Thurman T. Tyndall, Appellant,v.Togo D. West, Jr. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 13, 1998
01980205 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 13, 1998)

01980205

11-13-1998

Thurman T. Tyndall, Appellant, v. Togo D. West, Jr. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs Agency.


Thurman T. Tyndall v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01980205

November 13, 1998

Thurman T. Tyndall, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01980205

) Agency Nos. 96-0973,

) 96-1533, 96-2164

Togo D. West, Jr. )

Secretary, )

Department of Veterans Affairs )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant filed the instant appeal with the Commission from the agency's

determination that it had not breached the settlement agreement entered

into by the parties.

BACKGROUND

Appellant and the agency entered into a settlement agreement on February

4, 1997 in which appellant agreed to withdraw several EEO complaints

and the agency agreed in pertinent part to:

"Reassign [appellant] to a Medical Clerk, GS-679-4 position (Position

Description #7491-8), in the Clinic area....[Appellant] will be trained

in this position for not more than 90 days. Recruitment is beginning

for a trainer. When the trainer is hired, [appellant] and the Medical

Clerks in this area will be further trained. After satisfactorily

completing the training, [appellant], along with the other successful

Medical Clerks will be promoted to a GS-5 position."

By letter dated June 24, 1997, appellant informed the agency that it had

breached the settlement agreement by (1) hiring a trainer from within the

agency, and (2) not promoting appellant to a GS-5 position within 90 days,

or by May 4, 1997. Appellant requested that the agency hire a trainer

for appellant and that it pay appellant a GS-5 salary retroactive to May

4, 1997, the date by which appellant claims that he was to be promoted. It

appears from a review of the record that appellant received a promotion

to a GS-5 position on June 8, 1997.

In an undated letter to appellant, the agency responded to appellant's

allegation that it had breached the February 4, 1997 settlement agreement.

Therein, the agency indicated that the agreement required only that it

[agency] hire a trainer. The agency points out that the agreement

contained no requirement that the trainer be hired from outside the

agency. The agency further determined that the agreement did not require

the agency to promote appellant within 90 days. It required simply, that

appellant would not be trained for more than 90 days in the position of

Medical Clerk, GS-679-4 and thereafter, appellant would be further trained

by a trainer before being promoted to a GS-5 position.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties shall be

binding on both parties. If the complainant believes that the agency

has failed to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement, then the

complainant shall notify the EEO Director of the alleged noncompliance.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a). The complainant may request that the terms of

the settlement agreement be specifically implemented or request that the

complaint be reinstated for further processing from the point processing

ceased.

Settlement agreements are contracts between the appellant and the agency

and it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, and not

some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No.05900795

(August 23, 1990); In re Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 94 F.2d 296 (7th

Cir. 1938). In reviewing settlement agreements to determine if there

is a breach, the Commission is often required to ascertain the intent

of the parties and will generally rely on the plain meaning rule.

Wong v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05931097 (April

29, 1994)(citing Hyon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991)). This rule states that if the writing

appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, then its meaning must

be determined from the four corners of the instrument without any resort

to extrinsic evidence of any nature. Id. (citing Montgomery Elevator

v. Building Engineering Service, 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, appellant alleges that the agency failed to

comply with the settlement agreement, when a trainer was hired from

within the agency and when appellant was not promoted within 90 days,

or by May 4, 1997. The agency's response to appellant's allegations

correctly points out that the agreement did not require that a trainer

by hired from outside the agency. Nor did the agreement require that

appellant be promoted within 90 days. The agreement clearly states that

appellant would be trained for not more than 90 days in the position of

Medical Clerk GS-679-4 and that following training in this position,

and once a trainer had been hired, appellant would be further trained

(emphasis added). The agreement stipulates that following appellant's

successful training, he would be promoted to a GS-5 position. The record

indicates that appellant was, in fact, promoted to a GS-5 position on June

8, 1997. In applying the principles of law previously stated herein,

the Commission determines that the agency did not violate the terms of

the settlement agreement with respect to training and promotion.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's determination that it did not breach the

settlement agreement is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (MO795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive a

timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407.

All requests and arguments must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to

the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of

a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on

the date it is received by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in

which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST

NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL

AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL

NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national

organization, and not the local office, facility or department in

which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

November 13, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations