The Southern New England Telephone Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 30, 2010

356 N.L.R.B. 338 (N.L.R.B. 2010)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 338
The Southern New England Telephone Company and
Local 1298, Communications Workers of Amer-
ica, AFL–CIO. Cases 34–CA–12131 (formerly 3–
CA–26851) and 34–CA–12261
December 30, 2010
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS BECKER
AND PEARCE
On December 2, 2009, Administrative Law Judge
Wallace H. Nations issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed an-
swering briefs. The Respondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions1 and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions, and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, The-
Southern New England Telephone Company, New Ha-
ven, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as
modified.
Substitute the following for paragraph 2(g).
“(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its New Haven, Connecticut facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”14 Copies of the no-
1 The Respondent’s contention that the two-Member Board lacked
jurisdiction to issue a final Decision and Order in this case is moot.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to provide for the
posting of the notice in accord with J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11
(2010).
The Respondent has implicitly suggested that release of information
related to workers’ compensation benefits to the Union may violate
State law, but has failed to specify the provisions of State law it be-
lieves would be implicated or the categories of information covered by
any such provisions. Ordinarily, then, we would hold that the Re-
spondent has waived this argument. See Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc.,
344 NLRB 694 fn. 1 (2005), enfd. 456 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2006) (ex-
cepting party must specify on what grounds the judge’s findings should
be overturned); cf. Crittenton Hospital, 343 NLRB 717, 743–744
(2004) (rejecting claim that State law precluded release of certain em-
ployee personnel records where employer failed to cite any specific
supporting provision and the record showed that the law permitted
disclosure). Nevertheless, because state law issues may be implicated
during the compliance proceedings, and the record does not resolve this
potential conflict, our Order does not preclude the Respondent from
attempting to demonstrate at that stage of this proceeding that specific
categories of information related to workers’ compensation benefits
may not lawfully be released to the Union under State law.
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 34, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since March 7, 2008.”

Rick Concepcion, Esq., for the General Counsel.
George E. O’Brien, Jr., Esq., Deborah DeHart Cannavino,
Esq., and David J. Vegliante, Esq., of New Haven, Con-
necticut for the Respondent.
Atul Talwar, Esq., of New York, New York, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WALLACE NATIONS, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Hartford, Connecticut, on June 9–11, 2009. The
charge in Case 34–CA–12131 was filed by Local 1298, Com-
munication Workers of America, AFL–CIO (Union or Charg-
ing Party) on September 17, 2008, and an amended charge in
this case was filed by the Union on November 10, 2008. A
second amended charge was filed by the Union on March 23,
2009. The charge in Case 34–CA–12261 was filed by the Un-
ion on February 2, 2009. Based on the charges and amended
charges, Region 34 issued an order consolidating cases, consol-
idated complaint, and notice of hearing (complaint) on April 7,
2009. The complaint alleges, inter alia, that Southern New Eng-
land Telephone Company1 (SNET or Respondent) engaged in
certain activity in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondent filed a
timely answer wherein it admits, inter alia, the jurisdictional
allegations of the complaint.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs and
reply briefs filed by General Counsel, the Charging Party, and
Respondent, I make the following
1 This case was formally styled AT&T East, but was amended at
hearing to reflect the accurate name of the Respondent which is South-
ern New England Telephone Company or SNET. SNET is part of the
AT&T family.
356 NLRB No. 62

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 339
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, with an office and place of
business in New Haven, Connecticut, engages in the business
of providing telecommunication services. During the 12-month
period ending March 31, 2009, Respondent, in conducting its
operations described above, derived gross revenues in excess of
$100,000. During the same 12-month period, Respondent, in
conducting its business, received at its facility goods valued in
excess of $5000 from points located outside the state of Con-
necticut. Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Complaint Allegations
1. At all material times, the following individuals held the
positions set forth opposite their respective names and have
been supervisors of Respondent within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act and agents of Respondent within the meaning
of Section 2(13) of the Act:

Robert McCorkle Director, Labor Relations
Michael Weiss Director, Risk Management
Lina Loncar Associate Director, Risk Manage-
ment

2. At all material times, the following individuals held the
positions set forth opposite their respective names and have
been agents of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13)
of the Act.

Megan James Call Center Supervisor, Sedgwick
CMS2
Diane Kunst Employee Advocate Generalist,
Sedgwick CMS

3. At all material times, Sedgwick CMS has served as Re-
spondent’s third party claims administrator for its Disability
Benefits Plan, and has been an agent of Respondent within the
meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
4. Respondent and the Union have entered into several suc-
cessive collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent of
which is effective by its terms from April 4, 2004, through
April 4, 2009, which provides, in article II and Appendix A, for
the recognition of the Union and Communication Workers of
America (CWA) as the exclusive representative of certain of
Respondent’s employees in the State of Connecticut (the unit).
5. At all material times, based on Section 9(a) of the Act, the
Union and CWA have been the designated exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the unit.
6. On October 31, 2002, the Respondent, the Union, and
CWA entered into a “Settlement Agreement” regarding the
management and administration of the SNET Disability Bene-
fits Plan. The subjects in this paragraph relate to wages, hours,
2 Sedgwick CMS is hereinafter referred to as Sedgwick.
and other terms and conditions of employment of the unit and
are mandatory subjects for the purpose of collective bargaining.
7. By letter dated March 7, 2008, the Union requested that
Respondent furnish it with the following information:

a. Updated or most recent copy of all Sedgwick CMS form
letters that are used in the processing of short term disability
claims for Respondent; and,

b. Updated or current copy of all scripts used by Sedgwick
CMS Case Managers in the processing of short term disability
claims for Respondent.

8. Since on or about December 29, 2008, the Union has re-
quested that Respondent furnish it with information relating to
the pending worker compensation claims filed by several unit
employees. The information set forth in this paragraph and the
preceding one is necessary for and relevant to the performance
of its function as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the Unit.
9. Since on or about May 2, 2008, Respondent has failed and
refused to furnish the Union with the information requested by
it as described above in paragraph 7.
10. Since on or about December 29, 2008, Respondent has
failed and refused to furnish the information requested by it as
described above in paragraph 8.
11. Since on or about October 1, 2008, Respondent has re-
fused to participate in the semi-annual conference call with the
Union as set forth in item 3 of the “Settlement Agreement”
described above in paragraph 6.
12. Since on or about January 22, 2009, Respondent discon-
tinued the Union’s access to Sedgwick CMS representatives
relating to workers’ compensation issues and claims, and there-
after refused to provide the Union with any information con-
cerning worker compensation issues and claims.
B. Did the Respondent Unlawfully Fail and Refuse to Supply
Information Requested by the Union on March 7, 2008?
1. The factual background for the information request
Miriam (Mim) Rivera is employed as a network technician
for Respondent and has been with the Company for 31 years.
She is the elected secretary of the Union and serves on its exec-
utive board. She has held this later position since 2005. She has
held a number of other union positions in the past. She testified
that a union disability liaison position (UDBL) was created in
2001. In 2000, employees with a disability reported to a com-
pany nurse who acted as a liaison between the employee and
physician. In 2001, Respondent stopped this practice and sub-
stituted a third party disability claims administrator, currently
Sedgwick CMS (Sedgwick). The Union objected to this change
and filed ULP charges. Out of a settlement of those charges
came the union disability liaison position. Persons filling the
position are supervised by Rivera. At present there are four
UDBL’s and one in training.
The Union represents about 4700 of Respondent’s employ-
ees in Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
The parties’ collective-bargaining agreement provides for,
inter alia, long and short term disability benefits. The agree-
ment also directs employees to a Summary Plan Description or

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 340
SPD for more information on these benefits. Short term disabil-
ity benefits have two components, one for accidental disability
called AD and the other for disability caused by illness called
the SD. An accidental disability benefit is for an on the job
injury. To qualify for the benefit, an employee injured on the
job must first apply for workers’ compensation benefits.3 These
benefits, if granted, pay about two thirds of the employee’s
regular pay and the AD makes up the difference. Thus when a
workers’ compensation claim is filed with Sedgwick, a com-
panion disability claim is also filed. The AD claims are handled
by Sedgwick from its Chicago office and the claimants inter-
face with what Sedgwick calls case managers from that office.
Sedgwick handles workers’ compensation claims out of its
Rochester New York office and claimants interface with what
Sedgwick calls claims examiners. Separate files are maintained
for the workers’ compensation claims and the corresponding
AD claim.
Sedgwick is the third party administrator for the disability
plan and for workers’ compensation claims. If an employee is
injured, he or she is expected to file a workers’ compensation
claim and report that to his or her supervisor. Then the employ-
ee is to call Sedgwick and give what information the Sedgwick
representative requests. Sedgwick then sends the employee a
packet that explains what the employee must then do. When all
the paperwork is complete, Sedgwick, under guidelines provid-
ed by SNET, approves or disapproves the disability claim.
Rivera testified that when a claim is filed by a SNET em-
ployee, Sedgwick requires medical documentation from physi-
cians. According to Rivera, there are inconsistencies and some
confusion regarding Sedgwick’s instructions to employees.
These inconsistencies were the reason the UDBL system was
devised. The Respondent and the Union had meetings and con-
ference calls to work out the problems with the system. From
the Union’s standpoint, the Respondent did not know what was
actually happening in the field. According to Rivera, following
the Union’s input, Sedgwick was required to do audits, further
train its employees, and give back pay to some employees be-
cause those employees’ cases were not properly handled by the
Sedgwick case managers.
As noted above, in 2001, the Union filed a charge with the
Board which led to a settlement and the creation of what is
called in this record as the “Settlement Agreement.” This
agreement created the position of UDBL and the Respondent
agreed to pay half the regular wages of employees holding this
position. The Agreement was by its terms effective for the life
of the then collective-bargaining agreement between SNET and
the Union. It also stated the role of the UDBL was to assist
bargaining unit employees to understand the processes and
requirements for filing a disability claim. The UDBLs were
also to interface on behalf of employees with Sedgwick and its
predecessors, with SNET benefits personnel and with SNET
human resources in an effort to resolve procedural issues relat-
ing to the processing of claims and to help answer questions
employees may have about their disability claims or benefits.
The UDBLs could also assist employees to understand the ap-
3 Workers’ compensation will at some points in this decision be re-
ferred to a WC in the interests of brevity.
peal process and file an appeal if they wish to contest the denial
of disability benefits.
“The Union’s internet website speaking of the UDBLs states:
“Our goal is to help our fellow brothers and sisters gain ap-
proval of their benefit claims without going through the appeals
process. The appeal process should be used after all other ave-
nues have been exhausted.”
SNET also agreed in the Settlement Agreement to “partici-
pate in regularly scheduled semi-annual conference calls with
representatives from the Union, SMAART (Sedgwick’s prede-
cessor), SNET Labor Relations, and SBC (SNET’s parent com-
pany) to discuss procedural issues, if any, associated with the
administration of the SNET Disability Plan. The Company and
the Union agree to exchange an advanced copy of agenda items
one week prior to the meeting. If no agenda items are ex-
changed, the conference call will not take place.”
The Settlement Agreement further states: “If an employee’s
claim for disability benefits is denied, the employee or their
representative may send a written request to SMAART (Sedg-
wick) to obtain a copy of the medical information relied upon
to make a decision regarding the employee’s claim for disabil-
ity benefits, including assessments made by a SMAART inter-
nal physician advisor and the employee’s treatment provider.
SMAART must have a release signed by the employee in order
to provide copies of an employee’s disability file to anyone
other than the employee.”
Finally, the Agreement states: “The Company continues to
support the early intervention process in which CWA Local
1298 representatives and a labor relation’s manager work with
SMAART to resolve disability benefit issues arising out of
confusion, misunderstanding or miscommunication. This pro-
cess was discussed in a letter from Kevin Zupkus to Dennis
Trainor and Paul Mongo dated March 18, 2002.”
The letter referred to above was a clarification of the Com-
pany’s intent with respect to one paragraph of the Settlement
Agreement. It states that it was the Company’s intent to estab-
lish the role of UDBL and not to terminate this role at the end
of the Contract. However, the Company does not intend to
extend the UDBL pay-related provisions of Paragraph 2 beyond
the termination of the 2001 Labor Agreements.
As of the date of hearing in this case the persons holding
UDBL positions were Lisa Hodges, Kim Jancewicz, Rich
Feglewski, Debbie Smith, and Roberta Jones. As their supervi-
sor from the Union, Rivera meets with them and discusses
problems they cannot resolve on their own. Rivera then takes
over and “escalates” the problem by emailing her counterpart in
SNET’s labor relations department. The UDBLs come into
play when a union member is having difficulty getting a claim
processed. The UDBLs usually get a release from the employee
to continue to pursue the employee’s claim. Such releases are
generally required under the provisions of HIPPA regulations.
The Union then supplies the release to Sedgwick.
The Union has two release forms that it gives employees to
sign. One is for release of information by Sedgwick to the Un-
ion and the other is for release of information to the Union by
the employees’ physicians or treatment providers. Both are
required by HIPPA before either Sedgwick or a medical pro-
vider can legally supply medical information about employees

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 341
to the Union. Following the provision of the releases to Sedg-
wick and medical providers, the UDBLs can and do have con-
versations with both about employees’ medical conditions. The
release that is given to Sedgwick authorizes Sedgwick to dis-
close to the Union the following information: “All Medi-
cal/Clinical Documentation including but not limited to JURIS
notes, written and/or verbal Correspondence and Physician
Advisor reviews.” Rivera testified that JURIS notes are notes
Sedgwick puts into their records documenting conversations
with member-employees, and medical treatment providers and
any follow-up information.
When member-employees first contact Sedgwick, the Sedg-
wick case handler reads from a script when speaking with the
member-employee. In order to facilitate the favorable pro-
cessing of claims, the Union asked SNET about 1-1/2 years ago
to supply the scripts used so that members could better under-
stand what they had to provide to get approval of their claims.
At least one such script was supplied to the Union and the Un-
ion, feeling that it was not clear, asked for revisions to the
script. The Respondent agreed to one revision and another revi-
sion never got addressed due to time constraints. The script that
was supplied was called “Medical after Denial” and was to be
used to supply medical information that would allow a denial to
be reversed without an appeal if the needed information was
supplied. After denial of a claim, there is a 180-day period dur-
ing which an appeal can be filed.
When SNET, through Robert McCorkle, SNET’s Director of
Labor Relations, provided this script it did not require the Un-
ion to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition to supply-
ing it. Neither Sedgwick nor SNET at this time claimed that the
script was proprietary or confidential. Rivera testified that when
a case handler from Sedgwick reads a script to a SNET em-
ployee claimant, that handler does not tell the employee that the
questions being asked from the script are proprietary or confi-
dential.
Rivera testified that there are regular labor-management
meetings held regarding disability issues. One such meeting
took place in February 2008 in the form of a conference call. At
this meeting, as was the usual case, a representative from
Sedgwick was present. At this meeting, the Union identified to
SNET and Sedgwick problems with the processing of disability
claims. According to Rivera, Sedgwick seemed pleased to learn
of problems so they could fix them. One of the problems iden-
tified by the Union involved what is called the “two time re-
lapse rule.” According to the Union, Sedgwick was misapply-
ing this rule. Rivera testified that this rule had come up in a
number of the meetings about disability issues and that the
Union filed ULP charges about this problem and it was ulti-
mately solved by Sedgwick and SNET going back and paying
claimants for claims going back to 2004. The rule, which is
apparently unwritten is that if an employee is out on a disability
and returns to work, if that employee has an illness within the
first 8 weeks after returning to work and the illness last more
than 3 days, it is considered a relapse and the employee can go
back on disability with the approval of a case manager. This
would be true even if the second illness is not related to the
original cause of disability. Rivera did not know if Sedgwick
has a script about this rule. From what I take from the testimo-
ny, Sedgwick was not applying this rule in fact situations call-
ing for its application.
Sedgwick also uses form letters in handling claims for
SNET. When an employee files a claim, Sedgwick sends the
employee a packet of form letters to use to process the claim.
No where in this packet of form letters is any notice that the
letters are proprietary or confidential. SNET has shared the
form letters with the Union and never advised the Union that
the letters were proprietary or confidential. Prior to the March
2008 information request at issue in this case, the Union was
never told that SNET required a nondisclosure form be execut-
ed prior to the release of the requested information.
General Counsel introduced two Sedgwick form letters, one
to be sent to doctors and the other intended for the employee
claimant. SNET supplied the first one to the Union on April 3,
2006 and supplied the other on July 17, 2007. SNET did not
require a nondisclosure agreement with respect to either form
letter nor did it inform the Union that the letters were proprie-
tary and confidential.
On March 7, 2008, one of the Union’s UDBLs, Lisa Hodges
sent a written information request to McCorkle seeking:

1. Updated or most recent copy of all Sedgwick CMS form
letters that are used in the processing of short term disability
benefit claims for AT&T East (SNET).

2. Updated or current copy of all scripts used by Sedgwick
CMS Case Managers in the processing of short term disability
claims for AT&T East.

Hodges request asks that the information sought be provided
by March 18, 2008, and gave as the reason for the request “in
order to monitor and administer the collective bargaining
agreement”,4 The documents are the same type scripts and form
letters that SNET has provided in the past and discussed above.
The Union sought the information because it had found that
what SNET said in meetings about Sedgwick’s processes was
not what was actually being done. The scripts and form letters
would inform the Union about how the process was being han-
dled and enable it to better serve its member-claimants. To
date, the Union has not received the requested information. On
May 2, 2008, Rivera received an email from McCorkle dealing
with the information request. His email reads: “With respect to
the attached request for information, the Company is going to
require that the Union sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA)
prior to the Company releasing the requested documents. In
order to prepare this NDA, I will need a statement from you
4 This is the language used by Lisa Hodges in her original request.
On cross examination, Rivera remembered telling a Board agent when
giving an affidavit that the reason the Union needed the information
was because it was receiving reports from members that they were
being asked questions by Sedgwick that the members were not sure
they were required to give. Specifically, the members were informing
UDBLs that Sedgwick case managers were requiring additional medi-
cal information from employees attempting to go back on disability
with an 8-week period. Rivera was concerned that Sedgwick was vio-
lating the two time relapse rule. She also wanted to know what was in
the scripts so the Union would know everything regarding what mem-
bers need to know when applying for benefits. She testified that much
that was required was not in the SPD.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 342
(the Union) that provides the specific reason as to why the Un-
ion has made this request for documents. Once I receive this
statement, I will incorporate that into the NDA and then for-
ward the NDA to you for signature. With the signed NDA, the
Company will then forward the requested documents (emphasis
in original).”
Between the date of Hodges request and the McCorkle e-
mail of May 2, 2008, there was no other communication be-
tween the Union and SNET about the information request.5
At some point after May 2, 2008, but close in time to that
date, Rivera and McCorkle had an informal conversation where
she asked him why management needed an NDA for the re-
quested information. According to Rivera, McCorkle made a
motion with his hands that indicated to me that it was not his
decision. He actually said nothing in reply. She has had no
further conversations with McCorkle about the involved infor-
mation request. According to Rivera, no one from SNET’s
management has questioned the relevancy of the information
request.6
On September 3, 2008, Rivera emailed McCorkle stating:
“The Union has the right to the documents requested by UDBL
Lisa Hodges. We have provided the reason for the request. We
are entitled to receive these documents without filing an NDA.
The Union will be filing Unfair Labor Practice Charges unless
the requested documents are forwarded to us within ten days.”
Rivera sent another email to McCorkle on September 15,
2008. This one reads: “As you are aware, the 10 days has ex-
pired, and I have not heard back from you regarding the infor-
mation request. I have not even received the courtesy of a reply
as to whether the company intends on answering the request or
not. The union will proceed with filing ULP Charges tomor-
row.”
Through McCorkle, Respondent introduced a spread sheet
showing all information requests made of SNET by the Union
for the period of January 2007 through May 2009. There are 29
such requests shown on the Exhibit. For two of the requests,
Respondent required as a condition for providing the infor-
mation sought a nondisclosure agreement. In the first such in-
stance, the Union sought a copy of the contract between SNET
and Sedgwick. The Union refused to provide the nondisclosure
agreement with respect to this request. The Respondent ulti-
mately provided the contract without the nondisclosure agree-
ment after having redacted the financial terms of the contract.
The other instance in which it sought a nondisclosure agree-
ment is the request that is the subject of this hearing.
McCorkle testified that Respondent sought a nondisclosure
agreement for the Unions request for the Sedgwick scripts and
form letters because it was overly broad in Respondent’s opin-
5 Due to a SNET declaration of a surplus of employees at about the
time of the request, Lisa Hodges was required to take a new position
with the Company and was in training for this position for several
months. During this period, she did not serve as a UDBL.
6 Rivera had been given a NDA to sign in reference to an unrelated
information request, but she refused to read or sign it. This NDA is in
the Union’s files. This NDA was in response to the Unions request for
a copy of the contract between Sedgwick and SNET. The Union was
given a redacted copy without signing the NDA. It would have had to
execute the NDA to get an unredacted copy.
ion and Respondent felt the information sought was proprietary,
sensitive and it was concerned about the consequences of the
information being made public. However, until he heard the
testimony in this case, McCorkle did not know how much in-
formation was being requested nor did he ask of Sedgwick how
much information was covered by the Union’s request. Re-
spondent also introduced an email to SNET from Sedgwick’s
Managing Director dated March 26, 2008, that stated: “I spoke
with Brad Johnson, Sedgwick CMS is willing to release the
letters and scripts. We want a non-disclosure signed by the
CWA because this is proprietary and I want a disclaimer sent as
well. The union needs to understand that the letters may be
updated from time to time and the intake script is not absolute.
We may ask additional questions or less depending on the
claim scenario. Please let me know if you would like to discuss
further.”
The content of this email was not disclosed to the Union
McCorkle was unaware at the time of the request and at the
time of hearing just how many scripts and letters would be
encompassed by the Union’s request. On the other hand, he
admitted on cross examination that he was aware that only the
form letters and scripts that were used by Sedgwick with SNET
were being sought. He did not inquire of Sedgwick just how
much information this entailed. As noted earlier, McCorkle’s
response to the request asked that the Union provide the specif-
ic reason as to why the Union made the request for the involved
documents. On the other hand, according to McCorkle, the
reason stated by the Union for wanting this information is the
same reason they give for every information request and such
requests are uniformly complied with in a timely fashion save
for the one involved in this case.
McCorkle testified that he needed the Union’s reason for re-
questing the information to verify its relevance to the Union’s
role as employee representative. He did not remember ever
being asked by Rivera or another union official why the Com-
pany wanted a NDA. He also testified that though the scripts
are read and letters are mailed to the Union’s membership when
a claim is filed, neither Respondent nor Sedgwick ever told
claimants that the information contained in the scripts or the
form letters was confidential, privileged, or proprietary. No
claimant was ever told that he or she could not divulge the con-
tents of the letters, or relate what questions Sedgwick employee
had asked from the scripts.
Megan James, Customer Service Center Supervisor for
Sedgwick testified that at the customer service representative
level, the representatives have scripts that they follow in deal-
ing with claimants, though they are discouraged from reading
them word for word. The script is specific to the SNET benefit
plan. The script is provided to the representatives so they do not
fail to mention everything a claimant needs to know and dis-
cuss with the claimant. They are designed and used to help the
claimant perfect his or her claim. This is also true of form let-
ters sent out to the claimants. There are seven or eight form
letters sent to claimants, including releases, ERISA forms, ini-
tial physician statements, benefit approval contact letters, and
no contact letters. There are currently three or four scripts used
by Sedgwick for disability claims arising from SNET union

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 343
employees. There is an intake script, and there is a contact
script for the Workers’ compensation claims examiners and one
for disability case managers, which are more detailed because
the claims examiners and the case managers decide whether to
approve or disapprove the claim. The “two time relapse rule”,
discussed in detail in a later portion of this decision, is not in
the script, but is explained to claimants by the case manager.
2. Conclusions with respect to the March 7, 2008
information request
Under the Act, an employer is obligated upon request, to
furnish the Union with information that is potentially relevant
and would be useful to the Union in discharging its statutory
responsibilities. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967). These responsibilities include: (1) monitoring compli-
ance and effectively policing the collective-bargaining agree-
ment; (2) enforcing provisions of a collective-bargaining
agreement; and (3) processing grievances. American Signature,
Inc., 334 NLRB 880 (2001). The test for relevance is a liberal
“discovery-type standard. Acme, supra at 438; Postal Service,
337 NLRB 820; Postal Service, 332 NLRB 635 (2000).
Since there is a broad discovery type standard to measure
relevance, even potential relevance is sufficient to give rise to
an employer’s obligation to provide requested information.
Postal Service, 332 NLRB at 636. In this regard, the Board will
not pass on the merits of the grievance underlying the infor-
mation request, and the union is not required to demonstrate
that the information sought is accurate, nonhearsay, or even
ultimately helpful. Postal Service, 337 NLRB at 822. Certain
types of information pertaining to wages, hours, benefits and
working conditions of employees are considered “so intrinsic to
the core of the employer-employee relationship [as to be] con-
sidered presumptively relevant.” San Diego Guild v. NLRB, 548
F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977); Coca Cola Bottling Co., 311
NLRB 424 (1993). Where information is considered to be pre-
sumptively relevant, no specific showing of relevance is re-
quired, and the employer has the burden of proving lack of
relevance. Marshalltown Trowel Co., 293 NLRB 693 (1989)
(the Union is not required to articulate its purpose in requesting
presumptively relevant information); see also, Ohio Power Co.,
216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975); Grand Rapids Press, 331 NLRB
296 (2000); Contract Carriers Corp., 339 NLRB 851, 858
(2003). If the employer cannot demonstrate a lack of relevance,
it must provide an adequate reason why it cannot, in good faith,
supply the information. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra at 425.
Among other items, presumptively relevant information in-
cludes the names of unit employees, rates of pay, other pay-
related data, and “any other benefit or privilege that employees
receive.” Dyncorp/Dynair Services, 322 NLRB 602 (1996);
International Protection Services, 339 NLRB 701 (2003; Dead-
line Express, 313 NLRB 1244 (1994). It also includes such
information that “bears directly on the . . . administration of a
bargaining agreement.” Kelly Springfield Tire, 266 NLRB 587,
592 (1983). In other words, presumptively relevant information
has been found by the Board to relate to those subjects over
which the parties are required to bargain under Section 8(d) of
the Act.
I find the Union’s March 7, 2008 request to be presumptively
relevant. It relates to forms used by Respondent’s third party
administrator to handle benefit claims arising under the parties’
collective-bargaining agreement. It is readily apparent that
having the scripts and form letters sought would give the Union
the best possible information to aid its members in perfecting
disability claims under the parties’ contract. It would also let
the Union determine whether the Sedgwick documents con-
formed to the terms of SNET’s benefit plan. The request was
specific, requesting only those scripts and letters used by
Sedgwick in dealing with claims filed by SNET employees.
According to James, there were only seven or eight form letters
and three or four scripts involved. Thus, the request was neither
overly broad nor burdensome to comply with. Respondent’s
claim that the reason given by the Union for wanting this in-
formation was not specific enough fails based on McCorkle’s
testimony that the same reason is given for all Union infor-
mation request has always been deemed sufficient to provide
the information requested. See Marshalltown Trowel Co., su-
pra.
Sedgwick indicated that it was willing to provide the infor-
mation if a NDA was executed with regard to the documents
requested and Respondent made that a requirement for provid-
ing it. That is a ludicrous requirement under the circumstances.
Both forms of documents requested were prepared by Sedg-
wick to assist SNET employees in perfecting their claims. The
form letters are sent out to the affected public, that is, SNET
employee/claimants and their medical providers. The scripts are
read to those SNET employee/claimants. Sedgwick does not
claim in its communications with employees/claimant that the
form letters or the contents of their communications involving
the use of the scripts is confidential and that the questions asked
are proprietary information that may not be shared with others,
including the Union. Indeed, at an earlier point in time, Sedg-
wick and Respondent did provide one of the scripts to the Un-
ion without any claim of confidentiality or claim that the script
was proprietary in nature. At that time no NDA was required.
In this regard, the Board requires more than a blanket claim
of confidentiality. Metropolitan Home Health Care, 353 NLRB
25 (2008). Rather, the Board requires the party asserting confi-
dentiality to prove that such interests are in fact present and of
such significance as to outweigh the union’s need for the in-
formation. Exxon Co. USA, 321 NLRB 896 (1996). The Board
has set forth the framework to be applied when an employer
refuses to provide information on the grounds of confidentiali-
ty:

“[I]n dealing with union requests for relevant, but assertedly
confidential information, the Board is required to balance a
union’s need for the information against any ‘legitimate and
substantial’ confidentiality interests established by the em-
ployer. The appropriate accommodation necessarily depends
on the particular circumstances of each case. The party assert-
ing confidentiality has the burden of proof. Legitimate and
substantial confidentiality and privacy claims will be upheld,
but blanket claims of confidentiality will not. Further, a party
refusing to supply information on confidentiality grounds has
a duty to seek an accommodation. Thus, when a union is enti-
tled to information concerning which an employer can legiti-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 344
mately claim a partial confidentiality interest, the employer
must bargain toward an accommodation between the union’s
information needs and the employer’s justified interests.”

Pennsylvania Power & Light, 301 NLRB 1104, 1105–1106
(1991). However, if a party fails to establish its confidentiality
claim, a balancing test (between the union’s need for the infor-
mation against the employer’s claimed confidentiality interest)
is no longer necessary or proper. Detroit Newspaper Agency,
317 NLRB 1071, 1072 (1995). The Board has previously de-
fined what it considers to be a “legitimate” claim of confidenti-
ality. In Detroit Newspaper Agency, supra at 1074, the Board
noted:

“Confidential information is limited to a few general catego-
ries: that which would reveal, contrary to promises or reason-
able expectations, highly personal information, such as indi-
vidual medical records or psychological test results; that
which would reveal substantial proprietary information, such
as trade secrets; that which could reasonably be expected to
lead to harassment or retaliation, such as the identity of wit-
nesses; and that which is traditionally privileged, such as
memoranda prepared for pending lawsuits.”

Of the above categories, Respondent’s claim can only fall in-
to the category of proprietary “trade secrets” that must be pro-
tected against public disclosure. However, by definition, a trade
secret is information which is information that an entity “sub-
stantially protects and does not freely divulge to the public. See
e. g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra. Here, the Respond-
ent, through its third party benefits administrator Sedgwick,
freely divulges all of the information sought to SNET’s em-
ployee claimants, albeit in bits and pieces. Requiring a NDA of
those employees/claimants lawful representative standing in
their stead is as I noted above, ludicrous. A claim that the forms
and scripts are somehow proprietary and not disclosable with-
out a NDA is simply wrong for the same reason. They are dis-
closed without any claim of confidentiality or need for an NDA
on a daily basis to any union member who files a claim under
SNET’s disability benefits plan. There has not been and there
cannot be under the circumstances of this case any legitimate
claim that Respondent and Sedgwick’s need for confidentiality
outweighs the Union’s legitimate need for the information
sought to properly enforce the contract. For the reasons set for
above, I find that Respondent has violated the Act as alleged in
the complaint by not providing the Union with the information
sought in the March 7, 2008 information request. I similarly
find that there was no justification shown for the need for a
NDA. I will direct that the Respondent be ordered to supply
this information.
C. Did the Respondent Unlawfully Cancel a Meeting Scheduled
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and Thereafter Refuse to
Schedule Other Meetings?
As noted earlier, the parties entered into a settlement agree-
ment following the filing of Board charges by the Union in
2001. SNET agreed in the settlement agreement to “participate
in regularly scheduled semi-annual conference calls with repre-
sentatives from the Union, SMAART (Sedgwick’s predeces-
sor), SNET Labor Relations, and SBC (SNET’s parent compa-
ny) to discuss procedural issues, if any, associated with the
administration of the SNET Disability Plan. The Company and
the Union agree to exchange an advanced copy of agenda items
one week prior to the meeting. If no agenda items are ex-
changed, the conference call will not take place.” Pursuant to
this provision of the Settlement Agreement, a conference call
was set to take place on October 1, 2008.
On September 30, 2008, McCorkle sent Rivera an email
reading: “I tried calling your office a couple of times and
(phone number omitted) is just ringing out. I have been asked
to cancel the disability meeting scheduled for tomorrow morn-
ing at 10am.”
Rivera responded by email on the same day, saying “OK—
when can we reschedule?”
McCorkle responded by email dated October 1, stating: “We
are postponing the conference call scheduled for this morning
(10/01/08). We have held many discussions on the Disability
Plan issues already; and before we can provide the Union with
the materials you are requesting, we need to work out the Non-
Disclosure Agreement (NDA) issue. Since the Union has filed a
board charge, it would make sense to wait until the NDA issue
is resolved to determine how to proceed in the future. Hopeful-
ly, the Union will explain their need for all of this information
at that time as well. In the meantime, as the UDBL Team has
questions regarding particular cases, they may continue to use
the Employee Advocacy Group, as appropriate.”
On October 1, 2008, Rivera wrote the following email to
McCorkle: “Please clarify. Is the company refusing to hold
meetings regarding processes and procedures of AT&T’s disa-
bility plan with representatives of plan participants? I don’t
understand the connection between board charges for not an-
swering an information request and the regular meetings we
have had regarding the plans processes and procedures. These
meetings are directly related to problems on particular cases.
Will it be necessary to ask for a meeting for each particular
case we have unanswered or unclear questions to? As for the
reason for the information, the union was quite clear in their
reason ‘In order to monitor and administer the collective bar-
gaining agreement, the union requests the following infor-
mation.’ I am requesting you please provide us with available
dates so we may proceed with these meetings.”
Since the date of the October 1 email, the parties have not
had any meetings to discuss disability issues and none were
scheduled as of the date of Rivera’s testimony. According to
Rivera, the Respondent has not demonstrated any willingness to
resume these meetings. As she indicated in her October 1
email, the Union filed charges on this point and those charges
are part of this case. Rivera testified that the disability meetings
were limited to only discussions of disability issues. Since Oc-
tober 1, 2008, there have been no further discussions between
the parties related to either the information request or the issue
surrounding the disability meetings.
With respect to the cancelled conference call scheduled for
October 1, 2008, McCorkle testified that there had already been
seven conference calls held in 2008. He added that a charge had
been filed with respect to the information request and SNET’s
legal department felt that that matter had to be resolved before
having another conference call about disability benefits.
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 345
Though McCorkle did not remember whether there was a pre-
call agenda for the conference call, he did know that it did not
include anything about the information request. As noted
above, there have been no more conference calls about disabil-
ity issues since October 1, 2008. McCorkle testified that several
events, including a layoff, intervened and consumed all of his
department’s time. As noted earlier there have been very un-
successful ongoing negotiations for a new collective-bargaining
agreement during 2009 and as part of those negotiation, disabil-
ity benefit issues have been discussed. The Union has proposed
two or three changes in the proposed collective-bargaining
agreement which impact disability benefits. Some of the UD-
BLs were involved in negotiations over those proposed chang-
es. On the other hand, these negotiations were for a successor
collective-bargaining agreement and were not conference calls
as mandated by the settlement agreement.
According to McCorkle, since the matter of semi-annual
conference calls relating to benefit administration was first
implemented in the settlement agreement of 2002, there have
been years when only one was held and some in which more
than two were held. There were four such calls made in 2007
and seven held in 2008. McCorkle testified that it was not Re-
spondent’s intent to breach the settlement agreement when it
cancelled the October 2008 conference call. He believes that
once a new collective-bargaining agreement is reached, the
conference calls relating to benefits administration will resume.
On the other hand nothing has been said to the Union to indi-
cate Respondent’s willingness to meet via conference call to
discuss benefit administration issues.
If a term or condition of employment concerns a mandatory
subject of bargaining, an employer generally may not discon-
tinue that term or condition without first bargaining with the
Union to impasse or agreement. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 342
(1962); Tribune Publishing Co., 351 NLRB 196 (2007). If the
subject of bargaining “regulates the relation” between the em-
ployer and employee, that matter is a mandatory subject of
bargaining. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
See also, Peerless Publications, 283 NLRB 334 (1987) (Labor
law presumes that a matter which affects the terms and condi-
tions of employment will be subject of mandatory bargaining).
Section 8(a)(5) and (d) of the Act limit the obligation to bargain
to matters of wages, hours, and the terms and conditions of
employment. An employer violates its duty to bargain in good
faith when it unilaterally changes the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees without discussions with their
representative. Id. The Board has recognized exceptions to this
general rule only where “economic exigencies” compel prompt
action and where the union waives its right to bargain. See
Bottom Line Enterprises, 302 NLRB 373 (1991). It is well
settled that health benefits are a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. Mid-Continent Concrete, 336 NLRB 258, 259 (2001).
General Counsel contends the cancellation of the October 1,
2008 meeting and Respondent’s ongoing refusal to hold such
conference calls pursuant to the settlement agreement is an
unlawful unilateral change in a past practice and was done by
fiat without advance notice and the giving of an opportunity to
bargain. When it alleged that an employer has unilaterally
changed terms and conditions that constitute a past practice, the
General Counsel must establish the existence of the past prac-
tice. Exxon Shipping Co., 291 NLRB 489 (1988). In order to
prove the existence of a past practice, the Board has required
that: “The change complained of must be of an activity which
has been “satisfactorily established by practice or custom; an
‘established practice,’ or an established condition of employ-
ment” Id. at 492. Here, there can be no doubt that the disability
meetings have been held regularly in the years since the signing
of the settlement agreement. Based on the rather sparse evi-
dence in the record about these meetings, their frequency has
seemed to depend on the need for the meetings. Taking
McCorkle at his word, there has been at least one meeting in
some years and many more in others. There was no showing
made that in any prior year since 2002 Respondent cancelled a
scheduled meeting pursuant to the agreement and then refused
to hold any additional meetings. From the evidence, it appears
that in years past, Respondent was willing to meet as many
times as necessary to further the aims of the settlement agree-
ment. It seems to me and I find that Respondent cancelled the
October meeting in retaliation for the Union filing an unrelated
ULP charge and continued its retaliation to this day. I agree
with Rivera’s email that there appears to be no logical correla-
tion between the filing of a Board charge over the refusal of
Respondent to comply with an information request and the
holding of meetings to discuss procedural issues with respect to
the disability benefit plan. There was no evidence adduced that
would suggest that there was no need for the October 1 meeting
and for additional meetings thereafter. I find that the cancella-
tion of the October 1, 2008 meeting and the continuing refusal
to schedule and attend future such meetings constitute a bad
faith unilateral change in an established past practice and thus,
a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. There is no contention
that there were not issues that needed to be addressed in the
scheduled meeting or that a premeeting agenda had not been
submitted for this meeting.
D. Did Respondent Unlawfully Unilaterally Change the
Procedure by Which the Union
Obtained information related to workers’ compensation isssues
and thereafter fail and refuse to supply information to the
Union about such issues?
There are two primary issues related to workers’ compensa-
tion raised by the complaint. First is an allegation that Re-
spondent has refused to supply necessary and relevant infor-
mation to the Union related to specific requests on workers’
compensation issues. Second the complaint alleges that Re-
spondent has unilaterally changed the past established process
or procedure by which the Union has heretofore obtained work-
ers’ compensation directly from Sedgwick to one where it must
seek such information from a SNET employee, Lina Loncar. As
a part of this allegation, the complaint alleges that Respondent
has ceased supplying information relating to workers’ compen-
sation claims and issues.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 346
1. The pre-January, 2009 procedure for the processing of work-
ers’ compensation claims by Sedgwick and pre-January 2009
procedure for the Union to obtain information relating to the
processing of these claims by its membership.
Mim Rivera testified about the process for members to get
WC. UDBLs and Rivera have been supplied with persons to
contact with both SNET and Sedgwick that are in a higher posi-
tion than ones the employees can reach. These persons and
contact information are included in a document entitled Em-
ployee Advocates, and has names, phone numbers, and email
addresses for individuals to contact with queries about every
facet of SNET benefits, including disability benefits and work-
ers’ compensation issues. These documents are periodically
updated. The process of the UDBLs reaching out to the em-
ployee advocates is called escalation.
At the time that Rivera became a union officer and involved
in the UDBL program, the Sedgwick employee who was the
contact person for short term disability and workers’ compensa-
tion issues was Gloria Dukes. Rivera testified that she cannot
recall any instance when Dukes refused to supply information
related to workers’ compensation issues during her tenure as
the designated Sedgwick contact person. At some point, her
role with respect to short term disability claims was given to
Sedgwick employees Megan James and Diane Kunst. The con-
tact person for workers’ compensation was Charles French,
though generally the evidence suggests that the UDBLs usually
contacted Dukes, James, and Kunst and other Sedgwick em-
ployees in their position to answer questions about both disabil-
ity and WC claims. Rivera testified that Megan James was the
primary short term disability contact at Sedgwick, with Diane
Kunst as backup. At some point James was promoted to a high-
er position by Sedgwick and Kunst became the primary contact.
From the time in 2005 that Rivera became involved with the
UDBLs to December 2008, she was never informed that she or
the UDBLs were not to contact Sedgwick about workers’ com-
pensation issues. During that timeframe, UDBLs did in fact
contact the Sedgwick contact person with workers’ compensa-
tion issues and the UDBLs received answers to their questions
from the Sedgwick contact person. She testified that to the best
of her knowledge, Sedgwick’s contact person for workers’
compensation claims, Charles French, had never refused to
provide information responsive to a UDBL’s request prior to
January 22, 2009. She testified that Robert McCorkle has never
advised her not to contact Sedgwick with workers’ compensa-
tion issues.
When an employee is disabled on the job, the employee files
an AD claim with SNET using its third party administrator
Sedgwick. The employee also files a workers’ compensation
claim with the State of Connecticut, to be processed by Sedg-
wick. In the event that there is no contest to the workers’ com-
pensation claim, it is processed by a section of Sedgwick. In the
event of a contest, Sedgwick represents the Respondent and the
claimant either represents himself or herself or hires counsel.
Rivera testified that UDBL’s, responding to members’ inquir-
ies, contact Sedgwick’s workers’ compensation department
asking about the status of claims and the amount of money the
claimant will get.
Megan James is the customer service center supervisor for
Sedgwick. She also testified about the role of Sedgwick in the
processing of disability and WC claims. As her title implies,
she supervises all the customer service representatives who take
all initial claims for WC, short term or accidental disability
claims. Once the claim is filed, the employees she supervises
answer questions from the claimants or the UDBLs. Questions
that they cannot answer are escalated by the UDBLs to their
escalation contacts at Sedgwick. James has worked for Sedg-
wick for 5 years and prior to her promotion to supervisor was a
union liaison and employee advocate generalist. The two titles
refer to the same position. As union liaison, she worked with
the UDBls to try to resolve their escalations before they
reached the level of her boss. An escalation means the taking of
a problem to a step higher than the customer service representa-
tives. Most such escalations involve denied claims for disabil-
ity. James testified that it was her job to try to help the UDBLs
perfect their members’ claims. She primarily handled problems
arising in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, New Jersey, and Connecti-
cut. She mentors her replacement as union liaison Diane Kunst
and often gets involved with aiding Kunst in her dealings with
the UDBLs.
James began her career with Sedgwick handling medical on-
ly claims, that is, claims for medical expenses only, with no lost
time. She was soon promoted to the position of integrated disa-
bility manager handling claims for WC and the companion
accident disability claim simultaneously. She testified that
Sedgwick employees handling disability claims are called case
managers and those handling WC claims are called a claims
examiners. Insofar as Connecticut claims are concerned, the
case managers and claims examiners are in different offices.
The case managers are in Sedgwick’s Chicago office and the
WC claims examiners are in Sedgwick’s Rochester, New York
office.
James described the procedure to be followed for a SNET
employee who gets injured on the job. The employee must
notify his or her supervisor of the injury and of the employee’s
desire to file a claim. The supervisor in turn calls Sedgwick and
reports the claim to one of its customer service representatives.
The representative opens the claim and within 24 hours, either a
case manager or claims examiner calls the employee. When
contact is made, the investigatory process begins with the rep-
resentative learning all that can be found about the injury, in-
cluding doctor reports, a description of the injury and how it
happened. Compensability depends on the injury being job
related. If the injury is one for which WC benefits can be paid,
a WC claim is opened as well as a disability claim. If no lost
time is involved, the employee is referred to SNET’s health
insurance carrier as Sedgwick does not handle this aspect of
benefits.
Dual claims are filed in the event the injury is compensable
under the WC statutes and also under SNET’s disability plan.
As noted above, the two claims are handled by different Sedg-
wick employees. Thereafter, any questions the employee might
have are to be directed to the Sedgwick employee handling the
portion of the claim for which the employee has questions. If
the employee is represented by legal counsel in the WC portion
of the claim, Sedgwick has contact for that portion of the claim
only with counsel or with the employee with counsel on the
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 347
phone at the same time. James estimated that 60 to 70 percent
of employees with WC claims are represented by counsel. On
the WC portion of the claim, the first determination that Sedg-
wick has to make is whether the injury is compensable under
the involved State’s WC statutes. For example, stress is not
compensable under most State statutes and there are also in-
stances when employees claim the injury was job related when
in fact the injury occurred away from the job. Those types of
injuries are not compensable under WC. If the Sedgwick claims
examiner makes an initial determination that the injury is not
compensable, the employee and/or counsel is informed of the
denial. The employee can then appeal the denial to the Con-
necticut Workers’ Compensation Commission with or without
the assistance of counsel.
For the disability portion of the claim, the employee receives
a packet of information and forms from Sedgwick. Included in
the forms are releases so that Sedgwick can obtain medical
information related to the claim. Once Sedgwick has the release
in hand, it contacts the medical providers requesting all medical
information that would support the disability claim. Sedgwick
makes referrals when claimants’ physicians make requests for
tests such as an MRI or for physical therapy. The disability
portion of the claim is dependent upon a finding that the WC
portion is compensable. In some cases, Sedgwick would open a
stand alone claim for short term disability. This would occur in
situations such as the employee coming down with pneumonia
or some similar illness.
If the WC claim is found to be compensable, the employee’s
wages are then paid in part by WC and in part by the employ-
er’s disability plan. The portion paid under WC is governed by
State statute and State provided formulas. Sedgwick claims
examiners obtain the necessary wage information from SNET’s
E-Link or payroll departments and come up with the payments
that will be made under WC. The payment that is derived from
the state formulas is roughly two thirds of the employee’s pay.
The Respondent’s disability plan will then make the employee
whole depending on the employee’s years of service. It is pos-
sible for an employee to receive his or her whole pay, or a less-
er amount, depending on their time of service with SNET. The
WC portion continues regardless of the length of the employ-
ee’s service. The disability portion is subject to a 52-week limit
mandated by the SNET plan. The WC portion is governed by
statute.
At any time in the processing of either the WC claim or the
companion disability claim, the employee can contact Sedg-
wick with any questions he or she may have. The call is an-
swered by an automated phone system that contains prompts to
direct the call to the proper person depending on the question
the caller has. The caller can opt at any time to speak with
someone by dialing zero. If the person cannot reach the Sedg-
wick employee he or she wants to speak to, the Sedgwick em-
ployee will return the call within 24 hours.
If an employee with a WC claim has a question about the
amount of the WC check, he or she would speak with the
Sedgwick claims examiner handling their claim. This amount is
derived using state formulas and if the employee disputes the
amount, he or she must appeal to the Connecticut Workers’
Compensation Commission. If the employee disputes the
amount of the disability payment, he or she, with their supervi-
sor on the line, can discuss the matter with a SNET employee at
E-Link. That usually resolves the problem according to James.
If an employee is granted WC, but denied disability pay-
ments, the employee has 180 days to file an appeal. WC is gov-
erned by State statute whereas the disability payments are cov-
ered by the SNET plan, which has different definitions of what
is compensable and the documentation required to establish
compensability are different between the statutes and the SNET
plan. Typically, problems arise in this area if there is insuffi-
cient objective medical evidence to support the claim or the
employee is not following the treatment plan outlined by the
employee’s physician. In such cases the employee can speak
with their Sedgwick case manager to find what is needed to
perfect their claim. It is part of the case manager’s job to assist
the employees in perfecting his or her claim.
When James was working as Union Liaison, she worked
with the UDBLs from the Union. The people she dealt with
were Kim Jancewicz, Lisa Hodges, Rich Figlewski, Jessica
Morin, and Mim Rivera. James testified when she first took the
position of Union Liaison, the UDBLs in her view were testing
her and were negative in their dealings with her. James advised
the UDBLs that her job was to help and that they needed a good
working relationship. According to James, Jancewicz advised
her not to take it personally, that the Union had differences with
the Company and that her objective was to get rid of Sedgwick
so that they could go back to doing their own disability claims.
In response to a request to describe the nature of the communi-
cations she had with the UDBls, James answered: “Very chal-
lenging to say the least. They were my client so I maintained a
professional, you know, working relationship for the entire
duration. However, it was difficult. There was constant badger-
ing of my company, the case managers, AT&T (SNET) going
back and forth. It was just no matter what I did, they weren’t
really satisfied. I would get a case overturned and they would
come back, well you know you didn’t call the doctor on time.
Or something that—well the point is we got your members
benefits. So, you know, and no matter what, it was constantly
just downgrading AT&T (SNET) and Sedgwick.”
She noted that on occasion when talking with the UDBLs,
there would be more than one of the on the line at the same
time. She considered this situation to be very challenging and
would attempt to take her time to give accurate answers to the
UDBL’s multiple questions. She testified that the UDBLs
would in turn chide her for taking too long to answer. She testi-
fied that many of the emails from UDBLs were accusatory and
contained many allegations and misleading questions. They
would also seek detailed information that took hours for her to
gather. James testified that though Connecticut was just one of
several states that she handled, dealing with the Connecticut
UDBLs took up over half of her time. She said the UDBLs
were constantly seeking to have case managers removed from
accounts. This is not a problem she had with any other region
she dealt with.
With respect to WC issues she dealt with the UDBLs as a
union liaison for Sedgwick, James testified that she provided
general information. James has a WC background and would
occasionally try to educate the UDBLs on some of the issues
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 348
involved in WC claims. Primarily though, she answered ques-
tions about whether payments were or were not made, was
physical therapy approved, the status of the claim, and if a
claim were denied, the generic reason for denial. She refused to
answer WC questions about surveillance by SNET of employ-
ees on WC and any other type of privileged information. James
testified that the type information that Sedgwick could provide
about WC claims involved telling when payments were made,
whether the injury was compensable or not, whether a treat-
ment had been approved, and whether the claim had been ac-
cepted.
On a positive note, James testified that with the disability
claims, the UDBLs helped in getting needed medical infor-
mation from members’ medical providers to Sedgwick. They
also helped in perfecting the disability claims by calling mem-
bers doctors and explaining to them what medical documenta-
tion was needed for the claim. On a negative note, James testi-
fied that UDBLs were against the appeals process and some-
times caused an employee to miss the appeal deadline. In
James’ opinion, the employees do not need UDBLs to obtain
WC or disability benefits.
2. The pre-January 2009 procedures are changed
Prior to late December 2008 or early January 2009, the pro-
cess described by Rivera and James for the processing of WC
claims and for the UDBLs to get WC information from Sedg-
wick seemed to work, albeit not without problems in specific
cases. In the time frame mentioned, the process appears to have
ceased working. The problems had part of their beginning in an
August 2007 conference call between the UDBLs, Robert
McCorkle and Michael Weiss. Weiss is employed by SNET’s
parent company, AT&T, as its director of risk management. In
his position, he is responsible for handling casualty claims,
including as pertinent, workers’ compensation claims. He di-
rects the work of several people under him, including three who
work with workers’ compensation issues. One of these three,
Lina Loncar, is responsible for the Midwest region and the
East, including Connecticut. She works with Sedgwick to in-
sure proper handling of workers’ compensation claims. Sedg-
wick is responsible for handling all such claims from SNET
employees and deciding whether to grant the claims or oppos-
ing them at the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Commis-
sion. For Connecticut WC claims, Weiss’s primary contact with
Sedgwick is Charles French. Weiss and Loncar deal with him
by phone, and by monthly meetings. AT&T has a quality con-
trol program in place for its vendors, including Sedgwick and
regularly grades that company for its performance. Any issues
found in the grading process are brought to Sedgwick’s atten-
tion as soon as they are found. Loncar also deals with Sedgwick
employees who handle SNET’s WC claims and Sedgwick
claims managers.
With respect to the August 2007 conference call, Weiss testi-
fied that it was initiated by a request from Bob McCorkle who
told him that the Union wanted to speak with him. Weiss told
McCorkle to get the concerns of the Union in writing before the
call took place. Weiss had just hired Loncar at that time and he
wanted to use the conference call as a vehicle to introduce her
to the Union. According to Weiss, the meeting began with him
addressing a number of issues raised by the Union. Weiss re-
membered that the question of the role of the UDBLs in WC
claims came up. He testified that he noted to the Union that WC
is a statutory benefit, not a bargained for benefit, and that there
is only certain information that can be given to the Union about
WC claims unless they are the officially authorized representa-
tive of the claimant. To get that status, the Union would have to
file an appropriate form with the Connecticut Workers’ Com-
pensation Commission.
In his testimony, McCorkle also made the point that work-
ers’ compensation issues are a matter of statute and State law. It
is not a bargained for benefit and decisions made with respect
to WC claims are not subject to arbitration under the contract
between SNET and the Union.
Following the meeting, Weiss sent McCorkle a detailed
email describing the meeting and the topics discussed. The
description was typed by Lina Loncar from notes of the call
made by her. The portion that is relevant to this proceeding
reads:

“Overall, we have extremely high expectations and set
achievable goals with our partner—Sedgwick—for maintain-
ing and handling our Workers’ compensation coverage
throughout the country. Any complaints brought forth against
our Self-Insured programs could jeopardize our status with
the state.7 We will not under any circumstance release any
medical or personal information on any individual without an
appropriate HIPAA Compliant Medical Release signed and
dated by the Injured Worker. The current release form you are
currently using will no longer be accepted. We recommend
that you have the Union Counsel review and provide you with
one that will we compliant (misspelled in original) on all in-
stances. We will not under any circumstance release Juris.
Claim Notes to ANY individual. This is proprietary and Privi-
leged Information that will not be released to any individual.
All member representatives—wishing to represent other in-
jured Workers—must file a Notice of Appearance with the
State of CT—prior to even discussing anything with the
CE’s(Sedgwick claims examiners). Effective immediately,
any concerns or questions should be brought to Lina Loncar’s
attention. If these concerns become excessive or—Lina has
been instructed to simply delete them. Please bring matters to
our attention that certainly warrant consideration. No further
workers comp claims matters should be brought to the atten-
tion of Charles French nor the Sedgwick Union Liaison. Re-
quests to remove or reassign CE’s from the program will
strictly be directed by Mike and the Risk Management Team
only.”

As can be seen from the text quoted above, this is effectively
a change in the process for resolving WC issues that had been
in place for several years.
Weiss elaborated on the description saying that Lina Loncar
is the contact point for WC issues and such issues have to go
through her. Weiss wanted Loncar to become acclimated to the
7 According to the evidence, the Union has never filed a complaint
with the State of Connecticut Workers’ compensation Commission
about Sedgwick’s or SNET’s handling of claims.

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 349
WC issues and the union personnel dealing with such issues.
He further defined the next to last sentence in the quote above
to be limited to performance issues with Sedgwick claims ex-
aminers. However, McCorkle testified and contradicted Weiss,
testifying that he understood Weiss as meaning exactly what
the quoted part of the email says.
As examples of information that would not be provided to
UDBLs in connection with WC claims, Weiss mentioned medi-
cal information, file or juris notes, and specifics dealing with
why a claim was denied. He also mentioned that claims exam-
iners cannot talk with an UDBL about a claim if the claimant is
represented by an attorney. To the best of Weiss’s knowledge,
the Union has never filed a Notice of Appearance with the State
of Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Commission. No unfair
labor charge or grievance was filed with respect to the subject
matter of the August conference call. Among the information
that Weiss testified that a Sedgwick union liaison can give
UDBL’s with regard to WC are whether the temporary total
disability has been paid and the status of the WC claim.
UDBL Kimberly Jancewicz testified about the August 2007
conference call with Weiss. She testified that this call came
about because the Union was receiving negative feedback from
member WC claimants about the treatment that they received
from Sedgwick case managers, Henry Thomas and Sandra At-
kins. Jancewicz testified that members claimed the two case
managers were treating employees disrespectfully, not answer-
ing their questions and not returning calls. According to Jance-
wicz, Weiss stated in this call that he expected Sedgwick to
treat SNET employee claimants respectfully and noted SNET
paid Sedgwick a lot of money to administer the claims. He also
introduced SNET employee Lina Loncar to the conference call
participants, stating that she was someone in his office who the
UDBLs could have access to when they had a Workers’ com-
pensation issue with Sedgwick. According to Jancewicz, he
added that if the Union asked her too many questions or ask
inappropriate questions, he would cut off their access to her.
She testified that he also stated that there were too many WC
complaints being raised and that if it continued, SNET was in
danger of losing its license to manage its WC cases. Jancewicz
also testified that Weiss told them that the Respondent had no
obligation to speak to the Union or answer their questions about
WC issues. Rivera also remembered Weiss as saying the Com-
pany did not have to respond to the questions, stating that
workers’ compensation is not a bargained for benefit.
Following this meeting, nothing actually changed in the pro-
cessing of WC issue information requests by UDBLs and
Sedgwick and Weiss’s directive to use Loncar for such infor-
mation was ignored until January 2009. No ULP charges were
filed in response to Weiss’s statements for the simple reason
that they were not implemented and the Union continued to be
able to receive information relating to WC issues directly and
successfully from Sedgwick. As will be seen below, both be-
fore and after August 2007, the Union obtained such infor-
mation without any interference or involvement by Loncar. The
implementation of the threatened changes did not occur until
January 2009 and it was at that time they were made the subject
of ULP charges that in part resulted in the Complaint in this
case.
3. Evidence adduced with respect to specific examples of the
WC information request process before January 2009
Kimberly Jancewicz testified that until January 2009, there
was one person she contacted about all phases of disability,
including workers’ compensation issues, and that person was
Sedgwick escalation contact Diane Kunst. Kunst’s predecessors
in that position since 2006 were Tom Vlasic, Pat Kalina and
Gloria Dukes and Megan James. Charles French is also con-
tacted at times.
Jancewicz testified that members would contact her with is-
sues about their workers’ compensation claims and she would
get as many facts about the claim from the member as she
could. Then she would email her Sedgwick escalation contact
with questions in an attempt to resolve the issue posed by the
member. From the time she became a UDBL in 2006 until Jan-
uary 2009, workers’ compensation questions were routinely
answered by the Sedgwick contact person. If Jancewicz needed
further clarification, the Sedgwick personnel provided it.
Jancewicz testified that the questions asked of her by mem-
bers related to pay, to the status of claims, to Sedgwick case
managers not returning calls in a timely manner, or Sedgwick
not providing timely treatment when treatment is required. She
further testified that sometimes Sedgwick case managers do not
return members calls, sometimes the case managers do not
explain things to member’s ability to understand, sometimes the
case managers lose patience with the member and sometimes
the case managers are not very cooperative.8 In these cases, the
members call Jancewicz out of confusion, misunderstanding,
miscommunication, and frustration.
Jancewicz provided several examples of interchanges be-
tween the UDBLs and Sedgwick involving requests for infor-
mation relating to specific member/claimant’s workers’ com-
pensation claims. These examples are set out in a series of
email chains. I have discussed these below, noting the name of
the involved claimant and the exhibit number assigned to the
email trail. They reflect that until about the end of December
2008, Sedgwick supplied whatever the UDBLs asked for with
respect to workers’ compensation issues. Beginning in Decem-
ber 2008 and continuing at least to the date of the hearing in
this case, that situation changed. Both the former cooperative
mode and the new uncooperative mode of information ex-
changes can be seen in these email chains.
Pre-2009 communications between UDBLs and Sedgwick
over WC issues that were satisfactorily resolved at least from a
process standpoint.
a. Claimant Bob Lee, General Counsel’s Exhibit 27
General Counsel’s Exhibit 27 is an email chain that involved
emails between Jancewicz and Gloria Dukes concerning the
workers’ compensation problems of member Bob Lee. Jance-
wicz began the correspondence with an email dated July 12,
2006, noting Lee’s concern that he has not been paid for mile-
age and prescription drugs though he had sent in a voucher for
them 5 weeks earlier. Lee also believes the amount that Sedg-
8 Jancewicz appears from her testimony to not distinguish between
case managers for disability claims and claims examiners for WC
claims.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 350
wick says he is owed is incorrect. Jancewicz asks Dukes to
check into these matters.
Dukes responded the same day saying that the amount Lee is
receiving is correct and that a check for an offset has been sent
to him for an earlier incorrect amount. She added that the
voucher for mileage and prescription drugs Lee says he sent in
cannot be found. Dukes gave Jancewicz a fax number and
asked that Lee fax the voucher to Sedgwick. Jancewicz re-
sponded to this email with one saying that Lee will not be hap-
py, but that she will pass on the information.
b. Claimant Andrew Delieto, General Counsel’s Exhibit 28
General Counsel’s Exhibit 28 is an email chain involving
primarily Jancewicz and Dukes as correspondents and the sub-
ject matter was a problem experienced by member Andrew
Delieto. It begins with an email of August 3, 2006, asking that
an approval for treatment with a time limit be extended for
about 10 days to accommodate Delieto’s next doctor’s ap-
pointment and to advise that Delieto’s supervisor is getting
what he considers excessive emails about Delieto from Sedg-
wick.
Following this email, Jancewicz had a conversation with
Dukes about Delieto. Following this conversation, Jancewicz
emailed Dukes thanking her for approving an extension and
asks that in the future that Sedgwick give him more notice that
his approved time was running out. Following this email,
Dukes sent Jancewicz a detailed email answering a medical
question, notifying her that Delieto’s workers’ compensation
case remains approved and extended and gives the rate of pay,
and comments on the excessive email issue.
There is no suggestion on Duke’s part that the information
requested in GC 27 and 28 must be asked for and supplied to
Lee and Delieto directly rather than through the UDBL. In both
cases, Jancewicz passed on the information received from
Dukes to the involved member.
c. Claimant Mark Hermanowski, General Counsel’s Exhibit 29
General Counsel’s Exhibit 29 is an email chain between a
UDBL and Sedgwick escalation contact person Megan James
involving member Mark Hermanowski. The UDBL relates in
an October 3, 2007 email that Hermanowski is a new workers’
compensation claimant and further that he has been trying to
contact case manager Sandra Atkins about physical therapy.
The UDBL asks if James will contact Atkins and have her con-
tact Hermanowski so that he may receive treatment. The email
also points out that the physical therapy provider has been try-
ing unsuccessfully to get the therapy approved. By email of
October 4, 2007, James advises the UDBL that the problem has
been resolved and that Hermanowski’s treatment has been ap-
proved.
d. Claimant Bob Lee, General Counsel’s Exhibit. 30
General Counsel’s Exhibit 30 is an email trail between
UDBL Jessica Morin and Gloria Dukes involving member Bob
Lee. It begins with an email from Morin to Dukes dated Octo-
ber 2, 2006. Morin relays Lee’s question about when he should
be receiving a check and inquiring about Sedgwick’s denial of
a treatment for his back.
Dukes replied giving information about checks sent to Lee
and advised that Lee’s file makes no mention of a back problem
and his case manager had not received any such information.
Morin replied that Lee was inquiring about a disability
check, not the workers’ compensation checks that Dukes had
mentioned.
On October 3, 2006, another UDBL wrote Dukes stating that
the back problem dated to 1991 and had originally been han-
dled by another 3rd party provider. This UDBL notes that he
also needs an MRI and asks for the email address of Lee’s case
manager.
On October, 5, 2006, the UDBL again wrote Dukes asking
her to respond to the earlier email and states that Lee spoke to
someone about a form 43 and asks Duke to check on this matter
as well.
This latter email prompted a telephone conversation between
the UDBL and Dukes. Following the conversation, Dukes
emailed the UDBL advising that a check for Lee had been cut
and was in the mail and advised that the 1991 back claim was
still being handled by the original 3rd party provider and that
Lee should contact that provider.
e. Claimant Joseph Kvietkus, General Counsel’s Exhibit 31
General Counsel’s Exhibit 31 is another email chain involv-
ing Jancewicz and Sedgwick escalation person Diane Kunst
about issues surrounding member Joseph Kvietkus. On Decem-
ber 16, 2008, Jancewicz advised Kunst that Kvietkus had an on
the job injury on October 28, 2008, but did not seek treatment
until November 24, 2008. As Kvietkus’s supervisor did not
advise him to go to AT&T’s contract medical supplier, Concen-
tra, Kvietkus went to an emergency room. He was advised he
needed a MRI. According to Kvietkus, he had tried 12 times to
contact his Sedgwick case manager. He received a denial for
treatment from Sedgwick. Jancewicz noted she advised the
member to seek treatment through his insurance company, and
then asks Kunst about the status of approval for Kvietkus to
receive STD benefits.
Kunst replied with an email that stated that the member’s
workers’ compensation and accompanying disability claim had
been approved and that the MRI had been authorized. She also
noted that Kvietkus’ case manager stated she had called
Kvietkus several times and got a voice mail each time. She
asked for another phone number.
Jancewicz responded with an email thanking Kunst and not-
ing that the MRI facility had told Kvietkus that his MRI had
been denied. She inquires if that facility had been notified of
the approval and, if so, when. She also notes she will see if
Kvietkus has another telephone number.
Jancewicz then wrote Kunst stating that the number the case
manager had been calling was his work cell phone and that as
he was not working he did not have it on. She passed on
Kvietkus complaint that he had left his home phone number on
the case manager’s voice mail several times. She also asks who
the MRI approval notice had been sent to.
Kunst replied with the name of the company that would pro-
vide the MRI and said that company was notifying Kvietkus
and gave Jancewicz the home number of Kvietkus case manag-
er and the UR nurse.
Jancewicz then replied asking how long it would be before
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 351
Kvietkus could get his MRI.
Kunst replied that Kvietkus should have been notified by the
MRI people either the day before or the day of this email.
f. Claimant Sandra Yost, General Counsel’s Exhibit 25
General Counsel’s Exhibit. 25 is a series of emails concern-
ing employee Sandra Yost. Jancewicz testified about this series
of emails that went back and forth in 2006. Yost complained to
Jancewicz that she was not getting appropriate pay from her
workers’ compensation claim. The employee was not able to
give the UDBL much information, so Jancewicz contacted
Sedgwick and explained the problem to Pat Kalina, the Sedg-
wick escalation contact. Kalina in turn contacted Respondent’s
payroll department to check the calculations. The payroll peo-
ple found they had made an error and the employee had been
overpaid about $6000. Kalina then gave a detailed explanation
of the various calculations and an explanation for the overpay-
ment. At no point in this chain of communication did Sedgwick
or Respondent claim that the information would not be given
because workers’ compensation was not a bargained for bene-
fit. At no time during this exchange was the UDBL told that the
information could only be provided directly to the employee, or
that the employee must be on the line for the information to be
supplied.
Jancewicz testified that she had had communications with
Sedgwick employees about posing workers’ compensation
questions directly to them. For example, Sedgwick employee
Pat Kalina advised in a May 9, 2006 email to a UDBL: “It is
best for all concerned that we continue with the policy estab-
lished early on. Everything should still come though myself
whether it is short-term disability, workers’ compensation or
appeals. A single point of contact allows for consistency and
keeps confusion to a minimum.”
g. Claimant Robert Soucie, General Counsel’s Exhibit 38
General Counsel’s Exhibit 38 is a series of emails between
UDBL Dawn Valaitis and Sedgwick escalation contact Charles
French concerning employee member Robert Soucie. On
March 16, 2004, Valaitis writes that she had spoken with a
Sedgwick employee about the member’s AD denial and was
advised that the last piece of medical documentation received
were PT note from dates she listed. She requests that the work-
ers’ compensation side get all the medical documents that
Sedgwick has received on the AD side.
French replies that he has instructed Sedgwick employees to
honor her request but notes that the standards for approving a
worker’s compensation claim are different from the standards
for AD approval.
Valaitis replied that she believes the worker’ compensation
side had some documentation that the AD side did not. She
notes that she is going to have Soucie try to provide more de-
tailed information.
French replied that he agreed and that the medical infor-
mation needs to be reviewed.
h. Claimant Theodore Grossi, General Counsel’s
Exhibit 39 and 41
General Counsel’s Exhibit 39 is a series of emails between
Valaitis and Sedgwick escalation contact DeLaine Simmons
concerning employee Theodore Grossi. On October 19, 2004,
Valaitis notes problems with Grossi’s AD and workers’ com-
pensation claims and then forwards Grossi’s displeasure at the
way he was treated by one of the Sedgwick people he dealt
with. Valaitis asks Simmons why this person is dealing with
SNET employees.
Simmons responded that he had just spoken with Grossi and
believes the situation is under control. Sedgwick extended
Grossi’s disability payment period to give him sufficient time
to get additional medical documentation and directed that cop-
ies of medical documentation for review. With respect to the
personnel question, Sedgwick surmised that the complained of
employee was filing in for Grossi’s regular case manager and
noted it was still investigating.
General Counsel’s Exhibit 41 is an email to the Union from
Sedgwick dated November 5, 2004. It notes that it is an update
on Grossi’s case. It notes the Sedgwick employee assigned to
the case and states that this person has made doctor referrals for
Grossi. Sedgwick notes that Grossi now has an appointment
with the involved doctor and asks if there is anything else he
can do.
i. Claimant Robin Minevich, General Counsel’s Exhibit 40
General Counsel’s Exhibit. 40 is an email chain between
UDBL Dawn Valaitis and personnel at Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Company at a time before Sedgwick was SNET’s third
party administrator. I do not find this Exhibit particularly rele-
vant and will not address it.
j. Claimant George Alcover, General Counsel’s Exhibit 42
General Counsel’s Exhibit 42 is an email chain in March
2006 between UDBL Valaitis and Sedgwick employee Pat
Kalina regarding the WC claim of Alcover. According to the
emails, although the employee’s WC claim was approved, his
corresponding AD claim was denied and Respondent was seek-
ing to terminate him. Kalina provided responsive answers to all
of the information sought by Valaitis related to Alcover’s WC
claim, including the dates of approval, the medical diagnosis
and the contemplated future medical treatment of the employ-
ee’s symptoms; and the dates the employee has been out of
work due to injury.
k. Claimant Bruce Linnartz, General Counsel’s Exhibit 43
General Counsel’s Exhibit 43 is an email chain in June 2006
regarding the WC claim of Linnartz. The involved UDBL in-
quired of Diane Kuntz if Linnartz’s claim has been processed
as a WC claim, what is the status of the case, whether there are
any open absences, noting that doctor’s bills are not paid and
whether Linnartz was paid for mileage and differential on his
doctor’s visits. Kuntz replied: “WC claim open and accepted.
All bills have been processed. EE was paid for mileage for
2005 and 2006 in the amount of $76.65. No info on differential,
but will check with case manager tomorrow. EE had absence
from 9/29/05 through 1/31/06 which was all approved. No cur-
rent absence.”
l. Claimant Meta Turner, General Counsel’s Exhibit 44
General Counsel’s Exhibit 44 is an email chain between a
UDBL and Sedgwick employee Megan James in July 2006. It
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 352
begins with an email dated July 16 from the UDBL to James,
which reads: “Here we go again. Ann Marie Thomas has done
it AGAIN. Meta was out on Workers’ compensation. She sub-
mitted her mileage on May 24, 2007 and still has not received
her check. She placed a call to Ann Marie on approximately
June 15, 2007, Ann Marie was rude and sarcastic when Meta
asked about her mileage, Ann Marie said `I have it but I haven’t
gotten to it.’ Well it is now July 16, 2007 and STILL no check.
When do you think she will get to it? How can you justify this?
I don’t understand how Sedgwick can keep an employee who
constantly gets complaints about her rudeness, attitude and
sarcasm. I am asking that Ann Marie be taken off all SNET
East accounts. Our employees deserve to be treated with re-
spect. They did not ask to get injured on the job and should not
be treated with disrespect.”
James responded: “I just spoke with Annmarie and she states
that she did not have any sour conversations with Meta. She
states that she has not been rude or sarcastic towards her and
apologizes if Meta truly feels this way. She did send out the
mileage check in the amount of $118.82 on July 11, 2007. Un-
fortunately there is no statute that indicates a timeframe for
mileage reimbursement to go out to the injured worker. In some
WC cases, mileage is totaled aat the end of the claim and one
check goes out for the total amount. I will discuss your concern
with Annmarie’s supervisor and request that she speak to her
about her customer service. I will also inform her of your re-
quest, but I cannot guarantee that Annmarie will be taken off
SNET claims. I do apologize for this incident that may or may
not have happened and I assure you that this will be addressed.”
m. Claimant Noemi Cotto, General Counsel’s Exhibit 45
General Counsel’s Exhibit 45 is an email chain that begins
with an email of July 23, 2008, from a UDBL to Megan James.
In the initial email, the UDBL advises that Cotto relapsed on
Friday July 18. It then asks James to give the claim number,
FDD, the case manager and MDD. James on the same date
supplies the requested information. On July 29, 2008, the
UDBL emails James asking about a workers’ compensation
claim by Cotti for carpal tunnel noting that Cotti had received
an approval letter. The UDBL then asks James to confirm the
approval. James replied noting the approval. The UDBL then
writes another email of the same date asking if the workers’
compensation case has a different number from the STD case.
James replies immediately giving the case numbers for each
case. The UDBL then writes James noting that Cotti has sur-
gery scheduled for the carpal tunnel and asks if Sedgwick has
this information and also asks for the status of her SD case.
James responds that medical information had just been sub-
mitted and that she was advising the WC claims manager and
referred the SD claim. The UDBL then writes with another
question and James again responds, asking the UDBL to con-
tact her to review the claim and see if additional findings are
needed. The UDBL then writes asking if a “doc to doc” had
been set up. James responds with the requested information. A
few days later, the UDBL writes asking if the doc to doc took
place, and Megan writes back that it had and that results should
be available in a day or two. Several days later, the UDBL
writes saying she learned from SNET that the claim had been
denied and asking the results of a review of that situation.
James responds advising that there was insufficient medical
information to support the claim, noting that Cotti had not
shown up for an appointment. James advises taking an appeal.
The UDBL follows up with a detailed explanation of Cotti’s
situation and why she missed the appointment. The UDBL then
asks the specific reason for the denial and if it is medical insuf-
ficiency to explain what is needed. The UDBL then request the
entire file on Cotti. And that request is noted in a reply by
James. James went on vacation about this time in August 2008
as the next email about Cotti is directed to Diane Kunst. In this
email, the UDBL sets out the status of both the SD claim and
the WC claim and asks Kunst if it is accurate. Kunst replies
say that the information was accurate and giving the name of
the person assigned to the appeal. On September 3, the UDBL
writes James asking the status of Cotti’s claim. No other emails
were submitted into evidence with respect to Cotti.
4. Example of specific case that involve the December 2008—
January 2009 timeframe and which show the process
breaking down
Up to December 2008—January 2009, there seems to be no
real procedural problem with the response of Sedgwick to the
Union’s requests for information relating to WC claims. The
next several email chains show a problem developing.
a. Claimant Theodore Moskey, General Counsel’s Exhibit 37
General Counsel’s Exhibit 37 is an email trail between sev-
eral UDBL’s, Sedgwick’s Megan James and Respondent’s
employee Lina Loncar and concerns employee/member Theo-
dore Moskey. It begins on February 25, 2008, with a request
from the Union to James asking if Moskey’s workers’ compen-
sation claim has been approved and the duration of the approv-
al.
James responds on the same date noting some facts about
Moskey’s claim and stating the duration of the approval is to
February 26, 2008.
The Union, on February 26, 2008, wrote James noting that
Moskey had not be released by his doctor to return to work and
inquires why the approval ends on February 26.
James responded that benefits are paid weekly and notes that
the last time Sedgwick received medical data was February 13,
2008.
The Union responded on the same date asking what would
be necessary to extend the date of approval.
James responded that nothing was needed and the approval
would be extended.
The Union responded saying that it needed to be better
versed on workers’ compensation.
The Union again wrote on February 27, 2008, asking if
Moskey’s approval had been extended.
James responded saying that it had, through March 4, 2008.
There after, on a weekly basis, the Union inquired whether
Moskey’s approval had been extended and James responded in
the affirmative. On March 14, the Union asked for the name of
Moskey’s case manager.
James responded giving the name of the case manager and
stating that Moskey’s AD benefits were approved through No-
vember 13, 2007, but denied thereafter.
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 353
The Union then asked why the AD portion of his claim had
been denied and when.
James responded that the AD portion was denied as there
had been no updated medical documentation submitted to sup-
port Moskey’s claim he was unable to work.
The Union then inquired whether medical documentation
submitted with the workers’ compensation portion of the claim
was shared with the people handling the AD portion.
James responded that medical information was shared and
that updated medical information had not been supplied for the
workers’ compensation claim just as it had not been provided
for the AD portion. She also notes that the two claims are sepa-
rate with different criteria for approval.
The Union then replied asking whether the AD case manager
had reached out to Moskey’s doctor for updated medical docu-
mentation.
James responded that the workers’ compensation claim is
governed by state law and was being contested. She noted that
the case manager did reach out to Moskey and his doctor in
November 2007, but to no avail.
The Union responded asking what medical was supplied to
support the workers’ compensation claim and had the case
manager made a more recent effort to get documentation.
James then pointed out that medical documentation was not
submitted in the workers’ compensation case which was being
contested. She notes that is Moskey’s responsibility to provide
updated medical information in the AD case.
The Union then asks for the dates the case manager tried to
reach Moskey and his doctor.
James responded by giving several dates in November 2007
when Moskey or his wife were reached by the case manager
and one unsuccessful attempt that was followed up by a letter.
She also noted the reason why the workers’ compensation por-
tion was approved, but note that a form 36 would be approved
and those benefits end if medical documentation is not updated.
The Union then inquired when the form 36 issued.
James provided that date, which was in December 2007.
On March 19, 2008, the UDBL wrote James that it had just
faxed to James several pages of medical documentation.
James responded that she had received the documentation
and forwarded it to the appropriate people.
On March 27, 2008, the Union inquired if the documentation
been reviewed and does James have the outcome.
On the same date, James informs the Union that the docu-
mentation is insufficient to overturn the denial and notes that
much more is needed to change the outcome. She said it will
require an appeal to overturn the denial.
On May 20, 2008, roughly 2 months after the last message
from James, the Union inquired of the status of Moskey’s
claim.
James responded that there had been no change in Moskey’s
AD claim and that he should try to file an appeal, noting that
the limitations period for filing appeals had passed. She also
notes that his workers’ compensation claim was approved
through May 24.
The Union next wrote James on June 30, 2008, inquiring
about the status of Moskey’s workers’ compensation claim.
James responded stating that Moskey continued to receive
workers’ compensation, and the future of that claim was await-
ing a report made to the State of Connecticut.
On July 14, 2008, the Union again inquired as to the status of
the workers’ compensation claim.
James responded that Moskey continued to receive workers’
compensation benefits and the State was still waiting for the
report.
On July 21, 2008, the Union again inquired about the status
of the claim.
James responded saying no.
On August 1, 2008, the Union again inquired about the status
of the claim.
James responded that the report the State was awaiting was
now in its possession and a hearing would be scheduled.
On September 5, 2008, the Union again inquired about the
status of the claim.
James responded that Moskey’s claim is approved through
September 30 and that a request had been made with the State
for a hearing.
On November 3, 2008, the Union inquired if Moskey’s ap-
proval had been extended.
On the same date, James responded that it had and gave the
date through which it was approved.
On December 1, the Union again inquired if Moskey’s ap-
proval had been extended. This email went to Diane Kunst,
who evidently had taken over for James.
Kunst responded that it had been approved through Decem-
ber 30, 2008.
On January 2, 2009, the Union again inquired if Moskey’
approval had been extended.
On the same date, Kunst replied that it had been approved
through January 27, 2009.
On January 30, 2009, the Union emailed Loncar asking
about the extension of benefits.
On the same date, Loncar emailed the Union: “Please note-
that if Mr. Moskey has any questions or concerns regarding his
status—he may contact his attorney directly. Wendy will not be
communicating with him directly—since he is represented by
legal counsel. Please note—Diane is not obligated to keep you
on diary for updates on this claim or any other claims. Please
keep in mind – that workers’ compensation benefits—are not a
bargained for benefit—Therefore no information will be re-
leased to you unless a formal C-30 has been filed with the state
for approved representation.”
Jancewicz testified that the meaning of “on diary” means be-
ing updated.
b. Claimant Michael Gurnack, General Counsel’s Exhibit 36
General Counsel’s Exhibit 36 is an email trail between a
UDBL and Loncar involving employee Michael Gurnack. On
February 3, 2009, the UDBL wrote that Gurnack had been leav-
ing messages on his case manager’s voice mail, but had had no
response. The UDBL asks the identity of the case manager and
requests that Loncar find out why the case manager did not call
Gurnack. The email also lists Gurnack’ phone number.
On February 10, 2009, the UDBL wrote Loncar stating that
no response to the earlier email had been received, reiterated
the questions posed in that email and asks further if any one
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 354
had contacted Gurnack.
On the same date Loncar responded, “I have already spoken
to Mr. Gurnack and provided him of the claims examiner in-
formation.”
Jancewicz testified that before January 2009, the information
would have been provided to the Union and not directly to the
employee.
c. Claimant Debra Modzelewski, General Counsel’s Exhibit 47
General Counsel’s Exhibit 47 is a two email chain between a
UDBL and Lina Loncar in March 2009. The UDBL wrote
Loncar with respect to a Modzelewski and asked some ques-
tions surrounding her workers’ compensation claim. Loncar
responded by saying the member could contact her claims ex-
aminer directly with any questions and if she did not know the
identity of the claims examiner, she could contact Loncar. No
answers to the questions posed by the UDBL were ever given
by Loncar or Sedgwick to the UDBL.
d. Claimant Michael Sullivan, General Counsel’s Exhibit. 48
General Counsel’s Exhibit 48 is an email chain in April
2009, between UDBL Jancewicz and Loncar regarding a mem-
ber who had a workers’ compensation claim and gave Loncar a
brief history of his problems with Sedgwick in regard to the
claim. The email requests help from Loncar. Loncar responded
with an email saying that she will look into the matter that day
and notes that any delay that occurred with the claim was the
fault of the member. Jancewicz wrote back with a specific re-
quest about treatment authorization for the member and notes
that the delay may have been caused by his supervisor. Loncar
responded, “That would be your opinion. Again—this matter
has been addressed.” Jancewicz replied, “My email asked spe-
cific questions that have not been answered. Secondly, it is not
my opinion that waiting 18 days for some contact with the WC
Case Manager is untimely and incompetent, it is a fact.”
Jancewicz testified that neither Loncar, Sedgwick nor any
other SNET employee ever provided an answer to the questions
posed in the emails above sent to them by Jancewicz.
e. Claimant Eric Pucci, General Counsel’s Exhibit 49
General Counsel’s Exhibit 49 is an email chain beginning in
January 2009 between Jancewicz and Loncar about the work-
er’s compensation claim of member Eric Pucci. It begins with
an email from Jancewicz noting that Pucci had been unable to
get a satisfactory answer to his queries to his Sedgwick case
manager about how his benefit was derived. Jancewicz asks
Loncar to give the explanation and notes that the case manager
would not return Jancewicz’s calls. Loncar responded by giving
Jancewicz her phone number and asking that she call, adding
that Pucci must be on the line as well. The next email is from
Loncar to Jancewicz detailing the phone call and apologizing
for a misunderstanding on the part of Sedgwick. Jancewicz
replied thanking Loncar for looking into Pucci’s inquiry and
asks how long a process will take and asks if she can forward
Loncar’s previous email to Pucci. Loncar responded that she is
not sure how long the process can take and suggests that Pucci
ask his case manager. She adds that she has no objection to
forwarding the email to Pucci.
Jancewicz testified that Loncar’s directive to have Pucci on
the line with Jancewicz as a condition precedent to her provid-
ing information was the first time Sedgwick or SNET had made
such a requirement for providing information to a UDBL.9
f. Claimant Jeff Rice, General Counsel’s Exhibit 50
General Counsel’s Exhibit 50 is an email chain between
Sedgwick escalation contact point Diane Kunst, UDBL Jance-
wicz, and Loncar in the spring of 2009 concerning the workers’
compensation claim of member Jeff Rice. Jancewicz testified
that this member had had an exacerbation of his workers’ com-
pensation injury and was complaining that Sedgwick chose to
treat the exacerbation as a short term disability claim rather
than as a workers’ compensation claim. Jancewicz then began
emailing Kuntz to find an answer to the member’s inquiry. By
way of background, Rice had suffered an on the job injury and
reported it to his supervisor. The supervisor sent him to Con-
centra, the Respondent’s medical provider for workers’ com-
pensation injuries. Under normal procedures, when a member
files a workers’ compensation claim and goes to Concentra,
that company sends the medical information to Sedgwick.
After going to Concentra and his personal medical provider,
Rice called Sedgwick and informed them that both medical
providers had determined that his current injury was an exacer-
bation of a previous injury that was the subject of a workers’
compensation claim and was related to the original claim. Ac-
cording to Rice, Sedgwick ignored this information and accept-
ed the claim as a short term disability claim.
Sedgwick then scheduled an independent medical examina-
tion to verify if there was a causal relationship between the
original injury and the current one. Sedgwick was denying at
that point that the new claim was a workers’ compensation
claim.
The first several communications on this dispute were be-
tween Kuntz and Jancewicz. On April 16, 2009, Kuntz advised
the then status of the claim to Jancewicz and noted that any
other issues must be addressed by Loncar. Jancewicz then
emailed a further question to Kuntz. This was answered by an
email from Loncar. Loncar notes that an independent medical
examination is warranted and that if Rice needs immediate
medical surgical intervention, then “he needs to notify the
IDSC10 of the same. It is not your position to demand such a
request.” (emphasis in original) “This is a prime example of
why Risk Management and the IDSC request that all Union
Representatives – complete and file a Form C- 30 with the state
of CT to represent employees. Once again—if you are not le-
gally representing Mr. Rice—the IDSC nor Risk Management
are, obligated to respond to your denial directive. I would ap-
preciate that you not advise or direct the IDSC to issue denials
on any pending matters in the future. . . . If Mr. Rice has any
9 At the start of the hearing and again at this point of the record,
General Counsel sought to amend the complaint to allege this alleged
change in policy and procedure to be a separate violation of the Act.
Respondent objected to the proposed amendment as untimely. I agreed
with Respondent and noted that the evidence adduced with respect to
the alleged change would be considered as part of the overall alleged
change with respect to handling workers’ compensation claims, but
would not be used to make a separate finding of a violation of the Act.
10 IDSC is Sedgwick.

