The Procter & Gamble Company

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 19, 2020

2019006380 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/160,287 05/20/2016 Walter Pieter Hendrik Laurentius VAN DER KLUGT CM4269MQ 7739
27752 7590 10/19/2020
THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
GLOBAL IP SERVICES
CENTRAL BUILDING, C9
ONE PROCTER AND GAMBLE PLAZA
CINCINNATI, OH 45202
EXAMINER
ROLDAN-RAMOS, CHRISTIAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1723
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
centraldocket.im@pg.com
mayer.jk@pg.com
pair_pg@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte WALTER PIETER HENDRIK, THOMAS TOMBUELT MEYER,
and JAN MICHAEL TRINKAUS

____________

Appeal 2019-006380
Application 15/160,287
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, JEFFREY R. SNAY, and JANE E.
INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges.

INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 requests review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–8.2 We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to the “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies The Procter & Gamble Company as the
real party in interest. Appeal Brief filed March 26, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”) at 1.
2 Final Office Action entered October 31, 2018 (“Final Act.”) at 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant claims a method for forming and transferring fibrous
material to a carrier. Appeal Br. 1–2. Claim 1, the sole pending
independent claim, illustrates the subject matter on appeal, and reads as
follows:
1. A method for forming and transferring fibrous material to
a carrier, the method comprising the steps of:
forming an unbonded fibrous structure into a fibrous
patch by receiving fibrous material on a shell travelling at a
first speed through a receiving zone;
transferring the shell from the receiving zone to an
application zone;
applying the fibrous patch to the carrier travelling at a
second speed through the application zone; and
controlling the speed of the shell by a motor, the motor
comprising a stator and at least one mover; and
wherein the shell is driven by at least one mover, wherein
the mover maintains the shell at the first speed in the receiving
zone and the second speed in the application zone, and wherein
the mover is mounted on a stationary track.

Appeal Br. 4 (Claims Appendix) (emphasis added).
REJECTION
The Examiner maintains the rejection of claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Christian3 in view of Walsh4 in the Examiner’s
Answer entered June 25, 2019 (“Ans.”).

FACTUAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Upon consideration of the evidence relied upon in this appeal and

3 US 2004/0089516 A1, published May 13, 2004.
4 US 2010/0326796 A1, published December 30, 2010.
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each of Appellant’s contentions, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the reasons set forth in the Final
Action, the Answer, and below.
We review appealed rejections for reversible error based on the
arguments and evidence the Appellant provides for each issue the Appellant
identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072,
1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that even if the Examiner had
failed to make a prima facie case, “it has long been the Board’s practice to
require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s
rejections”)).
Appellant presents arguments directed to independent claim 1 only, to
which we accordingly limit our discussion. Appeal Br. 2–3; 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claim 1 requires the recited method for forming and
transferring fibrous material to a carrier to comprise, in part, forming an
unbonded fibrous structure into a fibrous patch by receiving fibrous material
on a shell traveling at a first speed through a receiving zone.
The Examiner finds that Christian discloses a method of forming and
transferring a material to a carrier comprising, in part, forming material web
20 (an unbonded structure) into discrete part 25 (a patch) on shell 50a–d
traveling at a first speed though receiving zone 23. Final Act. 3 (citing
Christian Abstr.; ¶¶ 47; Fig. 1).
Appellant argues that the “cited combination of Christian and Walsh
is not understood to disclose” forming an unbonded fibrous structure into a
fibrous patch by receiving fibrous material on a shell traveling at a first
speed through a receiving zone, and “the Examiner commits error by failing
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to show where the cited combination of Christian and Walsh teach or
suggest” this step of the method of claim 1. Appeal Br. 2.
As the Examiner explains in the Answer, however, the Examiner finds
that paragraph 47 of Christian discloses such a method step. Ans. 7. More
specifically, the Examiner finds that Christian’s disclosure in paragraph 47
of forming material web 20 (an unbonded structure) into discrete part 25 (a
patch) on shell 50a–d traveling at a first speed though receiving zone 23
corresponds to “forming an unbonded fibrous structure into a fibrous patch
by receiving fibrous material on a shell traveling at a first speed through a
receiving zone” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 3, Ans. 7 (citing Christian ¶
47). The Examiner thus identifies particular disclosures in Christian that
correspond to the step at issue in claim 1.
Appellant’s conclusory assertion that “the Examiner commits error by
failing to show where the cited combination of Christian and Walsh teach or
suggest” “forming an unbonded fibrous structure into a fibrous patch by
receiving fibrous material on a shell traveling at a first speed through a
receiving zone” as recited in claim 1 does not explain with any degree of
specificity why one of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood
the corresponding disclosures in Christian identified by the Examiner to
teach or suggest the step at issue in claim 1. Appellant’s assertion, therefore,
does not identify any particular error in the Examiner’s factual findings or
reasoning. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“the brief shall contain . . . . The
arguments of appellant with respect to each ground of rejection, and the
basis therefor, with citations of the statutes, regulations, authorities, and
parts of the Record relied on. The arguments shall explain why the
examiner erred as to each ground of rejection contested by appellant.”)
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(emphasis added); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(explaining that mere lawyer’s arguments or conclusory statements, which
are unsupported by concrete factual evidence, are entitled to little probative
value).
Appellant, therefore, does not identify reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–8, which we accordingly sustain. In re
Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the
function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by
an appellant, looking for nonobvious distinctions over the prior art.”).

CONCLUSION

Claims

35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–8 103 Christian, Walsh 1–8

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED