United States Soccer Federation, Inc.v.Aztec Shops, Ltd.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 27, 2017

No. 91220225 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 27, 2017)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Mailed: January 27, 2017

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

United States Soccer Federation, Inc.
v.
Aztec Shops, Ltd.
________

Opposition No. 91220225
to Application Serial No. 85458395
_______

Marie A. Lavalleye of Covington & Burling LLP for United States Soccer
Federation, Inc.
Katie Heilman of the Arent Fox LLP for Aztec Shops, Ltd.
_______
Before Shaw, Adlin, and Pologeorgis, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Shaw, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Aztec Shops, Ltd., seeks registration of the mark I BELIEVE THAT
WE WILL WIN!, in standard characters, for “Bottoms; Caps; Hats; Jackets; Shirts;
Sweatshirts; T-shirts; Tops,” in International Class 25:1

1 Application Serial No. 85458395, filed on October 27, 2011, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), alleging a date of first use anywhere and in commerce
of October 19, 2011.
Opposition No. 91220225
2
Opposer, United States Soccer Federation, Inc., has opposed registration of
Applicant’s mark on the ground that it fails to function as a trademark under Sections
1, 2 and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1052, and 1127. Applicant denied
the salient allegations of the notice of opposition.
The parties stipulated to resolution of this case through the Board’s Accelerated
Case Resolution procedure (“ACR”). Following the Board’s order approving the use of
ACR, the parties submitted their Joint Stipulation of Facts incorporating evidence
previously submitted with the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment. In
addition, pursuant to their agreement, the parties submitted supplemental evidence.
The Record
The record includes the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of the involved application. Opposer submitted the
following evidence:
1. The first declaration of Grant D. Johnson, counsel for Opposer, with exhibits
comprising internet excerpts and videos purporting to show use of the applied-
for mark by Applicant, Opposer, and third parties, as well as Opposer’s Initial
Disclosures;2
2. Mr. Johnson’s second declaration with exhibits comprising internet excerpts
about Applicant, as well as web page excerpts purporting to show Opposer’s
attempts to sell products bearing the proposed mark or variations thereof;3 and
3. The declaration of Michael Gressle, Director of Marketing for Opposer, with
exhibits relating to apparel sold by Opposer.4

2 5 and 6 TTABVUE.
3 14 TTABVUE.
4 22 TTABVUE.
Opposition No. 91220225
3
Applicant submitted the following evidence:
1. The declaration of Todd Summer, Director of Campus Stores Division & San
Diego State University (“SDSU”) Licensing, with exhibits relating to
Applicant’s use of the proposed mark and apparel sold by Applicant;5 and
2. A Notice of Reliance introducing third-party registrations of marks
comprising slogans and three of Opposer’s trademark application file
wrappers for slogans.6
In addition, the parties filed a joint stipulation of facts.7
I. Standing
Standing is a threshold issue that must be proven by the plaintiff in every inter
partes case. See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111
USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015). Our primary
reviewing court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has enunciated a
liberal threshold for determining standing, namely that a plaintiff must demonstrate
that it possesses a “real interest” in a proceeding beyond that of a mere intermeddler,
and “a reasonable basis for his belief of damage.” Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco at
1062 (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1902, 50 USPQ2d 1023, 1025-26 (Fed. Cir.
1999)). A “real interest” is a “direct and personal stake” in the outcome of the
proceeding. Ritchie v. Simpson, 50 USPQ2d at 1026. Moreover, allegations in support
of standing which may be sufficient for pleading purposes must later be affirmatively
proved by the plaintiff at trial. Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d
1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982).

5 23 and 34 TTABVUE.
6 24-33 and 40 TTABVUE.
7 35 TTABVUE.
Opposition No. 91220225
4
In its pleading Opposer alleges that as soccer’s national governing body in the
United States, it is responsible for the U.S. Men’s National Team and U.S. Women’s
National Team which compete against other countries, including in qualification
rounds for the World Cup, and if they qualify in the World Cup finals themselves.
Opposer further alleges that during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, fans of the U.S. Men’s
National Team adopted the applied-for mark as the rallying cry for the team. Finally,
Opposer alleges that registration of the applied-for mark will deprive Opposer and
others of the ability to use the mark as an “informational and aspirational slogan.”
We find Opposer properly pleaded standing.
To prove its standing, Opposer made of record video advertisements from 2014 for
the United States’ Men’s National Soccer Team showing use of the applied-for mark
by fans, professional athletes, and celebrities supporting the U.S. team.8 In addition,
Mr. Gresssle testified that Opposer has sold apparel, including apparel bearing the
applied-for mark, or marks derived from the applied-for mark.9 This establishes
Opposer’s interest in and use of the mark. Kellogg Co. v. General Mills Inc., 82
USPQ2d 1766, 1767 (TTAB 2007); Giersch v. Scripps Networks, Inc., 90 USPQ2d
1020, 1022 (TTAB 2009) (“Petitioner has established his common-law rights in the
mark DESIGNED2SELL, and has thereby established his standing to bring this
proceeding.”); Syngenta Crop Prot. Inc. v. Bio-Chek LLC, 90 USPQ2d 1112, 1118
(TTAB 2009) (testimony that opposer uses its mark “is sufficient to support opposer’s

8 5 TTABVUE, exhibits 17 and 18.
9 Gresssle Declaration, 22 TTABVUE.
Opposition No. 91220225
5
allegations of a reasonable belief that it would be damaged. . . .” where opposer alleged
likelihood of confusion).
Applicant argues that Opposer has not established standing because it does not
show that it has a real interest in using the mark in connection with Applicant’s
goods, or goods commercially related to them, or that Opposer is a competitor of
Applicant in the field of apparel.10 This argument is unpersuasive.
The Gresssle declaration establishes that Opposer produces clothing products in
connection with U.S. national soccer teams and that Opposer would like to use the
applied-for mark on clothing articles such as scarves. Accordingly, the Gresssle
declaration establishes that Opposer is indeed a competitor of Applicant in that
Opposer sells or licenses clothing supporting sports teams and that it would like to
continue using the applied-for mark.
Applicant also argues that Opposer does not itself make any goods and that
“Opposer’s standing cannot be premised on a third party’s activities or interest in
using the Applicant’s mark in connection with the same or commercially-related
goods.”11 This argument too is unpersuasive because Applicant is conflating “third
parties” with related parties, as that term is used in the Lanham Act, specifically
Opposer’s licensees. The fact that licensees may produce and sell goods for Opposer
does not negate Opposer’s real interest in this proceeding inasmuch as a licensee’s
use of a mark inures to the benefit of the trademark owner. See Quality Candy
Shoppes/Buddy Squirrel of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Grande Foods, 90 USPQ2d 1389 (TTAB

10 Applicant’s Br., p. 18, 37 TTABVUE 19.
11 Id. at 20.
Opposition No. 91220225
6
2007) (“[Y]ears of precedent make it very clear that proper use of a mark by a
trademark owner’s licensee or related company constitutes ‘use’ of that mark
attributable to the trademark owner.”); Section 5 of the Trademark Act, 15 USC
§ 1055.
Lastly, Applicant argues that Opposer has not proven that it has a real interest
in use of the applied-for mark as of the filing date of the opposition, January 20, 2015.
Applicant’s argument is unavailing. Opposer’s evidence establishes that the chant I
BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN! was used in advertising for the U.S. men’s soccer
team in mid-2014. In any event, it is not necessary that an opposer be using that term
as a trademark in order to find standing. Cummins Engine Co. v. Continental Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 892, 149 USPQ 559 (1966). Rather, an Opposer may prove its
standing by establishing merely that it has an interest in using the term in its
business. See De Walt, Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp., 289 F.2d 656, 129 USPQ 275,
280 (CCPA 1961) (Standing “will be presumed or inferred when . . . the opposer or
petitioner is one who has a sufficient interest in using the descriptive term in its
business.”).
II. Failure to function as a mark
Section 45 of the Trademark Act defines a “trademark” as “any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof – (1) used by a person . . . to identify
and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
It is well settled that not every designation that is placed or used on a product
necessarily functions as a trademark and not every designation adopted with the
Opposition No. 91220225
7
intention that it perform a trademark function necessarily does so. In re Hulting, 107
USPQ2d 1175, 1177 (TTAB 2013).
Slogans and other terms that are considered to be merely informational in nature,
or that express support, admiration or affiliation, are generally not registrable. See
In re Eagle Crest Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1227, 1232 (TTAB 2010) (“ONCE A MARINE,
ALWAYS A MARINE is an old and familiar Marine expression, and as such it is the
type of expression that should remain free for all to use.”); In re Pro-Line Corp., 28
USPQ2d 1141, 1142 (TTAB 1993) (BLACKER THE COLLEGE SWEETER THE
KNOWLEDGE appearing on t-shirts “would be viewed merely as an informational
message or slogan devoid of trademark significance.”). The more commonly a phrased
is used, the less likely that the public will use it to identify only one source and the
less likely that it will be recognized by purchasers as a trademark. See Reed v. Amoco
Oil Co., 611 F. Supp. 9, 225 USPQ 876, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
The critical inquiry in determining whether a designation functions as a mark is
how the designation would be perceived by the relevant public. To make this
determination we look to specimens and other evidence of record showing how the
designation is actually used in the marketplace. In re Eagle Crest Inc., 96 USPQ2d at
1229. Thus, the determinative factor as far as registrability is concerned is the
manner in which the mark is actually used. Michael S. Sachs Inc. v. Cordon Art B.V.,
56 USPQ2d 1132, 1135 (TTAB 2000).
Opposer argues that the applied-for mark fails to function as a trademark
identifying the source of Applicant’s goods:
Opposition No. 91220225
8
Applicant’s alleged mark—I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL
WIN!—is an enormously popular inspirational chant that
has been uttered by thousands (if not millions) and viewed
and heard by hundreds of millions of fans and devotees of
a multitude of causes over the past twenty years. . . . This
includes the chant’s long standing and wide-spread use at
sporting events and other social gatherings that have
absolutely no association with Applicant. . . . Many of these
documented uses predate Applicant’s own claimed first
use.12
In fact, Opposer made of record a number of news articles, blog excerpts, videos,
and other material showing that the chant I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN has
been widely publicized to have been used by others both before and after Applicant’s
adoption of the slogan in October of 2011. The following examples are representative:
• A U.S. Naval Academy blog excerpt dated October 30, 2003 from “Eric the
Jarl” describes the arrival of T-shirts featuring the chant I BELIEVE
THAT WE WILL WIN.13
• An Internet story dated May 25, 2009 describes the Northern Lebanon
Pennsylvania High School football team’s use of the chant I BELIEVE
THAT WE WILL WIN before a game.14
• A 2008 “Fan Manual” from Embry-Riddle University encourages students
to use the I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN cheer.15
• A YouTube video dated May 16, 2009 depicts Ithaca college football fans
chanting I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN.16