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 355
other issues or concerns regarding his WC claim—please direct
him to me.”
Jancewicz responded with an accusation that Sedgwick was
lying about the status of the claim and then continues: “In al-
most every exchange with you, you request the employee to
call you directly. Is this a generally known part of the process?
If so how has this been communicated to the Bargaining Unit?
It appears that the focus of your job is not to help employees
and facilitate the process, rather it appears that the focus [is] to
impede the process and cover up the abusive claims practices of
Sedgwick.” Loncar responds with a long email that addresses
every issue but the question about whether the change in policy
with respect to employees contacting Loncar directly and the
notice of the change to the bargaining unit.
g. Claimant James Sousa, General Council Exhibits 51 and 52,
Respondent’s. Exhibits 1 and 2
General Counsel’s Exhibit 51 is an email chain beginning in
January 2009 and ending in late February 2009. It began with
emails from Jancewicz to Diane Kuntz about a Workers’ com-
pensation pay issue posed by member James Sousa. After sev-
eral emails between these two individuals, Kuntz advised that
all future inquiries about this issue must be directed to Loncar.
Jancewicz continued to write to Kuntz on this issue and was
again directed to Loncar. At this point, Jancewicz does pose
some questions related to the issue to Loncar. Loncar respond-
ed by directing Jancewicz to have Sousa contact his attorney on
the matter.
More emails are exchanged with Jancewicz evidently not
getting the satisfaction she seeks, so she emails Bob McCorkle
with her frustration. She also again emails Loncar. Finally on
February 23, Loncar writes to both Kuntz and Jancewicz. She
tells Kuntz that no further action is required on her part. She
then tells Jancewicz to stop communicating with herself and
Sedgwick on the Sousa matter. She points out that if Sousa is
not satisfied at this point, he should contact his attorney as he is
represented by counsel. It ends by noting that SNET has made
every effort to explain and communicate the process by which
the Sousa claim was handled and SNET is no longer obligated
to continue to be this unproductive.
General Council Exhibit 52 is a short email chain between
Jancewicz and Bob McCorkle. It begins with Jancewicz’s email
of January 23, 2009, which states: “I understand from Sedg-
wick that there is a change in the person who will be handling
Workers’ compensation issues. Sedgwick says Lina Loncar will
be the Union’s escalation. Yesterday was the effective date.
Unfortunately, Lina has an out of office reply that state she is in
training all week and will not return until Monday. There is no
one available to answer question concerning pay shortages.
Meanwhile, we have an employee who was short $400.00 in
this weeks pay. What do you suggest? Usually when there is an
absence of escalation, there is someone to fill in. The employee
who was short in his check wants his money today.” Lisa
Hodges of SNET responded to the member affected saying that
the matter had been escalated to McCorkle and she would ad-
vise Sousa of what happens.
Respondent’s Exhibit 1 contains part of the foregoing email
chain both before and after February 23. The UDBL responds
to Loncar’s directive to stop communicating with her about
Sousa and points out to Loncar that the problem is not a matter
of understanding an explanation given, but that Sousa’s pay is
still incorrect.
On May 1, 2009, the involved UDBL writes Loncar with a
long email detailing the history of the Sousa matter and asking
for Loncar’s help. On May 7, the UDBL again writes Loncar
noting the earlier email and asking when Loncar plans to re-
spond. On the same date, Loncar sends a detailed email setting
out information about what transpired with Sousa’s pay and
indicating that the correct pay had been given to Sousa. It also
notes he could have gotten the same information that Sedgwick
got by going to SNET’s e-link which deals with pay issues.
On May 27, 2009, the UDBL sends an email to Loncar stat-
ing the correct amount owed to Sousa is near and they are only
$24.62 off, detailing her calculations for arriving at that
amount. The UDBL asks Loncar to advise what can be done.
On the same date, Loncar responds stating that once again,
she would ask that Sousa contact e-link directly as she has no
way of knowing what deductions are taken out of his pay at
each pay cycle.
This email prompts one from Rivera to McCorkle who com-
plains: “Why is Lina being so difficult? Are you aware that
when the UDBL identified a pay problem and Lina basically
told them to tell the member to get a lawyer and she didn’t pay
attention to anything that was told her. When the member did
get a lawyer and went before the WC commission, the commis-
sion agreed that money was due. Now that the determination
was made why can’t this be looked at? Do we need a specific
information request for a breakdown of how they determined
this? We shouldn’t have to go to these extremes.”
Respondent’s Exhibit 2 continues this chain of emails. On
June 1, 2009, McCorkle emails Jancewicz sending a breakdown
of Sousa’s pay provided by e-link. He informs Jancewicz that
any follow up regarding Sousa’s pay should go through Sousa’s
supervisor to e-link. Jancewicz replies thanking McCorkle for
the breakdown though she states it is incorrect. But she notes it
will be useful when she, Sousa and the supervisor speak with e-
link.
Jancewicz testified that though Loncar did respond to her
emails, Loncar never answered the questions posed in them.
Jancewicz further testified that Loncar has advised the UDBLs
that information related to members’ workers’ compensation
claims will not be provided because the workers’ compensation
benefit is not a bargained for benefit.
h. Claimant Mike Morrison, General Counsel’s Exhibit 33
Jancewicz next testified about an email trail concerning a
member/employee named Mike Morrison. It begins on Decem-
ber 8, 2008, with an email from a UDBL to Diane Kunst, seek-
ing the status of Morrison’s workers’ compensation claim, the
name of his case manager and a query as to why Morrison’s
AD check was different with each check.
Kunst replied seeking Morrison’s social security number as
Kunst could not find a claim by him for time off. The UDBL
replied giving the number.
A Jeff Duhigg then wrote the UDBL noting that Morrison’s
workers’ compensation claim was open and accepted, giving
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 356
the dates he was paid, giving the name of his case manager, and
noting possible reasons for varying amounts on his AD check.
The UDBL then wrote back asking if the claim had been
closed and wanting to know who closed it and whether Morri-
son had been informed.
Kunst replied saying that Morrison’s 2001 medical claim had
been closed due to lack of activity. It notes that the case man-
ager tried unsuccessfully to reach Morrison in early 2002.
The UDBL responded with three questions. Was Morrison
notified of the closing, who was his case manager, and what
was the date of injury?
Kunst responded that the date of injury was 12–07–01, the
case manager was Sandra Clovis and that Clovis had been una-
ble to reach Morrison, so the case was closed.
The UDBL replied asking whether Morrison was notified by
letter and was a message left when the case manager called
him.
Kunst replied that a message was left on Morrison’s answer-
ing machine.
The UDBL replied asking how the case manager can be sure
the message was left on the right machine, why wasn’t a letter
sent, and why wasn’t a voluntary agreement sent?
Kunst replied that the claim was medical only and it is
Sedgwick’s standard procedure to close such claims if there is
no activity. She asks “what is the problem?”
The UDBL then wrote back repeating all previous questions
and adding one that asked whether it was policy to close a
workers’ compensation claim within a month of its filing.
Kunst then wrote that according to Connecticut statues, the
claim was administered properly. Contact was attempted and
the employee never responded. She added that if there is any
other issues regarding this, please contact Lina Loncar.
The UDBL responded noting that Kunst was the Sedgwick
escalation point and asking Kunst to forward the previous mes-
sage to Loncar.
The UDBL then received an email from Megan James of
Sedgwick stating that she advised Kunst to respond about con-
tacting Lina Loncar. She also stated that the Union is not enti-
tled to specifics on a workers’ compensation claim and that
Mike Weiss advised that if the Union requests specifics, then
the request must be shared with Loncar.
Loncar then wrote the UDBL an email reiterating all the
questions the UDBL had raised about the Morrison case and
then asked if the UDBL had completed the appropriate State of
Connecticut form to represent Morrison and had the State ap-
proved the form. She directs the UDBL to forward the ap-
proved form and she will answer the UDBL’s questions. Oth-
erwise, she notes that the claim is closed and if Morrison has
any questions on his 7 year old claim, he can contact Loncar
directly.
The UDBL then wrote Loncar and stated that no State forms
had been completed and that the Union’s questions related to
Sedgwick’s and (SNET’s) administration of the claim. This
email ends with: “So, therefore, the Union would appreciate it
if you would forgo the terrorist tactics and answer the basic
questions that were asked a month ago.”
Loncar responded on January 5, 2009, stating: “In order to
avoid further communication via email . . . since we keep going
in circles—please call me directly should you need to discuss
the process in which our workers’ compensation claims are
handled. I believe your questions were originally responded to
by Diane, the claim was medical only. As for your comment on
the ‘terrorist tactics,’ I take great offense to that and do not
appreciate your tone.”
Following this email, on January 23, 2009, Jancewicz had
occasion to speak with Kunst on a workers’ compensation issue
and Kunst advised that as of January 22, 2009, the Union was
to direct all workers’ compensation inquiries to Lina Loncar.
Jancewicz asked why the policy was changing and Kunst ad-
vised that she had been told that workers’ compensation issues
must be directed to Loncar and that is all she would say.
Following this exchange, Jancewicz, on January 23, 2009,
wrote Loncar stating: “The UDBL office has been advised by
Sedgwick that there has been a change in the WC escalation
process and the Union has received no official notification. We
have been told that you are the new contact person. Is this in-
formation accurate?”
Loncar responded to Jancewicz thusly, “This is not a change
nor a new process. I oversee the Midwest and northeast—any
issues or concerns, need to be directed to my attention. I’ve
been in this position for well over a year . . . I believe the offi-
cial notification occurred during our conference call with the
CWA on/around August 1, 2007.”
i. Claimant Len Baird, General Counsel’s Exhibit. 35
On January 28, 2009, Jancewicz wrote Loncar about a prob-
lem experienced by employee/member Len Baird: “Len was
missing pay from 12/30/08 and 12/31/09. He was advised it
would be originally sent 2 weeks ago. When he did not receive
the check with the other information that was sent from Sedg-
wick he called the Union. I escalated the issue to Sedgwick last
week and after investigating they corrected the error and as-
sured me that the 2 days of pay would be sent. Mr. Baird re-
ceived the check, and it did say that it was for 16 hours, howev-
er it was approximately half of the amount it should have been.
The pay should have been around 480.00. I would appreciate
any help you could provide.”
Loncar replied: “Mr. Baird needs to follow up with Sandra
Atkins (Sedgwick case manager) directly to review his pay
concerns.”
Jancewicz testified that the questions posed in her email
above are the type that were formerly escalated to the Sedgwick
contact person, not Lina Loncar. Based on her experience,
Jancewicz testified that the Sedgwick contact person would
have given her the answers to the questions posed and not refer
the member to his case manager.
SNET did not in either General Council Exhibit 35 or 36 an-
swer the question posed by the UDBL and provide the infor-
mation sought by the UDBL. Similarly, no answers were pro-
vided to the Union in General Council Exhibits 33 and 37.
5. Conclusions with respect to whether a change in procedure
has taken place
The above cited email chains demonstrate clearly that prior
to January 2009, the way the UDBLs got information with re-
spect to workers’ compensation issues was to contact a Sedg-
wick escalation contact. The first set of email chains also show
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 357
that though sometimes tedious, the process resulted in the Un-
ion getting information requested or requested action taken.
The second set of email chains demonstrate clearly that by the
end of January 2009, such WC information request were to go
through Lina Loncar.
Jancewicz testified that she still deals with Diane Kunst and
that Kunst will still provide limited information such as wheth-
er a WC claim has been approved and to what date. If more
detailed information on WC is sought, Kunst directs the UDBL
to Loncar. Sedgwick employee Megan James testified that to
her knowledge, Sedgwick was still providing the UDBLs the
same type of information it had always provided. She testified
that there is nothing Sedgwick provided to the UDBLs prior to
January 2009 that it will not longer provide. I find her mistaken
in this belief as the email chains tell another story. As Jance-
wicz credibly testified, in January 2009, the Union was advised
by Respondent that the UDBLs could no longer ask questions
relating to WC of Sedgwick employees, but that such questions
must be directed to Lina Loncar. When the UDBLs started
posing questions similar to those posed historically to Sedg-
wick, Loncar would in most cases, not provide the information
requested.
Jancewicz testified that until a point in December 2008, she
was satisfied with the way Kunst and Megan James provided
information to the Union. This satisfaction ended when Lina
Loncar became the escalation point. She also testified that
when a union workers’ compensation claimant was represented
by legal counsel, Sedgwick would only answer general ques-
tions posed by the Union about the claim. In her affidavit,
Jancewicz stated that Sedgwick employees would answer any
question about workers’ compensation claims so long as the
claimant was not represented by legal counsel. She believed
that about one in four union member workers’ compensation
claimants are represented by counsel. Apparently, Sedgwick
has from the outset of its responsibilities limited the WC infor-
mation that it provides to the Union when a claimant is repre-
sented by counsel and this has not been a problem for the Un-
ion. I see no reason to change what has evidently been the sta-
tus quo in this regard.
In his testimony, Weiss denied that there has been any
change or limitation put on what information the union liaisons
have historically given the UDBLs with regard to WC claims.
As was the case with James similar belief, it is simply not true.
There was a procedural change in the WC process that occurred
in January 2009. The change occurred when Weiss became
aware of series of emails from the UDBLs and Sedgwick about
the WC claim of Mike Morrison, General Council Exhibit 33,
discussed above. He considered the questions and the manner
in which they were raised by the UDBLs to be inappropriate
and directed Loncar to stop it. Weiss then informed Charles
French of this decision. On or about January 5, 2009, Loncar
complained to Weiss about the emails involved in General
Council Exhibit 33 and wanted to file an EEO complaint
against the involved UDBL. The emails went on though the
claim involved was closed.
Weiss then mistakenly testified that there has been no change
in what UDBLs can obtain from Sedgwick relating to workers’
compensation claims. He testified that UDBLs have not been
given certain WC information in the past and that practice con-
tinues. Specifically, he noted that they are not now and have not
been in the past entitled to receive juris notes pertaining to WC
from Sedgwick. Juris notes in this context means notes of any
interaction between the claimant, their supervisor, and all inter-
action between the claimant and Sedgwick employees. They
likewise would not be entitled to any investigatory notes about
possible fraud. There is some doubt if the UDBLs can get med-
ical information related to the WC claim, but they are entitled
to all medical information related to the companion disability
claim which would be duplicative of what is in the WC file.
Pay information related to WC claims is not possessed by
Sedgwick and is no longer available to Sedgwick, according to
James.11 Such information is available to the employee from
SNET’s payroll department.
Weiss was shown General Council Exhibit. 51 wherein
Sedgwick union liaison Diane Kunst advises Jancewicz that
Kuntz had been advised by Loncar that all workers’ compensa-
tion issues be directed to Loncar. Weiss then testified that he
did not authorize Loncar to give such a directive and stated he
expected workers’ compensation inquiries be directed to Sedg-
wick claims examiners.
I believe the evidence only supports a finding that whether
authorized by Weiss or not, Loncar has changed the procedure
for the UDBLs to obtain workers’ compensation information by
interjecting herself in the process, then either providing infor-
mation or not, as it suits her. Her change of the procedure is
being followed by Sedgwick representative Kunst.
6. Conclusions with respect to the change in procedure involv-
ing WC claims and the providing of information to the Union
about WC claims
a. Are procedures involving WC programs and the providing of
information to a Union by the employer mandatory subjects of
bargaining?
The Board has held that WC programs are mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. Jones Dairy Farm, 295 NLRB 113 (1989);
Kohler Mix Specialties, 332 NLRB 630, 631 (2000). In Jones
Dairy Farm, supra, the employer sought to unilaterally imple-
ment a mandatory “work hardening” program that would re-
quire injured employees to perform light duty jobs and thereby
reduce the employer’s WC insurance costs. In its defense, the
employer, similar to Respondent here, claimed that it was not
obligated to bargain about its implemented program because
WC benefits were mandated by state law and not a creature of
the bargaining relationship with the union. 295 NLRB at 114.
The Board found that the work hardening program was a man-
datory subject of bargaining under Section 8(d) because WC
11 James testified that Sedgwick does not have direct access to e-link.
Sedgwick can make a request of the payroll department and are provid-
ed the information they need for WC at a later date. Typically, they are
looking for a weekly wage for employees for a fifty 2-week period.
Such a statement is required to use the statutory formulas to determine
WC pay and the payroll department supplies it. James also testified that
Sedgwick is no longer provided much payroll information and for that
reason cannot supply such information to employees or UDBLs. They
must seek that information directly from the payroll department. This
situation has existed for 6 months to a year.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 358
benefits, although created and provided for by state law, are
nevertheless “emoluments of value which accrue to employees
out of their employment relationship.” Id. at 115. In reaching
this conclusion, the Board found that state laws, including WC
laws, did not “supplant the Act and the bargaining obligations
under it. Rather, the two statutory schemes can often peacefully
coexist in our Federal system of Government.” Id. at 114.12 The
Seventh Circuit subsequently affirmed the Board’s findings,
including its conclusion that WC benefits constituted a manda-
tory subject of bargaining. In all cases following Jones Dairy
Farm, The Board has routinely found that WC programs were a
mandatory subject of bargaining over which an employer must
bargain and/or provide relevant requested information, regard-
less of how detailed that request may be.
For example, with regard to cases involving requests for WC
related information, in Regency Service Carts, 345 NLRB 671
(2005), during initial contract bargaining, the union requested
and the employer refused to provide on the basis of confidenti-
ality, detailed information concerning the extent and nature of
injury involved in three WC claims. The Board affirmed the
administrative law judge’s findings that the employer violated
the Act by, inter alia, delaying the submission of the requested
information, and relying on “spurious and frivolous objections
to clearly relevant requests.” 345 NLRB at 675. Similarly, in
Mission Foods, 345 NLRB 788 (2005), the union requested a
great deal of information during initial bargaining, including:
(1) the name and address of the company’s current workers’
compensation carrier; (2) a copy of all workers’ compensation
claims, along with a copy of any document showing any resolu-
tion of such claims, whether by settlement or litigation, for the
last five years; and (3) a copy of any company manual regard-
ing the handling or administration of workers’ compensation
claims. 345 NLRB at 796. The Board found that all of the re-
quested WC related information described above was presump-
tively relevant and that it must be furnished on request. Id. at
789–790.
In Westside Community Mental Health Center, 327 NLRB
661 (1999), the union requested and the employer refused to
provide, the following WC related information: copies “of all
on the job accident reports for the last two years” or copies “of
all WC claims along with a copy of any document which shows
any resolution whether by settlement or litigation for any such
claim for the last two years.” Id. at 672. The judge found a
violation in the employer’s refusal to provide the above infor-
mation, finding that the requested WC information was “analo-
gous to requesting health benefit plan information, to enable the
union to investigate a carrier’s reputation and determine the
employer’s policies concerning this coverage.” Id. at 674. The
12 Using similar logic with regard to statutorily created unemploy-
ment compensation programs, the Board found that such programs are
also mandatory subjects of bargaining. Armour & Co., 280 NLRB 824,
827 (1986) (“when an employer is empowered to take a specific action
which affects the economic well-being of his employees, the manner in
which he takes that action (and here, whether to take that action or not)
is a mandatory subject of bargaining.”) See also, Inland Steel Co., 77
NLRB 1, 4 (1948) (“the term “wages” must be construed to include all
emoluments of value, like pension and insurance benefits, which may
accrue to employees out of their employment relationship.”)
Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s findings that the
employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to
provide the union with requested information, including the
above described WC related information, which was relevant to
the performance of the union’s duties as collective-bargaining
representative. Id. at 661.
In Saipan Grand Hotel, 326 NLRB 80 (1998), the union re-
quested, inter alia: (1) “plan documents and/or insurance poli-
cies for medical, pension, workers’ compensation, disability
benefits and/or separation allowances”; and (2) costs per hour
in providing those benefits for bargaining unit employees. The
employer denied that the requested information was relevant
and necessary. However, the Board found that all of the re-
quested information, including the WC related portion of the
request, was presumptively relevant and must be furnished on
request. Id. at 80. Similarly, in Dexter Fastener Technologies,
321 NLRB 612 (1996), among other items, the union requested
and the employer refused to furnish, the “average total labor
cost per hour per employee including all wages, overtime, vaca-
tion, holiday, shift premiums, bonuses, medical insurance, den-
tal insurance, life insurance, FICA, unemployment compensa-
tion, workers’ compensation and any other costs you have. We
would like this specifying the per hour cost of each item.” In
finding that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
failing to provide this information, the Board did not distin-
guish the WC portion of the request from the other wage and
benefit portions of the request. Rather, the Board specifically
noted that “all of the foregoing types of information are pre-
sumptively relevant for purposes of collective bargaining and
must be furnished on request.” Id. at 613. In Honda of Hay-
ward, 314 NLRB 443 (1994), the Board found that the request-
ed contact information on the employer’s workers’ compensa-
tion carrier was presumptively relevant. In FMC Corp., 290
NLRB 483, 489 (1988), the Board found the union’s request for
a list of those unit employees eligible for workers’ compensa-
tion benefits to be relevant and found the employer’s refusal to
turn over that information to violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Not only is the workers’ compensation information sought
by the Union in the instant case presumptively relevant, the
Unions requests for such information pre-January 2009 have
been honored routinely by SNET and Sedgwick. I believe and
find that nothing has changed post-January 2009 which would
call into question the relevance of such information.
7. Did Respondent’s post January 2009 refusal to provide in-
formation requested by the Union relating to workers’ compen-
sation claims violate the Act?
Section 4 above which described email chains involving Re-
spondent’s post-January 2009 approach to dealing with infor-
mation request in a WC setting, set out several instances in
which Respondent failed or refused to supply information re-
quested by the Union. Specifically these email chains reflect
the following requests not honored by Respondent:

Date of Request Unit Employee Information Requested

12/26/2008 Mike Morrison 1) Was a letter sent to
Morrison?
2) How many attempts

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 359
were made to reach
him?
3) What was the mes-
sage left on his ma
chine and how can
Sedgwick be positive it
was his answering ma
chine?
4) Was medical infor-
mation left on the ma-
chine? Is policy to
close a WC claim in
less than a month of
opening it?
5) How did (case man-
ager) Sandra (Clovis)
know if Morrison was
to have follow-up ap-
pointments?
6) Was his physician
ever spoken to?
7) Was Morrison ever
spoken to by case man-
ager Sandra Clovis?
8) Was a voluntary
agreement sent and
signed?

1/26/09 Eric Pucci How was Pucci’s WC
benefit calculated?
1/28/09 Len Baird When would Baird re-
ceive about $240 in
missing pay?
1/30/09 Ted Moskey Updated status on
Moskey’s WC claim?
2/3/09 Michael Gurnack Name of assigned
claims examiner?
Whether Gurnack had
been contacted by
Sedgwick representa-
tive?
3/4/09 Debra The date when the IME
Modzelewski results would become
available?
How was employee’s
time off coded?
Was employee re-
quired to use sick
leave time or was ab-
sence coded under
WC?
4/6/09 Michael Sullivan Whether there had been
a delay in submitting
Sullivan’s WC claim to
Sedgwick?

The information sought as set out above involve a benefit
that arises out of the employment relationship. Based on the
cases cited in the section immediately proceeding this one, I
find the information sought cited above to be a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining and the information sought presumptively
relevant to the Union’s role as employee representative. The
majority of the requests directly concern other mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining, i.e. wages (Pucci, Baird); benefit claim
status (Morrison, Moskey, Modzelewski, Sullivan); use of sick
leave (Modzelewski); and name of individual administering the
benefit (Morrison, Gurnack). The information sought is of the
same type sought and given by Sedgwick and SNET prior to
January 2009. For this additional reason, Respondent had an
obligation to supply it. I do not find it sufficient for the Re-
spondent to excuse its failure in some instances by saying it
supplied the information directly to the employee involved. The
Respondent’s statutory obligation is to the Union and bypassing
the Union does not satisfy that obligation. Further there is no
proof in this record that the information was in fact given to the
employee. Saying that an employee is represented by counsel
and thus information cannot be supplied is likewise unavailing
as an excuse. Even Weiss testified that certain information is
supplied to the Union even when the claimant is otherwise
represented by counsel. There was no showing that the infor-
mation sought in the request cited above was of a type not his-
torically given to the Union. Clearly the employees involved in
the above information requests have given the Union a release
to obtain the information sought and it was at the employee’s
request that such information was sought.
Under the circumstances presented, I find that Respondent’s
refusal to supply this information to be in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
8. Did Respondent unilateral change in the process and proce-
dures for making information requests and other requests in-
volving the WC claims of its members violate the Act?
As found in Section 6 above and amply supported by the
documentary evidence in Section 5 and the credible testimony
of Jancewicz, Respondent’s less than credible denials to the
contrary, Respondent in January 2009 unilaterally and without
affording the Union the opportunity to bargain changed the
longstanding practice and procedure by which the Union ob-
tained information about workers’ compensation claims. This
change had the effect of appointing Loncar as the new contact
person for all WC inquires and the virtual cessation in the pro-
vision of information by Sedgwick or SNET to the Union. For
the first time, the Union was refused virtually any information
if the claimant was represented by counsel though Sedgwick
had traditionally provided at least some information. There was
established for the first time a requirement that the claimant
had to be present on a phone call in order for the Union to get
information. For the first time, the Union was apparently by-
passed in that Loncar passed on the information sought by the
Union to the claimant directly instead of giving it to the Union.
Other requests were summarily dismissed apparently on the
whim of Loncar. Having found that the matter of the provision
of information in the workers’ compensation area is a mandato-
ry subject of bargaining, I find that Respondent’s actions vio-
late Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. There is no evidence that the
Union was afforded any opportunity to bargain over this unilat-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 360
eral change, it was simply presented as fait accompli. For the
case law supporting this finding, the reader is referred to the
Section of this decision dealing with the cancellation of the
October 1, 2008 previously scheduled meeting and the continu-
ing refusal to schedule additional meetings.
I am mindful of the apparent reasons for the Respondent’s
actions. The parties have been without a new collective-
bargaining agreement and feelings on both sides are strained.
As can be seen from a reading of the email chains in Section 5
above, particularly the chain involving employee Morrison, the
Union’s manner of asking for information at times is not the
least professional. In her testimony, Jancewicz admitted having
animus toward Sedgwick, and for that matter, any third party
benefit administrator. But rather than dealing with the Union’s
provocative emails in a case by case manner or through discus-
sions, Respondent simply did away with the way the Union had
been getting WC information. Perhaps the matter is one ripe for
discussion in one of the periodic meetings pursuant to the set-
tlement agreement that were designed to address problems with
the processes and procedures for the Union and its communica-
tions with Sedgwick. Of course, Respondent unlawfully can-
celled that series of meetings in an unlawful manner as well.
Instances of unprofessional behavior in the Union’s emails to
Sedgwick does not remove the Act’s protection of the right of
the Union to engage in meaningful bargaining before an em-
ployer can unilaterally and without bargaining, cease a past
practice and put up barriers to the Union’s right to request in-
formation on a mandatory subject of bargaining. As the Board
has held, “For better or worse, the obligation to bargain also
imposes the obligation to thicken one’s skin and to carry on
even in the face of what otherwise would be rude and unac-
ceptable behavior.” Victoria Packing Corp., 332 NLRB 597,
600 (2000).
9. The agency status of Sedgwick
As previously noted in its Answer, Respondent denied that
Sedgwick’s representatives are its agents within the meaning of
Section 2(13) of the Act. As described below, the facts and law
do not support Respondent’s contention. In this regard, Section
2(13) of the Act provides:

“In determining whether any person is acting as an agent of
another person so as to make such other person responsible
for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts per-
formed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall
not be controlling.”

Based on legislative history, the Board applied common law
principles of agency in determining who is an agent under the
Act. See, Longshoreman ILA (Coastal Stevedoring Co.), 313
NLRB 412, 415 (1993), remanded 56 F.3d 205 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (holding “when applied to labor relations, however,
agency principles must be broadly construed in light of the
legislative policies embedded in the Act.)
It is well established that “a principal is responsible for its
agents conduct if such conduct is within the general scope of
the authority attributed to the agent, even if the principal did
not authorize the particular act.” In other words, if the principal
empowered the agent to represent the principal within the gen-
eral area in which the agent has acted. Bi-Medical Applications
of Puerto Rico, Inc., 269 NLRB 827, 828 (1984).
The burden of proving an agency relationship is on the party
asserting its existence. Using common law principles, an indi-
vidual can be a party’s agent if the individual has either actual
or apparent authority to act on behalf of the party. Apparent
authority results from a manifestation by the principal to a third
party that creates a reasonable basis for the latter to believe the
principle has authorized the alleged agent to perform the acts in
question. Thus, either the principal must intend to cause the
third person to believe the agent is authorized to act for him, or
the principal should realize that this conduct is likely to create
such a belief. Two conditions must be satisfied before apparent
authority is deemed created: (1) there must be some manifesta-
tion by the principal to a third party; and (2) the third party
must believe that the extent of the authority granted to the agent
encompasses the contemplated activity.
Here there can be no doubt that Sedgwick has actual authori-
ty to act for Respondent in regard to the administration of its
STD and WC benefit plan. Respondent’s summary plan de-
scription for its Disability Benefits Program, which is refer-
enced in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, lists
Sedgwick as the plan administrator and fiduciary of that plan.
That plan grants Sedgwick, and its representatives, with the
“power and duty to do all things necessary to carry out” its
terms. Thus, under the plan, Sedgwick maintains “the sole and
absolute discretion to interpret the provisions of the Program,
make findings of fact, determine the rights and status of partici-
pants and others under the Program, and decide disputes under
the Program . . . (which) decisions shall be final and conclusive
on all persons for all purposes of the Program.” The terms of
the plan conclusively confer agency status on Sedgwick, and
the testimony of its supervisor Megan James bolsters that con-
clusion. James testified that the authority to grant or deny STD
and WC claims filed by Respondent’s employees pursuant to
the disability plan has been, at all relevant times, exclusively
delegated by Respondent to Sedgwick; and that Respondent has
authorized Sedgwick representatives to speak to its employees
and to employees’ union representatives regarding the admin-
istration of the plan. James further testified that all of Respond-
ent’s STD and WC claims are administered by Sedgwick; that
employees have no choice but to go through Sedgwick’s repre-
sentatives in order to receive those benefits under the plan; and
that all compensability decisions affecting STD claims filed
under that plan and all initial WC claims are both exclusively
determined by Sedgwick representatives. James further testified
that when Sedgwick denies an employee’s STD related claim,
that employee can only appeal to a separate Sedgwick unit,
known as the Quality Review Unit, who also have the exclusive
jurisdiction to speak with Respondent’s employees and make
the final determination as to whether the employee’s appealed
claim has merit. In sum, an employee can only obtain their STD
and WC benefits by first speaking with and providing infor-
mation to a Sedgwick representative.
Based on the foregoing, at all material times, Sedgwick rep-
resentatives, including Supervisor James and representative
Diane Kunst, have been agents of Respondent within the mean-
ing of Section 2(13) of the Act.
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO. 361
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, SNET, is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 1298, Communication Workers of America, AFL–
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. By failing and refusing to supply the Union with necessary
and relevant information requested in a March 7, 2008 infor-
mation request, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act.
4. By, since on or about December 2008, failing and refusing
to supply the Union with necessary and relevant information
related to pending Workers’ Compensation claims filed by
several unit employees, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act.
5. By, since on or about October 1, 2008, unilaterally and
without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain, refusing
to participate in conference calls mandated by a 2002 settle-
ment agreement with the Union and by past practice, Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
6. By, since on or about January 22, 2009, unilaterally and
without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain, discon-
tinuing the Union’s access to Sedgwick CMS representatives
relating to workers’ compensation issues and claims and there-
after refusing to provide the Union with information related to
workers’ compensation issues and claims, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
7. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Respondent should be ordered to furnish the Union with the
information it requested on March 7, 2008, which is relevant
and necessary to the Union’s duties as statutory representative
of Respondent’s employees. Respondent should be ordered to
rescind its decision to deny the Union access to Sedgwick CMS
representatives for information or issues relating to workers’
compensation claims and restore the status quo existing prior to
January 22, 2009, in this regard. Respondent should be ordered
to provide the Union with information requested since on or
about December 2008 related to workers’ compensation claims
or issues, which information is relevant and necessary to the
Union’s duties as statutory representative of Respondent’s em-
ployees. Respondent should be ordered to rescind its decision
of on or about January 22, 2009, to refuse to supply the Union
with information relating to workers’ compensation claims or
issues and restore the status quo existing prior to that date in
this regard. Respondent should be ordered to, upon request,
participate in conference calls as mandated by the 2002 settle-
ment agreement with the Union. Respondent should be ordered
to, on request, to bargain collectively with the Union, over any
decision to change the past practices and procedures relating to
the Union’s dealings with Sedgwick CMS, including changes in
the manner of requesting and type of information that the Un-
ion may receive relating to workers’ compensation claims and
issues. And finally, Respondent should be ordered to post an
appropriate notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended13
ORDER
The Respondent, Southern New England Telephone Compa-
ny (SNET), New Haven, Connecticut, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
a. Failing and refusing to supply the Union with necessary
and relevant information requested in a March 7, 2008 infor-
mation request.
b. Since, on or about December 2008, failing and refusing to
supply the Union with necessary and relevant information re-
lated to pending workers’ compensation claims filed by several
unit employees.
c. Unilaterally and without affording the Union notice and
an opportunity to bargain, refusing to participate in conference
calls mandated by a 2002 settlement agreement with the Union
and by past practice.
d. Unilaterally and without affording the Union notice and
an opportunity to bargain, discontinuing the Union’s access to
Sedgwick CMS representatives relating to workers’ compensa-
tion issues and claims and thereafter refusing to provide the
Union with information related to workers’ compensation is-
sues and claims.
e. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining
or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
a. Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, furnish the Union
with the information it requested on March 7, 2008, which is
relevant and necessary to the Union’s duties as statutory repre-
sentative of Respondent’s employees.
b. Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, rescind its decision
to deny the Union access to Sedgwick CMS representatives for
information or issues relating to workers’ compensation claims
and restore the status quo existing prior to January 22, 2009, in
this regard.
c. Within 14 days of the Board’s order, furnish the Union
with information requested since on or about December 2008
related to workers’ compensation claims or issues, which in-
formation is relevant and necessary to the Union’s duties as
statutory representative of Respondent’s employees.
d. Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, rescind its decision
of on or about January 22, 2009, to refuse to supply the Union
with information relating to workers’ compensation claims or
issues and restore the status quo existing prior to that date in
this regard.
13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 362
e. Upon request, participate in conference calls as mandated
by the 2002 settlement agreement with the Union.
f. Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union, over
any decision to change the past practices and procedures relat-
ing to the Union’s dealings with Sedgwick CMS, including
changes in the manner of requesting and type of information
that the Union may receive relating to workers’ compensation
claims and issues.
g. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in New Haven, Connecticut, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”14 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 34, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since September
17, 2008.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to supply the Union with the
necessary and relevant information it requested in a March 7,
2008 information request.
WE WILL NOT continue as we have since December 2008 to
fail and refuse to provide the Union with necessary and relevant
information related to pending workers’ compensation claims
filed by Unit members.
WE WILL NOT, unilaterally and without notice and without af-
fording the Union an opportunity to bargain, refuse to partici-
pate in conference calls mandated by a 2002 settlement agree-
ment.
WE WILL NOT, unilaterally and without notice and without af-
fording the Union an opportunity to bargain, discontinue the
Union’s access to Sedgwick CMS representatives relating to
workers’ compensation issues and claims and failing and refus-
ing to provide the Union with information related to workers’
compensation issues and claims.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish the Union with the information it requested
on March 7, 2008.
WE WILL rescind our decision to deny the Union access to
Sedgwick CMS representatives for information relating to
workers’ compensation issues and claims and restore the status
quo in this regard to that which existed prior to January 22,
2009.
WE WILL furnish the Union requested since on or about De-
cember 2008 related workers’ compensation issues or claims.
WE WILL rescind our decision of January 22, 2009, to refuse
to supply the Union with information relating to workers’ com-
pensation issues or claims.
WE WILL, on request, participate in conference calls as man-
dated by the 2002 Settlement Agreement.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the Union
over any decision to change the past practices and procedures
relating to the Union’s dealings with Sedgwick CMS, including
changes in the manner of requesting and the type information
that the Union may receive relating to workers’ compensation
issues or claims.

SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY