Tinav.DeLeon, Appellant, v. William S. Cohen, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Commissary Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 1, 1998
01965628 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 1, 1998)

01965628

10-01-1998

Tina V. DeLeon, Appellant, v. William S. Cohen, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Commissary Agency), Agency.


Tina V. DeLeon v. Department of Defense

01965628

October 1, 1998

Tina V. DeLeon, )

Appellant, )

)

v. )

) Appeal No. 01965628

William S. Cohen, ) Agency No. 95-DCNW19-020

Secretary, )

Department of Defense, )

(Defense Commissary Agency), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the

basis of reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency provided make-whole relief

under Title VII after it determined that its reasons for having issued

a Letter of Counseling (Letter) were a pretext for unlawful reprisal?

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed

as a WG5/03 Store Worker - Material Handler at the agency's Fort Lewis

Commissary, Produce Department, Fort Lewis, Washington. On or around June

15, 1995, appellant received verbal counseling and the above-referenced

Letter from her supervisor. The Letter, documenting their conversation,

counseled appellant for: (1) leaving her shift early; (2) failing to

follow instructions; and (3) failing to keep her produce line stocked.

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, appellant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on August 8, 1995.

After investigating appellant's complaint, the investigator concluded

that management's reasons for issuing the Letter were not credible,

and were motivated by retaliatory animus. In its FAD, the agency

adopted the investigative report's finding that appellant was a victim

of unlawful reprisal when she was issued the Letter on June 15, 1995.

The agency FAD next addressed the issue of damages, and concluded that

appellant was entitled to:

having the Letter rescinded;

correcting the leave of absences taken on the recommendation of

appellant's psychologist;

reasonable attorney's fees, upon receipt of appropriate documentation,

in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501(e);

an award of $1300.00 in pecuniary compensatory damages, as reimbursement

of documented medical expenses for all visits to appellant's psychologist

occurring after the issuance of the Letter;

a nominal award of $200.00 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages for the

issuance of the Letter in retaliation for her participation in lawful

EEO activities and associated emotional distress.

With respect to (4) above, the agency noted that although appellant

submitted $2500.00 in medical expenses, the agency determined that

$1200.00 of that amount was associated with doctor's visits which occurred

prior to the agency's issuance of the Letter. The agency concluded

that these visits were not proximately related to the discriminatory

issuance of the Letter and therefore not reimbursable as pecuniary

compensatory damages.

With respect to (5) above, the agency noted that appellant's psychologist

stated: "[appellant] seems to be suffering increasingly from interpersonal

and managerial stress in the workplace," and recommended that appellant

take a leave of absence from the workplace. Accordingly the agency

granted appellant leave for the period June 26, 1995, through August 10,

1995, and again from August 11, 1995, through September 16, 1995.<1>

The agency also noted that in arriving upon a nominal nonpecuniary

compensatory damages award of $200.00, it considered that the Letter was

withdrawn in July of 1995, a few weeks after its issuance; appellant's

level of stress decreased while she was on leave during the summer of

1995; and finally, that upon her return in September of 1995, she left the

Fort Lewis Commissary for another position in the McChord Commissary.

Appellant appealed the agency's FAD, and through counsel, requested

$10,318.75 in attorneys's fees, $11,973.88 as reimbursement of wages

lost, $2500.00 in medical expenses, and $600,000.00 (at 12% interest)

compensatory damages.<2> The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

With respect to the items previously identified as (1) through (3) above,

we first find that the agency's proposed resolution with respect to

rescinding the Letter and awarding attorney's fees was proper. To this

end, we note that appellant is entitled to attorney's fees, both for

the processing of her complaint, and subsequently, for this appeal.

Appellant's submission of attorney's fees on appeal should, upon remand

of this case, be submitted to the agency pursuant to our ORDER which

follows this decision.

We also note that with respect to appellant's leave between June 26, 1996,

and September 16, 1996, the agency's order of relief, specifically, its

statement that it would "correct[] the leave of absences taken on the

recommendation of appellant's psychologist" is unclear. We therefore

instruct the agency to ensure that appellant is properly compensated

for her leave of absence between June 26, 1995, and September 16, 1995,

by restoring applicable sick or annual leave taken during this period.

Alternatively, if appellant was on leave without pay during this period,

she shall be awarded back pay, seniority and other employee benefits

for the above-referenced leave period pursuant to our ORDER following

this decision.

With respect to the items previously identified as (4) and (5) above,

we first note that the Commission has held that compensatory damages

are recoverable in the administrative process. See Jackson v. U.S,

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01923399 (November 12, 1992), request

to reopen denied, EEOC Request No. 05930306 (February 1, 1993).<3>

We next note that in reviewing a claim for compensatory damages, the

Commission has stated that "compensatory damages must be limited to the

sums necessary to compensate [a complainant] for actual harm, even if

the harm is intangible." EEOC Notice No. N915.002 at 13 (citing Carter

v. Duncan Higgins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The Commission

also notes that there are no precise formulas for determining the amount

of damages for nonpecuniary losses and should reflect the extent to

which the respondent directly or proximately caused the harm. Id. at

11-12. An award for compensatory damages for nonpecuniary losses should

also reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or

expected duration of the harm. Id. at 14. The Commission notes that for

a proper award of nonpecuniary damages, the amount of the award should

not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not be the product

of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount in

similar cases. See Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th

Cir. 1989); EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571,

574 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

A review of previous Commission decisions on the issue of compensatory

damages reveals that in Rountree v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal

No. 01941906 (July 7, 1995), affirmed, EEOC Request No. 05950919 (February

15, 1996), the Commission ordered an award of $8,000.00 in nonpecuniary

damages where the complainant's statement and a psychologist's report

indicated that some of the complainant's emotional distress, including

feelings of inadequacy, failure, and depression, were the result of a

discriminatory performance appraisal and the denial of bonus pay based

on that appraisal. In Benson v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal

No. 01952854 (June 27, 1996), the Commission affirmed the agency's

award of $5,000.00 in nonpecuniary damages where the complainant,

his relatives, and his colleagues offered testimony regarding the

embarrassment and humiliation that the complainant suffered at work

as a result of the denial of promotional opportunities, a suspension,

and other adverse actions. In Bever v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC

Appeal No. 01953949 (October 31, 1996), the Commission ordered an award

of $15,000.00 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages where the evidence

established that the complainant's situational anxiety was directly

linked to a hostile work environment, that the complainant was required

to take medication as a result thereof, and that the complainant's

symptoms included uncontrolled crying, weight loss, and depression.

In Lawrence v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (April 18,

1996), the Commission ordered an award of $3,000.00 in nonpecuniary

compensatory damages where the complainant established that she suffered

emotional distress as the result of sexual harassment and the agency's

failure to respond promptly to her allegations. Finally, in Demeuse

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01950324 (May 22,

1997), the Commission ordered an award of $1,500.00 in nonpecuniary

damages after the complainant established that he suffered emotional

distress when his post-traumatic distress disorder was exacerbated and

he had suicidal thoughts because his supervisor left out a letter from

appellant requesting accommodations for others to see, he was referred

to as "Rambo," his request for overtime restrictions was not honored

by the agency, and a supervisor "frisked" him for weapons when he was

walking to his work area.

A review of the medical records submitted by appellant indicates that

on the attending physician's statement submitted in conjunction with a

claim for workers compensation by appellant, completed on or around July

10, 1995, appellant's physician diagnosed appellant with "Adjustment

Disorder with mixed emotional features." In response to item 6., "What

are your findings?", appellant's physician stated that appellant had

abdominal pain, sleep and appetite problems, muscle tension and headaches.

We also note that appellant's individual psychotherapy and mental health

counseling continued throughout the summer, and that the agency agreed

to reimburse all charges for psychotherapy which were incurred following

the date the Letter was issued. We further note that the relationship

between appellant, some of her co-workers, and agency management was

acrimonious, and the record documented some of these difficulties.

We finally note that appellant had filed prior EEO complaints against the

agency, and that she experienced stress and other physical manifestations

as a result of her difficulties at the Fort Lewis Commissary.

Having carefully considered the facts of this case in conjunction with

previous awards of compensatory damages by the Commission, we first

find the agency's award of $1,300.00 in pecuniary compensatory damages

was proper. We agree with the agency's conclusion that appellant's

costs associated with her doctor's visits occurring prior to the

issuance of the Letter are not reimbursable because such visits are

not proximately related to emotional distress suffered as a result

of receiving the Letter. We also find that appellant is entitled to

an increased nonpecuniary damages award in the amount of $4,000.00.

In reaching this conclusion, the Commission has considered a number

of factors. For example, we considered the nature and severity

of the discrimination, and note that the agency concurred with the

investigator's report that agency management trumped up charges in

order to retaliate against appellant for her prior participation in

the EEO process. We also considered evidence submitted by appellant

concerning the nature and severity of appellant's emotional distress

and related symptoms proximately caused by the issuance of the Letter.

We note that the animus appellant experienced from agency management

was part of a series of acts which appellant considered harassing,

that she underwent psychotherapy during the summer of 1995, and that

the agency accepted without question appellant's contention that her

doctor's visits were proximately related to the act of discrimination

she endured by receiving the Letter on June 15, 1995. We also note that

the emotional distress associated with receiving trumped up charges

contained in the Letter caused appellant to take leave for the entire

summer, and upon her return, she left the Fort Lewis Commissary to work

at another Commissary. However, we are careful to point out that we

considered her prior acrimonious relationship with agency management

and staff as background information only, and this nonpecuniary award

is not intended to compensate appellant for any emotional distress as

a result of events occurring prior to the issuance of the Letter.

