to Moshe Levy, “. . . we
started working day and night in order to . . . finish all the work
. . .”—approximately 60 to 65,000 pounds of laundry per day.
As of August 2008, Respondent employed between 55 and 60

2 On a sign, posted by the entrance into the laundry area, is wording,
prohibiting the use of cameras and cell phones inside the plant.
individuals, operating its equipment and performing various
ancillary tasks,3 including sorting and stacking. Directly be-
neath Kobi Levy4 in the management hierarchy are Ron Brass-
man and Carmela Cruz Sarabia, herein called Cruz, who is a
supervisor or manager for Respondent, an admitted supervisor
and agent within the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the
Act, and the individual who performs translations from English
to Spanish and Spanish to English for Respondent, and below
Cruz are three women also known as supervisors, including
Ana Munoz, who, according to Moshe Levy, are responsible
for “. . . training the girls and watching that everything is
okay.”
America Ortiz Vazquez was employed by Respondent from
November 2, 2007, until she was terminated on September 10,
2008. She worked as a catcher in the laundry—“I am the one
who received the clothes once it was ironed. I would straighten
it up and then I would pack it up on the cars.” Although there
is no record evidence as to which of Respondent’s employees
first contacted the Union or precisely when such occurred,
Vazquez testified that she was a supporter of the Union and
engaged in actions commensurate with being a union propo-
nent. In the latter regard, she attended union meetings, and “I
would invite my co-workers and . . . if they accepted, then I
would tell the people at the Union and they would speak to
them.” Vazquez further testified that, on September 9, Cruz,
whom she knew as Carmen Garcia, approached her at work and
told her to go to the secretary’s office on the first floor. Ac-
cording to Vazquez, upon arriving, she found Kobi Levy, Cruz,
and the secretary, Mary Lou ____, waiting for her. Someone
closed the door, and, with Cruz translating, Levy “. . . asked me
if I was happy at my job.” Vazquez said, yes. “Then, he asked
me if I had any problems with the supervisor,” and Vazquez
responded that she had no such problems. “Then, he asked me
if I was in the union.” Vazquez replied, denying any such in-
volvement, “and then he told me he didn’t believe me that there
were people that was saying that I was with the union, and I
denied it. I told him that perhaps they had seen me on the street
. . . with some people from the Union, and that is why they
might have thought I was with the union.” Levy then “. . . told
me to tell him the truth, because if the wanted to, he could in
two minutes find out whether or not I was with the union, and
that, if he found out I was with the union, not [only] would I
just be fired from my job, but that he was going to get me out
of the country. I continued to deny it, and he said that many
laundry places had a union but that this did not, and then he
said to go back to work.”5
Vazquez further testified that, the next day, September 10, in
approximately the middle of the work day, Cruz again came to
her work station and told her to go to the secretary’s office on
the first floor. Upon arriving, she observed another employee,

3 Most of the work, such as washing, drying, ironing, and folding, is
done by machine.
4 Respondent admits that Moshe Levy and Kobi Levy are supervi-
sors and agents of Respondent within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) and
(13) of the Act.
5 Vazquez did not know to which union Kobi Levy was referring; he
just said “the union.”
UNIVERSAL LAUNDRIES & LINEN SUPPLY

91
Alejandrina Romero,6 Cruz, and Ana Munoz7 waiting in the
room. . . . Cruz began by asking both employees “‘what is
going on with you guys?’” Vazquez replied she did not know,
but Romero looked at her and said “‘We’re here because of the
union.’ To this, “. . . I said ‘but I am not with the union.’ And
[Romero] said, ‘You called me over the phone.’ I denied it.
And then [she] told me that Kobi told her, ‘If I give him just a
single name of someone that was with the Union, I wasn’t go-
ing to lose the job. . . . And your name was the first one I could
come up with.’ I told her, ‘Are you certain that I am with the
union,’ and she told me, ‘Yes, you called me over the phone.’ I
continued to deny it.”8 At this point, Kobi Levy entered the
secretary’s office, sat down, was quiet for a moment, and then,
with Cruz translating, asked me why I had lied to him. “Why
had I told him I wasn’t with the union when I really was? I
continued to deny it, and [Romero] kept saying to me ‘It is just
that I told him if I didn’t give him a name, I was going to be
fired.’ I kept telling [Romero] ‘Can you prove that I am with
the union?’ She said ‘Yes, because you called me. That is
why.’” At this point, Levy said that he did not believe either
employee, accused both women of lying to him, and said both
were fired.9
Maria Guadalupe Rojas, who was employed by Respondent
from August 30, 2007, until on September 30, 2008, as a
catcher and a packer in the laundry, testified that she became
aware of the union organizing at Respondent’s facility some
time during the last 3 months of her employment and that she
attended union meetings. She recalled being taken into a com-
pany office on three occasions and asked about union activities
and specifically remembered one such occasion approximately
a month prior to her layoff when she met with Carmela Cruz,
whom she knew as Carmen Garcia, and Kobi Levy. Previ-
ously, with Cruz translating, Levy had asked her “. . . what was
going on, why was I doing that,” and Rojas had been nonre-
sponsive. On this occasion in response to the same question,
she admitted “. . . that the people from the union had called me,
but it was just a phone call, and he said that I should have told
him about that because it related to the company.” Rojas re-
plied that she considered it “private to me” and that she did not
owe him “an explanation.” To this, Levy “. . . said that to think
through what it was what I was doing because it was not going

6 Vazquez testified that Romero did not have an established job;
rather, “she would switch around in different areas.”
7 According to Vazquez, while she was required to wear a blue shirt
with her name in the front while working, Munoz wore a white shirt as
did the other company supervisors. Also, Munoz was paid on a salary
basis and could transfer workers from job to job. While the General
Counsel contends that Munoz is a supervisor within the meaning of
Sec. 2(11) of the Act, as she did not engage in any of the unfair labor
practices herein, I decline to make such a finding.
8 During cross-examination, Vazquez admitted that she had, in fact,
spoken to Romero over the telephone about the Union and that she was
not telling the truth during meeting on September 10 in front of Cruz.
9 Neither party called Romero as a witness; as a result, there is no
evidence as to her version of the foregoing incident. I do note that, by
all accounts of their clash when confronted by Kobi Levy on September
10, her interests and those of America Vazquez were adverse and that
Respondent chose to believe Romero and rehired her a week after dis-
charging her.
to be good for us.” Levy failed to specifically deny either the
incident or the comments attributed to him by Rojas.
Respondent attributed any interrogations of its employees
and the discharges of Vazquez and Romero to the purported
theft of a portion of a list of its employees’ names and tele-
phone numbers. In these regards, Carmela Cruz testified that
an alphabetized list of the first names of Respondent’s employ-
ees and their telephone numbers, consisting of several separate
pages, was attached, by tape, to the wall behind the desk of
Respondent’s secretary, Mary Lou, in her first floor office10 and
that Mary Lou would utilize this list in order to telephone and
ask employees to work on their days off. During his cross-
examination of Cruz, who had been called as a witness by
counsel for the General Counsel on the first day of the hearing,
Respondent’s counsel showed her Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1,
a six page list of names and redacted telephone numbers with
no apparent pages missing or ripped apart,11 and asked “is that
the list to which you referred in your testimony” but with the
last names and telephone numbers redacted, and Cruz an-
swered, “yes.” During the second day of the trial, called as a
witness by counsel for Respondent, Cruz abruptly changed her
testimony, stating that, as the document did not contain the
names of employees, who had been laid off later in the month,
Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1 was not the September 2008 list of
Respondent’s employees’ first names and telephone numbers.
Reminded, by me, of her previous testimony, Cruz averred that
Respondent’s attorney had actually “. . . asked me if this is like
the paper that was posted on the office. Not exactly . . . I an-
swered a question as this is like the list that you saw in the of-
fice.”12 Ultimately, regarding the above exhibit, Cruz averred,
“This is how [the list] looked.” Contradicting Cruz, Kobi Levy
testified that the asserted list, consisting of five or six separated
pages, was posted “on the left side wall of the secretary.” As to
evidence probative of the existence of the list, Respondent
failed to call as a witness the secretary, Mary Lou, and offered
no explanation for its failure to do so.
Regarding how Respondent learned that a portion of the list
may have been stolen, Cruz testified that, some time prior to the
discharges of Vazquez and Romero, “a lot of people” began
complaining to her about phone calls from and visits to their
homes by union officials. According to Cruz, she learned of
one such home visit on a Friday prior to the discharge of
Vazquez when she approached a group of employees, including
Carmen Rojas, and Rojas “. . . told me . . . a [man and a
woman] went to her house. . . . She . . . was going out to buy
some things [at] the store, and she told [her visitors] she will
come back. When she [returned] to her house, they are . . .
there waiting for her.” Then, according to Cruz, Rojas said she
invited the two people into her house. They said they were

10 As stated above, the wall, on which the list was posted, is opposite
the office door.
11 The list of names goes from Adelita through Yesenis.
12 At this point, Respondent’s attorney stated that Respondent’s Ex-
hibit No. 1 “. . . was represented to be a recreation of the list.” Asked if
he had utilized the term “recreation” the day before, the attorney trum-
peted, “I most certainly did, your honor. I was very careful.” A review
of the transcript fails to support the assertions of either Cruz or Re-
spondent’s attorney.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

92
union representatives, asked if she wanted to support the union,
and asked her to “sign some papers.” Rojas refused to sign
anything until the union representatives explained what signing
the papers meant. The female union representative said Rojas
should sign and then she would explain the meaning of the
forms. Cruz further testified Rojas then told her “. . . that she
had seen a list and . . . they have [the] list. They told her that
America give it to them.” Cruz added that Rojas said she asked
the union representatives specifically about the list “. . . because
it was strange for her to [see] . . . phone numbers and the names
on their hands’” in front of her. Cruz recalled Rojas saying she
was not ready then to support the union and wanted to speak to
her coworkers about it and added that the supervisor Ana
Munoz was with her at her home at the time the union represen-
tatives came to the house. Cruz next testified she spoke to
Munoz “a few minutes” after speaking to Rojas, and Munoz “. .
. told me that it was true . . .” but, other than assertedly hearing
the name America, could not corroborate what the union offi-
cials said to Rojas. Cruz also testified that she informed Kobi
Levy about the telephone calls and visits to employees’ homes
by union agents, including the Carmen Rojas episode; however,
Levy failed to corroborate Cruz that she specifically informed
him of the Rojas incident.13 Likewise, Levy recalled that em-
ployees were “. . . complaining that there are people that are
calling their houses . . . or waiting [there] when they come from
work and they come to me and they said ‘You are the only one
who has our numbers and our addresses, so it has to come from
you.’”
According to Levy, aware that a list of employees’ names
and telephone numbers had been posted in the secretary’s of-
fice, he immediately went there and observed that the “bottom”
page of the list was missing and that the bottom quarter of an-
other page had been ripped off.14 On this same point, Carmela
Cruz testified that, after hearing from employees about the
union agents’ visits and telephone calls to their homes, she
went to the secretary’s office with Kobi Levy and observed one
of the pages of the list of names and telephone numbers ripped
apart, with the portion of the page with phone numbers missing.
Then, the secretary, Mary Lou,15 pointed to the list on the wall
and told them a page was missing. Kobi Levy further testified
that, immediately upon becoming aware of what appeared to be
a theft, he instructed the secretary to remove the remaining
pages of the list of names and telephone numbers from the wall
and to place the information in the office computer.
Then, Levy testified, he informed his father Moshe of the

13 Neither Rojas nor Munoz testified at the trial, and Respondent
failed to offer any explanation for the failure of both to testify. Of
course, I recognize the hearsay nature of Cruz’s uncorroborated testi-
mony regarding Rojas’s comments. While the Board requires that I
receive such testimony, the weight afforded to it is subject to my dis-
cretion.
14 Contradicting Levy, Cruz testified that he was aware of the miss-
ing page only because the secretary told him a page was missing.
15 There is, of course, no corroborating evidence regarding pages of
the putative list ripped apart or missing; nor is there any explanation as
to why the secretary, Mary Lou, failed to inform Respondent about the
asserted missing pages. I again note that Mary Lou failed to testify and
that Respondent offered no reason for not calling her as a witness.
missing pages from the list of names and telephone numbers,
and the latter instructed Kobi to find out what was happening.
Kobi averred that he and his father were especially concerned
as August 2008 was an especially hard time for the business
with the occurrence of several suspicious and unusual inci-
dents— “. . . we have a lot of problems from our competition.
. . . I’m talking stealing and shooting, and people taking pic-
tures of what we did.” According to Kobi, pursuant to his fa-
ther’s instructions, using Cruz as his interpreter, he began inter-
rogating Respondent’s employees.16 In this regard, after ini-
tially asserting that the alleged theft of a portion of the em-
ployee telephone list was Respondent’s issue and denying a
union was ever Respondent’s concern
(“. . . the union, for us, wasn’t the issue, and today is not the
issue also”), Levy ultimately conceded that a union was men-
tioned during these interrogations “. . . because when I know
that the list came—in this point, it came to a union.” He added,
“Of course I asked . . . if they got a call from the union. I said
the word union. I’m not going to lie and say I didn’t say the
word union, but the union wasn’t the issue . . . it could be the
IRS, it could be the union.” Contrary to his assertion, Levy’s
issue, in fact, appears to have been the union, for, as Levy ad-
mitted, “the question [to each employee] was do you know
who’s calling the people in behalf of union?”17 During cross-
examination, Levy continued to maintain that the issue was not
the union and said he only questioned those employees who
had reported telephone calls to their homes. Asked how he
knew which employees to question, Levy said “at the beginning
they came to me. And then it was one after the other, one after
the other. And I wasn’t talking with all of them in the office.
Some of them I met in the plant . . . and we start talking. It
wasn’t a formal talking. I just wanted to know what’s going
on.”18 Eventually, Levy testified, “I come up with the name
America,” and learned that the only employee with America as
a first name was America Vazquez. Thereafter, “I went to my
father. I told him everything . . . about it, and he said go ahead
and talk to her and this is what I did.”
Kobi Levy testified that “my father” made the decision to
terminate America Vazquez and that he is “a hundred percent”
sure of that. Thus, in accord with his father’s instructions,
Levy asked Carmela Cruz to bring Vazquez to the chief engi-
neer’s office, and, with Cruz translating, he asked Vazquez “. . .
who took the list from the board?” At first, Vazquez denied
taking the list of names but, under Levy’s persistent question-
ing, including a threat to contact the Las Vegas police about the

16 As to the number of employees to whom he spoke about the Un-
ion, Levy said, “I don’t remember but more than ten.”
17 Apparently, realizing his mistake, Levy quickly reversed himself,
stating “. . . again, we didn’t know it was the union or not, because I
was a hundred percent sure that this was one of our competition.”
18 Asked what he meant by wanting to know what was “going on,”
Levy replied, “When I saw that the list was missing . . . all the names
that were in this page was missing, those were the people that were
being addressed. So when I started to see and to put one to one to-
gether, I took eventually the list and I went to this, and this, and that,
and back and forth.” Levy never directly answered the question.
Levy denied saying to any employee, give me a name and you can
keep your job.
UNIVERSAL LAUNDRIES & LINEN SUPPLY

93
theft, she “. . . said, okay, I . . . .’ This is what I understood
from Carmela, ‘I took the list, but I didn’t give it to . . . the
union.’”19 Hearing this admission, Levy further testified, he
told Vazquez to return to work and then reported to his father,
telling him that, at first, Vazquez lied in denying she took the
list and that he told Vazquez she was lying.
“Because I knew she was lying.” His father20 then “. . . told
him that if she is the one who took the list, to let her go home.
He wanted to call the police, and I said, no.” Next, Kobi Levy
had Alejandrina Romero summoned to the secretary’s office
and asked her if she had taken part of the list of employees’
names. Romero replied “. . . that whoever took the list is
America and not her.” Then, Levy testified, he instructed Ro-
mero to remain, and “. . . called [Vazquez] to the office. . . .
And then they start arguing in Spanish, which I didn’t under-
stand. . . . I didn’t understand a word of what they saying, and I
said, ‘You know what, both of you, just go away from here.
And this is what happened.”21 Asked why Respondent fired
Vazquez, Levy said the only reason was that “she took the list
of name[s] of people that . . . belonged to the company and . . .
used it.” Asked why he also fired Romero, Levy answered,
“Because I didn’t have the time even to talk to her. . . . and she
said that she didn’t take the list. . . . I wasn’t so sure I needed to
talk to her more.” Nevertheless, he had her remain in the office
as Vazquez was brought back, “and it was what I expected it to
be. . . . So because I wasn’t sure about both of them, I told them
to go away. I mean, for America I can tell for a hundred per-
cent, she was the one who took the list. . . . She was the one
. . . because she admitted it, second . . . because the people
came to me and said the name America. . . . I don’t care who
she’s giving the list to, but she’s the one who took the list
. . . . She took the list from the office.”22

19 Asked if his questions to Vazquez only concerned the list, Levy
said “. . . it’s no union. That’s it.” Asked if his questions to Vazquez
related to his suspicion that she was the one who had given the stolen
information to the Union, Levy said, “I have no other, and . . . so I was
pretty sure that it was her.”
America Vazquez denied being aware that a list of names and phone
numbers was attached to the wall above the secretary’s desk in her
office. She further denied that the list was mentioned during her Sep-
tember 9 and 10 meetings with Kobi Levy or that, during said meetings,
Levy accused her of taking the list. Moreover, Vazquez denied being
aware a list of Respondent’s employees’ names and phone numbers had
been taken or, while admitting informing the Union how to contact her
fellow employees, giving employees’ phone numbers to the Union.
Finally, Vazquez specifically denied stealing a portion of Respondent’s
list of employees’ names and telephone numbers from the secretary’s
office.
20 Moshe Levy testified at the hearing that Vazquez was terminated
for “stealing documents from the company” and, while having no per-
sonal knowledge, asserted she also admitted to the theft. Other than the
foregoing, Moshe Levy failed to corroborate the testimony of his son
inasmuch as portions of his testimony were stricken from the record
due to Respondent’s violation of a sequestration order.
21 Levy conceded he never said the employees were fired, said he
maintained he only mentioned the list to both employees, and denied
mentioning the word union.
22 Levy denied knowing anything about Romero’s involvement with
the Union and professed not to care. Further, other than knowing she
Regarding the discharges of alleged discriminatees Vazquez
and Romero, Cruz, who stated that Kobi Levy terminated both
employees but that she had no knowledge of the reason for their
discharges, testified that she was present at both meetings in the
secretary’s office between Kobi Levy and Vasquez and acted as
the interpreter. While unable to recall much about the initial
meeting, she did recall Vazquez saying “. . . that [Romero] was
the one who took the list.”23 Then, she and Levy met with Ro-
mero and the latter “. . . said that she didn’t know about [the
list] . . . . She heard that it was America . . . the one who took
the list, and they were bringing people to the Union.” Because
the two women were “contradicting” each other, Kobi Levy
instructed her to bring Vazquez back into the room. Cruz did
so, and then the two employees immediately “. . . started argu-
ing. They said, ‘No, you did it. No, you did it.’” According to
Cruz, they were arguing about the list with each blaming the
other for taking it. Then, Levy, who had left the office before
Cruz returned with Vazquez, entered the office, “and then he
asked who took the list.” At this, the two alleged discrimina-
tees resumed their arguing, with each blaming the other for
stealing it. Finally, Levy said “. . . ‘that’s enough. Both of you
go out of here.’” He then turned to Cruz and instructed her to
“. . . ‘tell them that this is not because of the union’ because
both of them were mentioning the union . . . ‘tell them it is
because of the list.’” At this point, Kobi Levy walked out of
the office, and Cruz told the two women that they had been
fired. Contradicting Levy, asked if America Vazquez admitted
she was the one who had stolen the list of names, Cruz re-
sponded, “Not that I can remember.”
Cruz further testified that Romero telephoned her at home
later during the evening, “. . . and she told me that America as
pleading with her that ‘Yes, I was the one who was telling the
Union to call the people, you want to come with me?’”24 In the
same vein, Moshe Levy testified that, approximately a week
after the discharges, he telephoned Romero at home, and “I
asked her directly who stole the documents, and she told me
that she did not take anything, that America stole it, and they
were fighting about it, and she is telling me the truth, and by
looking at her eyes and asking her I believed her.” Accord-
ingly, he offered to return Romero to work, and she accepted.
Then, perhaps realizing the incongruity of his testimony, Levy
changed his account, stating that the foregoing conversation
occurred in his office at Respondent’s facility—“she came to
work. She wanted to talk to us. I spoke to her and decided to
hire her back.”
Maria Guadalupe Rojas testified that, on September 24, she
was working her usual job and that, at approximately
4 pm., Carmela Cruz approached her, and “she took me out of
my . . . area of work. Then, “. . . she asked me to make a report
regarding the Union.” According to Rojas, Cruz handed her a

gave the list of names to a union, Levy denied knowing the extent of
Vazquez’ involvement.
23 Testifying on the first day of the trial, Cruz recalled Kobi Levy
asking Vazquez to return the list, and, when she denied having it, “he
said that a lot of people told him that they saw her coming out of the
office with a paper.” But, “she still denied it.”
24 Cruz’s testimony was contradictory on this point. Thus, earlier
she claimed that Romero said Vazquez had been “threatening” her.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

94
blank sheet of paper and said “. . . to give a report on what I
knew about the union. . . . I asked her what would happen if I
didn’t do the report. She said that she would have to ask Kobi
or otherwise they wouldn’t let us punch in.” Also, Rojas testi-
fied, “Cruz mentioned to me that she wanted me to mention
America.” Thereupon, Rojas began writing on the sheet of
paper “what I knew of the Union” without mentioning any
names or detailing her own involvement with the union—“I
only mentioned that people from the union had spoken to me.”
She then signed and dated the document. Later, Cruz retrieved
the sheet of paper from Rojas, and the latter observed Cruz also
collecting papers from other workers. Carmela Cruz failed to
deny the foregoing testimony.
Martha Castillo worked for Respondent as an ironer in the
laundry from December 29, 2007, until September 29, 2008.
There is no evidence that she engaged in any activities on be-
half, or in support, of the Union, and, when asked if Castillo
engaged in union activities, Rojas replied, “no.” In any event,
according to Castillo, at approximately 11 p.m. on September
27, Kobi Levy summoned her to Moshe Levy’s office on the
second floor of Respondent’s facility. When she arrived, she
observed several supervisors, including Cruz, and at least three
other employees, including Guadalupe Rojas, already in the
room. With Cruz translating, Moshe Levy said “. . . that he was
going to introduce us to a company representative.” The repre-
sentative, who Castillo described as being “tall, fat, bald, and
white,” then introduced himself and, with Cruz translating, said
“. . . he was going to show us a video regarding the Union.”
The man then played the video, which lasted for 20 minutes
and which presumably portrayed the Union in a dissentient
manner, and, upon its conclusion, said “. . . that it wasn’t a
good thing for us to be in the Union.” Then, with Cruz translat-
ing, Moshe Levy said that, if we were in the Union because of
pay increases, that he wasn’t going to give a pay increase be-
cause it was a small company.” Kobi Levy then asked if there
were any questions. There were none, and the employees re-
turned to work. Maria Guadalupe Rojas also recalled being
present for the showing of this video; however, she remem-
bered viewing it “twenty days prior” to her layoff.
Moshe Levy’s account of the showing of this video was
rather bizarre. According to him, “I don’t know what happened
. . . . somebody approached . . . me and he said that there is a
trial against us about meetings, activities and all that. I didn’t
understand him, he said, ‘we want to talk to the girls here to
explain to them what it means.’ I didn’t know where they were
coming from. . . . I said ‘okay, if you want to talk to them about
union or whatever, non-union or whatever, talk’ . . . . When I
realized what is going—I left the place and I sat in my room,
showed the video, then he called me back and he said he
wanted to come back.” According to Levy, he refused the offer
and averred that showing the video was a mistake. Asked who
watched it, Levy replied “supervisors;” however, he later con-
ceded “some regular people, too” watched it. Asked if he said
anything prior to showing the video, Levy said, “When I told
them somebody is here that is coming to show us what is the
Union, or against, I wasn’t myself. I didn’t know. And that’s
it. Asked by me if I should conclude these people just showed
up uninvited or unsolicited and said they wanted to show a
film, Levy replied, “I don’t know how they do it. . . . I didn’t
know the company. They heard the lawsuit that we had . . . .”
Finally, Levy asserted the video incident occurred in October
(“Yeah, something in October”),25 and asserted that Castillo
and Rojas fabricated their respective testimony, regarding hav-
ing been present when the video was shown. Later, given an
opportunity by counsel to change his testimony, Levy stated the
showing of the video “maybe” was after the layoffs, “but it was
certainly after the whole situation happened, like the lawsuit
against us and everything.”
Rojas testified that, on September 30, after 2 days off, she ar-
rived at work and noticed that her name and that of a coworker,
Martha Castillo, who also was returning after 2 off days, were
not on the work schedule. Moments later, a shift supervisor
approached and told the two employees their names were not
on the schedule “. . . because we had been laid off.” The su-
pervisor was unable to explain the reason for their layoffs and
suggested that they speak to either Moshe Levy or Kobi Levy
or the secretary, Mary Lou. The latter arrived at the laundry a
short while later but also was unable to explain the reason for
their layoffs. She added that Moshe or Kobi would be able to
give them an explanation but that neither would be at the plant
for the next 2 or 3 days. Thereafter, on the following Thursday,
Rojas came to Respondent’s facility and, with Mary Lou trans-
lating, spoke to Moshe Levy. The latter explained that employ-
ees would be laid off for 30 to 40 days and “. . . they would call
me because work had ‘gone down’— and that I would get
called later.” Moshe added that employees were being laid off
and not discharged. Castillo recalled that she was informed of
her layoff from work on September 29. On that date, according
to Castillo, upon arriving for work, Cruz approached her and
said she was being laid off pursuant to Kobi Levy’s order.
Contrary to Moshe Levy’s assurances, neither alleged discrimi-
natee was ever recalled to work.
In Respondent’s defense, Moshe Levy testified that, com-
mencing in August, the amount of laundry from the Wynn Las
Vegas dropped to approximately 40,000 pounds per day due to
a decline in occupancy at the hotel caused by the nation-wide
recession. As a result, he decided to lay off seven or eight em-
ployees, and “. . . we told whoever I laid off, I told them, ‘come
back in December.’ Why? Because the Encore opened in De-
cember. So . . . we had again more employees to bring over.”26
As to how employees were chosen for layoff, “I selected them
by their work. If they were catchers and two people, I took one
from each position so that I won’t have double.” Asked how he
chose, Levy replied, “just by picking, that’s all . . . . I just pick
a number. I didn’t pick a person specifically.” He confirmed
that Rojas and Castillo were included in the layoff but denied
being influenced by union involvement or knowing any em-
ployees who were supporters of the Union. Continuing, Levy
testified that he met with five employees, who had been se-
lected for layoff, on Sunday, September 28. “I explained to

25 Given an opportunity to reconsider his testimony as to when the
video was shown, Levy again said he believed it was after the layoffs.
26 Levy conceded this was a change from Respondent’s past practice
with regard to layoffs when the company recalled laid-off employees
when business improved.
UNIVERSAL LAUNDRIES & LINEN SUPPLY

95
them that their work [has dropped dramatically] and show them
. . . we are starting to work at 9:00 and a commercial laundry
usually starts at 5–6 o’clock . . . and I told them that we have to
lay them off . . . because we don’t have work. And I told them
in December to come back because we are getting them work,
and I want them to do the work.” He added that the reason he
told the workers to return in December is because “I knew be-
fore” that Steve Wynn would be opening his Encore Hotel that
month. Further, while conceding that, in the past, Respondent
had laid off employees and then recalled them, Levy averred
that he had done so “. . . because we didn’t know what we were
getting from the week. We had no contract. We just worked.”
If work came in, “I have to finish it up tomorrow.” However,
when he spoke to the employees in September “. . . because I
knew when we were getting work . . . I had no problem telling
them come on December, we are working.” Finally, asked if
Rojas or Castillo had just walked into the laundry in December
he would have returned them to work, Levy replied “absolutely,
yes.”27
Carmela Cruz corroborated Moshe Levy, testifying that five
or six employees were laid off in September. Specifically, she
identified employees, Citlalli Misqua, Griselda Ramirez, and
Annabelle Aruvias, as well as Rojas and Castillo as the em-
ployees, who were laid off. Also, she denied Castillo’s testi-
mony regarding having informed the alleged discriminatee she
had been laid off.
2. Legal analysis
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent discharged its
employees, America Vazquez, Alejandrina Romero,28 Maria
Guadalupe Rojas, and Martha Castillo, in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. He further alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by various actions including
interrogating its employees concerning their activities in sup-
port of the Union, threatening its employees with suspension,
discharge, and/or deportation because of their support for the
Union, and warning its employees it would be futile for them to
select the Union as their bargaining representative. Given the
conflicting accounts regarding the incidents at issue herein, it is
obviously essential that I resolve the credibility of the several
witnesses presented by both the General Counsel and by Re-
spondent. As to this, the most impressive of the witnesses were
Rojas and Castillo. Each appeared to be testifying in a vera-
cious manner and conscientiously attempting to recall events
and conversations several months in the past. Therefore, I shall
credit the candid testimony of each and, in particular, note that
neither Kobi Levy nor Carmela Cruz specifically denied com-
ments attributed to each by Rojas and that Moshe Levy and

27 On this point, Kobi Levy contradicted his father, testifying that
Respondent began performing work for the Encore Hotel in January
2009— “The Encore we started in January, this January.”
28 Respondent’s counsel request that I draw an adverse inference
from the General Counsel’s failure to call Romero as a witness. Per-
haps in other circumstances such would be warranted; however, inas-
much as Respondent reinstated Romero after just a week supposedly
because it believed she was not the one who had taken the telephone
list, the alleged discriminatee was available to both parties to testify.
Therefore, I shall not draw the requested adverse inference.
Kobi Levy failed to specifically deny Castillo’s testimony re-
garding their comments after the showing of the union-related
video. Likewise, noting her demeanor as a witness, I believe
America Vazquez testified in a generally trustworthy manner.
In this regard, the alleged discriminatee candidly admitted that,
while being interrogated by Kobi Levy, she dissembled when
she denied having telephoned Romero about the union. As to
Carmela Cruz, whose demeanor was that of a witness testifying
in a manner designed to buttress her employer’s legal position,
I was nonplussed on the second day of the hearing by her men-
dacity in asserting to me that Respondent’s attorney used the
words “like the list” in the questions, to which she responded
on the previous day while identifying Respondent’s Exhibit No.
1 as the list of first names and telephone numbers, which had
been attached to the wall directly behind the secretary’s desk.29
Concerning Kobi Levy, whose demeanor, while testifying, was
that of a disingenuous witness, noting that Cruz, directly con-
tradicted him, I believe that his assertion that America Vazquez
admitted stealing the list of names and telephone numbers was
an utter calumny and that, given his contradictory testimony,
his protestation, the Union was not Respondent’s “issue” under-
lying its actions herein, was a like fabrication. Given the fore-
going, I am unable to credit either the deceitful Kobi Levy or
the perfidious Cruz whenever the testimony of each is contra-
dicted by another, more credible witness or is uncorroborated.30
Specifically, as compared to Levy and Cruz, I shall credit the
more candid Vazquez as to the events of September 9 and 10.
Finally, Moshe Levy likewise impressed me as being a gener-
ally untrustworthy witness. In particular, while I believe him as
to Respondent’s need to reduce its work force in September
2008, his strange testimony, related to the circumstances sur-
rounding the showing of the presumably antiunion video, and
his insistence said video was shown in October after the Sep-
tember layoffs was not worthy of belief. In these circum-
stances, I particularly place no reliance upon his testimony
regarding his method of selection of employees for the above
layoff.
Based upon my foregoing credibility resolutions and the re-
cord as a whole, I find that, sometime in late August or early

