The Electric Auto-Lite Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 29, 1950

92 N.L.R.B. 1073 (N.L.R.B. 1950)

In the Matter of THE;ELEcTRIc AUTO-LITE COMPANY and MELVIN ECK,
AN INDIVIDUAL
In the Matter of LOCAL 12, INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTO-
MOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA, CIO and MELVIN ECK, AN INDIVIDUAL
Cases Nos. 8-CA-219 and 8-CB-24.-Decided December 29, 1950
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 12, 1950, Trial Examiner Reeves R. Hilton issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of
the Intermediate Report attached hereto:. Thereafter, each of the
Respondents filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a sup-
porting brief. The request on the part of both Respondents for oral
argument is denied as we believe that the issues, the positions of the
parties, and the arguments are adequately reflected in the record and
the briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds
that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the
exceptions and the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner, with the following additions and modifications :
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the Re-
spondent Union, in violation of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act, caused
the Respondent Company to discharge Melvin Eck with respect to
whom membership in the Union had been terminated on some ground
other than his failure to tender the periodic dues uniformly required
as a condition of retaining membership.
As more fully described in the Intermediate Report, Complainant
Eck, an employee of 13 years with the Company, was discharged on
January 28, 1949, allegedly pursuant to the terms of a valid
maintenance-of-membership agreement. The Union requested Eck's
discharge following its suspension of Eck's membership on Decem-
92 NLRB No. 171.
1073
1074 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ber 1, 1948, because of his delinquency in paying certain union charges
accruing as the result of his failure to attend it, number of union
meetings. Whether these charges against Eck are "periodic dues"
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act
presents one of the principal issues in the case.
The Union argues that the charges in question were a proper part
of the regular monthly dues and that only such dues were owing
at the time of Eck's suspension, rather than "fines," as contended
by the General Counsel. Testimony on behalf of the Union indicates
that in September 1946, the membership of the Auto-late Unit' of
the Respondent Union, duly passed a motion increasing the regular
monthly dues from $1.50 to $2, with the further provision, how-
ever, that those members who attended each of the monthly union
meetings would be exonerated, upon appropriate evidence, from the
payment of the additional 50 cents. The minutes of the meeting at
which this resolution was adopted were not introduced in evidence.
In practice, the record shows, the additional charge of 50 cents did
not become due until after a member had failed to attend a meeting.
Those present at the meeting received attendance cards which fur-
nished the basis for their exemption from paying the 50-cent charge.
Significantly, this attendance card indicated that a "50-cent assess-
ment" would be levied for nonattendance. The constitution of the
International Union provides that the dues of each member shall be
$1.50 per month, without indicating that local unions, or any
subordinate body thereof, may increase this amount. The constitu-
tion also specifically authorizes the levying of "fines". for non-
attendance at membership meetings. Upon the basis of such evidence,
the Trial Examiner concluded that the regular monthly dues were
not increased by 50 cents, but that a "fine or assessment" in the same
amount was levied against absentee members. Like the Trial
Examiner, we believe that, regardless of the means adopted to in-
stitute this charge, the necessary and intended effect was to fix a
penalty upon those members who did not attend the monthly meet-
ings. We cannot consider such a charge, with the conditions attached,
as regular monthly dues. In our opinion, it is nothing other than
a fine 2
1 The Auto-Lite Unit, whose membership is confined to the employees of the Company,
is one of approximately 60 such units comprising the amalgamated local which is the
Respondent Union herein . Each such unit is vested with certain autonomous powers
subject to the constitution of the International Union and the bylaws of the Respondent
Union.
2 However , it is not necessary for the decision herein to determine whether the Union's
nonattendance charge is an assessment , as found by the Trial Examiner. Consequently,
we do not adopt the Trial Examiner ' s conclusions as to the illegality of such , or of any,
assessments.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1075
The further position of the Union, as indicated in the testimony,
was that, in any event, the Union had properly applied the monies
checked off from Eck's earnings first to pay his outstanding indebted-
ness in respect to the nonattendance charges, and that therefore, at
the time of his suspension from membership, Eck was delinquent only
in the payment of regular monthly dues. The Trial Examiner did
not discuss or rule upon this aspect of the case.
In such instances involving delinquent members who were subject
to a dues checkoff arrangement,3 the Union invoked a procedure, osten-
sibly authorized by the constitution of the International Union,' in
which it applied the monthly sum checked off the earnings of such
members initially to pay delinquent charges other than the regular
monthly dues. Under this procedure, the delinquent member was
notified by postal card that such action was being taken and that he
should appear immediately at the Union's dues office to "correct his
record." b
Eck had executed a checkoff authorization on September 1, 1947,
instructing the Company to deduct from his earnings each month and
pay over to the Union, "the sum of One Dollar and Fifty Cents," plus
not more than one assessment per year for the International Union,
Local 12, and the Auto-Lite Unit, respectively. Eck had failed to
pay the 50-cent nonattendance charges for a number of months in
1948. On three occasions during this period, the Union sent Eck its
postal card notification that his checked-off funds were being applied to
pay delinquent charges against him. In May and August 1948, Eck
appeared at the office of the Union to adjust his dues record in response
to the Union's notice. However, he failed to appear to make any ad-
justment following the Union's November notice of its application
of his checked-off funds. Thereupon the Union suspended him from
membership on December 1, 1948. His discharge followed.
It cannot be ascribed to mere coincidence that the sum of $1.50
authorized to be checked off from Eck's monthly earnings equalled
8 Authorization for the checkoff of union dues were executed by the employees solely on
a voluntary basis.
The constitution provides , in part, ". . . where a member has failed to pay an assess-
ment within the time required , but has paid dues in advance , the financial secretary of
the Local Union shall apply to the payment of the assessment the dues for the last month
or months covered by the advance dues payment in which event the dues payment for
such month or months shall be automatically cancelled . . In another provision, the
constitution defines "assessment " as "special fees levied by the International Union or
any of its subordinate bodies in accordance with the provisions of this International
Constitution ." It was also provided that dues and assessments are payable on or before
the first day of each month.
The postal card reads :
Dear Member,
In posting your record we are applying the [month ' s] deduction for the payment
of [delinquent charges] in the amount of $ . You will be expected to correct
your record immediately at the Dues Office.
1076 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the amount of the monthly dues provided for in the constitution of
the International Union. The intention was clearly to have deducted
only the monthly dues and the three specified annual assessments.
The fact that the checked-off authorization listed and limited three
annual assessments further indicates that no authorization was in-
tended to be given the Union to apply, at its complete discretion,
Eck's checked-off funds for any and all claims against him. How-
ever, irrespective of whether the International constitution required
that such procedure be followed, or whether Eck executed a blanket
authorization to the Union to apply his checked-off funds, as con-
tended, it is quite evident that such a technique could readily be
utilized by unions to circumvent the provisions of Section 8 (a) (3)
and render meaningless its purpose in limiting enforceable union
security to the collection only of "the periodic dues and initiation
fees." There is no question that a union member is entitled to pay,
if he wishes, all financial claims against him by his union, whether
or not the claims can be enforced by discharge under the terms of
Section 8 (a) (3). But to give substance to the statute and carry out
the declared intent of Congress, we are impelled to the conclusion that
an employee's willingness to pay to the union charges other than the
regular monthly dues may not be inferred from any blanket checkoff
authorization or union constitutional provision, but should be evi-
denced by clear and specific authorization as to each such charge.
Therefore, we cannot recognize or give effect to any procedure
whereby employee payments to a union intended to be applied for
regular monthly dues are diverted to pay other union claims against
the employee, unless each specific union claim for purposes other than
the regular monthly dues is clearly authorized by the employee to be
checked off his earnings,e or the employee authorizes the union spe-
cifically in each instance to apply fluids checked off for regular
monthly dues to pay other charges.
In the present situation, we do not regard Eck's adjustment of his
dues record in May and August 1948, in compliance with the Union's
notice of application of his checked-off funds, as a general acquies-
cence on his part in the Union's procedure and a binding authoriza-
tion to the Union to make similar applications of his checked-off funds
in the future.? We find, accordingly, that at the time of Eck's sus-
9In which case the checked-off sums would be subject to the provisions of Section 302
of Title II of the Act, but would not present any matter for unfair labor practice litiga-
tion. Salant & Selant, 88 NLRB 816.
7 Eck's dues deducted for the month of June had been applied by the Union, in part, to
pay the 1947 Labor Day parade assessment of $1. As noted, Eck made adjustment at
the union office in August at which time he paid to the Union, over and above his checked-
off dues the sum of $1.50. The Union's application of payment having been improper and
hence, ineffectual , the necessary effect of Eck 's additional payment in August served at
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1077
pension from membership he was delinquent only in the payment of
fines for failure to attend certain union meetings."
2. The basic issue must therefore be resolved, whether the Union's
charge for nonattendance at membership meetings, as a fine, is en-
compassed within the term "periodic dues" in Section 8 (a) (3) and
8 (b) (2) of the Act, and is thus protected thereunder.
Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) prohibit the discharge of an em-
ployee under a union-security agreement where union membership
was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee
to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Without passing upon the Trial Examiner's analysis of the legisla-
tive history, we are able to reach the same conclusion on a reading
and application of the clear terms of the statute, i. e., that the term
"periodic dues" does not encompass the nonattendance fine here in
question.
The statute specifies that the "periodic dues" be "uniformly re-
quired." This we read essentially to include the requirement that such
dues be charged to all members alike or that any distinctions in amount
be based upon reasonable general classifications. A charge which
distinguishes between individual members who attend particular meet-
ings and those who do not attend particular meetings, in our opinion,
is not one "uniformly" applied. Moreover, we do not doubt that a
member's attendance at a union meeting is highly desirable and salu-
tary to carry out-the democratic process. But, as we have already
held ,0 the Act as written may not be used as a means of requiring such
attendance. The Act's machinery is equally unavailable to enforce the
collection of a fine to accomplish this union objective.
The Union argues, in effect, that its constitution defines member-
ship dues to include such a fine,10 and that therefore the nonattendance
fee was levied as a "due," which fact was within the knowledge of all
parties including Eck and the Respondent Company. We must reject,
least to cancel out the $1 Labor Day parade assessment . Thus, we need not determine
whether such parade assessment constitutes "periodic dues."
8 To our dissenting . colleague who fails to see what our decision here serves to accomplish
other than to require the Union to engage in "detailed bookkeeping" and "innumerable cash
transactions," we point first to our function to carry out the intention of Congress as
expressed in the statute rather than to seek abstract accomplishment . But, in any case,
the manifest achievement of the majority opinion, while serving the clear intent of Con-
gress , is indeed a salutary one in this particular regard, in requiring the Union to make
unmistakably plain to all concerned whether it is properly increasing its dues rather than
by indirect means, adopting a procedure for levying fines which are outside the sanction
of Section 8 (a) (3).
9 Union Starch & Refining Company , 87 NLRB 779.
10 Membership dues are defined in the constitution, inter atia, as "special fees levied by
the International Union or any of its subordinate bodies . . . .
1078 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union's definition as determinative of the intrinsic meaning of
the statutory term "periodic dues." We note that the constitutional
definition here advanced was initially adopted by the International
Union in 1947, shortly after the enactment of the Labor Management
Relations Act. The International could not by the simple expedient
of altering a definition bring within the statute's limiting words
"periodic dues and initiation fees," all of the various fines and assess-
ments theretofore applied against its membership. We conclude,
therefore, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Union's charges against
Eck for his failure to attend membership meetings were not "periodic
dues uniformly required as a condition for retaining membership";
that the Union suspended Eck from membership and caused the Com-
pany to discharge Eck because he failed to pay such charges; and
that, by such conduct, the Union violated Section 8 (b) (2) and 8 (b)
(1) (A) of the Act.
3. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent Com-
pany cannot "justify" its discrimination against Eck under the pro-
visions of Section 8 (a) (3) (B). It is already established that the
Respondent Company regularly checked off from Eck's earnings and
paid over to the Union, sums sufficient to pay all of the Union's claims
against Eck for "periodic dues." On the basis of such knowledge by
the Company, we find, like the Trial Examiner, that the Company
did have "reasonable grounds for believing" that Eck's membership
was terminated 11 for reasons other than his failure "to tender the
periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership." 12
The Remedy
We have found, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent
Company discriminated against Melvin Eck and that the Respondent
Union caused the Respondent Company to discriminate against Eck.
Therefore, as recommended by the Trial Examiner, we shall order
the Respondent Company to offer Eck immediate reinstatement to
his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to
his seniority or other rights and privileges.1.3
11 We construe the term "terminated" necessarily to encompass the suspension of a
. member from good standing, as in the case of Eck.
12 The Trial Examiner found, in effect, that union-security provisions could be enforced
under the Act only as to those financial charges of a union against a member which
accrued during the term of the current contract. As such a conclusion is not necessary
to a determination of the case, we do not pass upon it.
13 In its brief, the Company advised the Board that Eck had been reinstated to his
former position a day or two after the hearing. As this fact is not established in the
:record itself, we shall nevertheless order that Eck be reinstated with back pay. Such
order cannot result in prejudice, if Eck has, in fact, been properly reinstated.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1079
As we have found that both Respondents are responsible for the
discrimination against Eck, in accordance with the Trial Examiner's
recommendation, we shall order the Respondents jointly. and severally
to make Eck whole for the loss of pay that he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against him 14 However, the Board has
recently held 15 that a union may relieve itself from further back-pay
liability by notifying the employer in writing that it has no objection
to the reinstatement of discriminatorily discharged employees. We
therefore provide that the Respondent Union shall not be liable for any
back pay accruing 5 days after the submission of such notice.
We shall also conform the back-pay order recommended by the
Trial Examiner with formula promulgated in F. W. Woolworth Com-
pany, 90 NLRB 289, for the reasons stated therein, by ordering
that the loss of pay on the part of Eck be computed on the basis of
each separate calendar quarter or portion thereof during the period
from the Respondent Company's discriminatory action to the date of
a proper offer of reinstatement. The quarterly periods, hereinafter
called quarters, shall begin with the first day of January, April, July,
and October. Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a
sum equal to that which Eck would normally have earned for each
such quarter or portions thereof, his net earnings,'6 if any, in other
.employment during that period. Earnings in one particular quarter
shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter.
We shall further order, in accordance with the Woolworth decision,
supra, that the Respondent Company, upon request, make available to
the Board and its agents all pertinent records.
The Trial Examiner recommended that a broad cease and desist
order be entered against the Respondent Union. However, as it
appears that the Respondent Union's violation consisted only in
misapprehension as to the applicability of a union-security agreement
under the peculiar facts here present, which does not suggest the like-
lihood of the commission of other unfair labor practices in the future,
we shall confine our cease and desist order to the unfair labor practices
found, and any like or related conduct.''
14 Acme Mattress Company Inc., 91 NLRB 1010.
" See Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., 90 NLRB 205.
1e By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses, such as for transportation, room.,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the Respondent Company, which would not have been incurred but for
the unlawful discrimination and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment
elsewhere. See Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440. Monies received for work
performed upon Federal, State, county, municipal , or other work-relief projects shall be
considered as earnings. See Republic Steel Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7.
21 New York Shipbuilding Corporation, 89 NLRB 1446.
1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board orders that :
A. The Respondent Company, The Electric Auto-Lite Company,
Toledo, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Encouraging membership in Local 12, International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees,
by discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of their employment;
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Melvin Eck immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges;
(b) Jointly and severally with the Respondent Union, make him
whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the section
entitled "The Remedy," in the Intermediate Report attached hereto;
(c) Upon request, make available to the National Labor Relations
Board, or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, time cards, personnel records and
reports, and all other records necessary for a determination of the
amount of back pay due and the right of reinstatement under the
terms of this Order;
(d) Post at its plant at Toledo, Ohio, copies of the notice attached
hereto and marked Appendix A.18 Copies of said notice to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, shall, after
being duly signed by the Respondent Company's representative, be
posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for
a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to employees are cus-
18 In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted in the notice , before the words "A Decision and Order," the words,
"A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
THE ELECTRIC AUTO- LITE COMPANY 1081
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
Company to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material;
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Decision and Order what
steps the Respondent Company has taken to comply therewith.