12 Opposer’s Br at 17, 36 TTABVUE 18.
13 5 TTABVUE 19.
14 Id. at 31.
15 Id. at 54.
16 Id. at exh. 7 (video).
Opposition No. 91220225
9
• A 2010 article in The Harvard Crimson describes fans’ use of the I
BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN chant to support Harvard’s basketball
team.17
• A 2010 article from phillynews.com describes a high school quarterback
who “helped change the final line of the famous sports chant from ‘I believe
that we will win’ to ‘I believe that we have won. . . .’”18
• A February 2011 blog article from yahoo.com/ncaa/basketball/the_dagger
discusses a basketball game between Temple University and St. Joseph’s
University. The article claims that Temple students “adapted the
ubiquitous ‘I believe that we will win’ cheer, chanting ‘I believe the [St.
Joseph’s ] Hawk is dead’ instead.”19
• A June 2011 blog article about cheering for a high school robotics team at
a competition states:
[T]his year we began to do a cheer known simply as “I
Believe.” This is a simple, yet effective chant that psychs
up the drive team when they hear it. It starts off with [team
members] screaming “I” at the top of our lungs. Then,
everybody else repeats after us. We then shout “I Believe,”
and everybody follows. Then “I Believe That,” and “I
Believe That We,” which everybody keeps following,
getting progressively louder. Then with one final scream,
the three of us scream “I Believe That We Will Win!”
Everybody then goes crazy chanting “I BELIEVE THAT
WE WILL WIN” repeatedly at the top of their lungs for
around 30 to 45 seconds.20

17 Id. at 64.
18 Id. at 71.
19 Id. at 75.
20 Id. at 78.
Opposition No. 91220225
10
• A June 2014 article purports to trace the origins of the I BELIEVE THAT
WE WILL WIN chant used in connection with the U.S. men’s national
soccer team to a New York high school in “the late 1990’s.”21
• A June 2014 article purports to trace the origins of the I BELIEVE THAT
WE WILL WIN chant “used by enthusiastic college basketball student
sections or hopeful U.S. soccer fans” to a “Naval Academy Prep School
student” in 1998.22
• A November 2011 article from ESPN.com discusses use of the I BELIEVE
THAT WE WILL WIN chant by Utah State basketball fans, and cites to a
2003 Washington Post article which alleged that the chant began at the
U.S. Naval Academy. The article also alleges that T-shirts bearing the
mark appeared in 2003.23
• An ESPN video from YouTube dated April 2014 depicts U.S. soccer fans
chanting I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN.24
• A YouTube video dated April 2015 depicts union members advocating for
higher wages chanting I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN.25
For its part, Applicant argues that “[b]ecause the relevant purchasing public has
come to associate the I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN! Mark with SDSU, the Mark
serves a source-identifying function and is entitled to registration.”26 In support,

21 Id. at 8.
22 Id. at 10.
23 Id. at 17-18.
24 Id. at exh. 17 (video).
25 Id. at exh. 20 (video).
26 Applicant’s Br., p. 14, 37 TTABVUE 15.
Opposition No. 91220225
11
Applicant points to over $74,000 in sales of products bearing the applied-for mark
since 2011 and advertising expenditures of approximately $400,000 annually for the
entire SDSU brand.27 Applicant submitted evidence showing use of the applied-for
mark on clothing, in retail store displays, and as an athletic facility wall decoration.
The following examples are representative:
28 29
30
Applicant also submitted examples of I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN! used as a
cheer in video promotions for the school.31

27 Summer dec., p. 4, 23 TTABVUE 5.
28 11 TTABVUE 35.
29 Id. at 42.
30 Id. at 37.
31 34 TTABVUE, exh. C (video).
Opposition No. 91220225
12
The function of a trademark is to identify a single commercial source. The record
before us establishes that the slogan I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN! has been
widely used over a long period of time by various groups and organizations as an
expression of enthusiasm and support for their particular sports team or cause. For
example, the videos, news articles, and blog excerpts establish that since at least the
late 1990’s the public has been exposed to numerous stories discussing how the slogan
has been chanted at games at all levels and types of competition—from high schools,
to colleges, to international-level events, and from basketball, to soccer, to football, to
union activities to robotics competitions. The evidence also establishes that the public
has been exposed to stories discussing how the slogan has been chanted at political
events and placed on T-shirts. The record establishes that I BELIEVE THAT WE
WILL WIN! has been described as “famous” and “ubiquitous.”
Because consumers are accustomed to seeing I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN!
used by many different groups, they would not view the slogan as a trademark
indicating that Applicant is the sole source of the clothing bearing the mark.
Moreover, some consumers will purchase clothing and other goods bearing the slogan
for the message it conveys. Applicant is not entitled to appropriate the slogan to itself
and thereby attempt to prevent competitors from using it to promote the sale of their
own clothing. It has been noted that “as a matter of competitive policy, it should be
close to impossible for one competitor to achieve exclusive rights” in common phrases
or slogans. 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7:23 (4th ed. Dec.
2016).
Opposition No. 91220225
13
Applicant argues that the applied-for mark is registrable because it is “an
arbitrary phrase when used in connection with the goods at issue, i.e., shirts and
other clothing items. . . .”32 And further, that “the USPTO has routinely registered
sport-related slogans as inherently distinctive, many for use on clothing.”33 Applicant
is correct that I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN! as applied to clothing does not
impart any information about the goods themselves. However, that is beside the
point. The issue before us is not whether the mark is merely descriptive of the goods,
but whether it functions as a trademark, i.e. to distinguish Applicant’s goods from
those of others. Thus, the numerous third party registrations submitted by Applicant
establish only that some slogans are registrable, not that this slogan is registrable.
Here, the primary purpose of I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN!, as shown by the
evidence of use by the public, is to convey information, that is, to convey enthusiasm
and support for particular sports teams or causes.
Applicant argues that “the fact that the I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN! Mark
is used in a non-trademark manner as a chant in sports and political arenas is not a
bar to registration, where it serves as an indicator of source of Applicant’s apparel
goods.”34 We disagree. It is well established that slogans such as the proposed mark
cannot serve as source indicators and they must remain available for others to use.
Indeed, the fact that I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN! is used by others in a “non-
trademark manner” as a chant in sports and political arenas (and on clothing)

32 Applicant’s Br., p. 10, 37 TTABVUE 11.
33 Id. at 11.
34 Id. at 16.
Opposition No. 91220225
14
establishes that the slogan cannot serve as an indicator of the source of Applicant’s
apparel. See In re Eagle Crest Inc., 96 USPQ2d at 1232 (holding the primary function
of slogan ONCE A MARINE, ALWAYS A MARINE is to express support, admiration
or affiliation with the U.S. Marines).
We find that I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL WIN! would not be perceived as a
trademark to identify and distinguish Applicant’s goods from the like goods of others.
Decision: The opposition is sustained and registration of the mark is refused.