Tracy K. Ownley, Complainant,v.Dr. Donald C. Winter, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 12, 2006
01a53034 (E.E.O.C. May. 12, 2006)

01a53034

05-12-2006

Tracy K. Ownley, Complainant, v. Dr. Donald C. Winter, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Tracy K. Ownley v. Department of the Navy

01A53034

May 12, 2006

.

Tracy K. Ownley,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. Donald C. Winter,

Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A53034

Agency Nos. 04-00183-009, 04-00183-020

Hearing Nos. 120-2004-00491X, 120-2004-00492X

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's final action dated March 2,

2005, finding no discrimination with regard to her complaints. In her

complaints, dated November 10 and December 24, 2003, complainant, a

Secretary, GS-5, at the agency's Office of Automation, the Naval Medical

Center, Portsmouth, Virginia, alleged that: (1) she was subjected to

a hostile work environment based on sex (female) when on September

11, 2003, her supervisor hit her with a file filled with papers and

denied her 30 minutes of compensatory time that she had worked; and

(2) she was discriminated against on the basis of reprisal for prior

EEO activity with respect to reassignment, assignment of duties,

changes in work area location, and supervision. Upon completion of

the investigation of the complaints, complainant requested a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On January 25, 2005, the AJ

issued a decision without holding a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is �genuine� if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is �material�

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

Upon review, the Commission finds that the AJ's issuance of a decision

without a hearing was proper in this case since there is no genuine

issue of material fact. The AJ stated that complainant's claim (1)

did not rise to the level of discriminatory harassment. The AJ also

stated that assuming arguendo that complainant had established a prima

facie case of discrimination, the agency has articulated legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for claims (1) and (2) in the complaints.

With regard to claim (1), complainant claimed that on September 11, 2003,

she submitted her corrected time card for 30 minutes of compensatory

time for the period of September 2 to 6, 2003. Complainant also claimed

that after the confrontation about the compensatory time, her supervisor,

Facilities Management Officer, Lieutenant Commander (LCDR), disapproved

her request and threw a folder filled with timekeeping papers hitting

her in the back of her head/shoulder area. The LCDR denied hitting

complainant with the folder; rather, he stated that he tossed it onto

complainant's desk. Complainant acknowledged that while the LCDR was

questioning her about the justification for her compensatory time, she

turned her back to him and continued her work. Based on the foregoing,

including other employees' statements in the record, it appears that

complainant and the LCDR had a personal conflict and did not get along

well. No employee who was at work witnessed the actual confrontation

at issue. One employee stated that on the date of the alleged incident,

complainant appeared upset and commented that, �I may have to put up

with this shit at home, but I don't have to put up with it here.� The

Commission finds that the alleged folder throwing incident in claim (1)

was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work

environment and, furthermore, we find that complainant did not show that

the alleged agency action, if true, was motivated by discrimination.

It is not clear if the compensatory time incident is meant to be

a separate claim apart from the harassment claim. Furthermore,

on appeal complainant indicates that she was ultimately allowed the

compensatory time. To the extent that the initial compensatory time

denial is a separate claim in the complaint, we find that complainant

has not refuted the agency's claim that complainant had insufficient

justification for working compensatory time and had not obtained advance

approval of such time. Therefore, we find that the AJ properly found

no discrimination regarding the initial denial of compensatory time.

With regard to claim (2), complainant claimed that after the foregoing

incident, her duties, assignment, and work location were changed.

The agency stated that after complainant reported the foregoing

incident, it immediately investigated the alleged assault which

could not be substantiated. However, the investigator recommended

one of the two be moved. Based on this recommendation, the Captain,

Director for Administration, recommended that complainant be moved to

a comparable secretary position, a Secretary, GS-5, at its Ambulatory

Procedures Department because she and the LCDR did not get along and

it was a better business case to reassign the Secretary, complainant,

rather than the Department Head, the LCDR.

Complainant also claimed that on October 2, 2003, she was denied access

to the office computer-generated calendar used to schedule appointment

for the LCDR. The record indicates and complainant admitted that the

subject access was restored thereafter on October 20, 2003. The agency

stated that the incident was not intentional but was a result of a

software reinstallation. Complainant proffered no evidence to refute

the agency's argument.

Complainant claimed that on October 1, 2003, she was made to exchange

desks with her coworker which no longer allowed her to greet incoming

guests and be involved in office business. The agency stated that

this desk swap was made because both complainant and the LCDR expressed

discomfort with having to sit where they could see each other from their

respective work stations. The Supervisory Civil Engineer recommended,

and the Captain concurred, the desk swap at issue and disagreed with

complainant's contention that this action prevented her from being

involved in office business as she was moved to a cubicle in a physical

relocation of less than 10 feet. Most people entering the building for

facilities business were familiar with the office layout and they could

easily locate complainant according to the agency.

Complainant also claimed that on September 12, 2003, she was notified that

her first line supervisor, the LCDR, had been changed to a new supervisor,

the Supervisory Civil Engineer. The agency stated that supervision

was changed to ease tensions by separating complainant and the LCDR.

The Captain stated that this arrangement was made because complainant

did not want to work for the LCDR, they had an ongoing investigation,

and he wanted to separate the two without actually taking complainant

out of the work environment.

Complainant claimed that from September 12, 2003 through December 28,

2003, duties were taken away from her, which prevented her from being

able to perform the full scope of duties in her position as Secretary.

The Supervisory Civil Engineer stated that the only duty he recalled being

removed from complainant was that of having to drop off and pick up mail

in the LCDR's office. He also stated that he took on that responsibility

to the extent of physically obtaining the mail and placing a box in his

own office for the in/out mail from the LCDR for complainant to pick up.

He indicated that he also provided tasking to complainant which the LCDR

had passed onto him.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that the agency articulated

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the alleged actions. The

Commission also finds that complainant failed to provide any evidence

that the articulated reasons were pretextual or that any agency action

was motivated by discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of

all statements submitted on appeal, the agency's final action is hereby

AFFIRMED because the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was

appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish

that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 12, 2006

__________________

Date