B. The Respondent Union, Local 12, International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica, CIO, Toledo, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Causing or attempting to cause The Electric Auto-Lite Com-
pany, or any other emmployer, to discriminate against an employee in
violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act;
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees
of The Electric Auto-Lite Company, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Jointly and severally with the Respondent Company make
whole Melvin Eck for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason
of the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the
section entitled "The Remedy" of the Intermediate Report attached
hereto ;
(b) Post at its offices at Toledo, Ohio, and post, or offer to post at
the plant, of The Electric Auto-Lite Company of the same place,
copies of the notice attached hereto and marked Appendix B.19
Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for
the Eighth Region shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent
Union's representative, be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof and be maintained by it for a period of at least sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps.
shall be taken by the Respondent Union to insure that such notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Copies
of the notice shall be posted or attempted to be posted at the plant
of the Respondent Company and maintained in the fashion set out
above;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighth Region in writing
within ten (10) days from the receipt of this Decision and Order
what steps it has taken to comply therewith.
19 Ibid.
929979-51-vol. 92-70
1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER STYLES , dissenting :
I would find no violation here. I am convinced on the basis of
all the evidence that Eck was suspended from union membership
and thereafter discharged under the valid union-security clause be-
cause he was delinquent only in the payment of his regular monthly
dues. It is beyond dispute that such dues come within the term
"periodic dues" in the proviso to Section 8 (a) (3) and that, therefore,
Eck's discharge was not proscribed by that section.
We all agree that Eck's union membership was suspended and his
employment terminated because he was delinquent in his financial
obligations to the Union. But what did Eck owe at the time of his
suspension? On the evidence before us I can only conclude that
Eck was in arrears with respect to the basic $1.50 a month in dues,
since the Union-in a manner I regard as wholly proper-had already
credited Eck with respect to the additional 50 cents per month arising
out of his nonattendance at meetings. Thus, however we may regard
the additional 50 cents per month, the plain fact is that it was not
delinquency in that regard that provoked Eck's.discharge.
I reach this conclusion on the basis of the following considerations.
As substantially detailed in the Intermediate Report and the majority
opinion, it is undisputed that in May, June, and November 1948, the
Union formally notified Eck, under the long-etablished procedure,
that it was applying monies checked off from his earnings to cover
his indebtedness resulting particularly from his failure to attend
certain union meetings. On two of these occasions, i. e., in May
and August, Eck appeared at the union dues office and made adjust-
ment of his dues record. It was Eck's failure to respond to the
Union's November application notice that brought about his sus-
pension from membership on December 1, 1948. His discharge was
not finally effected until January 28, 1949, and until such date Eck
had full notice and opportunity to settle his dues record with
the Union.
Moreover, in my view, the Union's authority to make such applica-
tion of checked-off funds is unassailable. Eck had executed a checkoff
authorization to the Company to deduct "the sum of One Dollar and
Fifty Cents," without specifying the purpose therefor.20 Proper
20 I take issue with the opinion of the majority that the intention of the checkoff authori-
zation was to have deducted only the monthly dues and the specified annual assessments.
First, the checkoff authorization must be read in conjunction with the constitutional
provision, recited in the text below, permitting the Union to apply advance payments of
dues against other delinquent charges. Secondly, the wording of the authorization is
plain, and its plain meaning indicates that it must have been intended for just such a
purpose as the Union's application of the deducted sum to pay charges other than regular
monthly dues. It is significant to me that the three annual assessments were carefully
specified in the checkoff authorization while the purpose of the monthly $1.50 deduction
was very carefully left open.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1083
authorization to apply these checked-off funds to pay the delinquent
charges before that of the current monthly dues was contained in the
constitution of the International Union, which provided, in part:
Where a member has failed to pay an assessment within
the time required, but has paid dues in advance, the Financial
Secretary of the Local Union shall apply to the payment of the
assessment the dues for the last month or months covered by.
the advance dues payment in which event the dues payment for
such month or months shall be automatically cancelled. .21
[Emphasis added.]
Dues are specifically made payable on or before the first day of
each month. My colleagues maintain, nonetheless, that checked-off
dues are not "advance payments." The above-quoted provision of
the constitution would make no sense if this were so. One would
hardly expect delinquent members to make advance payments leaving
their past delinquencies unpaid. Moreover, since 1946 the Union has
been applying checked-off dues under the authority of this constitu-
tional provision. Thus, the construction placed upon this provision
by the parties themselves demonstrates that checked-off dues were
viewed as advance payments.22
As a member of the Union, Eck implicitly acquiesced in and was
subject to the provisions of the constitution. Furthermore, Eck spe-
cifically acquiesced in this procedure when he readily responded in
all previous instances to the Union's notice of application and ad-
justed his dues record. Indeed, the record here shows that even as to
the Union's application of his checked-off funds again in November
preliminary to his suspension, Eck had no real objection. On January
28, 1949, after his discharge had already been effected, he attempted
to settle his dues record, as he had in past instances, but this time lie
was too late .23 His own testimony shows that his failure to pay the
delinquent charges this time resulted only from a mistake on his part
as to the final date of grace available to him under the established
union-security procedure. It is well settled in common law that such
acquiescence by Eck provided sufficient ground to bind him to the
"It is not disputed that the definition of "assessment" in the constitution , noted in
footnote 4, supra, , would include the nonattendance charge here involved.
a In case of doubt, a contract interpretation given by the parties themselves will be
adopted by the court . E. g., Barnett v. West Coast Company, 69 F. 2d 266 (C. A. 50 - See
also Restatement of Contracts , Sec. 235.
za The record discloses that Eck has been suspended from membership for dues delin-
quencies on at least two previous occasions but had settled his accounts with the Union
during the period of grace afforded employees before discharge.
1084 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Union's application of his checked-off funds under the particulars
herein.2'
As the majority admits, there can be no challenge of Eck's right to
pay any of the charges the Union levied against him, regardless of
their enforceability under the Act. Conceding this, it becomes im-
material how Ecic exercised his right to pay, if such was the legal
effect of his action. Nothing explicit in the Act or in its legislative
history can be construed to proscribe the union procedure, as utilized
in this case, of applying checkoff funds to pay charges other than the
regular monthly dues. My colleagues are alarmed by the possibility
that unions may, if allowed, seize upon such a procedure as a device
to circumvent the intendment of Section 8 (a) (3). However, if in
conjectural situations, unions might adopt such a procedure, clearly
legal in itself, to collect charges not includable in the term "periodic
dues" in Section 8 (a) (3), and this appears to contravene the ob-
jective of the statute, the remedy lies with Congress. These possibili-
ties do not privilege the Board to lay down rules, as my colleagues
undertake to do, stringently limiting unions in the allocation of funds
in their possession. The Board is not empowered to effectuate even a
most salutary policy by "administrative amendment of the statute." 25
In view of these considerations, therefore, I conclude that all that
Eck owed when he was suspended from membership related to the
basic $1.50 monthly dues, which, beyond doubt, were "periodic dues"
within the meaning of the proviso to Section 8 (a) (3).
But I would reach the result that the Act was not violated in this
case even if I were to concede that the Union was not free to credit
Eck's payments against the obligations arising out of his failure to
attend union meetings. For, in my opinion, even if we must assume
that Eck's delinquency included the 50 cents per month charged for
failure to attend meetings, that charge was not a fine, but was a part of
the regular monthly dues.
The Respondent Union introduced evidence of a duly adopted
resolution increasing the regular monthly dues from $1.50 to $2 with
the further provision that members attending union meetings would be
exonerated in each instance from paying the additional 50 cents. This
was proper, probative evidence which was umcontroverted by the Gen-
eral Counsel.
24 Generally , the application of payment for a designated purpose cannot be diverted
by a creditor without the consent of the debtor. But the latter will be bound thereby
if by acquiescence or other acts he indicates his acceptance of the condition or his
ratification of the creditor 's application . See 48 Corpus Juris 464 ; The Quickstep, 227
Fed. 355.
21 Colgate -Palmolive-Peet Co. v. N. L. R. B., 338 U. S. 355.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1085
The fact, mentioned by the Trial Examiner and my colleagues in
the majority, that the meeting minutes evidencing this resolution were
not introduced in the record does not serve to refute the established
fact that the resolution was adopted , as testified . Nor do the other
factors relied upon by the Trial Examiner and the majority: (a) It
is true that the Company was never notified by the Union of the dues
increase ; but no reason appears in the contract or elsewhere why the
Company should have been so advised formally. Checkoff authori-
zations were not required of the members nor was the regular deduction
limited specifically to the fixed monthly dues. (b) The Trial Ex-
aminer's statement that the Union never collected monthly dues, as
such, in the increased amount does not fairly reflect the facts. The
uncontested evidence shows that the Union did collect the increase in
dues, in many cases for periods substantially in advance of their due
date. ( c) My colleagues point to the provisions in the constitution of
the International Union (1) that monthly membership dues shall be
$1.50, and ( 2) that "fines" may be levied for nonattendance at member-
ship meetings . But the mere existence of the latter provision cannot
preclude a proper increase in dues by the Union or alter the fact that
it had done so. Nor is there any indication in the former constitutional
provision, or elsewhere , that local unions or subordinate bodies of the
International may not increase the dues above the normal or base
sum of $1.50 provided by the International .26 (d) That the Union
chose to suspend collection of the increase in dues until after the union
meeting for a particular month , as a realistic matter must be assigned
to the Union 's desire for convenience and efficiency, and does not alter
the legal effect of the adopted resolution increasing the dues. Likewise,
the reference to "a 500 assessment" on the attendance card given to
members present at union meetings is perhaps an inaccurate choice,
of language by the Union but as a matter of evidence , is not competent
to controvert the testimony that a motion to increase the dues was
duly adopted.
Notwithstanding this evidence , the Trial Examiner, with my col-
leagues now assenting , is able to conclude-as a fact-that the regular
monthly dues were not increased , but rather that a "fine" had been
levied against absentee members. With this I cannot agree. True,
26 Cf . Arbitration Award of Clarence M. Updegra f re John Deere Waterloo Tractor
Works, (June 26, 1950), 14 LA 910, which held that a strike assessment voted at a
UAW-CIO convention levying the sum of $1 per member upon the locals, which the locals
in turn added to the monthly claim against the members, constituted dues required to be
checked off by the Company. The arbitrator reasoned that the provision for dues of $1.50
in the UAW-CIO constitution (which is the same constitution here in question) indicated
only the "normal" dues, thus implying that such dues may legally be expanded by the
International Union or by a local under particular circumstances.
1086 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
one may say that the effect of the increase in dues, with the provision
for conditional exoneration appended, was to penalize absentee mem-
bers, but this does not make it a "fine," for with equal logic the ar-
rangement may be viewed as a reward to members who attended the
meetings. Indeed, it is clear that the intention was so to induce
membership attendance.27
But, however the arrangement may be viewed, it is clear to me
that it was accomplished by virtue of a dues increase and whatever
may be the other restrictions of Section 8 (a) (3) respecting the en-
forcement of union-security agreements, that section clearly places no
limitation upon a union increasing its regular monthly dues. This the
Union has legally done in the present case. Nor does the Act operate
to restrict the common trade union practice of exonerating members
from the payment of financial charges for particular reasons.' And
here the Union's power to exonerate members from financial charges
against them was specifically provided for in the International con-
stitution.28 In fact, my colleagues concede that a proper increase in
dues on the part of the Union and the granting of a rebate to members
who attend meetings, would serve as a valid defense to the discharge.
This being so, it appears that the only thing the majority decision
accomplishes is to require the Union to undergo the needless burden
and expense of installing and maintaining a detailed bookkeeping
system and engaging in innumerable cash transactions. Thus, by
collecting the $2 before the monthly meetings and then returning
the 50 cents to those who attended the meeting, the Union would
perhaps have made its purpose clearer, but. the result would be the
same as is now in effect.
I would, therefore, have reversed the Trial Examiner's factual
finding that the dues were not increased, and on that ground, as well
as the ground discussed above, dismiss the complaint.
MEMBER HOUSTON took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
"To me it is plain that the insurance of democratic control of a union depends upon
the full participation of its memlership.
28 This constitutional provision reads : "where Local Unions deem it necessary they may
exonerate certain members from the payment of dues to the Local Union. However, such
members, with the exception of those holding gratuitous life membership, shall be &dtl-
sidered as dues-paying members and per capita tax shall be paid on such members."
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1087
WE WILL NOT encourage membership in LoCAL 12, INTER-
NATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICUL-
TURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, or in any other
labor organization of our employees, by discriminatorily dis-
charging any of our employees or discriminating in any manner
in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any terms or
conditions of employment.
WE wnLL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the right to refrain from
any or all of the concerted activities guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organi-
zation as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8
( a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Melvin Eck immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent position without prej-
udice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as the
result of the discrimination against him.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from
becoming or remaining, members in good standing of the above-
named union or any other labor organization except to the extent that
this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with
Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended Act.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY,
Employer.
By ---------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title) -
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the date
hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL 12, INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA, CIO, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE ELECTRIC AUTO-
LITE COMPANY, TOLEDO, OHIO
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
1088 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause THE ELECTRIC AUTO-
LITE COMPANY, its agents, successors, or assigns, to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against employees because they are not
members in good standing in LOCAL 12, INTERNATIONAL UNION,
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS of AMERICA, CIO, or in any other manner cause or
attempt to cause that Company, its agents, successors, or assigns,
otherwise to discriminate against its employees in violation of
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce
employees of THE ELECTRIC AuTo-LITE COMPANY, in the exercise
of their rights to refrain from any or all of the concerted activities
guaranteed to them by Section 7, except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as author-
ized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL make Melvin Eck whole for any loss of pay he may
have suffered because of the discrimination against him.
LOCAL 12, INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICUL-
TURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMER-
ICA, CIO,
Union.
By --------------------------- ----------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the date
hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Messrs. Bernard Ness and Carroll L. Martin for the General Counsel.
James P. Falvey, of Toledo, Ohio, for the Company.
Lovell Goerlich, of Toledo, Ohio, for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed by Melvin Eck, an individual, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board; by the Regional Director of the Eighth
Region (Cleveland, Ohio), issued his complaints dated January 16, 1950, against
The Electric Auto-Lite Company, herein called the Company or the Respondent
Company, and Local 12, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, herein called the Union or
i The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing are called herein the Gen•
eral Counsel; the National Labor Relations Board is called the Board,
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1089'
the Respondent Union, alleging that the Respondent Company and the Respond-
ent Union had engaged in and were engaging in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and ( 3) and Section 8 (b) (1)
(A) and ( 2), respectively , and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 49 Stat . 449, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947 , 61 Stat. 136 , herein called the Act or the amended Act. The Regional
Director duly issued an order consolidating the cases for hearing . Copies of
the complaints , the charges , the order of consolidation , and notice of hearing
were duly served upon the parties.
With respect to the unfair labor practices , the complaint in Case No. 8-CA-219
alleged in substance that the Respondent Company, at the request of the Respond-
ent Union , discharged and thereafter refused to reinstate Eck because of his
nonmembership in the Union , although the Respondent Company had reasonable
grounds for believing that his membership was terminated for reasons other
than failure to tender periodic union dues, and thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1)
and (3 ) of the Act . With respect to Case No . 8-CB-24, the complaint alleged
in substance that the Respondent Union by causing the Company to discharge
Eck because of his nonmembership therein ., when his membership had been ter-
minated for reasons other than failure to tender periodic dues, violated Section
8 (b) (1) (A ) and (2 ) of the Act.