29 Likewise, I am equally concerned by Respondent’s attorney’s
shockingly faulty recollection regarding his asserted use of the word
“recreation” in reference to said exhibit.
30 Carmela Cruz offered hearsay testimony regarding a conversation
with an employee, Carmen Rojas, in which the latter assertedly in-
formed her about a visit to her home by union agents and said she ob-
served a list of names in the hands of one agent, who said America had
given it to them. Respondent failed to call Rojas as a corroborating
witness and offered no explanation for its failure to do so. Accord-
ingly, not only do I not believe her testimony but also I shall give no
weight to Cruz’s uncorroborated hearsay testimony.
Also, Respondent failed to call its secretary, Mary Lou, as a witness
to corroborate the testimony of Kobi Levy and Cruz regarding the
purported existence of a list of names and telephone numbers affixed to
the wall behind her work desk and the theft of a portion of said list by
an unknown individual. Further, Respondent offered no explanation
for her failure to testify. In these circumstances, noting the deceitful
testimony of Cruz and Levy, I place no reliance upon the testimony of
either regarding the existence of such a list or the alleged theft of a
portion of it.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

96
September, upon learning that union agents had been telephon-
ing Respondent’s employees and visiting their homes pursuant
to a nascent organizing effort, Kobi Levy and Respondent’s
highest-ranking supervisor, Carmela Cruz, embarked upon a
campaign not to discover who was responsible for stealing a
portion of the list of the names and telephone numbers of Re-
spondent’s employees31 but, rather, to uncover the identities of
those employees who were shepherding the union’s inside or-
ganizing efforts and to discharge them and to coerce and re-
strain other employees from engaging in support for union or-
ganizing. In this regard, I find that, by his own admission,
Kobi Levy interrogated more than ten of Respondent’s employ-
ees, asking them if they knew who was calling on behalf of the
union. I further find that, in late August or early September,
Maria Guadalupe Rojas was questioned about union activities
three times by Respondent; that, on one such occasion, she was
summoned from her work station to an office and, with Cruz
interpreting, questioned there by Kobi Levy; that, during the
meeting, Rojas volunteered that union agents had telephoned
her at home; and that Levy immediately asked “. . . what was
going on, why was I doing that?” After Rojas responded that it
was merely a phone call, which she considered it a private mat-
ter and for which she did not owe him an explanation, Levy
said it related to the company and told Rojas “. . . to think
through what it was . . . I was doing because it was not going to
be good for us.” Further, I find that, on September 9, Levy
ordered America Vasquez to report to the secretary’s office,
closed the door, and, with Cruz translating, after some prelimi-
nary questions, rather than about a missing portion of a list of
names and telephone numbers, interrogated the alleged dis-
criminatee as to whether she was “in the union” and, after she
denied it, said he did not believe her and “people” said she was
with the union. After Vazquez repeatedly denied it, Levy said
she should tell the truth and warned “. . . that if he found out I
was with the union, not only would I . . . be fired from my job
but . . . he was going to get me out of the country.” He added
that other laundries had unions “but that his did not.” Next, I
find that, on September 10, when Cruz alone met with Vazquez
and Romero in the secretary’s office, in obvious reference to
Levy’s question the day before, she asked the two employees
“‘what’s going on with you guys?’” Clearly understanding the
intent of the question, Romero said they were in the room be-
cause of the union, and Vazquez again denied any involvement
with a union. Romero responded that Kobi Levy told her, if
she gave him a name of someone with the union, she would not
be fired and that Vazquez was the first person she could name.
Vazquez asked if she was certain; Romero replied, yes, because
Vazquez had telephoned her; and Vazquez denied ever tele-
phoning Romero about a union. The “back and forth” between
the two alleged discriminatees continued until Kobi Levy en-
tered the room. He began by turning to Vazquez and asking

31 Simply stated, I do not believe Kobi Levy that Respondent’s main
concern was ascertaining who was responsible for stealing pages from
the list of names and telephone numbers posted in the secretary’s of-
fice. Rather, based upon the record as a whole and his admission,
regarding his questioning of employees, I believe his concern was a
union’s use of Respondent’s employees’ names and telephone numbers
to aid its organizing efforts.
why she had lied to him—“Why had I told him I wasn’t with
the union when I really was?” As previously, Vazquez denied
any union involvement, and she and Romero continued their
argument concerning union activity.
Pointing to the questions posed to Rojas by Kobi Levy in late
August or early September, the questions posed to Vazquez by
Levy on September 9, the questions posed to Vazquez and Ro-
mero by Cruz and Levy on September 10, and the admissions
by Levy regarding his questioning of, at least, ten employees,
the General Counsel argues that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating employees as to their union
activities and sympathies. In Rossmore House, 269 NLRB
1176 (1984), affd. sub nom, Hotel Employees Local 11 v.
NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985), the Board concluded that
it would no longer follow an unlawful per se approach to em-
ployer interrogations of employees and announced a new, “ba-
sic” test for evaluating the legality of an employer’s interroga-
tions of its employees concerning their protected concerted
activities—“whether under all the circumstances the interroga-
tion reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, and interfere with
rights guaranteed by the Act.” Id. at 1177. Subsequently, in
Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217 (1985), the Board
discussed “some areas of inquiry that may be considered” in
applying the Rossmore House test to an employer’s interroga-
tion of any of its employees, who are not “open and active”
union adherents. These, “relevant factors” include (1) the back-
ground (the surrounding circumstances including unlawful
threats and acts of discrimination); (2) the nature of information
sought; (3) the identity of the questioner; (4) and the place and
method of interrogation. Id. at 1218. While these factors
should be considered, they “are not to be mechanically applied
in each case” and are not “prerequisites” to a finding of coer-
cive interrogation. Perdue Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830,
835 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Medicare Associates, 330 NLRB 935,
939 (2000); Rossmore House, supra at 1178 fn. 20.
Initially, having concluded that Respondent was bent upon
discovering the identities of the main union adherents amongst
its employees, I agree that Kobi Levy’s admitted questioning
of, at least, ten of Respondent’s employees concerning tele-
phone calls to them on behalf of the union, his interrogation of
Maria Guadalupe Rojas after she admitted being telephoned at
home by union agents, Levy’s September 9 interrogation of
America Vazquez (was she “in the union”), Cruz’s September
10 questioning of Vazquez and Alexandrina Romero (“what’s
going on with you guys”), and Levy’s additional questioning of
Vazquez and Romero that day were coercive and violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Thus, there is no evidence that the
three alleged discriminatees were open and avowed union ad-
herents inside Respondent’s facility, and I do not believe Re-
spondent had a lawful purpose for questioning any of its em-
ployees. Further, the types of questions, designed to discover
its employees’ union sympathies and activities and those of
their fellow employees, were among those the Board has tradi-
tionally found to be coercive and unlawful. Atlantic Veal &
Lamb, Inc., 342 NLRB 418, 420 (2004); Donaldson Bros.
Ready Mix, Inc., 341 NLRB 958, 959 (2004); TKC, A Joint
UNIVERSAL LAUNDRIES & LINEN SUPPLY

97
Venture, 340 NLRB 923 fn. 2 (2003).32 Finally, with regard to
the interrogations of Rojas and Vazquez on September 9, I note
that the questioning was particularly coercive, having been
conducted by the plant manager and son of the managing part-
ner of the business, in a company office, in Vazquez’s case
with the door closed, and in conjunction with unlawful threats.
Donaldson Bros. Ready Mix, Inc., supra.
Next, I find that, late in the afternoon on September 24, Cruz
approached Rojas in her work area, handed her a sheet of paper,
and demanded that Rojas give her “. . . a report as to what I
knew about the union,” including information on Vazquez’s
role in the union organizing. Rojas asked what would happen if
she refused to do so, and Cruz said “. . . that . . . they wouldn’t
let us punch in.” Finally, I find that, after the showing of the
union-related video on September 27 and after the company
representative said it would not be good for the employees to
select a union to represent them, Moshe Levy warned the em-
ployees, who were present, that “if we were in the union be-
cause of pay increases . . . he wasn’t going to give a pay in-
crease because it was a small company,” and his son Kobi
closed the meeting by asking the employees if there were any
questions. With regard to Cruz’s demand that Rojas give her a
report concerning the union activity at the plant including
Vazquez’s role in the organizing, in agreement with counsel for
the General Counsel that Cruz’s act was violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, I believe that her demand for such a report
was akin to verbally interrogating Rojas for the same informa-
tion and was inherently coercive as it concerned the alleged
discriminatee’s protected concerted activities and those of a
fellow employee. Further, I note that, in response to Rojas’s
expressed reluctance to acquiesce to her unlawful demand,
Cruz threatened her with discharge if she refused to comply.
As to Kobi Levy’s seemingly innocuous request for employees’
questions after the showing of the union-related video on Sep-
tember 27, given the context (the employees were together in a
room with supervisors, Respondent’s labor relations consultant,
the plant manager, and Respondent’s managing partner, who
had just warned them regarding the futility of selecting a union
as their bargaining representative) and the obvious fact that
positive union-related questions would reveal them as union
sympathizers, I agree with the General Counsel that Levy’s
question was coercive. That each employee understood this is
clear as not one asked a question. Accordingly, I find Levy’s
question to have been violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The General Counsel next contends that, in order to dissuade
its employees from supporting a union, Respondent threatened
employees with discharge and/or deportation in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In these regards, during his conver-
sation with Rojas in late August or early September, after
unlawfully interrogating her about her telephone conversation

32 The fact that Cruz may not have specifically mentioned the word
union in her questioning of Vazquez and Romero on September 10
does not detract from the coercive nature of the question. Thus, neither
alleged discriminatee was an open and avowed union supporter, and,
having been interrogated by Levy about her union sympathies and
activities the day before, Vazquez certainly understood the tenure of
Cruz’s question. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 NLRB 1120, 1123
(2002).
with union agents and after Rojas insisted such was a private
matter and said she did not owe him an explanation, Kobi Levy
warned Rojas that her conversation with union agents related to
the company and “. . . to think through what it was . . . I was
doing because it was not going to be good for us.” Further, on
September 9, after Vazquez repeatedly denied any involvement
with a union, Levy said he did not believe her and warned “. . .
that if he found out I was with the union, not only would I . . .
be fired from my job but . . . he was going to get me out of the
country.” Moreover, on September 24, when Rojas expressed
her reluctance about writing a report concerning the union ac-
tivity amongst Respondent’s employees, Cruz warned that she
would inform Levy and “. . . they wouldn’t let us punch in” It
is, of course, unmistakable and traditional Board law that, as
such statements “reasonably tend to coerce employees in the
exercise of their [Section 7] rights,” an employer violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by explicitly threatening loss of em-
ployment in order to discourage its employees from engaging in
union activities. Trump Marina Hotel Casino, 353 NLRB 921,
925 (2009); White Oak Manor, 353 NLRB 795, 798 (2009);
Clinton Electronics Corp., 332 NLRB 479 (2000). Herein,
Levy’s September 9 threat to fire Vazquez from her job be-
cause of her suspected involvement with a union and Cruz’s
September 24 threat to Rojas that she would not be permitted to
punch in, a prerequisite for working, if she did not report about
the union activity at Respondent’s facility constitute clear
threats of discharge, patently violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Further, the Board
“. . . recognize[s] that threats involving immigration or deporta-
tion can be particularly coercive. Such threats place in jeop-
ardy not only the employees’ jobs and working conditions but
also their ability to remain in their homes in the United States.”
North Hills Office Services, 346 NLRB 1099, 1102 (2006);
Smithfield Packing Co., 344 NLRB 1, 9 (2004). Levy’s Sep-
tember 9 threat to Vazquez that he was going to get her out of
the country if he discovered she was supporting the union con-
stituted an explicit threat that he would take unspecified action
regarding her immigration status and was, therefore, violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Finally, after Rojas insisted that
her conversation with a union agent was a private matter and
that she did not owe Levy an explanation, the latter warned
Rojas that she should think through what she was doing be-
cause “. . . it was not going to be good for us.” In my view,
Levy’s warning constituted a threat to Rojas of unspecified
reprisals in order to discourage her from engaging in activities
in support of a union, and the Board has long held that such
threats designed to discourage employees from engaging in
their Section 7 rights are violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers, 350 NLRB 203, 204
(2007); California Gas Transport, 347 NLRB 1314, 1315
(2006).
As a final alleged violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the
General Counsel contends that Respondent unlawfully threat-
ened its employees that selecting a union as their bargaining
representative would be futile. In this regard, counsel for the
General Counsel points to two comments, the first by Kobi
Levy and the second by his father, Moshe Levy. Thus, I have
found that, during his meeting with Vazquez on September 9,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

98
after threatening the latter with discharge and with deportation
if he (Levy) discovered Vazquez was a union adherent, Levy
said that other laundries had unions but that his did not and that,
after showing the union-related video to several employees on
September 27, Moshe Levy told them that, if they were sup-
porting a union in order to get a increase in pay, “. . . he wasn’t
going to give a pay increase because [Respondent] was a small
company.” With regard to Kobi Levy’s comment to Vazquez, I
note, initially, that, in his posthearing brief, counsel for the
General Counsel misstated the record, writing that Levy said
“. . . while many other laundry facilities may be unionized, his
would not be.” Nevertheless, in the context of his threats of
discharge and of action against her immigration status, Vazquez
reasonably may have interpreted Levy as warning that Respon-
dent would remain a nonunion laundry notwithstanding its
employees’ desire for union representation. Of course, an em-
ployer’s warning to its employees that it would not accept a
union as its employees’ bargaining representative constitutes “.
. . a threat that the employees’ efforts to gain such representa-
tion would be futile” in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
and I so find. ADB Utility Contractors, Inc., 353 NLRB 166,
167 (2009); GATX Logistics, 330 NLRB 481, 488 (2000).
Likewise, I believe that Moshe Levy’s September 27 comment
after the showing of the video was an unlawful warning to the
listening employees that selecting a union to bargain in their
behalf for a wage increase would be futile inasmuch as he
would never agree to such a demand. Thus, rather than discuss-
ing the vagaries of the collective-bargaining process, Levy
threatened that Respondent would become “punitively intransi-
gent” in the event its employees selected union representation
and, therefore, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Federated
Logistics & Operations, 340 NLRB 255 (2003).
Turning to the discharges of employees Vazquez and Ro-
mero on September 10 and the layoffs of Rojas and Castillo at
the end of September, the General Counsel alleges that Re-
spondent, in fact, not only discharged Vazquez and Romero but
also Rojas and Castillo in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act. In these regards, in accord with my credibility resolu-
tions, I find that, on September 10, when Kobi Levy entered the
office in which Carmela Cruz had been speaking to Vazquez
and Romero and the two alleged discriminatees were arguing
about Vazquez’s involvement in union organizing, he was si-
lent for a moment and then asked Vazquez why she had lied to
him about not being in the union when she really was. Vazquez
continued to deny it and once again asked Romero if the latter
could prove she was in the union. To this, Romero again said
Vazquez had telephoned her on behalf of the union. At this
point, Levy said he did not believe either employee, accused
both of lying to him, and said both employees were fired. Fur-
ther, I find that Respondent laid off Rojas and Castillo on or
about September 30; that Cruz informed Castillo she was laid
off, explaining that Kobi Levy had ordered her layoff; that
Rojas returned to the plant 2 days later and spoke to Moshe
Levy, who said the laid-off employees would be off work for
30 to 40 days because work was down and “they would call
me” about returning to work; and that Respondent failed to
recall either Rojas or Castillo for work in December notwith-
standing a significant increase in its business due to the opening
of the Encore Hotel.
Counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for Respondent
agree that whether Respondent, in fact, violated the Act by
discharging the four alleged discriminatees must be determined
by utilizing the Wright Line analytical guidelines. Thus, in
order to establish a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act under Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.
2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982),33 “‘the
General Counsel bears the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that animus against protected conduct was
a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. If the
General Counsel makes a showing of discriminatory motivation
by proving protected activity, the employer’s knowledge of that
activity, and animus against protected activity, then the burden
of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it would have
taken the same action even in the absence of the protected ac-
tivity.’” St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers, supra, at 203;
North Carolina License Plate Agency #18, 346 NLRB 293
(2006); Donaldson Bros. Ready Mix, Inc., supra, at 961. Fur-
ther, once the burden has shifted to the employer, the crucial
inquiry is not whether the employer could have engaged in the
alleged unlawful acts but whether it would have done so absent
the alleged discriminatees’ union activities or support. Struc-
tural Composites Industries, 304 NLRB 729 (1991); Filene’s
Bargain Basement, 299 NLRB 183 (1990). Moreover, pretex-
tual discharge cases should be viewed as those in which “. . .
the defense of business justification is wholly without merit,”
and the “burden shifting” analysis of Wright Line need not be
utilized. Arthur Young & Co., 291 NLRB 39 (1988); Wright
Line, supra, at fn. 5. Finally, regarding the latter point, “it is . .
. well settled when a respondent’s stated reason for its actions is
found to be false, the circumstances warrant the inference that
the true motive is an unlawful one that the respondent desires to
conceal.” Flour Daniel, Inc., 304 NLRB 970, 970 (1991);
Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation v. NLRB, 362 F. 2d 466
(9th Cir. 1966).
With regard to America Vazquez, I believe counsel for the
General Counsel has met his initial burden of establishing that
Respondent was unlawfully motivated in discharging the al-
leged discriminatee. In this regard, I find that Vazquez was an
active supporter of the Union. Thus, she testified, and there is
no dispute, that she attended union meetings, spoke to employ-
ees about the Union, and gave union agents the names those
employees, whom, she believed, would support an organizing
campaign by the Union. Next, the record is demonstrable that
Respondent believed or, at least, suspected that Vazquez was an
ardent and active union proponent. As to this, Kobi Levy ad-
mitted that his interrogations of Respondent’s employees, con-
cerning who was calling on behalf of a union, yielded the name
America, which he subsequently connected to America
Vazquez. Moreover, on September 9, Levy averred to Vazquez
that “people” had informed him she was with the union, and, on
September 10, he accused Vazquez of lying to him when she
denied any involvement with the Union. Finally, on September