We further note that the agency FAD failed to order training and

discipline, if appropriate, to appropriate agency management officials

who were found to have retaliated against appellant for trumping up the

charges contained in the Letter dated June 15, 1995. We finally note

that the agency should post a notice in the Fort Lewis Commissary as

provided in this decision.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the FAD as

MODIFIED, and REMAND this case to the agency to take remedial actions

in accordance with this decision and ORDER below.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

The agency shall ensure that the Letter of Counseling dated June 15, 1995,

is rescinded and expunged from any agency personnel records concerning

appellant;

The agency shall ensure that appellant is properly compensated for her

leave of absence between June 26, 1995, and September 16, 1995, and

shall restore applicable sick or annual leave taken during this period.

Alternatively, if appellant was on leave without pay during this period,

appellant shall be awarded back pay, seniority and other employee benefits

for the above-referenced leave period;

To the extent applicable, the agency shall determine the appropriate

amount of back pay (with interest, if applicable) and other benefits

due appellant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.501, no later than sixty (60)

calendar days after the date this decision becomes final. The appellant

shall cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay

and benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested

by the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back

pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the appellant

for the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date

the agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The appellant

may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.

The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the

Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled

"Implementation of the Commission's Decision;"

The agency shall reimburse reasonable attorney's fees to appellant which

were associated with the processing of her complaint and her appeal,

consistent with our attorney's fees order (H1092), which follows this

order;

The agency shall take immediate steps, no later than sixty (60) days

after the date this decision becomes final, to provide training to

all supervisory and managerial staff at its Fort Lewis Commissary on

the current state of the law on employment discrimination, including

discrimination based on retaliation and the goals behind the law requiring

equal employment opportunities for all;

To the extent applicable, the agency shall make a determination whether

disciplinary action for any management official found to have participated

in the retaliation against appellant for her participation in the EEO

process are warranted;

Within thirty (30) days of the date on which this decision becomes final,

the agency shall tender to appellant pecuniary compensatory damages in

the amount of $1,300.00; and nonpecuniary compensatory damages in the

amount of $4,000.00;

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due appellant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at its Fort Lewis Commissary, copies of

the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. �1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. �1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by

the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request

containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action

in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of

your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the

complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file

a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the

date you filed your complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the

Commission, until such time as the agency issues its final decision

on your complaint. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct 1, 1998

_______________ _________________________________

DATE Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated __________ which found that a

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. has occurred at the Department of Defense,

Defense Commissary Agency, Fort Lewis Commissary (hereinafter "Fort

Lewis Commissary").

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any

employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL

DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,

or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

The Fort Lewis Commissary supports and will comply with such Federal

law and will not take action against individuals because they have

exercised their rights under law.

The Fort Lewis Commissary was found to have unlawfully retaliated

against the individual affected by the Commission's decision after

agency management issued an improper Letter of Counseling in June of

1995 shortly after the affected individual had filed an EEO complaint

of discrimination. The agency shall therefore remedy the violation

by rescinding and destroying the Letter of Counseling, restoring

annual leave, sick leave, or back pay, if applicable to the affected

individual, providing EEO training to appropriate agency officials,

and providing the individual compensatory damages and attorney's fees.

The Fort Lewis Commissary will ensure that officials responsible for

personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide

by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity laws.

The Fort Lewis Commissary will not in any manner restrain, interfere,

coerce, or retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her

right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in

proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.

Date Posted:

Posting Expires:

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1 We note that the agency FAD indicated that appellant reported to

work for one hour on August 10, 1995, and subsequently left the

facility.

2 We remind appellant and her counsel that under the Civil Rights Act

of 1991, compensatory damages recoverable for violations of Title VII

is capped at $300,000.00. [citation omitted]

3 In Jackson v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01923399

(November 12, 1992); request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request

No. 05930306 (February 1, 1993), the Commission held that Congress

afforded it the authority to award such damages in the administrative

process. It based this assessment, inter alia, on a review of the

statutory provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in relation

to one another and on principles of statutory interpretation which

require statutes to be interpreted as a whole. In particular, the

Commission discussed the meaning of the statute's definition of the

term "complaining party" and the significance of the reference to

the word "action" in Section 102(a). In addition to the specific

reasons set forth in Jackson for this holding, Section 2000e-16(b)

(Section 717) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. �2000(e)

et. seq.)(CRA) conveyed to the Commission the broad authority in the

administrative process to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions of

subsection (a) through "appropriate remedies." Similarly, in Section

3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA of 1991), Congress refers to

its first stated purpose as being "to provide appropriate remedies for

intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace;",

thereby reaffirming that authority. Consequently, it is our view that in

1991, Congress clearly intended to expand the scope of the "appropriate

remedies" available in the administrative process to federal employees who

are victims of discrimination. Moreover, in Section 717(c) of the CRA,

the term "final action" is used to refer to administrative decisions by

agencies or the Commission, as distinguished from the term "civil action,"

used to describe the rights of employees after such final action is taken.

Therefore, the Commission reaffirms the holding therein. See Cobey Turner

v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01956390 and 01960518

(April 27, 1998).