In its duly filed answer , the Respondent Company admitted that it discharged
Eck at the demand of the Union because of his failure to pay dues to the Union,
but denied that it had reasonable grounds for believing that the Respondent
Union had terminated Eck's membership therein for reasons other than the
failure of Eck to tender periodic dues to the Union. The Respondent Union, in
its answer , entered a general denial that it had engaged in unfair labor practices
as alleged . in the complaint ; as an affirmative defense the Respondent Union
averred that the allegations in the complaint alleging that it has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act
are barred by the Statute of Limitations and further that the final discharge
of Eck was the sole action of the Respondent Company. Both Respondents
denied the commission of unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at Toledo, Ohio, on February 28, 1950,
before the undersigned Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial
Examiner . The General Counsel, the Respondent Company and the Respondent
Union were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing . Full oppor-
tunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence bear-
ing upon the issues was afforded to all parties . At the close of the General
Counsel 's case-in-chief , a motion by the Respondent Union to dismiss the com-
plaint, for lack of proof , was denied. At the close of the hearing , motions by
the Respondents, respectively , to dismiss the complaint, were taken under ad-
visement and are now denied for the reasons appearing in the findings of facts
and conclusions of law made below. After the taking of evidence the Trial
Examiner granted, without objection , the General Counsel's motion to conform
the pleadings to the proof in respect to matters of form. All parties waived oral
argument before the Trial Examiner at the close of the hearing , and the Re-
spondents and the General Counsel, respectively , have filed briefs with the
undersigned.
As stated above, the Respondent Union, as part of its affirmative defense,
alleged in its answer that the relief sought by the complaint is barred by the
1090 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Statute of Limitations particularly in respect to the alleged violation of Section
8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. While the Respondent Union did not urge the fore-
going as the basis for either of its motions to dismiss made at the hearing, the
affirmative defense is now considered and treated as a motion to dismiss, which
motion is hereby denied for the following reasons. The original charge, alleging
violation of Section 8 (b) (2) was duly filed on June 15, 1949, and a copy thereof
served upon the Respondent Union the same day. Subsequently, on January
16, 1950, a second amended charge was filed and served upon the Union which
reiterated the previous unfair labor practices and further alleged that by reason
of such conduct the Respondent Union violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) as well
as Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act. The complaint was based upon the second
amended charge and the allegations therein refer only to unfair labor practices
occurring within 6 months preceding the filing of the original charge, hence
the complaint is not subject to dismissal on the ground that the second amended
charge was not timely filed and served as provided in Section 10 (b) of the Act 2
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT COMPANY
The Respondent Company is an Ohio corporation and maintains its principal
office and plant at Toledo, Ohio, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of automobile accessories. In the conduct of its operations the
Company, at its Toledo plant, annually purchases raw materials of an approxi-
mate value in excess of $500,000 of which in excess of 50 percent is shipped to the
Company's plant from places outside the State of Ohio. The Company annually
sells and delivers finished products having a value in excess of $500,000, of which
in excess of 50 percent is sold and delivered to customers outside the State of
Ohio. The parties stipulated at the hearing that the Company is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 12, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, CIO, is a labor organization admitting to mem-
bership employees of the Respondent Company.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The certification of the Respondent Union and its agreement with the Company
On August 3, 1948, the Company and the "Auto-Lite Unit" of the Respondent
Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of 2
years. The signatories to this agreement are the Company, the officers of the
Auto-Lite Unit, and the Regional Director of the International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO,
herein called the International Union. While the Union raised no objection to
its being named as a party Respondent in its answer or at the hearing, the Union
now urges that since its representatives did not execute the agreement it "is not
the offending union," in this proceeding. This contention is rejected.
2 Cathey Lumber Company, 86 NLRB 157; Jaques Power Saw Company, 85 NLRB 440.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1091
In December 1938, the Board certified 3 the Respondent Union as the exclusive
representative of the Company's production and nonproduction factory employees,
with. certain exclusions, for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
wages, hours of employment, and other, conditions of employment. Thereafter,
the Company and the Union executed agreements, which, since 1942, have con-
tinuously provided that employees shall become and remain members of the Union.
The Respondent Union is an "amalgamated local" composed of about 60 Units,
including the Auto-Lite Unit. Each Unit thereof is restricted to members em-
ployed in a particular manufacturing unit or by a particular company. Member-
ship in the Unit constitutes membership in the Respondent Union and applicants
for membership must be approved by majority vote of the appropriate unit
members. The Auto-Lite Unit (herein sometimes called the Unit) has approxi-
mately 5,000 members, all of whom are employed by the Company in the bar-
gaining unit mentioned above. The Unit, except as limited by the constitution
,of the International Union and the bylaws of the Respondent Union, is autono-
mous in matters concerning the Unit and elects officers, conducts bargaining
negotiations, processes grievances, and polices its agreements. The unit agree-
ments, however, must be approved by the International Union. In addition. the
Respondent Union maintains the unit membership records, collects dues • and
:assessments from- the- Company or the unit member and remits such monies to
the unit. The Respondent Union alone is responsible for the administration of
the unit agreement with respect to the check-off of dues and maintenance-of-
membership provisions. Admittedly, the officers of the Unit have not complied
with the noncommunist affidavit requirements of Section 9 (h) of the Act.
On July 16, 1948, the Board, pursuant to a petition ° filed by the International
Union, issued its certification that the Union was authorized to make an agree-
ment with the Company requiring membership therein as a condition of em-
ployment, in conformity with the provisions of the Act.
The foregoing indicates that while original Board certification was directed
only to the Respondent Union, the Union in performing its dut'es as the bar-
gaining representative of the Company's employees found it expedient to utilize
to a certain degree the services of both the Auto-Lite Unit and the International
Union. In doing so the Union was merely conducting its internal affairs in the
manner it desired, which it had the right to do, and clearly there was no indica-
tion that the Union intended to abandon or to assign the rights granted to it
under the Board certification to any other labor organization.. On the contrary
the Respondent Union, concedes that it is responsible for the administration and
-enforcement of the union-security provisions in the agreement which provisions
constitute the principal issue in this case. It is therefore found that the Union
is the proper party Respondent.
B. The discharge of Ecle
On January 28, 1949, the Company, at the request of the Union discharged
Eck because of his alleged failure to maintain membership in good standing in
10 NLRB 665.
Case No. 8-UA-994. The petition averred that the Respondent Union was the recog-
nized or certified bargaining agent for the employees in the unit described therein. Fol-
lowing the filing of the petition an election was conducted among the employees upon the
question, as stated in the ballot, as to whether they desired to authorize the International
Union to enter into an agreement with the Company which required membership in the
Union as a condition of continued employment.
1092 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union pursuant to the terms of then existing agreement between the Com-
pany and the Union. The pertinent provision of the agreement is as follows :
For the duration of this contract, it is agreed that all employees covered
by the contract who are members of the Union in good standing at the execu-
tion of this contract, and employees who may thereafter become members,
shall, as a condition of employment, remain members of the Union in good
standing as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the Union. Before
a dismissal becomes effective in the case of a member who is not in good
standing because of delinquency in the payment of dues, the employee will
be given an opportunity on the first occurrence only to reinstate himself in
good standing within two (2) weeks from the date dismissal is requested
by the Union.
The clause further provides that any request to the Company for a dismissal
shall contain a certification by the Union that the employee involved was a
member in good standing on the effective date of the agreement or subsequently
became a member thereof, and any dispute concerning the "good standing" of
any member shall be referred to the United States Conciliation Service for final
settlement.
The General Counsel does not contend that the agreement is invalid but
asserts that Eck was discharged because of his nonmembership in the Union
when the Company had reasonable grounds for believing his membership was
terminated for reasons other than Eck's failure to tender periodic union dues.
The Respondents urge that Eck was dismissed because of his failure to pay
dues to the Union.
At the time of his discharge Eck was working as a machine operator, in the
unit covered by the agreement, and had been in the employ of the Company
for about 13 years. He became a member of-the Union shortly after he was
first employed and was a member in good standing in August 1948, when the
agreement was executed. On September 1, 1947, Eck authorized the Company,
in writing, to deduct monthly union dues and assessments from his earnings
and to pay over these amounts to the Union. Thereafter, the Company, through
January 1949, regularly deducted from Eck's wages the sum of $1.50 per month
for union dues which it paid monthly to the Union. In addition, the Company
made deductions covering various union assessments' as set forth in the
authorization.
During December 1948, Eck received a form postal card from the Union inform-
ing him that 1 months' dues deduction had been applied to the payment of union
fines levied against him and requested Eck to immediately report to the union
office and correct the matter. Eck admitted he failed to attend 3 meetings
between August and November 1948. Although Eck had received a similar, but
not identical, notice from the Union in 1947, which he adjusted,' he failed to
contact the Union as requested in the notice mentioned above. Thereafter, on
January 12, 1949, the Respondent Union, through Randolph Gray, its financial
secretary, addressed a letter to the Company stating that Eck and about 80
5 The Company deducted and paid over to the Respondent Union the following assess-
ments, each in the sum of $1 ; October 12, 1947, and December 12, 1948, Auto-Lite Unit ;
March 7, 1948, Respondent Union ; and May 9, 1948, International Union.
6 Eck admitted he was suspended in June 1947, but that he went to the union office and
paid the "fine." Since Eck continued to work after this date his membership in good
standing was obviously restored.
4 All subsequent dates refer to 1949 , unless otherwise stated.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1093
other employees were "delinquent in the payment of their dues" and requested
their dismissal. under the maintenance-of-membership clause. In the letter,
the Union "certified" that Eck and the other individuals were members of the
Union in good standing when the contract was signed. Upon receipt of this
communication, the Company notified Eck, by letter dated January 14, that the
Union had requested his discharge because of delinquency in his union dues and
advised Eck that he had a 2-week grace period, commencing January 12, in
which to correct his delinquency. A copy of the maintenance-of-membership
provision was enclosed with the letter. Admittedly, the letter with the enclosure
was delivered to Eck's home on January 15. Since the letter, according to Eck,
granted a 2-week grace period, he "figured" this period commenced from the
date of delivery of the letter rather than January 12 as stated therein and de-
clared it was his intention to go to the union office at the conclusion of his
work on January 28 for the purpose of adjusting his delinquency. In the mean-
time, the Company, on January 19, informed the Union in writing that it had
sent a "two weeks' notice" letter to Eck and subsequently, the Union, by letter
dated January 2d, advised the Company that Eck's "delinquency" had not been
corrected as of that date. Upon receipt of this letter the Company discharged
Eck as of January 27 and so notified the Union on January 31. Eck did not
work on January 27 but when he reported the morning of January 28, he was
told by his foreman, Busdecker, that his "timecard had been pulled" and that
he was discharged. At the direction of Busdecker, Eck went to the Company's
employment office where he was informed that he had been discharged but the
reason therefor was not given to him. Several days later, however, Eck re-
ceived a written notice from the Company stating that he had been "Discharged
for non-payment of union dues." On the morning of his discharge, Eck went to
the office of the Union and asked Gray and the union cashier why the Union
considered him delinquent in dues, as stated in the union card of December 1948,
when the Company had deducted monthly dues regularly from his earnings in
accordance with his written authorization. Gray explained that Eck was $1.50
in arrears because the Union had applied 1 months' dues to the payment of
fines in an equal amount, levied by the Union by reason of his failure to attend
union meetings. Eck thereupon offered to pay his "meeting fines," which offer
the Union rejected. On the same clay Eck gave the above union card to a
committee member of the Auto-Lite Unite but the circumstances under which
this occurred are not stated. Sometime in the early part of February, Eck met
with the committee of the Auto-Lite Unit and Gray for the purpose of discussing
his discharge and during the course of the meeting Eck again inquired of Gray
as to how the Union determined he was delinquent in his dues when the Company
had regularly deducted the same and he had check stubs to prove these de-
ductions, to which Gray replied, "that still don't prove anything:" Eck had
no further meetings with the Union, nor has his membership therein ever been
restored.
The Union contends Eck was suspended on December 1, 1948, because of de-
linquency in dues which occurred in the following manner.
About September 1946, the membership of the Auto-Lite Unit, according to
John Begg its chairman, adopted a "motion" to increase the regular dues from
$1.50 to $2 per month.' The purpose of the "motion" was to encourage attend-
8 The card was not returned to Eck , nor was it produced at the hearing . However,
the Union produced an identical card which was offered and received in evidence.
Neither a copy of the motion nor the minutes of the meeting at which it was adopted
were produced at the hearing.
1094 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ance at unit meetings and after the adoption thereof members present at meet-
ings were exonerated from the payment of the additional 50 cents while members
not attending were assessed and required to pay that sum to the Union. The
IT nit, in order to accurately determine the presence or absence of members at
its meetings, adopted a plan whereby each member was required to fill out an
`.attendance card" certifying that he was present at that particular meeting.
The "attendance card" plainly stated that the member must leave the card with
the unit officers upon conclusion of the meeting otherwise an assessment in the
amount of 50 cents would be levied for nonattendance.
The Respondent Union claims that on August 26, 1948, Eck was "$2.00 in
arrears" with the Union, which represented dues for that month plus an assess-
ment for failure to attend the August meeting. In respect to this arrearage, Gray
testified that Eck was delinquent in April 1948, because of his failure to pay a
"parade assessment" of $110 and an assessment of 50 cents for nonattendance at
the April meeting. Subsequently, when the Union received Eck's regular monthly
dues from the Company covering June 1948, it applied this amount to the pay-
ment of the assessments leaving, the Union reasoned, his June dues unpaid and
thereafter future dues deductions were credited by it to those allegedly owing
for the preceding month. Thus, under this formula, Eck on December 1, 1948,
was indebted to the Union in the sum of $3.50, based upon the $2 August arrearage
and meeting assessments for September, October, and November. Both the con-
stitution of the International Union and the bylaws of the Respondent Union
provide for the automatic suspension of any member who becomes 2 months in
arrears in the payment of his dues or assessments. Accordingly, the Respond-
ent Union suspended Eck from membership on December 1, 1948.
The Company admits that, pursuant to its agreement with the Union, it dis-
charged Eck as of January 28, at the insistence of the Union for alleged delin-
quency in union dues. Although the Company concedes that it had continuously
deducted Eck's monthly dues for the period of September 1947 to January 1949,
and paid over the same to the Union, it nevertheless accepted without question
the Union's certification that Eck was delinquent in his dues because this matter
was purely an internal union affair and of no concern to the Company.
C. Conclusions
The issues as framed by the pleadings and litigated at the hearing are : (1) did
the Union terminate Eck's membership therein and cause the Company to dis-
charge him for reasons other than Eck's failure to tender periodic dues uniformly
required as a condition of retaining union membership; and (2) did the Com-
pany in discharging Eck at the Union's request have reasonable grounds for
believing that Eck's membership in the Union had been terminated for reasons
other than his failure to tender periodic dues uniformly required as a condition
of retaining his membership. Each of these questions must be answered in the
affirmative.
On August 3, 1948, the effective date of the agreement, Eck was a member of
the Union in good standing and the Union so "certified" on January 12, 1949,
when it demanded his discharge. Further, the Company for almost 1 year prior
to the effective date of the agreement had regularly deducted Eck's monthly
10 This assessment was levied because of Eck's nonattendance at the Labor Day parade
of 1947 ; through an "oversight" on the part of the Union it was not collected at the time.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1095
dues from his earnings and remitted the same to the Union in accordance with
Eck's written check-off authorization. In support of its contention that Eck's
suspension from membership on December 1, 1948, was caused by his failure to
pay periodic dues rather than fines, the Union adduced evidence to the effect
that the Unit at a meeting held in September 1946, voted to increase its regular
dues from $1.50 to $2 per month. The announced object of this action was to
encourage attendance at meetings by exonerating members attending from pay-
ment of the 50-cent increase while requiring absentee members to pay this
amount to the Union. At no time did the Union or the Unit notify the Company
that union dues had been increased, nor did the Union ever collect monthly dues,
as such, in the increased amount. Again, although Eck signed his check-off
authorization about 1 year after the action taken by the Unit, the authorization
plainly shows the regular dues to be $1.50 and not $2 per month. Finally, the
constitution of the International Union fixes regular union dues at $1.50 per
month. The constitution further provides that "Local Unions may levy fines for
non-attendance at membership meetings and for other reasons ..." not to
exceed $1. Since the action of the Unit in increasing dues had for its purpose
the encouragement of attendance at meetings, the increase as thus adopted and
applied served as a reward for members attending meetings and a punishment
directed against absentee members. Upon all the evidence it is, therefore, found
that the regular monthly union dues were not increased from $1.50 in September
3.946, but that on and after that date the Union levied a fine or an assessment
against individual members who failed to attend meetings in the amount of 50
cents per meeting.
Concerning Eck's delinquency the Union offered evidence, principally its
financial records, which disclosed that on December 1, 1948, Eck was indebted
to the Union to the extent of $3.50 which included assessments for failure to
attend five meetings, namely, April, August, September, October, and November
1948, as well as an additional assessment of $1 for nonattendance at the Labor
Day parade of 1947. Eck admitted he failed to attend the meetings in August,
September, and October but stated that he was present at the November meeting.
In view of Eck's direct testimony that he was present at the November meeting
and the fact that the Union's contrary assertion is based merely upon its financial
records, which are neither clear nor persuasive, it is found that Eck was present
at the November meeting. Eck did not testify concerning the fines or assess-
ments levied for nonattendance at the April 1948 meeting or the 1947 Labor Day
parade but this is immaterial because they antedated the execution of the agree-
ment." Moreover, the Union advised the Company on January 12, that Eck
was a member of the Union in good standing on August 3, 1948. The remaining
question to be determined is, whether fines or assessments are "periodic dues"
as that term is used in the Act.
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act declares it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization in
regard to the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment, except that he may discharge an employee under a union-security agree-
inent provided such agreement is executed in conformity with the provisions of
"The first proviso in Section 8 ( a) (3) permits the making of an agreement "to require
as a condition of employment membership [ in the union ] on and after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement which-
ever is the later ." This language indicates that union -shop agreements operate only
prospectively.
1096 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 8 (a) (3), the second proviso (herein called the proviso) therein stating
as follows : ,
That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for non-membership in a labor organization-if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other
than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initia-
tion fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining mem-
bership : 12
Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act similarly prohibits such discrimination on the
part of labor organizations unless the discrimination is protected for the same
reasons as stated in the foregoing proviso.
The legislative history of the pertinent provisions of Section 8 (a) (3) and
Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act seems to warrant fully the conclusion that Congress
intended to include only "periodic dues and initiation fees" and to exclude
assessments.
Thus, the original House Bill as passed by the House declared it unlawful
for an employer :
to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization by assisting any labor organization (i) through deducting from
the wages of any employees dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions
payable by the employee.13
The original Senate Bill as reported out of Committee provided that an
employer may not lawfully discharge an employee :
If he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied
or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender
dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership,14
When the Senate received the House Bill it struck out the entire House Bill
and substituted the Senate Bill, thereby deleting the words fees, assessments,
and other contributions from the Act, and substituting the words dues and
initiation fees. The bill then went to conference and there the word "Periodic"
was added to the language of the Senate Bill, and with that change the Section
was enacted into law. In the light of the legislative history, as appears below,
it seems that the term "periodic dues" clearly limits the liability of an employee
to the payment only of regular dues as required by a particular union of its
entire membership, which payments accrue at definite, stated intervals. The
phrase "periodical payments" is defined in Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawles,
Third Edition) as "payments occurring periodically, that is, at fixed times
from some antecedent obligation and not at variable periods at the discretion
of individuals."
That Congress was not merely substituting words without intended change of
meaning and substance is plainly indicated by the following Congressional
comment :
Senator Taft (April 25, 1947, re S. 1126)
The bill further provides that if the man is admitted to the union, and
is subsequently fired from the union for any reason other than non-payment
12 All underscoring added unless otherwise indicated.
13 H. R. 3020; Section 8 (a) (2) (c) (i).
14 S. 1126.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1097
of dues, then the employer shall not be required to fire that man. Under
this bill the employer would not have to fire that man unless he did not pay
his union dues."
Senator Ellender (April 28, 1947, re S. 1126)
One of the cases was that of Cecil B. De Mille, who, as we. know is a
producer of motion pictures on the west coast. He is also a radio com-
mentator. Mr. De Mille was forced to join a union in order to be able
to appear on the radio. Soon after he joined the union he was asked to
make a contribution to a cause in which he did not believe.
He refused to make such a contribution, then what happened? The
union kicked him out; it said, "We do not want you as a member any more."
Up to this moment, Mr. President, Mr. De Mille has not been able to make
any further broadcasts on the radio, simply because he violated the rules
of the union to which he belonged, now here was a man called upon to
put up a contribution to fight a cause in which he did not believe and
because he refused to pay the assessment made on him he was kicked around
and he is now unable to pursue his work. Such a situation is intolerable
and must be corrected. The pending measure-corrects such an evil.16
Senator Ball (re S. 1126)
The union shop, under which employees must join the union within 30
days, and maintenance-of-membership clauses are left valid, but can be
bargained for only after approved in a secret election by a majority of all
the employees affected. Even then, no employee can be fired by an em-
ployer if he is denied membership in or expelled from a union for any
reasons other than non-payment of regular dues and. initiation fees."
The Senate Report lB upon its bill (S. 1126), after citing examples of abuses
affecting the rights of minority members of unions under closed-shop agreements,
stated :
If trade-unions were purely fraternal or social organizations, such in-
stances would not be a matter of congressional concern, but since membership
in such organizations in many trades or callings is essential to earning a
living, Congress cannot ignore the existence of such power.
Under the amendments which the committee recommends, employers
would still be permitted to enter into agreements requiring all the employees
in a given bargaining unit to become members 30 days after being hired
if a majority of such employees have shown that their intent by secret
ballot to confer authority to negotiate such an agreement upon their repre-
sentatives. But in order to safeguard the rights of employees after such
a contract has been entered into, three additional safeguards are provided:
(1) Membership in the union must be available to an employee on the same
terms and conditions generally applicable to other members; (2) expulsion
from a union cannot be a ground of compulsory discharge if the worker
is not delinquent in paying his initiation fee or dues ...
15 93 Cong. Rec. 3952.
Ie 93 Cong . Rec. 4258 . See also statement of Senator Kern relating to the discharge
of two veterans in St. Louis because of their refusal to buy chances in a lottery conducted
by the union. 93 Cong. Rec. A 2378.
17 93 Cong. Rec. A 2378.
Is Senate Report 105, 80th Cong., p. 7.
"The third safeguard relates to the right to change the bargaining representative.
This provision was eliminated by the Joint Conference Committee.
929979-51-vol. 92-71
1098 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It seems to us that these amendments remedy the most serious abuses of
compulsory union membership and yet give employers and unions who
feel that such agreements promote stability by eliminating "free riders" the
right to continue such arrangements.
In view of the exhaustive legislative history of this Section of the Act it
seems reasonable to assume that had Congress intended to include "fines" and
"assessments" in the proviso it would have specifically done so. Again, in addi-
tion to the omission of these words from the proviso there is a complete absence
of references to "fines" in the Congressional debates and reports, which seemingly
include all phases of the subject then under consideration. It is therefore the
conclusion of the undersigned that the term "periodic dues" as used in Section
8 (a) (3) and Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act was not intended to include "fines"
or "assessments."
It is further concluded by the undersigned that the provisions of Section 302
of the Act, restrictions on payments to employee representatives, do not materially
relate to or bear upon the matters under consideration. Section 302 prohibits the
payment to, or receipt by, an employee representative of any money or thing
of value, where payment is made by the employer. Violations of this Section are
subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, the offender is liable to
criminal penalties. Section 302 further provides :
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable-
(4) with respect to money deducted from the wages of employees in pay-
ment of membership dues in a labor organization.