33 The Board’s Wright Line guidelines were approved by the Su-
preme Court in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S.
393 (1983).
UNIVERSAL LAUNDRIES & LINEN SUPPLY

99
24, when she asked Maria Guadalupe Rojas to draft a report on
the union activity at Respondent’s commercial laundry, Car-
mela Cruz specifically demanded that she write about Vazquez.
While the Wright Line guidelines require that the General
Counsel establish the employer’s knowledge of an alleged dis-
criminatee’s union activities, “. . . suspicion is sufficient to
satisfy the Wright Line requirement that the General Counsel
prove knowledge of union activity.” Desert Pines Golf Club,
334 NLRB 265, 275 (2001); Kajima Engineering & Construc-
tion, Inc., 331 NLRB 1604 (2000). Finally, that Respondent
harbored unlawful animus toward Vazquez is palpable and
indisputable. On this point, I have previously concluded that,
after she repeatedly denied any involvement with a union, Kobi
Levy threatened Vazquez, warning, if he subsequently learned
she was, in fact, a union supporter, he would not only fire her
but also would ensure her deportation from the United States.
Also, I have found that Levy warned employees that conversa-
tions with union agents would not “be good for us” and that,
after alleged discriminate Rojas expressed reluctance about
reporting on Respondent’s employees’ union activities, Car-
mela Cruz warned her that Respondent would not permit em-
ployees, who failed to do so, to clock in for work.
In the foregoing circumstances, I believe, the burden of per-
suasion shifted to Respondent to establish that, notwithstanding
its unlawful animus, it, nevertheless, would have terminated
Vazquez. Succinctly put, Respondent failed to meet its burden
of proof. In this regard, Respondent contends that it terminated
the alleged discriminatee because she purloined a portion of the
list of employees’ first names and telephone numbers, which
was posted in the secretary’s office. However, given my belief
that Kobi Levy and Carmela Cruz each paltered herein and the
convoluted and contradictory nature of the testimony of each
regarding the existence of the aforementioned list and the pur-
ported theft of a portion of it, absent the corroborating testi-
mony of the secretary, Mary Lou, I am unable to conclude ei-
ther that such a list was ever posted in her office or that a por-
tion of such a list was ever stolen. Further, I do not believe
Kobi Levy that, in late August and September, Respondent’s
main focus was on discovering who was responsible for the
putative theft. Rather, based upon the ample record evidence, I
believe Respondent’s efforts were directed at unmasking the
union adherents amongst its employee complement and at co-
ercing the remainder from engaging in support for a union.
Thus, instead of inquiring about the missing portion of the list,
Levy admitted that his interrogations of Respondent’s employ-
ees consisted of him asking who was calling them on behalf of
the union, and I have specifically credited Vazquez that, on
September 9, rather than concerning the missing portion of the
list, Levy’s questions to her consisted of him repeatedly asking
whether she was “in the union.” Moreover, Respondent offered
no actual evidence that Vazquez was responsible for the alleged
theft, and, of course, most damaging to Respondent’s asserted
defense, is that, while Levy maintained Respondent terminated
Vazquez because she admitted to him having pilfered the por-
tion of the aforementioned list, Carmela Cruz, who interpreted
for Levy, failed to corroborate him on this crucial and importu-
nate point. Accordingly, contrary to Respondent, rather than
based upon her involvement in the theft of missing portions of a
list, the overwhelming record evidence is that, given Levy’s
interrogations of employees, his interrogation of Vazquez,
Cruz’s demand that Rojas draft a report on Respondent’s em-
ployees’ union activities and specifically those of Vazquez, and
Levy’s threat of termination and deportation to Vazquez if he
discovered her union adherence, Respondent discharged
Vazquez for unlawful reasons in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act, and I so find.
Turning to the discharge of Alejandrina Romero, I do not be-
lieve that the General Counsel has met its initial burden of
proof by establishing Respondent was unlawfully motivated in
terminating her. Thus, there is no record evidence that Romero
engaged in any union activities or that Respondent knew or
suspected her of supporting the union organizing at the laundry.
While counsel for the General Counsel argues Respondent
“associated” Romero with the suspected union sympathizer
Vazquez, the credible record evidence is that Romero appar-
ently was one of the employees, who informed Kobe Levy that
the latter had telephoned Romero regarding the union, an event
which, in Levy’s presence on September 10, Romero ada-
mantly insisted occurred and Vazquez just as vehemently de-
nied.34 Confronted with this “she said, she said” situation,
Levy abruptly terminated Romero, who, I believe, Respondent
required to be present in the room to provoke an admission
from Vazquez of her involvement with a union, as well as
Vazquez, who was the actual object of Respondent’s animus.
In my view, notwithstanding the existence of significant record
evidence establishing Respondent’s patent animus toward un-
ion supporters, Levy discharged Romero not because of its
unlawful animus but, rather, in an act of pique resulting from
the failure of Respondent’s scheme to deceive Vazquez into
admitting her involvement with a union.35 In these circum-
stances, I am unable to find that the General Counsel estab-
lished that Respondent was unlawfully motivated and termi-
nated Romero in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act
and shall recommend dismissal of this complaint allegation.
Concerning Respondent’s layoff of Maria Guadalupe Rojas,
the credible record evidence is that she attended several union
meetings prior to being laid off by Respondent at the end of
September. Moreover, the record establishes that Respondent
suspected that she was engaged in union activities or, at least,
was a union supporter. Thus, not only did Kobi Levy interro-
gate her on this subject at which point Rojas admitted that un-
ion agents had telephoned her at home but also Carmela Cruz
demanded that she submit a written report as to her knowledge
of the union activity at Respondent’s laundry and Rojas was
one of just four employees, including Martha Castillo, who
were required to attend the showing of the union-related video
on September 27. Further, as previously discussed, there is
ample record evidence of Respondent’s general animus toward

34 Vazquez testified that, at one point, Romero accused Kobi Levy of
threatening to terminate her and saying, if she gave him the name of
just one union supporter, he would not discharge her. This hearsay
testimony was not corroborated, and I shall give it no weight.
35 I agree with counsel for the General Counsel that the record is de-
void of an explanation for the discharge of Romero; however, such
does not excuse the General Counsel from meeting its Wright Line
burden of proof.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

100
union supporters. More particularly, Levy tenebrously warned
Rojas that engaging in union activities would not be good for
employees, and Cruz directly threatened Rojas with discharge if
she refused to provide Respondent with the aforementioned
report on union activities amongst the employees at the laun-
dry. In these circumstances, the counsel for the General Coun-
sel met his initial burden of establishing that Respondent was
unlawfully motivated in laying off the alleged discriminatee.
As to whether Respondent met its Wright Line burden of
proof and established that it would have laid off Rojas notwith-
standing its unlawful animus against union adherents, I accept,
and have no reason to doubt, that, by September 2008, Respon-
dent’s business situation had deteriorated to a degree necessitat-
ing the layoffs of employees and that, in fact, Respondent laid
off some employees for business considerations. However,
while Moshe Levy, who admitted having selected the individu-
als for layoff, explained he basically chose one person from
each job classification in the laundry without regard for names,
he failed to adequately explain how he selected Rojas, in par-
ticular, from among the presumably numerous employees in her
job classification. Thus, given the extent of Respondent’s
unlawful animus, I do not believe his assertions that he acted
without knowledge of any of the employees, whom he chose
for layoff, or that he acted without knowledge or suspicion of
said employees’ support for a union. This is particularly true
regarding Rojas as Respondent specifically required her to draft
a report on her knowledge of the union activities of its employ-
ees and unlawfully warned her of the consequences of not do-
ing so. Moreover, that Moshe Levy was very much concerned
about the union organizing amongst Respondent’s employees is
demonstrated by Respondent’s general animus against union
supporters and the facts that he facilitated and arranged for36
the showing of the union-related video to four employees in
late September and that he subsequently warned said employ-
ees about the futility of selecting a union for the purpose of
representation. In these circumstances, I believe that Levy, on
behalf of Respondent, selected Rojas for layoff because he
knew or suspected her support for the on-going union organiz-
ing amongst Respondent’s employees. Accordingly, I find that
Respondent failed to meet its burden of proof and that it se-
lected Rojas for layoff, laid her off, and then failed to recall her
in December in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.37
With respect to alleged discriminatee, Martha Castillo, there
is, of course, no record evidence that she engaged in any union
activities and Rojas added that Castillo was not a participant.
Nevertheless, I believe the record warrants the conclusion that
Respondent suspected her of supporting the union organizing
activity amongst the laundry employees. Thus, I believe Casti-
llo that she was among four employees, who were required to
attend the showing of the union-related video in late Septem-
ber, and, other than Moshe Levy’s bizarre testimony, Respon-

36 I do not accept his preposterous explanation for the circumstances
surrounding the showing of the union-related video.
37 In this regard, noting a change from Respondent’s past practice, I
do not credit Moshe Levy’s assertion that he told all the laid-off em-
ployees they should call in December as to recall. Rather, I believe
Rojas that Levy told her Respondent would notify, call her when there
was sufficient business improvement to warrant recall.
dent offered no explanation as to why it selected Castillo to
attend. In my view, there can be but one explanation—
Respondent believed or suspected she was a union adherent.
Finally, as mentioned above, the record is replete with evidence
of Respondent’s animus toward employees who engaged in
activities in support of a union or were union adherents. In
these circumstances, I believe counsel for the General Counsel
sustained his burden of proof that Respondent harbored unlaw-
ful animus in laying off Castillo.
In contrast, I do not believe Respondent sustained its burden
of proof by establishing that it would have laid off the alleged
discriminatee notwithstanding its unlawful animus. In this
regard, I reiterate my view that, in September 2008, Respon-
dent’s deteriorating business situation necessitated the laying
off of a portion of its work force. Further, as with alleged dis-
criminatee Rojas, I likewise believe that Moshe Levy failed to
adequately explain why he selected Castillo rather than another
employee in her job classification for layoff. Moreover, as
stated above, I do not credit his assertion that he engaged in the
selection process without knowledge or, at least, suspicion of
Castillo’s union sympathies. Three factors convince me that
said view is correct. First, of course, the record evidence is
manifest with regard to Respondent’s unlawful animus. Next,
Respondent offered no explanation for requiring Castillo to
view the union-related video. Finally, in accord with my
aforementioned credibility resolution, despite the fact that busi-
ness conditions had sufficiently improved by December or
January 2009 so as to warrant such and despite its past practice
of recalling laid-off employees, Respondent failed to recall
Castillo for work. Therefore, I am unable to conclude that Re-
spondent selected Castillo for layoff notwithstanding its unlaw-
ful animus toward suspected union supporters and find that, in
including her in its September layoff of employees and failing
to recall her in December, Respondent engaged in conduct
violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating its employees regarding their union sym-
pathies and activities and the union sympathies and activities of
their fellow employees, Respondent engaged in acts and con-
duct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By threatening its employees with discharge and/or depor-
tation in order to discourage them from engaging in support for
union organization, Respondent engaged in acts and conduct
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By threatening its employee with unspecified reprisals in
order to discourage them from engaging in support for union
organization, Respondent engaged in acts and conduct violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By threatening its employees that selecting a union to rep-
resent them would be futile, Respondent engaged in acts and
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By discharging its employee, America Vazquez, because it
suspected that she was participating in union activities, Re-
UNIVERSAL LAUNDRIES & LINEN SUPPLY

101
spondent engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
8. By selecting for layoff, laying off, and eventually failing
to recall Maria Guadalupe Rojas and Martha Castillo, because
it suspected they supported the union organizing amongst its
employees, Respondent engaged in acts and conduct violative
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
9. Respondent’s above-described acts and conduct affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
10. Unless set forth above, Respondent engaged in no other
unfair labor practices.
REMEDY
I have found that Respondent engaged in serious unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act. Accordingly, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease
and desist from engaging in such acts and conduct. Generally, I
shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and de-
sist from interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act. Specifically, as I have found that Respondent unlawfully
discharged its employee, America Vazquez, and unlawfully
selected for layoff, laid off, and failed to recall its employees,
Maria Guadalupe Rojas and Martha Castillo, I shall recommend
that it be ordered to offer Vazquez, Rojas, and Castillo rein-
statement to their former positions of employment and, if said
positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions
with no loss of seniority or other rights and privileges previ-
ously enjoyed, and make each whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from, in the
case of Vazquez, from September 10, 2008 and, in the cases of
Rojas and Castillo, from September 30, 2008 to the date of a
proper offer of reinstatement to each, less any interim earnings,
as prescribed in F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987).38 Further, I shall recommend that
Respondent be ordered to expunge from its records any refer-
ences to its unlawful discharge of Vazquez and unlawful selec-
tions for layoff and layoffs of Rojas and Castillo and inform
each that such has been done. Finally, I shall recommend that
Respondent be ordered to post a notice to its employees, advis-
ing them of its unfair labor practices and the steps it is required
to take to remedy them.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended39
ORDER
The Respondent, ABC Industrial Laundry LLC d/b/a Uni-
versal Laundries & Linen Supply, Las Vegas, Nevada, its offi-

38 Counsel for the General Counsel’s request for a change in the
manner of the interest calculation is best made to the Board. Accord-
ingly, I shall not rule on it.
39 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging its employees because it suspected they have
engaged in activities in support of a union;
(b) Selecting for layoff, laying off, and failing to recall its
employees because it suspected they supported the union activi-
ties of their fellow employees;
(c) Interrogating its employees regarding their union sympa-
thies and activities and the union sympathies and activities of
their fellow employees;
(d) Threatening its employees with discharge and/or deporta-
tion in order to discourage them from engaging in activities in
support of a union;
(e) Threatening its employees with unspecified reprisals in
order to discourage them from engaging in support for a union;
(f) Threatening its employees that selecting a union to repre-
sent them would be futile;
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies and purposes of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer to its
employees, America Vazquez, Maria Guadalupe Rojas, and
Martha Castillo, immediate and full reinstatement to their for-
mer jobs, or, if said jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed and make
Vazquez, Rojas, and Castillo whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion;
(b) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the above unlawful dis-
charge and layoffs, and within 3 days thereafter notify
Vazquez, Rojas, and Castillo, in writing, that this has been done
and that the discharges and layoffs will not be used against
them in any way;
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order;
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Las Vegas, Nevada, copies of the attached notice, in
English and Spanish, marked “Appendix.”40 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 28,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60

40 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

102
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since September 1, 2008.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.