Thus, Section 302 directed only against payments to employees representatives
is criminal in nature, and creates no unfair labor practices, whereas the purpose
of Section 8 (a) (3) and Section 8 (b) (2) is to protect the employees' job, each
is remedial in character and each proscribes unfair labor practices. Conse-
quently, the interpretation placed upon the term "periodic dues" as used in
Section 8 (a) (3) and Section 8 (b) (2) would not be controlling in respect to
"membership dues" as used in Section 302, or vice versa, because of the funda-
mental differences in the Sections.
Finally, the Union contends that since its letter of January 26, merely advises
the Company of the "true status" of Eck's membership in the Union and requests
his dismissal under the agreement, such statements, unaccompanied by any
threat of reprisal, force, or promise of benefits, are expressions of opinions and
views and are therefore protected under Section 8 (c) of the Act2° Of course,
the purpose of this provision is to protect the right of both employers and labor
organizations to free speech. However, the right is limited to. the expression of
views, arguments or opinions relating to labor matters unaccompanied by
threats, or force, or promise of benefits. The Union in demanding that the
Company discharge Eck pursuant to its agreement obviously was not- merely
expressing its views, arguments, or opinions that Eck was not a member of the
Union in good standing but was in fact directing and ordering the Company to
dismiss Eck for the stated reason that he was no longer a member thereof
within the meaning of the maintenance-of-membership provision in the agree-
ment. To excuse this conduct by reading Section 8 (c) into Section 8 (b) (2)
20 Section 8 (c) provides: The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1099
would be to completely destroy the effectiveness of the latter provision and to
condone acts which Congress has expressly prohibited . In considering the effect
of Section 8 (c) upon Section 8 (b) (4) (A), the Board in Wadsworth Building
Company, Inc., and Klassen & Hodgson , Inc. (81 NLRB 802, 814-815 ), held that
peaceful picketing as a means of inducement and encouragement in furtherance
of an unlawful object was not protected because to apply Section 8 (c) to Section
8 (b) (4) (A) would lead to "absurd or futile results" ; further it was the duty
of the Board to enforce the public policy embodied in the Act and to follow the
"purpose [of. Section 8 (b) (4) (A)] rather than the literal words [of Section
8 (c) ]." (See also , International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N. L.
R. B., 181 F. 2d 34, February 24, 1950, C. A. 2.) Again, the Board, in the Inter-
national Typographical Union case ( 86 NLRB 951 ), held that intraunion publi-
cations stating the position of the union and its agents with respect to collective
bargaining policy, which policy was actually followed and enforced in collective
bargaining negotiations , were not expressions of views, arguments , or opinions,
but were in the nature of admissions , directions , instructions or other verbal
acts and properly admissible in evidence. But any serious doubt concerning the
intention of Congress to restrict the purpose and scope of Section 8 (b) (2)
through the application of Section 8 (c) is clearly removed upon examination
of the legislative history of that provision. The original bill as passed by the
Senate ( S. 1126 ) declared , in Section 8 (b) (2), it an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization "to persuade or attempt to persuade" an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee , except under specified conditions . When the bill
went to joint conference, the House conferees objected on the ground that the
language contained therein "seemed inconsistent with the provision guarantee-
ing all parties freedom of expression" and accordingly the conferees "clarified
this language so that it now reads 'to cause or attempt to cause' " an employer
to thus discriminate against an employee, in order to conform with Section 8
(e)2' The Union's demand therefore that the Company discharge Eck, as set
forth in its letters of January 12 and January 26, clearly bears upon the issue
of whether the Union unlawfully caused or attempted to cause the Company
to discriminate against Eck , hence the letters, to the receipt of which the Re-
spondents interposed no objection , were properly received in evidence and must
be considered in resolving the issue thus presented.
The Company attempts to justify its discharge of Eck upon the grounds that
it relied upon the Union "certification " that Eck was no longer a member in
good standing. The Company further argues that it could not inquire into the
correctness of this certification because any inquiry would necessitate delving
into the internal affairs of the Union and such conduct is prohibited by Section
8 (a) (2) of the Act. Under Section 8 (a) (2), as under the original Act, it
is declared an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or to con-
tribute financial or other support to it. Neither the provisions of the Act nor
the decisions of the Board warrant the conclusion urged by the Company. More-
over, if an employer is permitted to discharge an employee upon the bare as-
sertion by a labor organization that an employee is not a member in good standing
in accordance with the terms of a valid union-security agreement then the ad-
ministration and enforcement of Section 8 (a) (3) is frustrated . To hold other-
wise would be to place in the hands of the employer and the labor organization
a convenient device whereby either or both could remove an individual from his
2193•Cong. Rec. p. 6600 ( June 5, 1947).
1100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
job with impunity ; this is the precise conduct Congress intended to eliminate
in enacting the proviso in Section 8 (a) (3).
Under the checkoff authorization Eck's dues had been paid for all periods
subsequent to August 3, 1948, the effective date of the agreement and that fact
was well known to the Company who made the checkoff and remitted the dues
to the Union. It is therefore obvious that there was, to the knowledge of the
Company and the Union, no period covered by the agreement for which Eck had
failed to pay periodic dues uniformly required as a condition of retaining mem-
bership in the Union.
Under the foregoing circumstances and upon the entire record, it is con-
cluded and found that the Respondent Company discharged Eck on January
28, 1949, because of his suspension from membership in good standing by the
Union. Since the Company had reasonable grounds for believing Eck's member-
ship in the Union had been terminated for reasons other than his failure to
tender periodic dues, uniformly required as a condition of retaining membership
in the Union, it is found that the Respondent Company discriminated in regard
to hire or tenure of employment to encourage membership in the Union in viola-
tion of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, and thereby also interfered with, restrained,
and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7,
in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
It is further found that the Respondent Union suspended Eck from membership
in good standing because of Eck's failure to pay fines or assessments for non-
attendance at the meetings of August, September, and October 1948, and demanded
that the Respondent Company discharge Eck for that reason. As the Respondent
Company violated Aection 8 (a) (3) in making the discharge which the Respond-
ent Union demanded, it is found that the Respondent Union caused the Com-
pany to discriminate against Eck, and thereby violated Section 8 (b) (2) of the
Act.
It is further found that by causing the Respondent Company discriminatorily
to discharge Eck for reasons other than failure to tender periodic dues, the
Respondent Union restrained and coerced Eck in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 and thereby violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
Union Starch and Refining Company, 87 NLRB 779.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent as set forth in Section III above, occurring
in connection with the operations of the Respondent Company set forth in Sec-
tion I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burden-
ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents, and each of them, have engaged in unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that they cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent Company on January 28, 1949, dis-
criminated against Melvin Eck in regard to hire and tenure of employment to
encourage membership in the Respondent Union, and thereby interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7, and that the Respondent Union committed an unfair labor practice by
causing the Respondent Company so to discriminate thereby 91gd 11QgtFg1[1iHg i.nd
coercing Eck in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
THE ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE COMPANY 1101
It is therefore recommended that the Respondent Company offer to Eck
immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent
position'22 without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges.
As it has been found that both the Respondent Company and the Respondent
Union are responsible for the discrimination suffered by Eck, it will be recom-
mended that they jointly and severally make Eck whole for any loss of pay he
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him by payment to
him of a sum of money equal to the amount that he normally would have earned
as wages from January 28, 1949, the date of the Respondent Company's dis-
crimination, to the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement less his net
earnings during that period.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case the undersigned makes the following :
CoNCLusIoNs of LAW
1. The Electric Auto-Lite Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent Union, Local 12, International Union, United Automobile,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Melvin
Eck, thereby encouraging membership in the Respondent Union, the Respondent
Company, The Electric Auto-Lite Company, has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Company has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
5. By causing the Respondent Company to discriminate. against Melvin Eck
in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, the Respondent Union has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (b) (2) of the Act.
6. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Union has engaged and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
22 In accordance with the Board 's consistent interpretation of that term , The Chase
National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB 827.